2 Relative Deprivation in the Islamic World + FACE

TERRORISTI CON LE PEZZE AL CULO

Non propriamente dei frustrati...

Abbud Al-Zumur, coinvolto nell'assassinio del presidente egiziano Sadat, nacque in una delle famiglie più ricche e importanti del Governatorato di Giza e fu colonnello dell'intelligence militare, posizione alquanto prestigiosa.

Osama bin Laden, plurilaureato in occidente, era il rampollo di una delle famiglie più ricche dell'Arabia Saudita.

Ayman Al-Zawahiri, successore di bin Laden, proviene da una famiglia di accademici dell'alta borghesia.

Sami Al-Arian, che si dichiarò colpevole in un tribunale americano nel 2006 per aver fornito sostegno alla Jihad islamica palestinese, era professore ordinario di ingegneria informatica presso la University of South Florida.

Azhari Husin, ingegnere e responsabile della cantieristica di Jemaah Islamiyah nel sud-est asiatico, ha conseguito un dottorato presso l'Università di Reading e ha lavorato come docente presso l'Università tecnologica della Malesia.

Assem Ham-moud, un libanese coinvolto nel complotto del 2006 per far saltare in aria i tunnel della metro di New York, ha insegnato economia all'università internazionale libanese.

Anwar al-Awlaki, cittadino americano di origini yemenite che divenne predicatore di jihad e fu ucciso in Yemen nell'ottobre 2011 da un drone statunitense, ricevette una laurea in ingegneria civile presso la Colorado State University nel 1994; era figlio di Nasser al-Awlaki, ministro dell'agricoltura, presidente dell'Università di Sana’a e parente dell'ex primo ministro dello Yemen, Ali Mohammed Mujur. Invece di diventare un magnate degli affari o un funzionario di regime in Yemen, ha scelto di diventato un mentore jihadista.

Abdulmutallab, figlio di un ricco e ben connesso banchiere nigeriano che ricopriva anche posizioni politiche, venne nel Regno Unito per conseguire una laurea in ingegneria meccanica presso l'University College di Londra. Mentre frequentava l'università viveva in un appartamento del valore di 4 milioni di dollari.

Faisal Shahzad, che ha conseguito una laurea in informatica e ingegneria, è il figlio di un alto ufficiale dell'aeronautica pakistana; sebbene non fosse ricchissimo, era comunque un figlio del privilegio.

Samar Alami e Jawad Botmeh, due ingegneri responsabili dell'attentato del 1994 all'ambasciata israeliana a Londra, sono figli di un banchiere e di un facoltoso uomo d'affari, rispettivamente; nessuno di loro ha mai subito privazioni materiali, questo è poco ma sicuro.

Altri numerosi esempi si trovano nel libro.
#Amazon

A groundbreaking investigation into why so many Islamic radicals are engineersThe violent actions of a few extremists can alter the course of history, yet there persists a yawning gap between the potential impact of these individuals and what we understand about them. In Engineers of Jihad, Diego...

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Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education

A groundbreaking investigation into why so many Islamic radicals are engineersThe violent actions of a few extremists can alter the course of history, yet there persists a yawning gap between the potential impact of these individuals and what we understand about them. In Engineers of Jihad, Diego...

2 Relative Deprivation in the Islamic World
Note:2@@@@@@@@@@@@@ saggiata l ipotesi della frustrazione. Spiega poco. Non basta. Occorres altro. Troppi privilegiati. Troppe xsone con buone prospettive altrove.

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many Muslim countries have suffered development crises and have failed to create decent jobs for university graduates.
Note:ISTRUITI: FUTURO PRECARIO

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We might speculate that political rebellions grow out of the frustrated expectations of the educated.
Note:IPOTESI FRUSTRAZ

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If acquiring a degree in higher education is a reflection of high hopes and ambition, does thwarted ambition produce militants among university graduates?
Note:ALTE ASPETTATIVE ALTE FRISYRAZ

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FRUSTRATED AMBITIONS AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
Note:Ttttttttt

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venerable tradition—a
Note:L ipotesi

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back to Aristotle and Tocqueville.

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The theory is not about absolute deprivation or poverty as such, factors that are not necessarily linked to militancy (Krueger 2007).
Note:Tipo l invidia

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(Berman et al. 2011; Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; Salert 1976; Finkel and Rule 1986; Piazza 2006).
Note:Ma L EVIDENZA È PRECARIA

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The process might not be limited to individual economic failure but could also involve “group relative deprivation,” a concept originally proposed by sociologist W. G. Runciman as “fraternal deprivation” (1966). This occurs when an individual feels that the group he belongs to is collectively deprived
Note:RETTIFICA DEL CONCETTO: FRUSTRAZIONE DI GRUPPO. NON INDIVIDUALE. Sono contagiato dalla rabbia del fratello

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Unfulfilled Promises: Egypt
Note:t

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In our reading of relative deprivation, individuals with above-average skills, who have been selected for their university studies on merit, are particularly susceptible to frustration and a sense of injustice when they find their professional future hampered by a lack of opportunities.
Note:PIÙ DOTATI PIÙ ESPOSTI

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Egypt, where our puzzle first emerged, perfectly epitomizes the story of militancy rooted in frustrated ambitions. During Nasser’s “socialist years,” from 1960 to 1966, the Egyptian university system was opened to lower-class students and enrollment greatly increased. Nasser offered state employment to all new graduates (Longuenesse 2007: 41).
Note:NASSER E L UNIVERSITÀ APERTA A TUTTI

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CON LAVORO STATALE X TUTTI

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When development sputtered and Egypt lost the 1967 war against Israel, students, who had been socialized and mobilized into Nasser’s ideology like no other group, were the most disillusioned. Protests occurred regularly, first dominated by leftist slogans but turning to Islamic rhetoric in the 1970s.
Note:CRISI E SCONFOTTA CON OSRAELE. LE VITTIME E LE RETORICHE: ISLAM E SINISTRA

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Ibrahim, in his early study of 1970s radicals, noted that most activists in his sample ranked “decidedly high in both motivation and achievement.”
Note:I RADICALI LAUREATI

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Many graduates preferred joblessness even to relatively well-paying menial jobs, and for numerous young Egyptians marriage became unaffordable. Making a virtue out of necessity, many graduates tried to restore their dignity by adopting an austere Islamic morality to compensate for their material deprivation (Hoffman 1995: 208).
Note:ORGOGLIO LAUREA: SI RIFIUTA IL LAVORO MODESTO

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The gradual marginalization of the middle classes, previously the bedrock of regime support, became increasingly obvious. The dearth of opportunities was made all the more grating by the corrupt allocation of jobs by the state, whereby elites channeled the country’s few well-paying jobs to their own offspring.
Note:CLASSE MEDIA ALL ANGOLO

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The Islamist opposition was able to provide an organized focus to this discontent, as documented by Wickham in her seminal study of grassroots Islamist mobilization.
Note:GLI ISLAMISTI CAPITALIZZARONO IL MALCONTENTO

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Muslim Brothers found strong support among lower-middle and middle-class students.
Note:FLLI MUS

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in the late 1990s Mohamed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers, wanted to return from his technical studies in Germany to work in Cairo but faced dire job prospects as his family lacked the “right connections.”3 When he left Germany for good in summer 2000, it was not to return to his home country but to enroll in a flight school in Florida on orders of Osama bin Laden.
Note:IL CASO ATTA È ESEMPLARE

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BEYOND EGYPT
Note:t

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Willis reports that the economic crisis in Algeria pushed young men, particularly students, toward Islamist movements in the 1980s and 1990s (1996: 85, 109).
Note:ALGERIA

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According to Sageman—who briefly mentions relative deprivation as a necessary condition of radicalization—many Al-Qaida members, although academically gifted, did not have full-time jobs (2004: 92, 95).
Note:I MOLTI TALENTI IN AL QUAEDA

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Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010) show that high levels of unemployment enable militant Palestinian organizations to recruit more educated and experienced suicide terrorists, who in turn attack more important Israeli targets.
Note:AI LAUREATI PALESTINESI

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Meyersson Milgrom and Jasso (2004) demonstrate that higher levels of education are associated with lower support for the Roadmap to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while higher levels of income among Palestinians are associated with greater support.
Note:PIÙ ISTRUITI PIÚ OPPOSTI ALLA ROAD MAP

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Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen
Note:ACASI SIMILI ALL EGITTO

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While Middle Eastern growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s had been impressive, the whole region fell behind in terms of per capita income compared to other developing economies from the mid-1970s on (see figure 2.2), exactly the time when Islamist opposition and, in most cases, militancy emerged as a major phenomenon across the region (Yazbeck Haddad, Esposito, and Voll 1991; Hunter 1988; Kepel 2002; Roy 1994).
Note:CONTA LA CRESCITA. NN LA XRICCHEZZA

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Elisabeth Longuenesse—who has written the foremost study of the social and educational history of the professional middle class in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria—provides a rich description of the emerging “discrepancy between expectations and possibilities” for graduates in the 1970s and 1980s
Note:UNA FONTE DI MERITO QUANDO SI PARLA DI FFRISTR

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there are some hard data that illustrate the limited mobility chances of average graduates in 1980s and 1990s Arab countries: private returns to higher education—the amount of extra earnings per year of education—in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen were considerably lower than they were in Latin American and Asian countries (see figure 2.3).
Note:MOBILITÀ SOCIALE BASSA

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In Palestine, the size of the educated labor force increased dramatically from 1981 to 1987 while income differences between secondary school and university graduates fell by half, meaning that a university degree paid off progressively less (Angrist 1995).
Note:COLLEGE PREMIUM IN PALESTINA

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If mobility closure for the highly educated explains their overrepresentation among militants, then Islamic countries with more successful economies should have fewer radicalized graduates than Arab countries.
Note:E LE NAZ CHE CRESCONO? HANNOENO UNIVERS TRA I TERORISTI

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Singapore, Indonesia, and India have not undergone economic crises as pronounced and protracted as those in the Arab world, and their output of university graduates is also more aligned with their level of development.6 These are the same countries that have the lowest presence of graduates in our sample (22.5 percent). The share is the lowest in Singapore (6 of 31 cases),7 which is the most successful economically, despite much higher levels of education in the population at large.
Note:I TRE PAESI SOTTO LA LENTE

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L IPOT CONFERMATA

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Comparative international research has shown that a larger share of adults who have attained some level of higher education makes democratic revolutions more likely (Kurzman and Leahey 2004).
Note:REGOLA GENERALE: SONO LE CLASSI MEDIE A FARE LA RIV

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ARE ENGINEERS ESPECIALLY DEPRIVED?
Note:t

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why should engineers stand out

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In the MENA region, a degree in engineering carries more than mere technical status (Cornand 1990; Wickham 2002), and many students choose it as much because of their interest in the subject as because of the prestige it confers (Hanafi 1990: 173).
Note:INGEGERI ANCHE X LO STATUS

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Mobility failure for these students at the top of the educational pyramid must be all the more galling.
Note:FRUSYRAZ PIÙ FORTE

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As early as the 1820s, Egypt’s modernizing regimes under the Muhammad Ali dynasty glorified science and industry as a means of catching up with the West (Longuenesse 2007: 174).
Note:L ING SIMBOLO DELL INSEGUOMENTO ALL OVEST

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Under the Nasserist regime in Egypt and Ba‘athist rule in Syria in the 1960s, the “hegemony of modernist scientism became total” (Longuenesse 2007: 68).
Note:c

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Among Egypt’s Nasserist technocrats, engineers had a heavier and more visible presence than any other category of graduates (Moore 1994: 9, 13,166ff.).
Note:c

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No Politics among the Engineering Aristocracy
Note:t

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Arab engineers were apolitical for most of their history, primarily focused on serving governments in the interest of technical modernity (Longuenesse 2007: 60, 101). Compared to their dominant role in post-1970s Islamist militancy, they are strikingly absent from previous political movements. Early nationalist and socialist leaders and even early Islamists overwhelmingly came from other professions; many of them were lawyers and teachers.
Note:ING. DA SEMPRE SIMBOLO DI APOLITICITÀ

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Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the two founders of the secularnationalist Ba‘athist movement in Syria, were teachers, as was Zaki al-Arsuzi, the leader of a parallel movement that joined forces with the Ba‘ath in 1947.
Note:c

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Engineers appeared later, as functionaries, not revolutionary leaders.
Note:c

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Springborg (1978) describes the political mobilization of the lawyers’, doctors’, and journalists’ syndicates from the 1950s to the 1970s but does not mention engineers.
Note:c

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Professionals were already present in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s and 1950s,13 but most of the leading Islamist activists in the 1950s and 1960s in Egypt and North Africa came from second-tier faculties like education.
Note:c

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Among early Islamists, teachers had the leading positions that engineers occupy today: the prime mover of twentieth-century Islamist organization, Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, was a teacher at Dar Al-Uloum school in Cairo,
Note:c

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c

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Isam Attar, leader of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood after 1957, was a teacher of Arabic literature. The Shabiba Islamist movement in Morocco was set up by an educational inspector in 1972, a job also held by the leader of the Moroccan justice and charity movement, Abdessalam Yassine (b. 1928, d. 2012).
Note:c

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A Turn for the Worse, and toward Radicalization
Note:t

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But as cracks in the modernization projects widened from the 1970s onward, engineers began to show up in Islamist movements—notably in the early Egyptian militant groups studied by Ibrahim but also among the peaceful Islamist opposition in Egypt (Wickham 2002: 116, 184; Moore 1994: 208). The militant “Fighting Vanguard” group that led the mass insurrection in the Syrian city of Hama in 1982 was led by a civil engineer, Adnan Uqla (who had succeeded a dentist in leading the organization).
Note:L ING FA POLITICA E IMBRACCIA I FUCILI

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It seems hardly a coincidence that previously apolitical engineers appeared on the political scene precisely when development in the Islamic world started to wane and when the status of new cohorts of graduates, who were perceived to be their nations’ technical vanguard, was progressively undermined.
Note:L INGRESSO IN POLITICA NN È UNA CASO. COINCIDE CON LA CRISI

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“In less than half a century, the [Arab] engineer went from the status of a senior civil servant to that of a rank and file technical or bureaucratic employee, becoming a hindrance to administration and public enterprises” (2007: 81).17
Note:ING: DA SCIENZIATO A BUROCRATE. SPESSO DOSOCC MASCHERATO

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The employment situation for those in the engineering field in the 1970s worsened palpably, but it still compared favorably to that of other disciplines, not least due to heightened labor demand from the Gulf. A further dramatic deterioration came with the collapse of the price of oil after 1982.
Note:ANNI OTTANTA E COLLASSO DEL PEDTROLUO

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Individual and Collective Frustrations
Note:t

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Given their vaunted status as their nations’ pioneers, Muslim engineers were likely frustrated both individually and collectively, not only because of their personal labor market failures but also because of the technological and developmental failures of their societies.
Note:FRUSYRAZ COME PROFESSIONE. FRUSTRAZ COME ARABI

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Moreover, Muslim engineers who studied in the West, itself a sign of an even greater ambition and willingness to make sacrifices, should have felt more deprived, both individually and collectively.
Note:c IL CFR DI CHI HA STUDIATO ALL ESTERO

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Mohamed Atta often bemoaned Western influence in Arab cities (Holmes 2005): According to Dittmar Machule, his thesis supervisor at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg in Germany, Atta hated skyscrapers because in the Syrian city of Aleppo, on which he wrote his doctoral dissertation, tall buildings stole the privacy of the traditional Arab homes in whose courtyards women were once able to remove their veils unseen by strangers (Rose 2004).
Note:L ODIO DI AYTA X I GRATTACIELI

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Further Tests of Relative Deprivation
Note:t

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if being an engineer indicates that one is hard-working and ambitious, and if these traits lead to particularly deep frustration when development stalls in one’s home country, then we should expect the less well equipped and ambitious to be much less represented among militant movements. This is exactly what the data presented in chapter 1 seem to show: courses of study that are associated with less prestige in the Islamic world—the arts, humanities, education—which also typically have less stringent admission requirements, are strongly underrepresented in the sample.
Note:I MENO BIZIOSI SONO PIÙ PACIFICI

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Frustrated expectations also seem to explain why teachers played a much larger role in all forms of militancy in the early years of political Islam. Before the age of mass higher education, when many towns and villages were proud to send even one young student to university, a degree in education carried some prestige and was a vehicle for upward mobility.
Note:FASE 1 I PRIMI FRUSTR SONO GLI INSEGN. POI L ISTR DI MASSA LI HA DEGRADATI RIDUCENDO LE FRUSTR DELLA CRISI

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The story for lawyers—hardly present in our sample at just 1.8 percent—matches that of teachers: in early twentieth-century Egypt a law degree was considered very prestigious (Longuenesse 2007: 56), but later it became one of the least regarded degrees (Moore 1994: 46). Lawyers were among the leaders in the early nationalist struggle (Longuenesse 2007: 57). In the 1950s, the lawyers’ syndicate still led the opposition to Nasser, playing a more active political role than either the doctors’ or engineers’ syndicate up to the 1970s (Springborg 1978: 281; Reid 1974: 46).
Note:AVVOCATI . STESSO MODELLO

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Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010) and Lee (2011) explain the presence of highly educated militants in stagnant economies in terms of opportunity costs:26 As economic opportunities dwindle, highly skilled individuals incur smaller relative costs by becoming militant.
Note:COSTO OPPORTINITÀ DELLE CONVERS TERROROSYA

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THE SAUDI EXCEPTION AGAIN
Note:y

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Saudi Arabia, a country with only 1 engineer among 10 graduates in our main sample, no engineer among 14 graduates in the Sinjar sample, and only 1 engineer among 11 graduates in Thomas Hegghammer’s sample mentioned in chapter 1. This is true even though the proportion of engineers in the Saudi population is comparable to that of other Arab states.
Note:PO HI ING NEI TERRORISTI SAUDITI

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What is special about Saudi engineers? Most obviously, they have had much better labor market chances than their peers in any of the non-Gulf MENA states: the Saudi market has been able to absorb virtually all university graduates with prestigious technical degrees.
Note:OVVIO: IN AS L ECONOMIA TIRAVA

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Job market chances for the technically educated have further improved in recent years as the government has been exerting pressure on companies to hire nationals instead of foreigners.
Note:c

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There have been signs of scarcity of engineers during the recent oil boom (Saudi Gazette, 21 May 2006, 3 December 2006; Bahrain Tribune, 21 April 2006; Arab News, 12 April 2007; Khaleej Times, 21 June 2007).
Note:c

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Compared to the other Arab cases, the Saudi contingent in our Muslim world sample appears quite unaccomplished, with lower education levels and less prestigious courses of study among those who attended university.
Note:GLI UOMINI CHE FORNISCE AS AL TERRORISMO SONO I MENO PREP

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According to official sources, the main threat in Saudi domestic militancy comes from individuals who have dropped out of education, not elites (Saudi Gazette, 4 January 2011).
Note:c

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CONCLUSIONS, AND FACTS THAT DO NOT FIT
Note:Tttttttttt La frustrazione spiega aualcosa ma poco. Vedremo come a pesare é il profilo cognitovo

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the weaker presence of graduates among extremists from countries with better labor market opportunities

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RIASSUMIAMO I FATTI CHE CORROBORANO L IPOTESI DELLA FRUSTRAZIONE COME MOLLA DELLA SVOLTA RADICALE 1

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prominent role of engineers in Islamist radicalism from the 1970s on in countries undergoing economic crises,
Note:2

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absence from Islamist movements of engineers in Saudi Arabia, a country where they retain excellent labor market chances;
Note:3

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waxing and waning of the role played by other professions, such as teachers and lawyers, in opposition movements
Note:4

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consider the doctors who, compared to engineers, are significantly less overrepresented,
Note:DOVREMMO ASPETTARCELI E NN CI SONO...GODONO DI PARI STATUS E HANNO AVUTO PARI DIFFICOLTÀ

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a surplus of doctors and, consequently, unmet expectations
Note:EFFETTO DELLA GRANDE ESPANSIONE DELL UNIVERSITÀ

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engineers’ greater dependence on the state could have made them more vulnerable to budget cuts
Note:PRIMA SPIEGAZIONE della differenza...IL DOTTORE SI RICICLA NEL PRIVATO

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Second, if engineering students came from lower social backgrounds than those in medicine did, they would have incurred greater relative costs for their education and entertained expectations of higher social advancement.
Note:SECONDA IPOTESI: L ING PARTE PIÙ DAL BASSO. LA SUA FRUSTR È PIÙ BRUCIANTE

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we have found no evidence to support it.
Note:NESSUN SUPPORTO. VEDREMO CHE A PESARE SARÀ LA MENTALITÀ LINK

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engineering was the hardest subject that attracted the most ambitious individuals
Note:Altra spiega a supporto della frustrazione

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engineering students in the 1970s had relatively privileged backgrounds;
Note:L egitto nn conferma

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more urban and privileged background relative to agronomists
Note:Altro studio contro

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engineers are strongly overrepresented in three Asian countries that did not experience economic failure
Note:Contro fd

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individuals who abandoned a potential or actual promising career. For instance, Abbud Al-Zumur,
Note:Casi molto diffusi contro l ipotesi fd

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Osama bin Laden,
Note:Altro caso

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Ayman Al-Zawahiri,
Note:Altro caso

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Sami Al-Arian,

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Azhari Husin,
Note:Seguono molti esempi

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neither of whom likely experienced material deprivation.
Note:A chiusa della lunga lista

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The genealogy of global jihadism contains a core of wealth and privilege, as well as a surfeit of engineers—facts that do not sit comfortably with the theory of relative deprivation,
Conclusione. La frustraz nn spiega tutto

Crociate e Jihad

Secondo Bernard Lewis (non proprio uno che passa per strada) c' è una bella differenza tra crociate e jihad: "Le Crociate possono essere più accuratamente considerate come una limitata, ritardate e, in ultima analisi, inefficace risposta alla Jihad... Un tentativo di riconquistare con una guerra santa quel che era andato perduto nel corso della guerra santa islamica che era stata subita... la Jihad musulmana, invece, è percepita come un’azione illimitata, come un obbligo religioso che deve continuare affinché tutto il mondo avrà adottato la fede musulmana,   sottoposta  quindi al dominio islamico… l’obiettivo della jihad è quello di portare il mondo intero sotto la legge islamica..."