Visualizzazione post con etichetta religione. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta religione. Mostra tutti i post

venerdì 27 dicembre 2019

COME SI DIVENTA ATEI

COME SI DIVENTA ATEI
Da adolescente, pensavo che la religione si trovasse nei libri sacri. Ci credevo perché mi era stato insegnato così. Inoltre, da persona che amava i libri trovavo tutto questo molto plausibile, ne ero addirittura lusingato. Tuttavia, ho riscontrato immediatamente che molti "adoratori del Libro" non amavano affatto i libri in generale. In tutto questo c'era quindi qualcosa che non andava.
Successivamente, ho rettificato il tiro e, leggendo Tommaso, ho pensato che la religiosità fosse essenzialmente una scelta razionale. Devo ammettere che per me è ancora così, ma se questa è una buona teoria per me, non riesco più a sostenere che sia una buona teoria generale della religione. Se giudico i miei correligionari vedo più che altro persone emotive, che danno poco spazio alla riflessione, all'analisi razionale della fede, a volte ne sono persino offesi. E così mi sono ritrovato in età avanzata senza una buona teoria della religione. Come rimediare?
Mi sono messo in ricerca e ho incontrato (sui libri) alcuni studiosi - sia atei che credenti - i quali sostenevano che l'atteggiamento religioso ha una profonda radice cognitiva, è cioè un fenomeno del tutto naturale e sempre lo sarà. L'essere religiosi si attaglia al nostro cervello. Il contorno dell'identità religiosa è modellato dalla storia, dalle liturgie e dalle teologie, ma le radici della sensibilità religiosa, sono antiche e primordiali. In questo senso mi sono ritrovato nello strano connubio tra Nuovi Atei e don Giussani: la scelta religiosa "ci corrisponde". Diversamente dai primi, però, non proseguivo pensando che la religione fosse una deviazione dalla retta via, un inciampo nella maturazione individuale. Al contrario: sfidare la nostra natura era per me, oltre che temerario, segno di immaturità.
Successivamente, mi sono avvicinato anche a chi sosteneva una comprensione funzionalista della religione, chi la vedeva come un adattamento culturale. Ci sono molti autori, infatti, che spiegano bene come la religione svolga particolari funzioni nella società o nella psicologia sociale. Spiegano come la religione, ad esempio, abbia reso possibile la cooperazione umana, e come sia stata fondamentale per consentire l'emersione della complessità sociale negli ultimi 10.000 anni. C'è un dibattito aperto sulla questione, e comunque sembra chiaro che la religione non sia stata affatto la "radice di tutti i mali", piuttosto qualcosa di indispensabile per governare la complessità sociale.
Una prospettiva culturale è importante per colmare la lacuna principale dell'antropologia cognitiva: come spiegare le variazioni nell'espressione della religiosità? Gli antropologi cognitivi avevano buone argomentazioni sul perché i fenomeni religiosi tendevano a incanalarsi in determinate direzioni (ad esempio, perché gli dei sono antropomorfi), ma non spiegavano, ad esempio, perché certe persone fossero atee o perché la religiosità oscillava nel tempo.
Le origini dell'incredulità rappresentano un banco di prova fondamentale per una buona teoria della religione. Quando si diventa atei? Ora bene o male lo sappiamo, e c'è un modo semplice per rispondere: la maggior parte delle persone si comporta come le pecore. In ambienti atei la persona comune trova le affermazioni religiose inverosimili. Al contrario, in ambienti religiosi le proposizioni atee sembrano ai più ridicole oltreché blasfeme. Proprio come per i credenti, molti atei non derivano affatto la loro "fede" da una riflessione. La religione, in questo senso, condivide molte caratteristiche con la politica e la cultura. In Italia amiamo l'opera ma non certo sulla base di profondi giudizi estetici!
L'ateo e il credente hanno una struttura mentale loro propria, nessuno lo nega, ma si tratta di pre-condizioni che conducono all'esito previsto (ateismo o fede) solo se immerse nel giusto contesto. Per esempio, la credenza in Dio o in altri poteri soprannaturali può essere collegata in modo cruciale alla capacità cognitiva umana di inferire gli stati mentali di altre persone ("mentalizzazione"). I credenti religiosi pensano intuitivamente alle loro divinità come esseri con stati mentali che anticipano e rispondono ai loro bisogni. Pertanto, l'incapacità di "mentalizzare" rende la credenza meno intuitiva. Questa capacità manca più spesso agli uomini, e cio' spiega il faith-gap. Tuttavia, la probabilità di diventare ateo è indotta dalla scarsa esposizione a stimoli culturali credibili dell'impegno religioso, in questo senso lo stile cognitivo del singolo ha un peso molto più ridotto.
Faccio solo un esempio, prendiamo una società avanzata del XXI secolo, sarà un posto dove è molto importante saper scrivere un programma per i computer. Ma per svolgere al meglio questo compito la capacità di "mentalizzare" è alquanto relativa. Si tratta di qualcosa destinato a perdere valore. Da cio' deriva il fatto che sempre più persone prive di questa abilità potranno comunque avere successo e creare un contesto di successo dove l'ateismo puo' trovare il giusto reagente e diffondersi a macchia d'olio.


giovedì 12 settembre 2019

UNA TEORIA DELLA RELIGIONE

https://feedly.com/i/entry/54BMp4PRpfGpZgJrJ0T5blULTdimg4gCgsikrRGjEsQ=_16ca8d039a8:1d179ec:340e5e89

UNA TEORIA DELLA RELIGIONE
Quella di questo libro, sinceramente, non mi piace. La mia preferità vede la religione nascere con una funzione che poi si trasforma nel tempo. Le tre fasi fondamentali:
1) Nei popoli primitivi la religione emerge come emanazione di quell'abilità fondamentale per la sopravvivenza che consisteva nel rintracciare e identificare l'agente in talune situazioni. Così come da certe tracce si risaliva al passaggio di certi predatori, allo stesso modo si passava da certi fenomeni naturali all'esistenza di una divinità.
2) Successivamente, i precetti della religione sono stati molto utili per il coordinamento sociale. Pensiamo solo al ruolo delle maledizioni e delle punizioni divine in sistemi sociali con scarsissimi mezzi idonei alla ricerca dei colpevoli di delitti.
3) Più recentemente la religione ha risolto i problemi identitari delle persone. Sentirsi cristiani diventa un modo per dare significato al proprio quotidiano e delineare la propria identità.
Se queste sono le premesse, come spiegare la secolarizzazione?
La funzione 1 è stata assorbita dalla scienza, la 2 dal diritto e la 3 dai mille gruppi (club) di aggregazione che la società dell'informazione ci propone in alternativa alla vecchia religione.
La religione resiste solo se si trasforma in una teoria scientifica sulle realtà ultime, oppure in una teocrazia, oppure se esiste una famiglia solida attraverso cui trasmettere l'affiliazione identitaria.
Ora, la religione come teoria scientifica è appannaggio di una ristretta minoranza, la teocrazia un rischio temerario e la famiglia in disfacimento è ovunque spiazzata da papà stato e dall'abbondanza in cui viviamo che ci rende sempre più autonomi.
#Amazon

mercoledì 28 febbraio 2018

La religione è consolatoria?

La religione ha una funzione consolatrice? A quanto pare sembrerebbe che, almeno per il buddismo, non sia così: i monaci tibetani sono, tra quelli studiati, il gruppo umano più terrorizzato dalla morte.
STATIC1.SQUARESPACE.COM

La religione come intrattenimento

Le religioni cesseranno più o meno gradualmente di influire sulla nostra convivenza per trasformarsi in forme di intrattenimento.
Intrattenimento intellettuale, spirituale, esistenziale, psicologico, consolatorio...
Non si tratterà di una marginalizzazione poiché la nostra vita futura sarà per il 90% dedicata all'intrattenimento.
#Amazon
The groundbreaking follow-up to the New York Times bestseller The Great Stagnation The United States continues to mint more millionaires and billionaires than any…
AMAZON.COM

giovedì 7 settembre 2017

Chapter 8 The Gods of Cooperation and Competition

Chapter 8 The Gods of Cooperation and Competition
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For all its virtues in binding strangers together, religious cooperation is born out of competition and conflict between groups. It is therefore expected that religious cooperation in turn fuels the very conflicts, real or imagined, that are perceived to threaten it. (This is the topic of the next chapter.) This dynamic helps us understand and resolve the seeming paradox that it is the handmaiden both of cooperation within the group and of conflict between groups.
Note:LA RELIGIONE FA COOPERARE IL GRUPPO E LO FA CONFLIGGERE

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groups that happen to have members who acquire traits favoring self-sacrifice and subordinate self-interest for group interests—that is, groups with stronger social solidarity—will tend to win out.
Note:SACRIFICIO DI SÈ

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Religion returns to center stage, not as a theological explanation of purpose or order, but as itself a product of evolution that enables groups to function as adaptive units—at least to a degree.
Note:SLOAN WILSON... LA RELIGIONE COME PRODOTTO EVOLUTIVO

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In an ambitious cross-cultural investigation spanning 33 nation-states, Michele Gelfand and her colleagues measured something related to social solidarity. They looked at the degree to which nations are “tight”—that is, do they have strict social norms that apply to many situations? How important is conformity to these norms? How much deviation from norms is tolerated and do people get punished for violating these norms?
Note:GELFAND: ALTRUISMO E GUERRA

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they found that, all else being equal, conflict a hundred years ago increased the odds of strict norm-enforcement today. Tighter nations were also more religious—and that makes sense too if world religions are a group-mobilizing force.
Note:IL NUMERO DI GUERRE PREGRESSE PREVEDE LA RELIGIOSITÀ... LA RELIGIOSITÀ INCREMENTA CON IL PERICOLO

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as any observer of team sports fans can see, the “cooperate to compete” instinct is particularly strong among that segment of the population that likes war: young men.
Note:FANATICI E ALTRUISTI

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Richard Sosis and his colleagues looked at this issue from a different angle.
Note:SOSIS... PIÙ GUERRA PIÙ RITUALI

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they found that the greater the participation in warfare, the more likely there are costly rites for males.
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Sosis sees these painful rites as costly behaviors that signal group commitment. He points out that ritual scarification and violence create male solidarity, which keeps freeriding during warfare under control.
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As Scott Atran explains, seemingly irrational tendencies make for stronger groups that can outdo their more rational, self-interested rivals:
Note:RITI IRRAZIONALI... RITI COSTOSI IMPEGNO PIÙ GARANTITO

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Seen in this light, it is not surprising that prosocial religions have been a major force shaping human history. When intergroup rivalries are strong, prosocial religious groups, with their Big Gods and loyalty practices that promote social solidarity, could have a competitive edge over rival groups.
Note:MONOTEISMO... GRUPPI PIÙ ESTESI E POTENTI

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Building Moral Communities of Strangers
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As Jonathan Haidt shows, much of morality is rooted in social intuitions in the service of gluing individuals together to form “sacred” communities.
Note:MORALITÀ E COESIONE

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As Haidt recognizes, not all moral systems are religious, and not all religions are moral systems, but some religious systems—those that have prosocial consequences—have been moral systems throughout time.
Note:RELIGIONE E MORALE

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They found that the stronger an individual expressed religious belief and reported high levels of religious participation, the more likely he or she condemned moral transgressions.
Note:QUENTIN ATKINSON... RELIGIOSITÀ E TRASGRESSIONE MORALE

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These findings complement results by Shariff and Rhemtulla discussed earlier, who found, all else being equal, lower crime rates in nations with stronger belief in hell than heaven.
Note:CRIMINE E RELIGIOSITÀ

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Morality without God
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This does not mean, of course, that religion is necessary for morality. No doubt core human moral instincts evolved long before religions spread in human groups.
Note:LA MORALITÀ PRECEDE LA RELIGIONE

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Kiley Hamlin, Karen Wynn, and Paul Bloom have found that moral-like judgments can be found even in preverbal babies: by six months of age, they show a preference for an individual who helps and an aversion to an individual who obstructs someone else’s goal.
Note:BAMBINI

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Even our primate cousins have vestiges of moral instincts. A long line of research by primatologist Frans de Waal and his colleagues shows capacities for emotional contagion, consolation, and grief in chimpanzees.
Note:MORALITÀ E SCIMMIE

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We do not need religion to be moral beings. But moral communities of strangers may not have evolved as readily without religions with Big Gods.
Note:IL PROBLEMA DELLO STRANIERO... COME LO AFRONTA LA RELIGIONE

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Intergroup Competition and Warfare
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There is no shortage of evidence in the historical and ethnographic record showing that violent and nonviolent conflict has been endemic to human existence.18 In fact, one driver of large group size in cultural evolution is the intensity of between-group competition for resources and habitats. For example, in the 186 societies of the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (discussed earlier), prevalence of conflict among societies, resource-rich environments, group size, and Big Gods all go together. In places with rich natural resources, there is more intergroup conflict, larger groups, and watchful gods.
Note:CONFLITTI GRANDI GRUPPI E BIG GOD SONO CORRELATI

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one possibility is that conflict over resources led to competition and political expansion of victorious groups, which in turn festered more conflict at the peripheries of these expanding empires. One argument is that these were precisely the antecedent conditions that gave rise to politically centralized states. As Charles Tilly puts it, war made states, and states made war.
Note:TILLIS SULLA GUERRA COME ORIGINE DELLO STATO...

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Peter Turchin, who has pioneered the scientific study of historical dynamics, emphasizes that the scaling up of social groups happened predominantly in frontiers of states and empires. He calculated that over 90 percent of preindustrial age mega-empires—defined as unified states covering greater than 1 million square kilometers (or 386,100 square miles)—arose in frontier regions, such as the Eurasian steppes.
Note:TURCHIN E LE FRONTIERE CONFLITUALI COME ORIGINE DELLE RELIGIONI

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this is the old adage that the best way to compete with rivals is to cooperate with allies. Medieval Arab philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldûn, who was a keen observer of the rise and fall of Islamic dynasties in fourteenth-century North Africa, saw social solidarity, which he called asabiya,
Note:VECCHI ADAGI CONFERMATI

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How Prosocial Religions Won in the Game of Intergroup Cultural Competition
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This observation brings us to the idea that prosocial religions, with their group-beneficial norms that suppress selfishness and increase social cohesion, outcompeted their rivals. There are good reasons to think that this process has been driven by cultural—rather than genetic—evolution.
Note:L ALTRUISMO DELLE RELIGIONI È VINCENTE

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Scott Atran and Joseph Henrich summarize the idea this way: Religious beliefs and practices, like group beneficial norms, can spread by competition among social groups in several ways, including warfare, economic production, and demographic expansion. Such cultural representations can also spread through more benign interactions, as when members of one group preferentially acquire behaviors, beliefs, and values from more successful groups. Over historical time, demographic and cultural patterns have favored prosocial religious groups.
Note:ESPANSIONISMO CULTURALE

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Cultural Group Stability
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when all is said and done, what matters, in cultural terms, is how well a group weathers storms that might lead to its collapse. World history is littered with the corpses of vast, but short-lived, empires, such as the Assyrian and Mongol conquests that unified large parts of the Middle East and Eurasia, respectively.
Note:IMPORTANZA DELLA STABILITÀ... ESEMPIO DI IMPERI BREVI

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Returning to this study of the group longevity of religious and secular communes in nineteenth-century America, Richard Sosis looked at an ideal case study because these communes operated under difficult conditions, facing various internal and external threats to group stability. Communes that were unable to solve “collective action problems”—overcoming internal disputes, preventing members from defecting to rival groups, surviving droughts, and so on, could not prosper. Indeed, some communes were dissolved soon after they were founded, whereas others flourished. For every year considered in a 110-year span, religious communes were found to outlast secular ones by an average factor of four.
Note:UNA ROBUSTA RELIGIONE STABILIZZA

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The evidence just discussed leads to two key conclusions: (1) differential rates of group survival favor prosocial religious groups; and (2) the combination of belief in supernatural watchers, extravagant displays, and other commitment devices explains the cultural survival advantage of these groups—precisely what would be expected if prosocial religions were “packaged” by cultural evolutionary processes.
Note:CONCLUSIONI

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Neither could genetic group selection easily explain these effects, given the very short time frames (just over a 110 year span) and the fact that variation in nineteenth-century American commune membership is unlikely to be of genetic origin.
Note:I TEMPI DELLA GENETICA NN SPIEGANO ALCUNI FENOMENI... SI RICORRA ALLA SELEZIONE CULTURALE

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Attracting Religious Converts
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In her study of the spread of Islam into Africa, Ensminger argues that Islamic beliefs, supported by powerful displays of faith such as abstaining from alcohol, avoiding pre- and extramarital sex, not consuming pork, and ritual fasting—permitted greater trust, shared rules of exchange, and the use of credit institutions among converted Muslims.26 The spread of Islam in turn facilitated more trade and greater economic success.
Note:ISLAM: FORZA E COMPETIZIONE

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This might come as a surprise to many, but Americans have not been as religious as they are today. Roger Finke and Rodney Stark emphasize the role of religious competition in the dramatic expansion of religiosity in America since 1776.27 Those familiar with American religious movements today know that competition among religious institutions for membership has been a long-time feature of American life.
Note:AMERICA E COMPETIZIONE RELIGIOSA

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Religious Fertility
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To survive and prosper, religious groups attract followers, induce adherents to reproduce at rates greater than replacement levels, or, as the demographic expansion of the Mormon Church shows, ideally, do both.
Note:LA PROSPERITÀ DEMOGRAFICA APPORTATA DALLARELIGIONE

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The Mormon Church grew, in a time span of just 170 years, from a small group of a few hundred to 15 million followers worldwide. Likewise, Christianity itself grew by leaps and bounds in the Roman Empire, and a once obscure offshoot of Judaism became the state religion of the empire in less than 300 years.
Note:MORMONI ED EBREI

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The cultural success of prosocial religious groups is therefore aided in no small part by their reproductive success,
Note:FERTILITÀ

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Sociologist Eric Kauffman remarks with irony that, in the culture wars between the religious and secular, arguments fly back and forth, yet neither side seems to have noticed the most important trend that may really settle the dispute. He notes: Religious fundamentalists are on course to take over the world through demography. We have embarked on a particular phase of history in which the frailty of secular liberalism will become even more apparent. In contrast to the situation today, the upsurge of fundamentalism will be felt more keenly in the secular West than in developing regions. This is because we are witnessing the historic conjunction of religious fundamentalism and demographic revolution.
Note:KAUFFMAN: L'ARGOMENTO RELIGIOSO È ESSENZIALMENTE DEMOGRAFICO

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A study comparing the fertility rates of European Jews found that the atheists had the lowest birthrate, averaging around 1.5 children per woman (again, below replacement), whereas the religious Jews averaged nearly three, with the Ultra-Orthodox in Israel averaging six to eight children per woman.
Note:EBREI

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Michael Blume explains: Although we looked hard at all available data and case studies back to early Greece and India, we still have not been able to identify a single case of any non-religious population retaining more than two births per woman for just a century. Wherever religious communities dissolved, demographic decline followed suit.
Note:ATEI SENZA FIGLI DA SEMPRE

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It is no accident that religious conservative attitudes on women’s rights, contraception, abortion, and sexual orientation are conducive to maintaining high fertility levels.
Note:RELIGIONE E DIRITTI DELLA DONNA

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it is possible that religious fertility is shaped by a process called gene-culture coevolution.35 Just as the lactose-tolerance allele spread in less than 10,000 years in groups that adopted milk-producing cows, goats, and camels, it is conceivable that prosocial religious beliefs and practices adopted by some groups but not others might have exerted selection pressures on the human gene pool of these groups. This provocative idea is just starting to receive attention.
COEVOLUZIONE CULTURA E GENETICA... IL MIGNOLO DI HENRICH

domenica 27 agosto 2017

HL La religione del futuro - ch 5

Chapter 5 Irreligious: Losing My Religion (and Spirituality) - iGen: Why Today's Super-Connected Kids Are Growing Up Less Rebellious, More Tolerant, Less Happy--and Completely Unprepared for Adulthood--and What That Means for the Rest of Us
Jean M. Twenge

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Their skateboard park is the former Church of St. Joseph in Arnhem, the Netherlands. Like many other churches across Europe, the Church of St. Joseph closed as more Europeans disassociated from religion.
Note:SIMBOLO... SKATEPARK AL POSTO DELLA CHIESA

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For decades, the United States has been a much more religious country than most of Europe.
Note:USA VS UE

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Then came the Millennials. As studies by the Pew Research Center showed in the mid-2010s, one in three Millennials (then 20 to 34 years old) claimed no religious affiliation, much higher than the one in ten Americans over age 70 who did not affiliate. However, younger people have always been less religious and older people
Note:CONVERGENZA MILLENNIALS

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Part of the Flock: Public Religious Participation
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Beginning in the 1990s and accelerating in the 2000s, fewer and fewer young people affiliated with a religion. The shift was largest for young adults,
Note:AFFILIAZIONE

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iGen’ers are more likely than any generation before them to be raised by religiously unaffiliated parents.
Note:UNA GENERAZIONE CRWSCIUTA DA GENITORI TIEPIDI

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two forces are working simultaneously to pull iGen’ers away from religion: more iGen’ers are being raised in nonreligious households, and more iGen teens have decided not to belong to a religion anymore.
Note:FAMIGLIA E SCELTA

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Attendance at services declined slowly until around 1997 and then began to plummet.
Note:ANCHE LA FREQUENZA PATISCE

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“They tend to come back to the Church because they want their children to have some sort of religious education,”
Note:DUBBIO... NON È CHE SI TORNA IN CHIESA QUANDO SI METTE SU FAMIGLIA?

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iGen’ers and the Millennials are less religious than Boomers and GenX’ers were at the same age.
Note:CONFRONTO TRA GENERAZIONE

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Faithful but Different
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Losing My Religion: Private Religious Beliefs
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For twenty years, headlines and academic articles declared that yes, fewer Americans affiliated with a religion, but just as many were praying and just as many believed in God.
Note:PREGARE E CREDERE

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Then it fell off a cliff. By 2016, one out of three 18- to 24-year-olds said they did not believe in God. Prayer followed a similar steep, downward trajectory.
Note:NO PREGHIERE NO CREDENZE

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it is no longer true that Americans are just as religious privately. More and more Americans, especially Millennials and iGen’ers, are less religious both publicly and privately. This is not due to shifts in ethnic or racial composition in the population: the trends are the same,
Note:FINE ANCHE DELLA SPIRITUALITÁ

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spends all of his free time playing video games.
Note:VIDEOGAMES ANZICHÈ IN CHIESA

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he thinks religion is for, he says, “It’s great for supporting people, like, if they’re in a bad time.
Note:RELIGIONE COME CONSOLAZIONE

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“I’ve stopped praying just to thank God; I only pray when I need something or when someone else needs something,”
Note:CHI PREGA PREGA PER CHIEDERE

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But even belief in an afterlife started to fade after 2006.
Note:ANCHE L'AL DI LÀ PERDE COLPI

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iGen is, with near certainty, the least religious generation in US history.
Note:I MENO RELIGIOSI IN ASSOLUTO

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they never attend religious services, don’t pray, and don’t believe in God.
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Religion vs. the Twenty-First Century
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a recent study found that 80% of unmarried young adult evangelical Christians have had sex.)
Note:PRECETTI NON RISPETTATI ANCHE DAI CREDENTI

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the future of Christianity:
Note:IL FUTIRO DELLA CRISTIANITÀ

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they will usher in a new, more tolerant era of Christian belief that steps away from what people should not do to focus on what they should do.
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“Spiritual but Not Religious” Has Become “Not Spiritual and Not Religious”
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Robert Fuller penned a book called Spiritual but Not Religious
Note:FULLER

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That might have been true at one time, but no longer. iGen’ers are actually less spiritual as well as being less religious.
Note:ORA NON VALE PIÙ

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it’s not age, because Boomers and GenX’ers were perfectly happy to be religious when they were young; iGen is less religious even in beliefs that don’t require religious institutions;
Note:NON È L'ETÀ

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iGen’ers are less religious and less spiritual, publicly and privately, and strikingly different from previous generations when they were young.
Note:CONCLUSIONE

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in recent years teens from higher-SES families were more likely to go to religious services (see Figure 5.9
Note:LA PERDITA DI RELIGIOSITÀ RIGUARDA DI PIÙ I POVERI E VI MENO ISTRUITI

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Too Many Rules: Why Religion Has Declined
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Why are young Americans now less religious?
Note:PERCHÈ

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more individualistic times were less religious times.
Note:INDIVIDUALISMO

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following certain rules and joining groups, two other factors that don’t fit particularly well with an individualistic mind-set.
Note:REGOLE E COMUNITÀ

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Even religious teens often adhere to a more individualistic version of faith. When Christian Smith interviewed young people for his book Soul Searching, he found that many adhered to a belief system he labeled “moralistic therapeutic deism,”
Note:INDIVIDUALISMO RELIGIOSO

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In You Lost Me: Why Young Christians Are Leaving Church . . . and Rethinking Faith, his book about young former Christians, David Kinnaman reports that many young people feel a disconnect between their church and what they experience outside of it, including science, pop culture, and sexuality.
Note:DISCONNESSIONE

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many Millennials and iGen’ers distrust religion because they believe it promotes antigay attitudes. More young people now associate religion with rigidity and intolerance—
Note:RELGIONE VISTA COME INTOLLERANTE

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Seventy-nine percent of the nonreligious believed that Christianity was antigay.
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How can you love everyone, except gays, transgenders, and people who don’t believe in our God?
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David Kinnaman’s book unChristian
Note:UN LIBRO SULL'ULTIMO TEMA

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“We have become famous for what we oppose, rather than who we are for.”
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religious organizations should focus on active discussions with iGen’ers that address the “big questions” they have about life,
Note:AFFRONTARE LE QUESTIONI DIRETTAMENTE

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Europe with Bigger Cars: The Future Religious Landscape
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(56%) believe that the decline in religion is a bad thing, while only 12% believe it’s a good thing.
Note:DECLINO RELIGIOSO... BENE O MALE?

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Evangelical churches have not lost as many members over the last few decades as other Christian denominations have. That might be because they’ve recognized that iGen’ers and Millennials want religion to complete them—to strengthen their relationships and give them a sense of purpose.
Note:EVANGELICI... IL SERVIZIO COMPLETO

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Religion will survive, but it will be a flexible, open, equal religion that gives people a sense of belonging and meaning
Note:LA RELIGIONE DEL FUTURO

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It is unclear where iGen’ers will find community interaction to replace religion. Perhaps they won’t find it at all, content to rely on their social media network,
E LA COMUNITÁ?


venerdì 28 luglio 2017

Divertirsi a rompere l’incantesimo

Divertirsi a rompere l’incantesimo

RELIGION FROM THE OUTSIDE – The Scientist as Rebel – Freeman Dyson
***
Trigger warning: – atei di professione – la religione da dentro e da fuori – credere di credere – la religione fa male o bene al mondo? – la religione a scuola – amore e terrorismo
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BREAKING THE SPELL of religion is a game that many people can play. The best player of this game that I ever knew was Professor G. H. Hardy, a world-famous mathematician who happened to be a passionate atheist.
Note:HARDY: ATEO DI PROFESSIONE
There are two kinds of atheists, ordinary atheists who do not believe in God and passionate atheists who consider God to be their personal enemy.
Note:DUE TIPI DI ATEISMO
Paul Erdös was another world-famous mathematician who was a passionate atheist. Erdös always referred to God as SF, short for Supreme Fascist. Erdös had for many years successfully outwitted the dictators of Italy, Germany, and Hungary, moving from country to country to escape from their clutches.
Note:IL SUPER FASCISTA
And now comes Daniel Dennett to take his turn at breaking the spell. Dennett is a philosopher. In Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon1 he is confronting the philosophical questions arising from religion in the modern world.
Note:DENNETT
Why does religion exist? Why does it have such a powerful grip on people in many different cultures? Are the practical effects of religion preponderantly good or preponderantly evil? Is religion useful as a basis for public morality? What can we do to counter the spread of religious movements that we consider dangerous? Can the tools and methods of science help us to understand religion as a natural phenomenon?
Note:LE DOMANDE DI DENNETT
Dennett defines scientific inquiry in a narrow way, restricting it to the collection of evidence that is reproducible and testable. …He does not accept as scientific the great mass of evidence contained in historical narratives and personal experiences. Since it cannot be reproduced under controlled conditions, it does not belong to science. 
Note:COS’È LA RICERCA SCIENTIFICA PER DENNETT
He quotes with approval and high praise several passages from The Varieties of Religious Experience, the classic description of religion from the point of view of a psychologist, published by William James in 1902. …James is examining religion from the inside, like a doctor trying to see the world through the eyes of his patients. …He studied the personal experiences of saints and mystics as evidence of something real existing in a spiritual world 
Note:WILIAM JAMES
For Dennett, the visions of saints and mystics are worthless as evidence, since they are neither repeatable nor testable. Dennett is examining religion from the outside, following the rules of science.
Note:ESPERIENZE NON BRIPETIBILI
He explains them tentatively as products of a Darwinian competition between belief systems, in which only the fittest belief systems survive. The fitness of a belief system is defined by its ability to make new converts and retain their loyalty. …it has nothing to do with the truth or falsehood of the beliefs. 
Note:COME SPIEGARE LE RELIGIONI
He observes that belief, which means accepting certain doctrines as true, is different from belief in belief, which means believing belief in the same doctrines to be desirable. He finds evidence that large numbers of people who identify themselves as religious believers do not in fact believe the doctrines of their religions but only believe in belief as a desirable goal.
Note:CREDERE DI CREDERE
The phenomenon of “belief in belief” makes religion attractive to many people who would otherwise be hard to convert. To belong to a religion, you do not have to believe. You only have to want to believe, or perhaps you only have to pretend to believe. Belief is difficult, but belief in belief is easy.
Note:VOGLIA DI CREDERE
He quotes Alan Wolfe, one of the sociologists who study American religious organizations and practices: Evangelicalism’s popularity is due as much to its populistic and democratic urges—its determination to find out exactly what believers want and to offer it to them—as it is to certainties of the faith.…
Note:EVANGELICI E POPULISMO
Like Hardy and Erdös, Dennett plays the game of breaking the spell by making religion look silly. Many of my scientist friends and colleagues have similar prejudices. One famous scientist for whom I have a deep respect said to me, “Religion is a childhood disease from which we have recovered.” There is nothing wrong with such prejudices, provided that they are openly admitted.
Note:DIVERTIRSI A ROMPERE L’INCANTESIMO
In a long chapter entitled “Morality and Religion,” he blames religion for many of the worst evils of our century. He blames not only the minority of murderous fanatics whose religion impels them to acts of terrorism but also the majority of peaceful and moderate… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:FANATISMO E GUERRE
He quotes with approval the famous remark of the physicist Stephen Weinberg: “Good people will do good things, and bad people will do bad things. But for good people to do bad things—that takes religion.” Weinberg’s statement is true as far as it goes, but it is not the whole truth. To make it the whole truth, we must add… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:SIMMETRIA?
The main point of Christianity is that it is a religion for sinners. Jesus made that very clear. When the Pharisees asked his disciples, “Why eateth your Master with publicans and sinners?” he said, “I come… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:LA RELIGIONE DEI PECCATORI
I see no way to draw up a balance sheet, to weigh the good done by religion against the evil and decide which is greater by some impartial process. My own prejudice, looking at religion from the inside, leads me to conclude that the good vastly outweighs the evil. In many places in the United States, with widening gaps between rich and poor, churches… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:UN BILANCIO
Dennett, looking at religion from the outside, comes to the opposite conclusion. He sees the extreme religious sects that are breeding grounds for gangs of young terrorists and murderers, with the mass of ordinary believers giving… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:IL BILANCIO DI DENNETT
I see religion as a precious and ancient part of our human heritage. Dennett sees it as a load of superfluous mental baggage… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:EREDITÀ O ZAVORRA?
in the end,” he says, “my central policy recommendation is that we gently, firmly educate the people of the world, so that they can make truly… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:SCELTA INFORMATA
To give the recommendation a concrete meaning, the meaning of the little word “we” must be specified. Who are the “we” who are to… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:MA CHI EDUCA CHI?
“We” might be the parents of the children to be educated, or a local school board, or a national ministry of education, or a legally established ecclesiastical authority, or an… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:GENITORI? SCUOLA? ESPERTI?
The control of education is the arena in which political fights between religious believers and civil authorities become most bitter. In the United States these fights are made peculiarly intractable by the legal doctrine of separation of church and state, which forbids public schools to provide religious instruction. Parents with fundamentalist beliefs have a legitimate grievance, being… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:SCUOLA
When public education was instituted in England in 1870, eleven years after Darwin’s theory was published, Huxley was appointed to the royal commission which decided what to teach in the public schools. Huxley was himself an agnostic, but as a member of the commission he firmly insisted that religion should be taught in schools together with science. Every child should be taught the Christian Bible as an integral part of English culture. In recent times the scope of religious instruction in England has been extended to include Judaism and Islam.… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:SOLUZIONE HUXLEY
The teaching of religion in public schools coincided with a decline of religious belief and a… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:ESITO DELL’INSEGNAMENTO CONGIUNTO
Dennett also advocates more intensive research on religion considered from a scientific point of view. Here again, we can all agree with the recommendation, but we may disagree about the meaning of “research.” Dennett limits research to scientific investigations studying religious activities and organizations as social phenomena. In my opinion, such research, looking at religion from the outside, can be helpful but will never throw much light on the central mystery. The central mystery is the perennial sprouting of religious practices and beliefs in all human societies from ancient times until today. My mother, who was a skeptical Christian like me, used to say, “You can throw religion out of the door, but it will always come back through the window.”
Note:NON SOLO SOCIOLOGIA
Let me state frankly my own philosophical prejudices in opposition to Dennett. As human beings, we are groping for knowledge and understanding of the strange universe into which we are born. We have many ways of understanding, of which science is only one. Our thought processes are only partially based on logic, and are inextricably mixed with emotions and desires and social interactions.
Note:AFFERMARE IL MISTERO
To understand religion, it is necessary to explore it from the inside, as William James explored it in The Varieties of Religious Experience.
Note:STUDIARE DA DENTRO
The sacred writings, the Bhagavad Gita and the Koran and the Bible, tell us more about the essence of religion than any scientific study of religious organizations.
Note:IL SACRO
We can all agree that religion is a natural phenomenon, but nature may include many more things than we can grasp with the methods of science.
Note:NATURA E SCIENZA
The best source of information about modern Islamic terrorists that I know of is a book, Understanding Terror Networks, by Marc Sageman.2 Sageman is a former United States foreign service officer who worked with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Chapter 5 of his book, he describes in detail the network that planned and carried out the September 2001 attacks on the United States. He finds that the bonds holding the group together, during its formative years in Hamburg, were more personal than political. He concludes: “Despite the popular accounts of the 9/11 perpetrators in the press, in-group love rather than out-group hate seems a better explanation for their behavior.”
Note:AMORE E TERRORISMO
We have no firsthand testimony from the young men who carried out the September 11 attacks. They were not as highly educated and as thoughtful as the kamikaze pilots, and they were more influenced by religion. But there is strong evidence that they were not brainwashed zombies. They were soldiers enlisted in a secret brotherhood that gave meaning and purpose to their lives, working together in a brilliantly executed operation against the strongest power in the world. According to Sageman, they were motivated like the kamikaze pilots, more by loyalty to their comrades than by hatred of the enemy.
DAL MALE COMPIUTO IN NOME DELLA RELIGIONE COMPRENDIAMO MEGLIO IL BENE CHE PUÒ FARE.