Visualizzazione post con etichetta swinburne dualismo. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta swinburne dualismo. Mostra tutti i post

giovedì 30 gennaio 2014

L' eresia di Tommaso

Anima definita come forma del corpo.

E' chiaro che in questo caso l' anima perisce con il corpo (violato il dogma dell' immortalità dell' anima).

Tommaso esce dall' imbarazzo in modo cervellotico.

Molto meglio definire diversamente l' anima adottando il dualismo sostanzialista (vedi Swinburne: the evolution of the soul).

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JoB9X2-V1ss

martedì 11 dicembre 2012

Piccola difesa del dualismo

Swinburne è un dualista, trova che questa posizione sia il frutto di una esperienza.

Con questo non mancano gli argomenti per sostenerla, per esempio quello noto del cervello spezzato:


You take my brain out of my skull and you divide it into two, and you put one half
into one otherwise empty skull and the other half into another otherwise empty skull.
And if that’s not enough to produce two conscious persons, you add bits to each of
these brains from my identical clone and then you start these operating and you have
two living persons with conscious lives.  But you do not know which is me – it may
be that number 1 is me and it maybe that number 2 is me and it maybe that neither are
me. But one of these answers must be correct. And that again illustrates the point that
you could know everything that has happened to bodies (what has happened to every
atom of what was previously my brain) and yet no know what has happened to me.
Hence being me must involve something else as well as my body

E' davvero strano che il fisicalismo abbia preso piede in questo modo:


I just don’t think that physicalists have seriously faced
up to what are the data which need explaining. I suppose that they are thinking rather
loosely that since physical science has been very successful in explaining physical
events, all events must be physical events! But obviously that doesn’t follow

Sulla neuroscienza e sui correlati:


the discovery of innumerable causal correlations of this
kind is not the discovery of a scientific theory. For a scientific theory we need more
general laws indicating why certain sorts of brain event give rise to certain sorts of
mental event – why this brain event gives rise to that thought, and the other brain
event gives rise to the other thoughts. I don’t think there can be such a theory

L' internalismo uccide le pretese assurde di certi filosofi ispirati dalla neuroscienza:


There isn’t a quantifiable
difference between a red image and a blue image, although of course there is a
quantifiable difference between their causes. There isn’t a quantifiable difference
between the thought that ‘today is Friday’, and the thought that ‘Russia is a big
country’. Yet to have a scientific  theory you need general functional laws
determining how a certain sort of variation will give rise to another sort of variation

 http://users.ox.ac.uk/~orie0087/framesetpdfs.shtml