venerdì 24 agosto 2018

HL Fallacies physicists fall for Edward Feser

Fallacies physicists fall for
Edward Feser
Citation (APA): Feser, E. (2018). Fallacies physicists fall for [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com

Parte introduttiva
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 2
Fallacies physicists fall for By Edward Feser
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 8
Hilary Putnam notes that “mathematically presented quantum-mechanical theories do not wear their ontologies on their sleeve… the mathematics does not transparently tell us what the theory is about.
Nota - Posizione 9
SCIENZA E ONTOLOGIA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 11
“Why bother imposing an ‘ontology’ on quantum mechanics at all?...
Nota - Posizione 11
LA REAZIONE DI MOLTI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 11
uantum mechanics has a precise mathematical language
Nota - Posizione 11
SUFFICIENTE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 12
we know how to use that language to make predictions
Nota - Posizione 13
Cccccccc
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 15
return to the instrumentalism of the 1920s.
Nota - Posizione 15
DI FATTO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 17
in other contexts they are, I have observed, quite happy to talk about the same theories as descriptions of reality
Nota - Posizione 18
CHI PARLA COME SOPRA SI CONTRADDICE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 19
The metaphysical implications of relativity theory, or indeed of any theory in physics,
Nota - Posizione 20
NN LIMITATO A QM
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 27
the same people will usually insist on a realist understanding of scientific theories
Nota - Posizione 28
POSITIVISMO STRUMENTALISMO E ALTRI ANTI REALISMI....CONTRADDIZIONE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 30
If you insist that nothing worthwhile can be said about any matter that is not susceptible of experimental testing, then you have indeed ruled out of bounds philosophical questions like the ones just referred to. But you have also thereby ruled out a realist interpretation of theoretical entities, because realism is not susceptible of experimental testing.
Nota - Posizione 31
SINTESI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 37
even instrumentalism itself is a philosophical thesis
Nota - Posizione 37
ALTRO PROBLEMA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 38
views like instrumentalism cannot be settled experimentally
Nota - Posizione 38
E POI....
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 39
Scientism is simply not a coherent position.
Nota - Posizione 39
CONCLUSIONE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 41
if you think that these commitments are rationally justifiable ones– and of course, anyone beholden to scientism thinks his view is paradigmatically rational– then you are implicitly admitting that there can be such a thing as a rationally justifiable thesis which is not a scientific thesis. Which is, of course, what scientism denies.
Nota - Posizione 43
LA CONTRADDIZIINE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 44
So why is it so common?
Nota - Posizione 44
PERPLESSITÀ
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 46
because it is so common and so simple.
Nota - Posizione 46
PRIMA SPIEGA...CONTAGIO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 50
Paradoxically, the very obviousness and prevalence of the fallacy keeps them from seeing it.
Nota - Posizione 51
IL PARADOSSO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 52
Then there is the element of pride. You have to be smart to do natural science.
Nota - Posizione 52
SECONDO ELEMENTO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 55
You are convinced that philosophers and other non-scientists have nothing of interest to say.
Nota - Posizione 56
QUINDI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 58
“Some religious nut is going to catch me out on a blatant fallacy? No way in hell! I refuse to believe it!”
Nota - Posizione 59
TIPICA REAZIONE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 60
third factor is that, though the fallacy is pretty simple, you have to have at least a rudimentary understanding of certain philosophical concepts– realism, instrumentalism, self-contradiction,
Nota - Posizione 61
TERZO ELEMENTO...L'ELEMENTO INCOMPEYTENZA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 68
defenders of scientism will, in response to the claim that extra-scientific philosophical commitments are unavoidable,
Nota - Posizione 69
UN ESEMPIO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 76
there is a special kind of bias to which those who detect bias in others are prone.
Nota - Posizione 76
IL BIAS BIAS DI PINKER
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 77
when you are keen to ferret out biases in others, you are often blind to the biases that influence you as you do so.
Nota - Posizione 78
DEF
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 80
paradox of rationality is that expertise, brainpower, and conscious reasoning do not, by themselves, guarantee that thinkers will approach the truth. On the contrary, they can be weapons for ever-more-ingenious rationalization.
Nota - Posizione 81
PARADOSSO DELLA RAZIONALITÀ
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 82
“the major enemy of reason in the public sphere today… is not ignorance, innumeracy, or cognitive biases, but politicization”
Nota - Posizione 83
EFFETTO COLLATERALE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 85
These factors account for why defenders of scientism are often so dogmatic
Nota - Posizione 86
LA POLITICIZZAZIONE SPIEGA MOLTO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 88
Scientism has become a political cause,
Nota - Posizione 88
PURTROPPO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 93
it cannot be correct to say that we can have no rationally justifiable belief in what cannot be experimentally tested. This is most obvious in the case of mathematics.
Nota - Posizione 94
ALTRA CONTRADDIZIONE DEL POSITIVISMO...IL PROBLEMA CON LA MATEMATICA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 97
defenders of scientism are often willing to expand their conception of what counts as “science” to include mathematics.
Nota - Posizione 98
AL PUNTO CHE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 100
there are rational forms of discourse that don’t involve empirical testability.
Nota - Posizione 100
GLI STESSI POSITIVISTI AMMETTONO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 101
the thesis that empirical science and mathematics exhaust the genuine forms of knowledge is not itself a proposition of either empirical science or mathematics.
Nota - Posizione 102
DOPODICHÈ RIPARTE LA SECONDA PROP.
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 109
consider the proposition that change occurs. We know this is true from experience. But that does not mean that it is empirically testable
Nota - Posizione 110
CI SONO POI GLIJ A PRIORI SINTETCI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 113
The thesis that change occurs is, accordingly, not falsifiable or empirically testable. And yet we know it from experience,
Nota - Posizione 114
Cccccccc
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 116
Which is precisely what scientism denies.
Nota - Posizione 116
Cccccccc
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 117
they conflate empirical with experimentally testable.
Nota - Posizione 117
POSITIVISMO...NOZIONE RISTRETTA DI ESPERIENZA...LIMITATA AI SENSI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 118
the proposition that change occurs is empirical in the sense that we know it via experience, but it is not experimentally testable or falsifiable.
Nota - Posizione 119
ESEMPIO