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Visualizzazione post con etichetta elinor ostrom governare i beni collettivi. Mostra tutti i post

sabato 22 giugno 2019

HL HUERTA IRRIGATION…

HUERTA IRRIGATION…
Note:HUERTA@@@@@@@@@@

Yellow highlight | Location: 1,641
84 irrigators served by the Benacher and Faitanar canals in Valencia gathered at the monastery of St. Francis to draw up… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:NEL 1435

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rights to water from these canals, how the water would be shared in good years as well as bad, how responsibilities for maintenance would be shared, what officials they would elect and how, and what fines would… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:L OGGETTO

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Many rules concerning the distribution of irrigation water were already well established… Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.
Note:C È UN PRIMA

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conflict over water has always been just beneath the surface of everyday life, erupting from time to time
Note:UNA REGIONE ARIDA

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Maass and Anderson (1986)
Note | Location: 1,657
CHI STUDIÒ BENE LA FACCENDA

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Glick (1970)
Note:Cccccccccccc

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Valencia
Note:Tttttttttttttt

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the Turia River are divided into eight major canals serving the 16,000-hectare huerta.
Note:IL PRIMO CASO

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Over 80% of the farms are less than 1 hectare,
Note:AGRICOLTORI PICCOLI...MOLTO FRAMMENTATI

Yellow highlight | Location: 1,664
Most winters are frost-free, and the summers are hot and sunny.
Note:TEMPO

Yellow highlight | Location: 1,665
potatoes, onions, and a wide diversity of vegetable crops.
Note:PRODOTTO

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The variation in the flow of the Turia River has historically been quite high. Years of low water flow have been followed by years of extensive flooding.
Note:IL PROBLEMA

Yellow highlight | Location: 1,669
Until the turn of this century, no dams had been constructed on the Turia River
Note:NIENTE DIGHE

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irrigated land (regadiu), and the remaining lands in these huertas are dry lands (seca).11 Some land is entitled to water only in times of abundance (extremales).
Note:TASSONOMIA EREDITATA DALLA SITUAZIONE

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each piece of regadiu land is entitled to a quantity of canal water proportionate to its size.
Note:IL PRINCIPIO

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irrigators from seven of the major canals are organized into autonomous irrigation communities whose syndic,12 or chief executive, participates in two weekly tribunals.
Note:L ORGANIZZAZIONE...TRIBUNALE DELL ACQUA

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met on Thursday mornings outside the Apostles’ Door of the Cathedral of Valencia.
Note:QUANDI È CONVOCATO...FORTI TRADIZIONI ISLAMICHE

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Its proceedings are carried on without lawyers, but with many onlookers.
Note:DIBATTIMENTO

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immediate decision regarding the facts
Note:TEMPI

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a second tribunal, which serves as a coordinating committee encompassing all seven of the canals to determine when to institute operating procedures related to seasonal low waters or to discuss other intercanal problems.
Note:SECONDA ISTITUZIONE

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His responsibilities include the basic enforcement of the regulations of his own unit. He lias the power to make authoritative physical allocations of water when disputes arise in the day-to-day administration of the waterworks, to levy fines, and to determine the order and timing of water deliveries during times of severe shortages
Note:SYNDIC

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In modern times, the hereters elect an executive committee (junta de gobierno) to consult with the syndic until the next biannual meeting.
Note:ALTRO ORGANO...DECIDE QUANDO CHIUDERE I CANALI X LA MANUTENZIONE

Yellow highlight | Location: 1,699
abundance, seasonal low water, and extraordinary drought.
Note:LE CONDOZIONI AMBIENTALI DA CUI DIPENDONO LE DECISIONI ALLOCATIVE

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allowed to take as much water as they need
Note:IN ABBONDANZA

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water is distributed to specific farmers through a complex, rule-driven hydraulic system.
Note:LOW WATER

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Each farm on a distributory canal receives water in a set rotation order,
Note:Cccccccccc

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If a farmer fails to open his headgate when the water arrives there, he misses his turn and
Note:Ccccccccc

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In periods of extraordinary drought, these prm:edures are modified so that farms whose crops are in the most need of water are given priority over farms whose crops require less water.
Note:SICCITÀ

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As a drought period continues, the syndic and his representatives take more and more responsibility for determining how long each farmer may have water,
Note:CENTRALITÀ SYNDIC

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Given that everyone is watching everyone else, there is considerable potential for violence among irrigators and between irrigators and their agents.
Note:VIOLENZE

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In 1443 there were 441 fines assessed; in 1486 there were 499 fines (Glick 1970, p. 54).
Note:STABILITÀ

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fines at a rate of more than one per day.
Note:Cccccccc

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the temptation to obtain water not legally available to the farmer
Note:VIOLAZIONE COMUNE

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actions that caused harm to others (flooding a road or a fallow field, wasting water)
Note:Cccccccccc

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Thus, approximately 25,000 opportunities for theft occurred, as contrasted to 200 recorded instances of illegal taking of water. That would give a recorded infraction rate of 0.008.
Note:COMPLIANCE

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suspect that high enforcement levels have been required to dampen the ever present temptation to steal water,
Note:CONTROLLI

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even though the syndic received two-thirds of the fine (the other third going to the accuser) and the authorized levels for fines were set high, the actual fines assessed “were very low
Note:INTERESSANTE....FREQUENZA E MITEZZA

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From time to time, the cost to a farmer of waiting for his next legal turn to receive water, as contrasted to stealing water available in the canal, would be extraordinarily high.
Note:COASE

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the guards did not deeply antagonize the farmers, who generally adhered to the rules.
Note:COASE PORTA A BUONI RAPPORTI

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Assessing harsh punishment to someone who usually follows the rules, but in one instance errs in the face of a desperate situation, can engender considerable antagonism and resentment (Oliver 1980).
Note:COME CON O BAMBINI

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Murcia and Orihuela
Note:Ttttttttttttt

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Segura River
Note:IL FIUME DI CUI PARLIAMO ORA...ANCORA PIÙ SECCO CHE A VALENCIA

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Of the 13,300 farms included within the service area of the huerta of Murcia, 83% are less than a single hectare. Of the 4,888 farms in the huerta of Orihuela, 64% are less than a single hectare, and 86% are less than 5 hectares.
Note:PICCOLISSIMI

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water rights in Murcia and Orihuela are tied to the land.
Note:ANCHE QUI

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Regadiu and seca lands were designated long ago and have remained stable for centuries.
Note:AMCHE QUI

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more emphasis on the problem of watering highlands and lowlands
Note:IL PROBLEMA

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Each farmer is assigned a tanda, a fixed time period during which he may withdraw water.
Note:SI VA A TEMPI

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The tanda procedure has some advantages over the turno procedure used in Valencia. Each farmer can plan his activities with a greater degree of certainty as to when he will be able to irrigate.
Note:CFR CON VALENCIIA

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When extraordinary low-water conditions are in effect, the officials of each community post a new schedule for each rotation of the season – approximately every two weeks – indicating which crops will be given precedence
Note:EMERGENZA

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Both huertas have established water courts in which farmers can bring charges against each other
Note:GIURISDIZIONE INDIPENDENTE

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(Consejo de Hombres Buenos)
Note:Cccccccc

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Alicante
Note:Tttttttttt

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Monnegre River
Note:IL PROSSIMO CASO

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The even greater shortage of water in this huerta,
Note:QUI CO VUOLE UNA STRAYEGIA PARTICOLARE

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Shortly after Alicante was recovered from the Muslims, rights to withdraw water for fixed time periods were separated from ownership of land, and a market in these rights existed apart from the market for land.
Note:DIRITTI NEGOZIABILI

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Local irrigators have sought out still other sources of water, and that has involved them in extensive contractual arrangements with large-scale private water companies.
Note:COMAGNIE PROVAYE

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the water rights could not be sold to individuals whose land lay outside the huerta.
Note:CONTRO LA SPECULAZIONE

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They can purchase scrip in three ways: at an informal market among holders of rights conducted on Sunday morning before a formal auction is held; at the formal auction; and on market days, when farmers are congregating for trade.
Note:TRE MERCATI DEI DIRITTI

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to vote in the general assembly of the community, a farmer must own 1.8 hectares of land; to vote for the executive commission, 1.2 hectares of land; and to be eligible to serve on the commission, 3.6 hectares of land
Note:REGOLE DIVERSE QUI

Yellow highlight | Location: 1,871
National authorities have exerted more control over irrigation matters in Alicante than in the other huertas. A large structure, such as Tibi Dam, can be seized and used as a source of revenue and power by a rent-seeking ruler. Although Philip II did not attempt to exercise control over the Tibi Dam when it was built, the dam was transferred to royal ownership for a century in 1739.
Note:RENT SEEKING

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The Spanish Civil War also interrupted the control that farmers exercised over the irrigation syndicate.
Note:Ccccccccccffc

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By the time the centralized monarchy based on the Castilian model came to dominate Spain and Latin America, the autonomy of the huertas was well established. The continuing willingness of the irrigators in these regions to stand up for their rights attests that they had greater autonomy than did those in other parts of Spain.
Note:UN AUTONOMIA BEN DIFES

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the system that has evolved in Alicante enables farmers to be most efficient in using other input factors. The system devised in Valencia is the least efficient of the Spanish systems, with the Murcia-Orihuela systems coming in between.
UNA STIMA DI MAAS....PIÙ BISOGNO PIÙ EFFICIENZA

martedì 13 giugno 2017

Né stato, né mercato: l'alpeggio svizzero e quello gapponese

COMMUNAL TENURE IN HIGH MOUNTAIN MEADOWS AND FORESTS -- Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Canto Classics) by Elinor Ostrom
Törbel, Switzerland
Törbel, Switzerland, a village of about 600 people located in the Vispertal trench of the upper Valais canton,
Note:IL POSTO
For centuries, Törbel peasants have planted their privately owned plots with bread grains, garden vegetables, fruit trees, and hay for winter fodder. Cheese produced by a small group of herdsmen, who tend village cattle pastured on the communally owned alpine meadows during the summer months, has been an important part of the local economy.
Note:ECONOMIA: AGRICOLTURA PRIVATA. ALLEVAMENTO SU PASCOLI COMUNI
five types of communally owned property: the alpine grazing meadows, the forests, the “waste” lands, the irrigation systems, and the paths and roads connecting privately and communally owned properties.
Note:5 TERRENI, 5 DIRITTI
The law specifically forbade a foreigner (Fremde) who bought or otherwise occupied land in Törbel from acquiring any right in the communal alp, common lands, or grazing places, or permission to fell timber. Ownership of a piece of land did not automatically confer any communal right (genossenschaftliches Recht). The inhabitants currently possessing land and water rights reserved the power to decide whether an outsider should be admitted to community membership. (Netting 1976, p. 139)… Access to well-defined common property was strictly limited to citizens, who were specifically extended communal rights.
Note:DOCUMENTI DEL 1400: BANDITO LO STRANIERO
“no citizen could send more cows to the alp than he could feed during the winter” (Netting 1976, p. 139).
Note:QUANTE VACCHE ALL'ALPEGGIO?
Adherence to this “wintering” rule was administered by a local official (Gewalthaber) who was authorized to levy fines on those who exceeded their quotas and to keep one-half of the fines for himself.
Note:INCENTIVI ALL'ESATTORE
This and other forms of cow rights are relatively easy to monitor and enforce.
Note:FACILE APPLICAZIONE
the number of cows each family sends is the basis for determining the amount of cheese the family will receive at the annual distribution.
Note:IL NUMERO DI BESTIE È ANCHE LA BASE PER RIPARTIRE IL FORMAGGIO
The village statutes are voted on by all citizens and provide the general legal authority for an alp association to manage the alp. This association includes all local citizens owning cattle. The association has annual meetings to discuss general rules and policies and elect officials. The officials hire the alp staff, impose fines for misuse of the common property, arrange for distribution of manure on the summer pastures, and organize the annual maintenance work,
Note:L'ASSOCIAZIONE ALLEVATORI
Private rights to land are well developed in Torbel and other Swiss villages. Most of the meadows, gardens, grainfields, and vineyards are owned by various individuals, and complex condominium-type
Note:DIFFUSA ANCHE LA PROPRIETÀ PRIVATA
The inheritance system in Törbel ensures that all legitimate offspring share equally in the division of the private holdings of their parents and consequently in access to the commons, but family property is not divided until surviving siblings are relatively mature (Netting 1972).
Note:EREDITÀ A DILAZIONE
for at least five centuries these Swiss villagers have been intimately familiar with the advantages and disadvantages of both private and communal tenure systems and have carefully matched particular types of land tenure
Note:ISTITUZIONI EMERSE DA UN TRIAL AND ERROR
(1) the value of production per unit of land is low, (2) the frequency or dependability of use or yield is low, (3) the possibility of improvement or intensification is low, (4) a large territory is needed for effective use, and (5) relatively large groups are required for capital-investment activities.
Note:QUANDO È INDICATA LA PROPRIETÀ COMUNE? LE CINQUE CONDIZIONI
Switzerland, farmers use private property for agricultural pursuits and a form of common property for the summer meadows, forests, and stony waste lands near their private holdings. Four-fifths of the alpine territory is owned by some form of common property: by local villages (Gemeinden), by corporations, or by cooperatives. The remaining alpine territory belongs either to the cantons or to private owners or groups of co-owners (Picht 1987, p. 4).
Note:IL SISTEMA TORBEL È ABBASTANZA DIFFUSO… 4/5
(1) the number of animals that can be fed over the winter,5 (2) the amount of meadowland owned by a farmer, (3) the actual amount of hay produced by a farmer, (4) the value of the land owned in the valley, or (5) the number of shares owned in a cooperative. A few villages allow all citizens to send equal numbers of animals to the summer alp (Picht 1987, p. 13).
Note:LA REGOLA PROPORZIONALE SUI DIRITTI
Overuse of alpine meadows is rarely reported.
Note:EVITATA LA TRAGEDIA DEI BENI COMUNI
All of the Swiss institutions used to govern commonly owned alpine meadows have one obvious similarity – the appropriators themselves make all major decisions about the use of the CPR. The users/owners are the main decision making unit.
Note:CHI DECIDE LE REGOLE? CHI USA. NON IL CITTADINO
Many of the rules they use, however, keep their monitoring and other transactions costs relatively low and reduce the potential for conflict.
Note:IMPORTANZA DELLA REGOLA SEMPLICE. NON C'È UNA SORVEGLIANZA PROFESSIONALE
The first step is that the village forester marks the trees ready to be harvested. The second step is that the households eligible to receive timber form work teams and equally divide the work of cutting the trees, hauling the logs, and piling the logs into approximately equal stacks. A lottery is then used to assign particular stacks to the eligible households. No harvesting of trees is authorized at any other time of the year.
Note:LA PROCEDURA PER IL TAGLIO DEGLI ALBERI
Combining work days or days of reckoning (where the summer’s cheese is distributed and assessments are made to cover the costs of the summer’s work) with festivities is another method for reducing some of the costs associated with communal management.
Note:LA FESTA. NEI GIORNI DI DISTRIBUZIONE DEL PRODOTTO, DEI DIRITTI O DI LOTTERIA.
In recent times, the value of labor has risen significantly, thus representing an exogenous change for many Swiss villages. Common-property institutions are also changing to reflect differences in relative factor inputs. Villages that rely on unanimity rules for changing their common-property institutions are not adjusting as rapidly as are those villages that rely on less inclusive rules
Note:CAMBIAMENTI: L'OSTACOLO DELL' UNANIMITÀ
Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan
Margaret A. McKean (1986) estimates that about 12 million hectares of forests and uncultivated mountain meadows were held and managed in common by thousands of rural villages during the Tokugawa period (1600–1867)
Note:QUANTIFICARE LA PROPRIETÀ COMUNE IN GIAPPONE
The villages are established on steep mountains where many microclimates can be distinguished. Peasants cultivate their own private lands, raising rice, garden vegetables, and horses.
Note:I TRE VILLAGGI GIAPPONESI. MOLTO SIMILI A TORBEL
The basis for political rights differed from one village to another. Rights were variously based on cultivation rights in land, taxpaying obligations, or ownership rights in land.
Note:IL PARAMETRO PER DISTRIBUIRE I DIRITTI VARIA
In traditional Japanese villages, the household was the smallest unit of account, but the kumi, composed of several households, was frequently used as an accounting and distributional unit related to the commons….Consequently, households with many members had no advantage, and considerable disadvantages, in their access to the commons. Population growth was extremely low (0.025% for the period 1721–1846),…
Note:FAMIGLIA UNITÀ DI BASE. DISINCENTIVO DEMOGRAFICO
The rules used in these villages, like those in the Swiss villages, were tailored to the specific environment, to the particular economic roles that various forest products played in the local economy, and to the need to minimize the costs of monitoring labor inputs, resource-unit outputs, and compliance with the rules.
Note:CRITERI GUIDA DELLA REGOLAZIONE
A village headman usually was responsible for determining the date when the harvesting of a given product could begin.
Note:FISSARE LA DATA INIZIO LAVORI
... each kumi was assigned a zone according to an annual rotation scheme, and each household had to send one, but only one adult. On the appointed day, each representative reported to the appropriate kumi zone in the winter fodder commons and waited for the temple bell as the signal to begin cutting. However, this grass was cut with large sickles, and since it would be dangerous to have people distributed unevenly around their kumi zone swinging sickles in all directions, the individuals in each kumi lined up together at one end of their zone and advanced to the other end, whacking in step with each other like a great agricultural drill team. The grass was left to dry ... and then two representatives from each house-hold entered the fodder commons to tie the grass up into equal bundles. The haul for each kumi was grouped together and then divided evenly into one cluster per household. Each household was then assigned its cluster by lottery. (McKean 1986, pp. 556–7)
Note:ESEMPIO DI REGOLA PER RACCOGLIERE IL FIENO
There were written rules about the obligation of each household to contribute a share to the collective work to maintain the commons – to conduct the annual burning (which involved cutting nine-foot firebreaks ahead of time, carefully monitoring the blaze, and occasional fire-fighting when the flames jumped the firebreak), to report to harvest on mountain-opening days, or to do a specific cutting of timber or thatch. Accounts were kept about who contributed what to make sure that no household evaded its responsibilities unnoticed. Only illness, family tragedy, or the absence of able-bodied adults whose labor could be spared from routine chores were recognized as excuses for getting out of collective labor.... But, if there was no acceptable excuse, punishment was in order. (McKean 1986, p. 559)
Note:LAVORI COLLETTIVI
Most of the villages hired “detectives” who daily patrolled the commons on horseback in groups of two looking for unauthorized users. In some villages, this position was considered “one of the most prestigious and responsible available to a young man” (McKean 1986, p. 561).
Note:DETECTIVE
One village that did not use formal detectives relied on a form of “citizen’s arrest,” and anyone was authorized to report violations.
Note:CITTADINO PUBBLICO UFFICIALE
“It was considered perfectly appropriate for the detective to demand cash and saké from violators and to use that as their own entertainment cache” (McKean 1986, p. 561). In addition to the fines paid to the detectives, violators were deprived of their contraband harvest, their equipment, and their horses.
Note:SANZIONE
The most serious sanctions that could be and occasionally were imposed involved complete ostracism or ultimately banishment from the village.
Note:PENA DI MORTE... CIVILE
Impatience with waiting for mountain-opening day was one reason.
Note:CAUSA PIÙ COMUNE D'INFRAZIONE
A second reason for rule violation sometimes was genuine disagreement about the management decisions of a village headman.
Note:DISACCORDO SULLE REGOLE
One former detective in Hirano, now a respected village elder, described how he had been patrolling a closed commons one day and came upon not one or two intruders but thirty, including some of the heads of leading households. It was not yet mountain-opening day, but they had entered the commons en masse to cut a particular type of pole used to build trellises to support garden vegetables raised on private plots. If they could not cut the poles soon enough, their entire vegetable crop might be lost, and they believed that the village headman had erred in setting opening day later than these crops required. (McKean 1986, p. 565)
Note:UN ESEMPIO DI VIOLAZIONE MASSIVA
In that instance, fines were imposed, but they involved making a donation to the village school, rather than the usual payment of saké.
SANZIONE PARTICOLARE NEL CASO DI VIOLAZIONI MASSIVE

lunedì 22 febbraio 2016

Governare i beni collettivi di Elinor Ostrom

Governare i beni collettivi di Elinor Ostrom
  • Che differenza c è tra i beni comuni e i beni pubblici?
  • I beni comuni sono difficili da delimitare anche se l esclusione e cmq possibile.
  • Tesi ostrom: nn esiste una dicotomia pubblico/privato ma un continum. Spesso le scelte sono cooperative e le istituzioni che governano i beni comuni sono flessibili e non eteroimposte.
  • Gli utenti spesso hanno tra loro una vicinanza familiare e collaborano in un processo partecipativo. Il localismo è esaltato, così come l autogestione
  • Esempi di risorse comuni: banchi di pesca, pascoli, co,tivazioni open fields, risorse idriche
  • Le consuetudine spesso s impongono sull esclusiva perchè quest'ultima è troppo costosa da applicare, pensiamo ai banchi di pesca. Del resto la socializzazione è talmente inefficiente...
  • Spesso le soluzioni ottimali sono state abbandonate perchè ritenute anti moderne. Le riforme agrarie hanno snobbato le so,uzioni open field per favorire la frammentazione artificiosa o la concentrazione. Anche la tecnica e le macchine hanno remato contro.
  • Tesi: soluzioni open field tornano dove le istituzioni sono sufficientemente elastiche.
  • SoLuzioni open fields sembrano limitare i rischi.
  • L open field è nella pratica una proprietà privata sottoposta a vincoli d uso. Esempio: la rotazione triennale grano orzo maggese scelta dal paese, i privati si adeguano. A ciò si associava il diritto di spigolatura e l obbligo di seminare tutti insieme. Anche il bestiame era privato ma soggetto a regole collettive. Spesso esisteva poi una quota di terreno più collettivizzata delle altre.
  • Esempio italiano: i boschi dell alto cadore. La legna come combustibile. I pascoli comuni cuscinetto evitavano l investimento in staccionate. Dopo la raccolta i campi venivano aperti per spigolatura e pascoli.
  • Il bene comune nn era poi tanto comune visto che la restrizione di sfruttamento assegnava privilegi ad una ristretta cerchia di nobili
  • Il common prevede una chiara definizione della comunità degli aventi diritto. Spesso anzi è necessario appartenere alla cerchia dei patri. Per questo forse i maggiori successi si colgono nelle aeree alpine e impervie in generale. La terra veniva difesa ferocemente dall arrivo degli outsider.
  • L' esclusività è più efficace dei common per garantire sfruttamenti di lu go periodo. D altro canto favorendo la concentrazione favorisce anche l abbandono contro delle terre.
  • Anche internet potrebbe essere trattata come un common.
continua