PERCHE' SONO MONARCHICO

PERCHE' SONO MONARCHICO

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Compulsory licensing IT robin hanson

Compulsory licensing IT robin hanson

riccardo-mariani@libero.it

Citation (APA): riccardo-mariani@libero.it. (2018). Compulsory licensing IT robin hanson [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com

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Parte introduttiva

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 3

Compulsory Licensing Of Backroom IT? by Robin Hanson

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 3

We now understand one of the main reasons that many leading firms have been winning

Nota - Posizione 3

IL SEGRETO DEL SUCCESSO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 6

top managers flocking to top firms, automation creating an imbalance in productivity, merger-and-acquisition mania, lack of antitrust regulation and more.

Nota - Posizione 7

LE RAGIONI AVANZATE IN PRECEDENZA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 7

IT spending that goes into hiring developers and creating software owned and used exclusively by a firm is the key competitive advantage.

Nota - Posizione 8

LA NUOVA IPOTESI SUGGERITA DAI DATI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 10

built their own software and even their own hardware,

Nota - Posizione 11

I GRANDI PLAYER

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 11

aligning their business model with some outside developer’s idea of it.

Nota - Posizione 12

IERI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 12

When new technologies were developed in the past, they would diffuse

Nota - Posizione 13

BASTA CON LA CLASICA DIFFUSIONE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 13

productivity rose across entire industries.

Nota - Posizione 13

Cccccccc

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 14

someone is trying to copy and reproduce Google’s cloud infrastructure

Nota - Posizione 14

IMMAGINA....TROPPO COMPLICATO ANCHE COPIARE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 15

massive and inextricably linked to the engineers, workers, systems and business models built around

Nota - Posizione 15

LA NUOVA TECNOLOGIA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 15

in the past it might have been possible to license, steal or copy

Nota - Posizione 16

IERI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 16

technology can’t be separated from the systems of which it’s a part.

Nota - Posizione 17

OGGI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 17

Walmart built an elaborate logistics system around bar code scanners,

Nota - Posizione 17

ESEMPIO DI TECNO NN IN VENDITA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 19

rising industry concentration,

Nota - Posizione 20

CONSEGUENZA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 23

much must be learned through experience,

Nota - Posizione 23

ATTRAZIONE DEI MIGLIORI VERSO I MIGLIORI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 27

balance has been lost with regard to information technology… the policy challenge is to offset this trend.

Nota - Posizione 28

ANTITRUST IMPOTENTE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 29

future for both IP and antitrust policy is to facilitate the diffusion of new technical knowledge and right now the trend seems to be in the wrong direction.…

Nota - Posizione 30

WRONG DIRECTION

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 35

making good backroom software, to use internally, has become something of a natural monopoly.

Nota - Posizione 36

NEOMONOPOLIO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 37

one standard approach to regulating monopolies is to force them to sell to everyone at regulated prices.

Nota - Posizione 38

LA VIA TRADIZIONALE....FORSE È APPLICABILE ANCHE QUI?

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 49

Note that I’m not saying that it is obvious that this is a good solution. I’m just saying that this is a standard obvious policy response to consider, so someone should be looking into it. At the moment I’m not seeing other good options, aside from just accepting the increased IT-induced firm inequality and its many consequences.

Nota - Posizione 51

CONCLUSIONE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 52

it is very hard to take software written for internal use and make it available for outside use.

Nota - Posizione 53

EMERGE DAI COMMENTI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 54

what happens when leaders of different industries start to coordinate their IT with each other.

Nota - Posizione 54

INTERROGATIVO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 55

we might have single firms as big winning leaders in larger economic sectors.

Nota - Posizione 56

IL RE DELLA TERRA

The Efficiency of Free Competition (competizione vs concorrenza) Bryan Caplan

The Efficiency of Free Competition (competizione vs concorrenza)

Bryan Caplan

Citation (APA): Caplan, B. (2014). The Efficiency of Free Competition (competizione vs concorrenza) [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com

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Parte introduttiva

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 2

The Efficiency of Free Competition (competizione vs concorrenza) By Bryan Caplan

Nota - Posizione 7

TRE CATEGORIE PRIMA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 7

economists

Nota - Posizione 7

SECONDA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 7

engineers

Nota - Posizione 8

TERZA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 8

entrepreneurs

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 11

no need for the external advice of economists."

Nota - Posizione 11

IMPRENDITORE > ECONOMISTA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 15

"The question for antitrust is whether there exist artificial entry barriers.

Nota - Posizione 15

ALTRA CITAZIONE

Nota - Posizione 23

perfetta vs libera condizione necessaria e sufficiente sintesi delle parti

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 23

1. Introduction

Nota - Posizione 23

Ttttttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 23

the virtues of so-called "perfect competition,"

Nota - Posizione 23

ESALTATA DALL ECON TRADIZ

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 24

huge number of tiny firms

Nota - Posizione 24

CONDIZIONE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 25

curve is perfectly horizontal,

Nota - Posizione 25

PRICE TAKERS

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 27

deny that this market structure is a necessary condition for economic efficiency.

Nota - Posizione 27

LO SCOPO DEL LAVORO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 29

forcing all markets into the Procrustean mold of perfect competition.

Nota - Posizione 29

UN ERRORE CHE DERIVA DAL CULTO DELLA CONC XFETTA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 30

sacrifice obvious economies of scale

Nota - Posizione 30

OVVIA CONSEG

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 31

Second, the exclusive focus on how unregulated markets deviate from perfect competition has led economists to neglect the anti- competitive character

Nota - Posizione 32

SECONDO...GAFFE SULLA REGOLAMENTAZIONE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 34

there are other market structures consistent with economic efficiency.

Nota - Posizione 34

COROLLARIO DELLA TESI PRINCIPALE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 35

whatever structure emerges from free (_not_ "perfect") competition tends to be optimal;

Nota - Posizione 35

MA QUALE MERCATO GARANTISCE L EFFICIENZA?

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 50

2. Why Free Competition Is Efficient

Nota - Posizione 50

Tttttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 51

Firms that have attributes that make them able servants of the consumers tend to survive,

Nota - Posizione 51

L INTUIZIONE FONDAMENTALE....PRINCIPIO CHIAVE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 57

Yet almost all economists fail to apply the same logic to factors like the size

Nota - Posizione 58

PERCHÈ NN SI APPLICA IL PRINCIPIO ALLA DIMENSIONE?

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 60

If fewness of firms leads to collusion against consumers, then that very fact means that hold-outs or new entrants have an extra incentive to spring up, making the problem less likely.

Nota - Posizione 61

COLUSIONE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 62

lack of innovation,

Nota - Posizione 62

PICCOLA IMPRESA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 65

Envision, for example, "trust-busting" the American auto industry into 1000 firms;

Nota - Posizione 66

ESPEDRIMENTO MENTALE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 70

free competition rewards productive efficiency, but doesn't it at the same time hurt allocative efficiency?

Nota - Posizione 70

DUBBIO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 71

the case is weaker than usually supposed.

Nota - Posizione 71

TESI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 73

For example, some food that tastes good is unhealthy,

Nota - Posizione 73

AL BUONO SI ACCOMPAGNA SPESSO IL MALE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 74

Free competition does not encourage unlimited tradeoffs of allocative for productive efficiency;

Nota - Posizione 75

IL MONOPOLISTA NN PUÓ ESAGERARE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 76

creates an opportunity for a smaller firm to enter

Nota - Posizione 77

RIPETO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 79

above-average rates of return always attract new entrants.

Nota - Posizione 79

Ccccccc

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 87

those who can most effectively influence the legislative process to win

Nota - Posizione 87

LA COMPETIZIONE IN REGIME DI INTERVENTISMO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 94

a license levied on new entrants

Nota - Posizione 94

ESEMPII DI LEGGE MONOPOLISTICA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 100

I think that the ideal of marginal cost pricing is mistaken,

Nota - Posizione 101

TESI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 104

average cost pricing, in contrast, is the spontaneous tendency of the market.

Nota - Posizione 104

PIÙ REALISTICO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 108

MC pricing requires comprehensive state regulation

Nota - Posizione 108

UL GUAIO DI MC....COSTO DELLA POLITICA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 113

AC pricing lets consumers pay for fixed costs

Nota - Posizione 114

INNOVAZIONE E COSTI MEDI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 116

AC pricing ties benefits to payment;

Nota - Posizione 117

ALTRA CARATTERISTICA

Segnalibro - Posizione 135

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 136

3. Collusion and Predation as Alternatives to Efficiency

Nota - Posizione 136

Tttttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 259

4. Regulation versus Competition

Nota - Posizione 259

ttttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 294

5. The Hard Cases

Nota - Posizione 294

ttttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 295

"Productive inefficiency is hearby declared illegal.

Nota - Posizione 295

ESPERIMENTO MENTALE...PENSATE ALLA LEGGE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 298

free competition already discourages productive inefficiency,

Nota - Posizione 298

PRIMA OBIEZIONE AD UNA SIMILE LEGGE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 300

it is very difficult to correctly identify productive inefficiency,

Nota - Posizione 300

SECONDA OBIEZIONE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 307

natural monopoly regulation, merger restrictions, and prohibition against price-fixing.

Nota - Posizione 308

LEGGI QUASI SIMILI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 309

they focus on what is seen, to the detriment of what is not seen

Nota - Posizione 309

SEEN UNSEEN

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 310

natural monopoly regulation.

Nota - Posizione 310

Tttttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 311

more than one firm is inefficient. But if there is only one firm, there will be monopoly pricing, which is also inefficient.

Nota - Posizione 312

LE DUE EFFOCIENZE NN PERSRGUIBILI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 312

government permits the monopoly to exist, but regulates

Nota - Posizione 312

SOLUZIONE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 314

when regulation prevents some problem, it crowds out the market's solution.

Nota - Posizione 315

PRIMA OBIEZ.....MODELLATA SULLA PRECEDENTE

Nota - Posizione 317

CHIAVE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 317

innovation,

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 321

Inter-industry competition also checks

Nota - Posizione 321

TUTTO È IN CONCORRENZA CON TUTTO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 325

How do you really know that an industry requires a monopoly if you never allow competition?

Nota - Posizione 325

SECONDA OBIEZIONE....RICALCATA SULLA PRECEDENTE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 330

Next we come to merger regulation.

Nota - Posizione 330

Tttttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 382

6. Regulation: A Public Choice Perspective

Nota - Posizione 383

tttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 452

7. Conclusion

Nota - Posizione 452

ttttttttt

4 Dismembering the Octopus hl

4 Dismembering the Octopus TOWARD A RADICAL MARKET IN CORPORATE CONTROL
Note:4@@@@@@@@@@

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BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity, State Street.
Note:TUTTI LE CONOSCONO...MA COSA FANNO?...QUALCOSA NELLA FINANZA

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institutional investors.
Note:DI SOLITO SI USA L ESPRESSIONE

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rarely discussed outside the specialized financial press,
Note:ANCHE SE SONO I PIÙ POTENTI

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Together, they control more than a fifth of the value of the US stock
Note:FATTI

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JP Morgan, United Airlines, Verizon, Google.
Note:COMPAGNIE CONTROLLATE DA....

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How can these asset managers fly so securely under the radar
Note:PERCHÈ I PIÙ POTENTI SONO ANCHE I PIÚ SCONOSC

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they are diversified and many of their investments are held somewhat passively.
Note:IPOTESI

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they own stock in a wide range of companies

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Passivity means that they do not frequently buy and sell

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They also often manage the assets that are technically owned by workers
Note:SONO ISTITUZ

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Vanguard has been rightly praised for pioneering low-cost index funds,
Note:VANGUARD

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avoid the hazards of stock-picking.
Note:FUNZIONE

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institutional investors have harmed a wide range of industries, raising prices for consumers, reducing investment
Note:SONO SOGGETTI CHE INCIDONO SULL ECONOMIA

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This outcome is not, as far as we know, the result of any deliberate conspiracy

Note | Location: 2,592

MA ATTENZIONE

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giving institutional investors more control over companies—but over individual companies rather than over industries.
Note:LA SOLUZIONE X RIPRISTINARE LA COMPET

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The Monopolist with a Thousand Faces
Note:Tttttttttttrr

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The word “monopoly” was coined by Aristotle
Note:M

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the state,
Note:LA PRINCIPALE FONTE DI MONOPOLII

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well-connected individuals or groups
Note:LA CATTURA

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the monopolistic control of the British East India Company over the trade in tea.
Note:ORIGINE DELLA SECESSIONE USA

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local banks
Note:MONOP PICCOLE IMPRESE 900

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Large enterprises or projects, like the construction of canals,
Note:NESSO ESSENZIALE CON LO STATO

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advances in technology and developments in the law eventually allowed entrepreneurs to form business enterprises large enough to undertake vast industrial projects.
Note:POI...TECNO E LEGGE

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entrepreneurs sold stocks and bonds
Note:STRUMENTO

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the possibility that the businesses could restrict competition, becoming monopolies without any aid from the state
Note:PREOCCUPAZ...LA LEVA DELLA BORSA

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monopolies’ incentives to impede trade and reduce production in order to raise the price
Note:ANTOINE COURNOT

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primary impediment to the operation of free markets and the central cause of inequality,
Note:IL MONOPOLIO X WALRAS

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about the last thirty years of the nineteenth century.
Note:ROBBER BARON...USA

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transportation, energy, manufacturing, finance.
Note:IN TUTTI I SETTORI

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one company would buy up others.
Note:CRWAZIONI X ACQUISIZIONE

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The company then bought up its competitors.
Note:STANDARD OIL

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U. S. Steel and the American Tobacco Company.
Note:ALTRI MONOP

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They contributed to the economic and political inequality of the Gilded Age
Note:GILDED AGE

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novels of F. Scott Fitzgerald.
Note:IMMORTALATA

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In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act

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the new law became a powerful tool in the hands of the Progressive movement
Note:USO POLITICO

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The first great Progressive president, Theodore Roosevelt,
Note:PROG ERA

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spread the fixed costs of production over many more consumers
Note:MA LA GRANDE IMPRESA NN È SOLO MALE

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lower prices,

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eliminate local monopolies

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It would thus never have made sense simply to abolish big business.
Note:INSOMMA

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“horizontal” concentration
Note:LA PIÙ XICOLOSA

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The Clayton Act of 1914 strengthened antitrust law
Note:SOTTO WILSON

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It took a Great Depression and the rise of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal to establish an activist antitrust
Note:IL PICCO

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Regulators and courts became more aggressive

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prohibiting firms from buying the stock of other firms.
Note:CLAYTON ACT

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the “Red Queen” phenomenon,
Note:Ttttttttttt

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“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.”
Note:ALICE...FATTA LA REGOLA GABBATO LU SANTO

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work-around used by business,

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getting new laws

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Beginning in the 1970s and accelerating from the 1980s onward, antitrust authorities lost track of the ways in which capital markets reconfigured themselves
Note:NEL RED QUEEN L AMMINISTRAZ È XDENTE

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we must examine the evolution of the corporate form
Note:CRUCIALE X CAPIRE

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Acephalous Cephalopods

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public stock corporation
Note:STANDARD FORM NEL XX SECOLO

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its stock and debt typically trade on an
Note:IL VANTAGGIO CHIAVE NELL EFFICIENZA

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Ownership became liquid:
Note:LIQUIDA

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liquid public ownership also created a paradox
Note:PARADOSSO

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Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
Note:SCOPRITORE

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“ownership” of a corporation was very different from ownership of ordinary property.
Note:UN PROP MOLTO ARTICOLARE

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If you own your car, you both control it
Note:POTERE E CONTROLLO

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The problem goes back to voting,
Note:CONTROLLO VOTO MAGGIORANZE

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your vote is unlikely to make a difference.
Note:AZIONISTA FIAT

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you are unlikely to pay much attention to how Google is operated
Note:DISINTERESSE

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you are in no position to exercise your vote in an informed way.
Note:NO INFO

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stock ownership is beneficial only because it gives you the ability to enjoy gains
Note:OGGI

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So, who does control corporations? Usually the managers.

Note | Location: 2,682

CHI CONTROLLA?

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The separation of ownership and control gives rise to what economists call “agency costs.”
Note:COZTI D AGENZIA

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use the corporation to enrich herself
Note:X ES FISSANDO PAGHE STRAORD

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stock markets gave investors the power to obtain liquidity, but the price to be paid was loss of control
Note:RIASSUNTO

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a market for takeovers
Note:IMPORTANTE X DISCIPLINARE I MANAGER...PRIMO STRUMENTO DELLA TRADIZIONE

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current thinking focuses on corporate compensation
Note:SECONDO STRUMENTO

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CEOs should be paid with stock,
Note:Ccccccc

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Governments have tried to encourage firms to adopt “best practices”
Note:UN FILM GIÀ VISTO

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none really resolves
Note:DELUSIONE

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Effortless Capitalism
Note:Ttttttttttttt

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economists developed financial ideas that came to be known as “portfolio theory”
Note:ASSUNTO

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it makes more sense to buy shares in a diverse group of corporations mimicking the whole economy
Note:L IDEA CENTRALE...SOPPORTARE SOLO RISCHI SISTEMICI

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Investors can avoid these stock-specific risks by diversifying widely
Note:DIVERSIFIC

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The so-called efficient capital markets hypothesis
Note:SECONDO STRUMENTO TEORICO

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anyone trying to pick an “undervalued” stock is deluding herself.
Note:IL MERCATO NN SI BATTE

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that there is little point in stock-picking in the first place, certainly for amateur investors.
Note:CONCLUSIONE

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ordinary investors often act irrationally.15
Note:INOLTRE...FINANZA COMPORTAMENTALE

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The cheapest way to do this is via low-cost mutual funds (especially index funds) that track broad market indices.
Note:STRUMENTO CONCRETO X SEGUIRE IL CONSIGLIO...RISPARMIARE SULLE COMMISSIONI

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mimic the index of interest (e.g., S&P 500).
Note:INDEX FUND

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Index fund operations are relatively mechanical, so their costs are low;
Note:ROBOTIZZATO

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institutional investors has risen dramatically, starting roughly in 1980 at about 4% control and leveling out around the Great Recession at 26%.
Note:CRESCITA VERTIGINOSA

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This contrasts sharply with the heft of institutional investors.
Note:MA IL PESO NELLE DECISIONI....

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they became the largest owners of the firms in which they invested.
Note:ISTITUZINALI

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institutional investors might provide the market discipline
Note:UN IDEA

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Vanguard, for example, owns more than 6% of Delta Airlines,
Note:ESEMPIKO

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when Vanguard calls, Delta’s CEO will answer the phone

Note | Location: 2,745

Ccccccccc

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antitrust enforcement aimed to prevent any single corporation from dominating an entire market.
Note:LA POLITICA TRAD ANTITRUST

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institutional investors behave much as trusts
Note:DI FATTO

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these institutions have the potential to eliminate competition
Note:NN SOLO IN UN SETTORE

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it was not until 2012 that a brilliant young economist, José Azar, put together the puzzle.
Note:AZAR

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What’s Wrong with Indexing?
Note:Ttttttttttttt

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we need to return to the basic theory of competition

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Suppose that GM and Ford are the only two automobile manufacturers in the US
Note:ES

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lowering the price
Note:COMPETIZ

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But as we have seen, most firms are not independently owned—instead, they are dominated by institutional investors who own large stakes in rival firms.
Note:COMPROPRIETÀ

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imagine first that a single shareholder owns 100% of Ford and 100% of GM.
Note:ESPERIM

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The shareholder would direct the CEOs of Ford and GM not to engage in price competition
Note:CONSEGUENZA

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act as if the two firms were merged.
Note:FUSIONE

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Real institutional investors own only about 5–10% of the companies, but the same logic holds.
Note:IN MISURA DEPOTENZIATA

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Each institutional investor wants GM and Ford to forgo price competition
Note:PRICE COMP RIDUCE I PROFITTI

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It doesn’t matter whether their stake is 100%, or 7%, or 6%,

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On the other hand, CEOs often hold concentrated shares in the firms they manage.
Note:IL BILANCIAMENTO CEO...SPESSO INSUFF

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The supporting evidence is supplied by the work of Azar, Martin Schmalz,
Note:L ISTITUZIONALE PESA ECCOME

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One study considers the airline industry.
Note:Ttttttttt

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Another study reaches a similar conclusion for the banking industry.

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if firms coordinate their political activities, they are likely to be more effective in lobbying for their interests
Note:INOLTRE...LOBBING

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The logical end point of institutional investment and diversification is the coordination of all capital
Note:LA FINE DELL IPERDIVERSIFIC

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Restoring Competition
Note:Ttttttttttttt

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ban institutional investors from diversifying their holdings within industries
Note:SOLUZIONE RADICALE

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We would also allow institutional investors to remain diversified within, as well as across, industries as long as they did not grow too large.
Note:IN ALTERNATIVA...SOGLIA 1%%%

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No investor holding shares of more than a single effective firm in an oligopoly and participating in corporate governance may own more than 1% of the market.
Note:REGOLA

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how to define “oligopoly
Note:DIFFICOLTÀ

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how to address firms that operate in multiple markets,
Note:ALTRO PROBLEMA

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GOVERNANCE
Note:Ttttttttttttt

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Institutional intermediaries compete and are rewarded on the basis of “relative performance”
Note:OGGI

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it has gained nothing relative to its own competitors in the financial services industry.
Note:SE CI SI IMPEGNA IN X....POICHÈ TUTTI POSSIEDONO QUOTE

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these incentives are greatly dampened relative to the case in which each corporation is mostly controlled by a single institutional investor.
Note:È OVVIO CHE

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concentrating the interests
Note:COMANDAMENTO

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That competition at present centers primarily on fees, services, and the illusory ability of fund managers to “pick” stocks.
Note:LA COMPETIZIONE TRA FONDI

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By creating dominant, large, concentrated shareholders, our policy might disadvantage minority shareholders,
Note:CONTROINDICAZIONI DELLA PROP

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DIVERSIFICATION
Note:TTTTTTTTTTT

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The major objection to our strategy is that it could limit the diversification available
Note:L OB PRINCIP

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if our policy did limit diversification within an industry, the size of this effect would be small.
Note:PRIMA RISP

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If savers truly want that last bit of diversification, they can simply invest some of their money in many different institutional investors.
Note:SECONDO

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index fund exception in our policy.
Note:INFINE

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never communicates with the operational firms;
Note:STOP COMUNIC...GESTIONE ROBOTICA

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Law on Our Side
Note:Tttttttttttt

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Beyond Monopolies
Note:Ttttttttt

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large firms pose a problem of monopsony as well with respect to workers.
Note:ALTRO PROB DEL MONOP

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hold down the wages of workers who could not find good jobs outside of the industry they specialized in.
Note:ESPERIENZA ANCHE NEI ROBBER BARON

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government introduced laws to support labor unions and protect workers from being overworked,
Note:LA SOLU ZIONE FINORA

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antitrust has a powerful role to play in preventing monopsony
Note:OGGI

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Luigi Zingales makes a forceful case in his 2012 book, A Capitalism for the People, that antitrust law should be used to block mergers that result in the acquisition of political influence
TO BIG TOO FAIL