Visualizzazione post con etichetta antitrust. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta antitrust. Mostra tutti i post

sabato 15 giugno 2019

PERCHE' SONO MONARCHICO

PERCHE' SONO MONARCHICO

Ok, immaginate Facebook governata democraticamente dai suoi utenti...

Devo proseguire?

lunedì 30 luglio 2018

Compulsory licensing IT robin hanson

Compulsory licensing IT robin hanson
riccardo-mariani@libero.it
Citation (APA): riccardo-mariani@libero.it. (2018). Compulsory licensing IT robin hanson [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com

Parte introduttiva
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 3
Compulsory Licensing Of Backroom IT? by Robin Hanson
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 3
We now understand one of the main reasons that many leading firms have been winning
Nota - Posizione 3
IL SEGRETO DEL SUCCESSO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 6
top managers flocking to top firms, automation creating an imbalance in productivity, merger-and-acquisition mania, lack of antitrust regulation and more.
Nota - Posizione 7
LE RAGIONI AVANZATE IN PRECEDENZA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 7
IT spending that goes into hiring developers and creating software owned and used exclusively by a firm is the key competitive advantage.
Nota - Posizione 8
LA NUOVA IPOTESI SUGGERITA DAI DATI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 10
built their own software and even their own hardware,
Nota - Posizione 11
I GRANDI PLAYER
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 11
aligning their business model with some outside developer’s idea of it.
Nota - Posizione 12
IERI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 12
When new technologies were developed in the past, they would diffuse
Nota - Posizione 13
BASTA CON LA CLASICA DIFFUSIONE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 13
productivity rose across entire industries.
Nota - Posizione 13
Cccccccc
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 14
someone is trying to copy and reproduce Google’s cloud infrastructure
Nota - Posizione 14
IMMAGINA....TROPPO COMPLICATO ANCHE COPIARE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 15
massive and inextricably linked to the engineers, workers, systems and business models built around
Nota - Posizione 15
LA NUOVA TECNOLOGIA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 15
in the past it might have been possible to license, steal or copy
Nota - Posizione 16
IERI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 16
technology can’t be separated from the systems of which it’s a part.
Nota - Posizione 17
OGGI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 17
Walmart built an elaborate logistics system around bar code scanners,
Nota - Posizione 17
ESEMPIO DI TECNO NN IN VENDITA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 19
rising industry concentration,
Nota - Posizione 20
CONSEGUENZA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 23
much must be learned through experience,
Nota - Posizione 23
ATTRAZIONE DEI MIGLIORI VERSO I MIGLIORI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 27
balance has been lost with regard to information technology… the policy challenge is to offset this trend.
Nota - Posizione 28
ANTITRUST IMPOTENTE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 29
future for both IP and antitrust policy is to facilitate the diffusion of new technical knowledge and right now the trend seems to be in the wrong direction.…
Nota - Posizione 30
WRONG DIRECTION
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 35
making good backroom software, to use internally, has become something of a natural monopoly.
Nota - Posizione 36
NEOMONOPOLIO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 37
one standard approach to regulating monopolies is to force them to sell to everyone at regulated prices.
Nota - Posizione 38
LA VIA TRADIZIONALE....FORSE È APPLICABILE ANCHE QUI?
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 49
Note that I’m not saying that it is obvious that this is a good solution. I’m just saying that this is a standard obvious policy response to consider, so someone should be looking into it. At the moment I’m not seeing other good options, aside from just accepting the increased IT-induced firm inequality and its many consequences.
Nota - Posizione 51
CONCLUSIONE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 52
it is very hard to take software written for internal use and make it available for outside use.
Nota - Posizione 53
EMERGE DAI COMMENTI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 54
what happens when leaders of different industries start to coordinate their IT with each other.
Nota - Posizione 54
INTERROGATIVO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 55
we might have single firms as big winning leaders in larger economic sectors.
Nota - Posizione 56
IL RE DELLA TERRA

The Efficiency of Free Competition (competizione vs concorrenza) Bryan Caplan

The Efficiency of Free Competition (competizione vs concorrenza)
Bryan Caplan
Citation (APA): Caplan, B. (2014). The Efficiency of Free Competition (competizione vs concorrenza) [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com

Parte introduttiva
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 2
The Efficiency of Free Competition (competizione vs concorrenza) By Bryan Caplan
Nota - Posizione 7
TRE CATEGORIE PRIMA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 7
economists
Nota - Posizione 7
SECONDA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 7
engineers
Nota - Posizione 8
TERZA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 8
entrepreneurs
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 11
no need for the external advice of economists."
Nota - Posizione 11
IMPRENDITORE > ECONOMISTA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 15
"The question for antitrust is whether there exist artificial entry barriers.
Nota - Posizione 15
ALTRA CITAZIONE
Nota - Posizione 23
perfetta vs libera condizione necessaria e sufficiente sintesi delle parti
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 23
1. Introduction
Nota - Posizione 23
Ttttttttttt
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 23
the virtues of so-called "perfect competition,"
Nota - Posizione 23
ESALTATA DALL ECON TRADIZ
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 24
huge number of tiny firms
Nota - Posizione 24
CONDIZIONE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 25
curve is perfectly horizontal,
Nota - Posizione 25
PRICE TAKERS
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 27
deny that this market structure is a necessary condition for economic efficiency.
Nota - Posizione 27
LO SCOPO DEL LAVORO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 29
forcing all markets into the Procrustean mold of perfect competition.
Nota - Posizione 29
UN ERRORE CHE DERIVA DAL CULTO DELLA CONC XFETTA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 30
sacrifice obvious economies of scale
Nota - Posizione 30
OVVIA CONSEG
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 31
Second, the exclusive focus on how unregulated markets deviate from perfect competition has led economists to neglect the anti- competitive character
Nota - Posizione 32
SECONDO...GAFFE SULLA REGOLAMENTAZIONE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 34
there are other market structures consistent with economic efficiency.
Nota - Posizione 34
COROLLARIO DELLA TESI PRINCIPALE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 35
whatever structure emerges from free (_not_ "perfect") competition tends to be optimal;
Nota - Posizione 35
MA QUALE MERCATO GARANTISCE L EFFICIENZA?
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 50
2. Why Free Competition Is Efficient
Nota - Posizione 50
Tttttttttt
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 51
Firms that have attributes that make them able servants of the consumers tend to survive,
Nota - Posizione 51
L INTUIZIONE FONDAMENTALE....PRINCIPIO CHIAVE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 57
Yet almost all economists fail to apply the same logic to factors like the size
Nota - Posizione 58
PERCHÈ NN SI APPLICA IL PRINCIPIO ALLA DIMENSIONE?
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 60
If fewness of firms leads to collusion against consumers, then that very fact means that hold-outs or new entrants have an extra incentive to spring up, making the problem less likely.
Nota - Posizione 61
COLUSIONE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 62
lack of innovation,
Nota - Posizione 62
PICCOLA IMPRESA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 65
Envision, for example, "trust-busting" the American auto industry into 1000 firms;
Nota - Posizione 66
ESPEDRIMENTO MENTALE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 70
free competition rewards productive efficiency, but doesn't it at the same time hurt allocative efficiency?
Nota - Posizione 70
DUBBIO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 71
the case is weaker than usually supposed.
Nota - Posizione 71
TESI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 73
For example, some food that tastes good is unhealthy,
Nota - Posizione 73
AL BUONO SI ACCOMPAGNA SPESSO IL MALE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 74
Free competition does not encourage unlimited tradeoffs of allocative for productive efficiency;
Nota - Posizione 75
IL MONOPOLISTA NN PUÓ ESAGERARE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 76
creates an opportunity for a smaller firm to enter
Nota - Posizione 77
RIPETO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 79
above-average rates of return always attract new entrants.
Nota - Posizione 79
Ccccccc
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 87
those who can most effectively influence the legislative process to win
Nota - Posizione 87
LA COMPETIZIONE IN REGIME DI INTERVENTISMO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 94
a license levied on new entrants
Nota - Posizione 94
ESEMPII DI LEGGE MONOPOLISTICA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 100
I think that the ideal of marginal cost pricing is mistaken,
Nota - Posizione 101
TESI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 104
average cost pricing, in contrast, is the spontaneous tendency of the market.
Nota - Posizione 104
PIÙ REALISTICO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 108
MC pricing requires comprehensive state regulation
Nota - Posizione 108
UL GUAIO DI MC....COSTO DELLA POLITICA
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 113
AC pricing lets consumers pay for fixed costs
Nota - Posizione 114
INNOVAZIONE E COSTI MEDI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 116
AC pricing ties benefits to payment;
Nota - Posizione 117
ALTRA CARATTERISTICA
Segnalibro - Posizione 135
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 136
3. Collusion and Predation as Alternatives to Efficiency
Nota - Posizione 136
Tttttttttt
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 259
4. Regulation versus Competition
Nota - Posizione 259
ttttttttt
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 294
5. The Hard Cases
Nota - Posizione 294
ttttttttt
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 295
"Productive inefficiency is hearby declared illegal.
Nota - Posizione 295
ESPERIMENTO MENTALE...PENSATE ALLA LEGGE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 298
free competition already discourages productive inefficiency,
Nota - Posizione 298
PRIMA OBIEZIONE AD UNA SIMILE LEGGE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 300
it is very difficult to correctly identify productive inefficiency,
Nota - Posizione 300
SECONDA OBIEZIONE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 307
natural monopoly regulation, merger restrictions, and prohibition against price-fixing.
Nota - Posizione 308
LEGGI QUASI SIMILI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 309
they focus on what is seen, to the detriment of what is not seen
Nota - Posizione 309
SEEN UNSEEN
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 310
natural monopoly regulation.
Nota - Posizione 310
Tttttttttt
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 311
more than one firm is inefficient. But if there is only one firm, there will be monopoly pricing, which is also inefficient.
Nota - Posizione 312
LE DUE EFFOCIENZE NN PERSRGUIBILI
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 312
government permits the monopoly to exist, but regulates
Nota - Posizione 312
SOLUZIONE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 314
when regulation prevents some problem, it crowds out the market's solution.
Nota - Posizione 315
PRIMA OBIEZ.....MODELLATA SULLA PRECEDENTE
Nota - Posizione 317
CHIAVE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 317
innovation,
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 321
Inter-industry competition also checks
Nota - Posizione 321
TUTTO È IN CONCORRENZA CON TUTTO
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 325
How do you really know that an industry requires a monopoly if you never allow competition?
Nota - Posizione 325
SECONDA OBIEZIONE....RICALCATA SULLA PRECEDENTE
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 330
Next we come to merger regulation.
Nota - Posizione 330
Tttttttttt
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 382
6. Regulation: A Public Choice Perspective
Nota - Posizione 383
tttttttt
Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 452
7. Conclusion
Nota - Posizione 452
ttttttttt

lunedì 11 giugno 2018

4 Dismembering the Octopus hl

4 Dismembering the Octopus TOWARD A RADICAL MARKET IN CORPORATE CONTROL
Note:4@@@@@@@@@@

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,576
BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity, State Street.
Note:TUTTI LE CONOSCONO...MA COSA FANNO?...QUALCOSA NELLA FINANZA

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,578
institutional investors.
Note:DI SOLITO SI USA L ESPRESSIONE

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,578
rarely discussed outside the specialized financial press,
Note:ANCHE SE SONO I PIÙ POTENTI

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Together, they control more than a fifth of the value of the US stock
Note:FATTI

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JP Morgan, United Airlines, Verizon, Google.
Note:COMPAGNIE CONTROLLATE DA....

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How can these asset managers fly so securely under the radar
Note:PERCHÈ I PIÙ POTENTI SONO ANCHE I PIÚ SCONOSC

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they are diversified and many of their investments are held somewhat passively.
Note:IPOTESI

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they own stock in a wide range of companies
Yellow highlight | Location: 2,586
Passivity means that they do not frequently buy and sell
Yellow highlight | Location: 2,586
They also often manage the assets that are technically owned by workers
Note:SONO ISTITUZ

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,587
Vanguard has been rightly praised for pioneering low-cost index funds,
Note:VANGUARD

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,588
avoid the hazards of stock-picking.
Note:FUNZIONE

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,590
institutional investors have harmed a wide range of industries, raising prices for consumers, reducing investment
Note:SONO SOGGETTI CHE INCIDONO SULL ECONOMIA

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,591
This outcome is not, as far as we know, the result of any deliberate conspiracy
Note | Location: 2,592
MA ATTENZIONE

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giving institutional investors more control over companies—but over individual companies rather than over industries.
Note:LA SOLUZIONE X RIPRISTINARE LA COMPET

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The Monopolist with a Thousand Faces
Note:Tttttttttttrr

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The word “monopoly” was coined by Aristotle
Note:M

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the state,
Note:LA PRINCIPALE FONTE DI MONOPOLII

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well-connected individuals or groups
Note:LA CATTURA

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,600
the monopolistic control of the British East India Company over the trade in tea.
Note:ORIGINE DELLA SECESSIONE USA

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local banks
Note:MONOP PICCOLE IMPRESE 900

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,602
Large enterprises or projects, like the construction of canals,
Note:NESSO ESSENZIALE CON LO STATO

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advances in technology and developments in the law eventually allowed entrepreneurs to form business enterprises large enough to undertake vast industrial projects.
Note:POI...TECNO E LEGGE

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entrepreneurs sold stocks and bonds
Note:STRUMENTO

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,606
the possibility that the businesses could restrict competition, becoming monopolies without any aid from the state
Note:PREOCCUPAZ...LA LEVA DELLA BORSA

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,608
monopolies’ incentives to impede trade and reduce production in order to raise the price
Note:ANTOINE COURNOT

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,614
primary impediment to the operation of free markets and the central cause of inequality,
Note:IL MONOPOLIO X WALRAS

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,618
about the last thirty years of the nineteenth century.
Note:ROBBER BARON...USA

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,618
transportation, energy, manufacturing, finance.
Note:IN TUTTI I SETTORI

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,619
one company would buy up others.
Note:CRWAZIONI X ACQUISIZIONE

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,620
The company then bought up its competitors.
Note:STANDARD OIL

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,622
U. S. Steel and the American Tobacco Company.
Note:ALTRI MONOP

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,623
They contributed to the economic and political inequality of the Gilded Age
Note:GILDED AGE

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novels of F. Scott Fitzgerald.
Note:IMMORTALATA

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In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act
Yellow highlight | Location: 2,627
the new law became a powerful tool in the hands of the Progressive movement
Note:USO POLITICO

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The first great Progressive president, Theodore Roosevelt,
Note:PROG ERA

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spread the fixed costs of production over many more consumers
Note:MA LA GRANDE IMPRESA NN È SOLO MALE

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lower prices,
Yellow highlight | Location: 2,633
eliminate local monopolies
Yellow highlight | Location: 2,634
It would thus never have made sense simply to abolish big business.
Note:INSOMMA

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“horizontal” concentration
Note:LA PIÙ XICOLOSA

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The Clayton Act of 1914 strengthened antitrust law
Note:SOTTO WILSON

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It took a Great Depression and the rise of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal to establish an activist antitrust
Note:IL PICCO

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,649
Regulators and courts became more aggressive
Yellow highlight | Location: 2,650
prohibiting firms from buying the stock of other firms.
Note:CLAYTON ACT

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the “Red Queen” phenomenon,
Note:Ttttttttttt

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“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.”
Note:ALICE...FATTA LA REGOLA GABBATO LU SANTO

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work-around used by business,
Yellow highlight | Location: 2,656
getting new laws
Yellow highlight | Location: 2,660
Beginning in the 1970s and accelerating from the 1980s onward, antitrust authorities lost track of the ways in which capital markets reconfigured themselves
Note:NEL RED QUEEN L AMMINISTRAZ È XDENTE

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we must examine the evolution of the corporate form
Note:CRUCIALE X CAPIRE

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Acephalous Cephalopods
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public stock corporation
Note:STANDARD FORM NEL XX SECOLO

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its stock and debt typically trade on an
Note:IL VANTAGGIO CHIAVE NELL EFFICIENZA

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Ownership became liquid:
Note:LIQUIDA

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,669
liquid public ownership also created a paradox
Note:PARADOSSO

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Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
Note:SCOPRITORE

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“ownership” of a corporation was very different from ownership of ordinary property.
Note:UN PROP MOLTO ARTICOLARE

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,676
If you own your car, you both control it
Note:POTERE E CONTROLLO

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,678
The problem goes back to voting,
Note:CONTROLLO VOTO MAGGIORANZE

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your vote is unlikely to make a difference.
Note:AZIONISTA FIAT

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you are unlikely to pay much attention to how Google is operated
Note:DISINTERESSE

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you are in no position to exercise your vote in an informed way.
Note:NO INFO

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stock ownership is beneficial only because it gives you the ability to enjoy gains
Note:OGGI

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So, who does control corporations? Usually the managers.
Note | Location: 2,682
CHI CONTROLLA?

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The separation of ownership and control gives rise to what economists call “agency costs.”
Note:COZTI D AGENZIA

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use the corporation to enrich herself
Note:X ES FISSANDO PAGHE STRAORD

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stock markets gave investors the power to obtain liquidity, but the price to be paid was loss of control
Note:RIASSUNTO

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a market for takeovers
Note:IMPORTANTE X DISCIPLINARE I MANAGER...PRIMO STRUMENTO DELLA TRADIZIONE

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current thinking focuses on corporate compensation
Note:SECONDO STRUMENTO

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CEOs should be paid with stock,
Note:Ccccccc

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Governments have tried to encourage firms to adopt “best practices”
Note:UN FILM GIÀ VISTO

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none really resolves
Note:DELUSIONE

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Effortless Capitalism
Note:Ttttttttttttt

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economists developed financial ideas that came to be known as “portfolio theory”
Note:ASSUNTO

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it makes more sense to buy shares in a diverse group of corporations mimicking the whole economy
Note:L IDEA CENTRALE...SOPPORTARE SOLO RISCHI SISTEMICI

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Investors can avoid these stock-specific risks by diversifying widely
Note:DIVERSIFIC

Yellow highlight | Location: 2,709
The so-called efficient capital markets hypothesis
Note:SECONDO STRUMENTO TEORICO

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anyone trying to pick an “undervalued” stock is deluding herself.
Note:IL MERCATO NN SI BATTE

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that there is little point in stock-picking in the first place, certainly for amateur investors.
Note:CONCLUSIONE

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ordinary investors often act irrationally.15
Note:INOLTRE...FINANZA COMPORTAMENTALE

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The cheapest way to do this is via low-cost mutual funds (especially index funds) that track broad market indices.
Note:STRUMENTO CONCRETO X SEGUIRE IL CONSIGLIO...RISPARMIARE SULLE COMMISSIONI

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mimic the index of interest (e.g., S&P 500).
Note:INDEX FUND

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Index fund operations are relatively mechanical, so their costs are low;
Note:ROBOTIZZATO

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institutional investors has risen dramatically, starting roughly in 1980 at about 4% control and leveling out around the Great Recession at 26%.
Note:CRESCITA VERTIGINOSA

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This contrasts sharply with the heft of institutional investors.
Note:MA IL PESO NELLE DECISIONI....

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they became the largest owners of the firms in which they invested.
Note:ISTITUZINALI

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institutional investors might provide the market discipline
Note:UN IDEA

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Vanguard, for example, owns more than 6% of Delta Airlines,
Note:ESEMPIKO

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when Vanguard calls, Delta’s CEO will answer the phone
Note | Location: 2,745
Ccccccccc

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antitrust enforcement aimed to prevent any single corporation from dominating an entire market.
Note:LA POLITICA TRAD ANTITRUST

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institutional investors behave much as trusts
Note:DI FATTO

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these institutions have the potential to eliminate competition
Note:NN SOLO IN UN SETTORE

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it was not until 2012 that a brilliant young economist, José Azar, put together the puzzle.
Note:AZAR

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What’s Wrong with Indexing?
Note:Ttttttttttttt

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we need to return to the basic theory of competition
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Suppose that GM and Ford are the only two automobile manufacturers in the US
Note:ES

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lowering the price
Note:COMPETIZ

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But as we have seen, most firms are not independently owned—instead, they are dominated by institutional investors who own large stakes in rival firms.
Note:COMPROPRIETÀ

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imagine first that a single shareholder owns 100% of Ford and 100% of GM.
Note:ESPERIM

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The shareholder would direct the CEOs of Ford and GM not to engage in price competition
Note:CONSEGUENZA

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act as if the two firms were merged.
Note:FUSIONE

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Real institutional investors own only about 5–10% of the companies, but the same logic holds.
Note:IN MISURA DEPOTENZIATA

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Each institutional investor wants GM and Ford to forgo price competition
Note:PRICE COMP RIDUCE I PROFITTI

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It doesn’t matter whether their stake is 100%, or 7%, or 6%,
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On the other hand, CEOs often hold concentrated shares in the firms they manage.
Note:IL BILANCIAMENTO CEO...SPESSO INSUFF

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The supporting evidence is supplied by the work of Azar, Martin Schmalz,
Note:L ISTITUZIONALE PESA ECCOME

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One study considers the airline industry.
Note:Ttttttttt

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Another study reaches a similar conclusion for the banking industry.
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if firms coordinate their political activities, they are likely to be more effective in lobbying for their interests
Note:INOLTRE...LOBBING

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The logical end point of institutional investment and diversification is the coordination of all capital
Note:LA FINE DELL IPERDIVERSIFIC

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Restoring Competition
Note:Ttttttttttttt

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ban institutional investors from diversifying their holdings within industries
Note:SOLUZIONE RADICALE

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We would also allow institutional investors to remain diversified within, as well as across, industries as long as they did not grow too large.
Note:IN ALTERNATIVA...SOGLIA 1%%%

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No investor holding shares of more than a single effective firm in an oligopoly and participating in corporate governance may own more than 1% of the market.
Note:REGOLA

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how to define “oligopoly
Note:DIFFICOLTÀ

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how to address firms that operate in multiple markets,
Note:ALTRO PROBLEMA

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GOVERNANCE
Note:Ttttttttttttt

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Institutional intermediaries compete and are rewarded on the basis of “relative performance”
Note:OGGI

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it has gained nothing relative to its own competitors in the financial services industry.
Note:SE CI SI IMPEGNA IN X....POICHÈ TUTTI POSSIEDONO QUOTE

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these incentives are greatly dampened relative to the case in which each corporation is mostly controlled by a single institutional investor.
Note:È OVVIO CHE

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concentrating the interests
Note:COMANDAMENTO

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That competition at present centers primarily on fees, services, and the illusory ability of fund managers to “pick” stocks.
Note:LA COMPETIZIONE TRA FONDI

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By creating dominant, large, concentrated shareholders, our policy might disadvantage minority shareholders,
Note:CONTROINDICAZIONI DELLA PROP

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DIVERSIFICATION
Note:TTTTTTTTTTT

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The major objection to our strategy is that it could limit the diversification available
Note:L OB PRINCIP

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if our policy did limit diversification within an industry, the size of this effect would be small.
Note:PRIMA RISP

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If savers truly want that last bit of diversification, they can simply invest some of their money in many different institutional investors.
Note:SECONDO

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index fund exception in our policy.
Note:INFINE

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never communicates with the operational firms;
Note:STOP COMUNIC...GESTIONE ROBOTICA

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Law on Our Side
Note:Tttttttttttt

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Beyond Monopolies
Note:Ttttttttt

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large firms pose a problem of monopsony as well with respect to workers.
Note:ALTRO PROB DEL MONOP

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hold down the wages of workers who could not find good jobs outside of the industry they specialized in.
Note:ESPERIENZA ANCHE NEI ROBBER BARON

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government introduced laws to support labor unions and protect workers from being overworked,
Note:LA SOLU ZIONE FINORA

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antitrust has a powerful role to play in preventing monopsony
Note:OGGI

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Luigi Zingales makes a forceful case in his 2012 book, A Capitalism for the People, that antitrust law should be used to block mergers that result in the acquisition of political influence
TO BIG TOO FAIL