Mill hoped that getting citizens involved in politics would induce them to take on broader perspectives, empathize with one another more, and develop a stronger concern for the common good. He hoped political engagement would develop their critical thinking skills and increase their knowledge.Read more at location 1013
1.Civic and political activity requires citizens to take a broad view of others’ interests, and search for ways to promote the common good. This requires long-term thinking as well as engagement with moral, philosophical, and social scientific issues. 2.If so, then civic and political activity will tend to improve citizens’ virtue and make them better informed. 3.Therefore, civic and political activity will tend to improve citizens’ virtue and make them better informed.Read more at location 1017
Nineteenth-century historian and author of Democracy in America Alexis de Tocqueville also advanced it, though with many reservations.Read more at location 1022
In this chapter, I maintain that most common forms of political engagement are more likely to corruptRead more at location 1028
The education argument is popular among philosophers and theorists, but is not really a philosophical argument.Read more at location 1035
Whether it in fact produces those results is something we can, in principle, test using social scientific methods.Read more at location 1038
One must provide strong empirical evidence that when citizens participate more, they will tend to take a broad view of others’ interests,Read more at location 1044
what forms of participation are supposed to ennoble and educate.Read more at location 1047
Now suppose we don’t know how to measure what participation does to us, and so we just don’t know whether Mill is right or wrong. In that case, we should still not accept the education argument. Just as we should not accept, without proper evidence, that the paleo diet makes us healthier,Read more at location 1050
Chapter 2 demonstrated that people who are more interested in politics are both more likely to be well informed and more likely to participate. That evidence implied that voters know more not because they vote;Read more at location 1056
Many philosophy departments try to convince people that they should major in philosophy because it will make them smarter. As a matter of fact, philosophy majors get the best overall scores on the GRE, and some of the best scores on the LSAT, MCAT, and GMAT.6 Philosophy majors tend to be smart. Yet test results, by themselves, provide no evidence that philosophy makes anyone smarter. The problem is that students choose their majors; the majors aren’t chosen for them.Read more at location 1060
we already have strong evidence of a selection effect. High school students who say they intend to major in philosophy have higher average SAT scores than those who are drawn to any other intended major, except physics.Read more at location 1068
Some governments force citizens to vote, and this allows us to test whether getting citizens to vote causes them to acquire greater levels of knowledge.Read more at location 1075
The test results are negative. Political scientist Sarah Birch, in her comprehensive book Full Participation, reviews nearly every published paper examining whether compulsory voting improves voters’ knowledge. She concludes that it does not.Read more at location 1076
In a related work, political scientist Annabelle Lever recently reviewed the empirical studies on compulsory voting, and concluded that it had “no noticeable effect on political knowledge or interest [or] electoral outcomes.”Read more at location 1080
Many advocates of the education argument will be nonplussed by these results. They would say that for participation to educate and enlighten us, it’s not enough to vote. We need to talk.Read more at location 1085
Hélène Landemore says, “Deliberation is supposed to … [e]nlarge the pools of ideas and information, … [w]eed out the good arguments from the bad, … [and lead] to a consensus on the ‘better’ or more ‘reasonable’ solution.”10 Bernard Manin, Elly Stein, and Jane Mansbridge contend that democratic deliberation is a process of training and education.11 Joshua Cohen claims “the need to advance reasons that persuade others will help to shape the motivations that people bring to the deliberative procedure.”Read more at location 1091
Habermas says deliberators should observe the following rules: •Speakers must be consistent; they must not contradict themselves. •Speakers must treat like cases alike. •Speakers should use terms and language in a consistent way so as to make sure they are all referring to the same things. (There should be no equivocating or switching definitions in ways that would interfere with communication.) •Speakers must be sincere; they must assert only what they believe. •Speakers must provide reasons for introducing a subject or topic into the discussion. •Everyone who is competent to speak should be allowed into the discussion. •Speakers should be allowed to discuss any topic, assert whatever they like, and express any needs—so long as they are sincere. •No one may coerce or manipulate another speaker.Read more at location 1103
If people are sincere, rational, offer reasons for their views, give every voice proper respect, and so forth, then of course deliberation will educate people. If people were to follow Habermas’s or Cohen’s rules, then they would deliberate the way vulcans would deliberate. Of course deliberation would educate and enlighten them.Read more at location 1127
But as philosopher Michael Huemer comments, deliberative democracy so described looks like fantasy: “If there is one thing that stands out when one reads philosophical descriptions of deliberative democracy, it is how far these descriptions fall from reality.Read more at location 1130
Habermas and Cohen say that citizens must advance reasons for their proposals.Read more at location 1133
But in actual democracies and deliberation, no one is literally required to state reasons for their policy proposals.Read more at location 1135
What matters are rhetoric, sex appeal, and promoting the team.Read more at location 1143
As I discussed in chapter 2, political psychology shows that most of us are much more like hooligans than like vulcans. We suffer from a number of biases, including: Confirmation bias: We tend to accept evidence that supports our preexisting views. Disconfirmation bias: We tend to reject or ignore evidence that disconfirms our preexisting views. Motivated reasoning: We have preferences over what we believe, and tend to arrive at and maintain beliefs we find comforting or pleasing, or whatever beliefs we prefer to have. Intergroup bias: We tend to form coalitions and groups. We tend to demonize members of other groups, but are highly forgiving and charitable toward members of our own groups. We go along with whatever our group thinks and oppose what other groups think. Availability bias: The easier it is for us to think of something, the more common we think that thing is. The easier it is for us to think of an event occurring, the more significant we assume the consequences will be. We are thus terrible at statistical reasoning. Prior attitude effect: When we care strongly about an issue, we evaluate arguments about the issue in a more polarized way. Peer pressure and authority: People tend to be influenced irrationally by perceived authority, social pressure, and consensus.Read more at location 1144
In a comprehensive survey of all the extant (as of 2003) empirical research on democratic deliberation, political scientist Tali Mendelberg remarks that the “empirical evidence for the benefits that deliberative theorists expect” is “thin or non-existent.”19 In her survey, Mendelberg finds: •Deliberation sometimes facilitates cooperation among individuals in social dilemmas, but it undermines cooperation among groups. When people self-identify as members of a group, including as members of political groups, deliberation tends to make things worse, not better.20 (Remember that in the real world, people tend to self-identify as members of a political group.) •When groups are of different sizes, deliberation tends to exacerbate conflict rather then mediate it.21 (Note that in realistic circumstances, political groups tend to be different sizes.) •Deliberation does tend to make people more aware of others’ interests. Nevertheless, other empirical work shows that if groups simply state their preferences without any discussion, this is just as effective as stating their preferences with discussion.22 So deliberation per se isn’t itself helpful in this case. •Status seeking drives much of the discussion. Instead of debating the facts, people try to win positions of influence and power over others.23 •Ideological minorities have disproportionate influence, and much of this influence can be attributed to groups’ “social appeal.”24 •High-status individuals talk more, are perceived as more accurate and credible, and have more influence, regardless of whether the high-status individuals actually know more.25 •During deliberation, people use language in biased and manipulative ways. They switch, for example, between concrete and abstract language in order to create the appearance that their side is essentially good (and any badness is accidental) while the other side is essentially bad (and any goodness is accidental). If I describe my friend as kind, this abstract language suggests that they will regularly engage in kind behavior. If I say that my enemy donated some money to Oxfam, this concrete language leaves open the question of whether this kind of behavior matches my enemy’s character and could be expected again.26 •Even when prodded by moderators to discuss controversial matters, groups tend to avoid conflict, focusing instead on mutually accepted beliefs and attitudes.27 •When a discussant mentions commonly held information or beliefs, this tends to make them seem smarter and more authoritative to others, and thus tends to increase their influence.Read more at location 1162
During “other times”—when citizens debate morals, justice, or social scientific theories meant to evaluate those facts—“deliberation is likely to fail.”Read more at location 1192
the use of reasoned argument to reinforce prior sentiment is a widespread phenomenon that poses a significant challenge to deliberative expectations.Read more at location 1202
Deliberation tends to move people toward more extreme versions of their ideologies rather than toward more moderate versions.Read more at location 1214
Deliberation over sensitive matters—such as pornography laws—frequently leads to “hysteria” and “emotionalism,”Read more at location 1216
Deliberation frequently causes deliberators to doubt there is a correct position at all. This leads to moral or political skepticism or nihilism.Read more at location 1222
Deliberation often makes citizens apathetic and agnostic about politics,Read more at location 1224
During deliberation, citizens frequently change their preferences and reach consensus only because they are manipulated by powerful special interests.Read more at location 1227
Consensus often occurs only because citizens purposefully avoid controversial topics,Read more at location 1229
Rather than causing consensus, public deliberation might cause disagreement along with the formation of in-groups and out-groups.43 It can even lead to violence.Read more at location 1231
Some deliberative democrats advocate replacing or at least supplementing mass voting with “deliberative polling.” In a deliberative poll, one brings together, say, a thousand citizens to deliberate about a given topic. The citizens are selected at random, although the poll’s organizers try to ensure that the demographics of the deliberative body are similar to those of the community or nation as a whole. The organizers give the deliberators relevant informational sources, such as news articles, social scientific papers, and philosophical arguments for various sides. A moderator helps spur participants to deliberate and do so properly. The moderator tries to ensure that people stick to the topics at hand and that no one dominates the conversation. There is some evidence that this kind of moderated deliberation can work, at least in the laboratory and even in some real-world scenarios.Read more at location 1240
In the end, I am an instrumentalist about the choice between democracy and epistocracy. If democracy with deliberative polling (with whatever abuses and flaws it suffers) turns out to produce better results than the best form of epistocracy (with whatever abuses and flaws it suffers), then I’ll advocate democracy with deliberative polling.Read more at location 1256
It would be tempting in that case to conclude that deliberation is pointless and ineffective, but at least not harmful.Read more at location 1265
What is rational for you to believe or not depends on the evidence available to you. Imagine a child has led a sheltered life, with no exposure to history, geology, biology, physics, or cosmology. They believe, on the basis of their young Earth creationist parents’ testimony, that the universe is six thousand years old and that all animals were created six thousand years ago. But suppose this child then takes sixteen years of classes in history, geology, biology, physics, and cosmology. Along the way, they get to sequence DNA, re-create Gregor Mendel’s pea experiment, handle fossils, and the like. After sixteen years of intense study, though, suppose they continue to believe the world is six thousand years old and that all animals were created as they currently are. In this case, from an epistemological standpoint, they got worse. After all, they encountered an overwhelming amount of evidence confirming evolution and disconfirming young Earth creationism. They should have changed their mind, but didn’t.Read more at location 1271
Note: RAZIONALITÀ: GLI ARGOMENTI IMPLICANO UNA RETTIFICA. CHI NN RETTIFICA COMMETTE UN ERRORE CHE NN COMMETTE CHI NN DISCUTE. DISCUTERE PEGGIORA LA NS SITUAZIONE Edit
when deliberation has no effect on citizens’ beliefs or their degree of credence in their beliefs, we should generally interpret this as showing that deliberation made them worse, from an epistemic viewpoint.Read more at location 1289
One might expect that most deliberative democrats would advocate deliberation cautiously or with reservations, only in those cases where we had solid evidence it works.48 On the contrary, deliberative democrats tend to be nonplussed by the empirical results described above.Read more at location 1304
Note: IL DELIBERAZIONISTA DI FRONTE ALLA CONFUTAZIONE EMPIRICA: PERPLESSO PRENDE TEMPO IPOTESI AD HOC Edit
They tend to assume the benefits of deliberation will be revealed in due time.Read more at location 1307
Deliberative democrats can rightly assert that the research hasn’t falsified their views, because people aren’t deliberating properly.Read more at location 1318
If they say, “Sure, actual deliberation messes people up, but proper deliberation would improve their character and knowledge,” that’s not much different from stating, “Sure, actual fraternities mess men up, but proper fraternities would improve their character and scholarship.”Read more at location 1365
Note: PENSIAMO AL PAPA CHE DIFENDE LA CHIESA DICENDO: LA CHIESA CHE SBAGLIA NN È VERA CHIESAS QUINDI LA CHIESA CATTOLICA NN È IMPUTABILE. SOSPETTO? Edit
Sometimes it is better for a person’s epistemic character if they remain ignorant and apathetic.Read more at location 1374
Note: MEGLIO L GNORANZA CHE IL SAPERE DEFORME. MEGLIO NN PECCARE SENZA TENTAZIONI CHE PECCARE IN TENTAZIONE Edit
For these reasons, we have strong presumptive grounds against encouraging more and more citizens to participate in politics, spend time thinking about politics, watch political news, or engage in political deliberation.Read more at location 1376
