A me piace passeggiare meditando le cose di Dio. Ogni giorno faccio in modo di dedicare qualche minuto a questa pratica, basta anche solo la passeggiata con il mio cagnolino. Anche sulla passione per la montagna forse incide questa abitudine. Talvolta, se giungo alla meta senza fatica apparente, il merito è una meditazione particolarmente assorbente. Poi ci sono le preghiere più formali che nel mio caso hanno lo scopo di sospendere la vita e indurmi alla passività. Mi sono fatto l'idea che, ovviamente, possiamo agire bene o male ma di solito agiamo male, cosicché l'inazione diventa un valore da coltivare. Detto così, per quanto vero, suona provocatorio, lo so. Lo dico allora in modo più sfumato e meno radicale: la preghiera è il mio modo per "contare fino a 10". Quando ci capita qualcosa di rilevante l'impulso naturale è quello di agire immediatamente, lo sentiamo quasi come un dovere ma di solito è una iattura. Chi è in cerca di contro prove guardi alla politica: di fronte ad un problema, qualsiasi problema, quello che ci aspettiamo è che la politica si muova e ponga rimedio. Siccome il politico lo sa, si comporta di conseguenza e un decretino non lo nega mai a nessuno. Ma queste aspettative sono demoniache e l'azione a caldo per rispondere alle attese del pubblico pone quasi sempre le basi di problemi successivi ancor più gravi. Ma rinviare i problemi e risolverli è la stessa cosa, almeno per un politico che ha per orizzonte le prossime elezioni tra qualche mese. La preghiera, per me, ha quindi il ruolo di ritardare o azzerare l'azione sostituendosi alle sciagurate aspettative che mettono in moto lo sciagurato politico. E' il miglior vaccino contro il maledetto "action bias", direbbe lo psicologo. Muore una ragazza per mano di un tipo losco? Preghiamo, rimandiamo indagini e condanne. Alluvione? Preghiamo anziché sfamarci con spiegazioni semi-improvvisate. Riscaldamento globale? Preghiamo, anziché agire sulla base di schemini ideologici. Eccetara. Non vale per tutti ma vale per il 90% di noi, e le probbilità di essere nel 90% sono pari... al 90%! I Rosari, in questo senso, sono eccellenti. Ho amato molto anche l'esame di coscienza serale nel quale esercitare il cinismo su me stesso, ovvero scoprire le mie motivazioni ben nascoste dietro quelle più nobili. Poi c'è la mia preghiera preferita per contenuti, la Serenity Prayer: «Dio, concedimi la serenità di accettare le cose che non posso cambiare, il coraggio di cambiare le cose che posso, e la saggezza per conoscere la differenza.». Francamente, non ho mai incontrato un concentrato di saggezza valevole per tutti i campi della conoscenza che ho attraversato. [tra le altre cose, è la premessa ideale per l'elogio della passività di cui sopra].
Visualizzazione post con etichetta #huemer passività. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta #huemer passività. Mostra tutti i post
venerdì 20 settembre 2024
venerdì 13 gennaio 2017
Calma e gesso
Viviamo nella società dell'ignoranza e cerchiamo di gestirla come i dottori medievali gestivano i loro malcapitati pazienti, con salamandre e decotti.
Questa almeno l'opinione da cui parte Mike Huemer nel suo "In Praise of Passivity"...
... Voters, activists, and political leaders of the present day are in the position of medieval doctors. They hold simple, prescientific theories about the workings of society and the causes of social problems, from which they derive a variety of remedies– almost all of which prove either ineffectual or harmful. Society is a complex mechanism whose repair, if possible at all, would require a precise and detailed understanding of a kind that no one today possesses...
Chi vuole agire per porre un rimedio si fermi a riflettere. Anzi, meglio ancora se si ferma e basta...
... the wisest course for political agents is often simply to stop trying to solve society’s problems...
Ma cosa non conosciamo esattamente? La politica e le sue leggi, per esempio.
Esempi di ignoranza proverbiale...
... Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter give the flavor of public political knowledge in America: The most commonly known fact about George [H.W.] Bush’s opinions while he was president was that he hated broccoli. During the 1992 presidential campaign 89 percent of the public knew that Vice President Quayle was feuding with the television character Murphy Brown, but only 19 percent could characterize Bill Clinton’s record on the environment. Also during that campaign, 86 percent of the public knew that the Bushes’ dog was named Millie, yet only 15 percent knew that both presidential candidates supported the death penalty... International data indicate that Americans’ political knowledge is no more than moderately below average...
Il consenso degli esperti è bellamente ignorato anche quelle poche volte che lo si riscontra...
... Fortunately, in some areas of social theory, one can find a clear, policy-relevant consensus among the experts. Unfortunately, this consensus is often boldly defied by both political leaders and the general public...
Il caso del "protezionismo"...
... The vast majority of economists– the people whose profession is to study these kinds of things– oppose protectionism and believe that it harms the domestic economy... even left-wing economists such as Paul Krugman, famous for advocating government management of the economy,[ 21] have signed on to this consensus... When experts from opposite sides of the political spectrum converge on a given position, in contradiction to conventional opinion, who is the more likely victim of a cognitive bias: the community of experts, or the uneducated masses?...
Il caso del terrorismo...
... Experts whose careers center on the study of terrorism generally agree that terrorism functions as retaliation for specific government policies, especially for foreign military occupation of territories that the terrorists prize.[... Political leaders in countries subject to terrorist attacks, however, typically blame the attacks on fundamental and irreconcilable clashes of values, on the moral virtue of their own country and the sheer evil of the terrorists... They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other...
Non che gli esperti abbiano la verità in tasca: sanno ben poco anche loro...
... In light of the ignorance of typical political leaders and members of the general public, we might be tempted by the idea of rule by experts, as in Plato’s Republic.[ 28] [4] Unfortunately, when it comes to descriptive social theory, even the experts’ knowledge is unimpressive, as demonstrated recently by the social psychologist Phillip Tetlock...
Giusto qualcosina in più del profano... più che altro sono bravi a razionalizzare...
... the best experts did only slightly better than chance at predicting outcomes... What the experts were good at was rationalizing their failures...
Ahimé, la politica è zeppa di questioni non testabili...
... Might it be that experts have highly reliable beliefs about these untestable matters? There is no reason to think so. Typically, if a person proves unreliable whenever you actually test that person’s claims, it is reasonable to assume that that person is also unreliable with regard to the claims you did not test... Thus, experts are probably even less reliable when it comes to these untestable matters...
Senza contare che molte scelte politiche riguardano i valori: quanta eguaglianza perseguire? I disaccordi etici sono inevitabili, chi avrà ragione? Boh...
... There is no generally accepted theory– either among ordinary people or among experts– for any of the central evaluative categories of moral or political philosophy. There is no generally accepted theory of the good, the right, justice, authority, human rights, equality, or liberty...
La tentazione è quella di gridare: io ho ragione, ovvio. Ma "io" non sono un essere speciale...
... We may be tempted to argue that while other people are unreliable about evaluative questions, we ourselves have the correct values... I would suggest that we ought to be very suspicious of any attempt to treat ourselves as special...
Cose che sappiamo...
... I think we know that slavery is unjust, that democracy is superior to dictatorship, that torture is almost always wrong, that free markets work better than communist planning...
Davvero poco considerate le discussioni in cui ci impegniamo di solito.
Discutiamo di problemi a cui eminenti studiosi hanno dedicato la vita. Ma a noi, curiosamente, non interessa quanto avevano da dire costoro...
... People often vociferously defend a policy while having no awareness of the literature on the subject...
Ma come riconoscere la conoscenza?
Ci sono 7 indizi...
... Genuine political knowledge tends to be: 1. Simple... 2. Accepted by experts... 3. Non-ideological... 4. Weak... 5. Specific and concrete... 6. Supported by appropriate evidence... 7. Undefeated by counter-evidence...
Forse il punto decisivo è il quarto: la vera conoscenza della società umana è soggetta a molte eccezioni.
Facciamo un caso in cui si riscontrano i 7 requisiti: "le democrazie sono preferibili alla dittatura"...
... Consider now the claim that democracy is better than dictatorship. This claim fares reasonably well with respect to the above list...
Possiamo dire che questa è “conoscenza”. Ma non andiamo molto lontano con questa conoscenza, a noi interessa ben altro.
Ma perché siamo tanto ignoranti in politica?
Innanzitutto l'ignoranza politica è razionale: informarsi costa tanto e rende poco...
... The benefits of political knowledge are dubious. For the overwhelming majority of individuals, political knowledge makes no practical difference to how their lives go, since the probability of their causing a change in public policy is approximately zero... The costs of political knowledge, however, can be enormous, beginning with the costs in sheer time and effort...
Persino coltivare un’abitudine al razionalismo è costoso: il carico cognitivo sopportabile è limitato, meglio investirlo altrove.
Potremmo riassumere l'argomento in quattro punti...
... 1. People act only when the benefits exceed the costs. 2. The benefits of acquiring political knowledge are minimal. 3. The costs of acquiring political knowledge are substantial. 4. Therefore, people will not acquire political knowledge...
E i politici di professione? Hanno interessi diversi dal bene pubblico...
... politician may have strong motives to discover which positions are popular among voters and campaign contributors. But this is quite a different matter from discovering which policies are truly best...
Non voglio essere pessimista: molta gente è sicuramente ben intenzionata. Ma lo è veramente o vuole solo sentirsi tale per sentirsi in pace con se stessa?...
... most of those who think of themselves as deeply moved by high ideals are not in fact so moved. This may seem a surprising claim...
Come discernere i veri "santi"...
... there is at least one way of distinguishing the desire for X from the desire to perceive oneself as promoting X. This is to observe the subject’s efforts at finding out what promotes X...
È una questione empirica...
... It seems to me that most people who expend a great deal of effort promoting political causes expend very little effort attempting to make sure their beliefs are correct...
I riscontri sono scoraggianti: pochi tra i più impegnati studiano, pochi cambiano idea... chiari indizi che l'ideologia spadroneggia e la santità latita. Noi vogliamo sentirci impegnati per il bene, non lo siamo veramente.
Nessuno studia anche perché la materia è difficile...
... There is another reason why human beings are terrible at figuring out political issues: it is a lot harder to figure things out than it appears...
In un certo senso le scienze sociali sono anche più ostiche delle scienze fisiche, il fatto che non esistano laboratori non significa che la sperimentazione sia bandita ma che deve essere molto più sofisticata.
I secoli passati sono cosparsi dai cadaveri di teorie elaborate nelle scienze che riteniamo più affidabili…
… From ancient Greece through the middle ages, the received view in (what then passed for) science was that the physical world was composed of four elements: earth, air, fire, and water. The received medical theory was that diseases were caused by imbalances among the four bodily fluids, namely, black bile, yellow bile, blood, and phlegm. For instance, a fever was caused by an excess of blood, which therefore needed to be treated by draining the patient’s blood. The 20 ancient and medieval theory of the cosmos located the Earth at the center with the sun and planets orbiting the Earth. The fixed stars were points of light on a large spherical shell encompassing the sun, Earth, and planets….
Cosa dovremmo pensare delle teorie di moda oggi nelle pseudoscienze sociali?
L’attenzione, la cura, l’impegno deve come minimo decuplicarsi!
C'è un altro fatto: il numero di teorie possibili che spiegano un fenomeno è infinito...
... the number of possible theories of any given phenomenon is enormous, if not infinite. Of these, all but one are false. So given just the information that T is a theory, the probability that T is correct is approximately zero....
Conseguenza prevedibile: bias ovunque (specie di conferma)…
… 1. People act only when the benefits exceed the costs. 2. The benefits of acquiring political knowledge are minimal. 3. The costs of acquiring political knowledge are substantial. 4. Therefore, people will not acquire political knowledge…
Non sorprende che la politica sia il paradiso dell’ideologia e della “razionalizzazione”: “pensare male” ci consola e ci costa poco, “pensare bene” ci costa caro e ci deprime…
… We now test hypotheses experimentally, making serious and explicit efforts at falsification. But when it comes to political ideology, no such techniques have been developed…
Nessun laboratorio a disposizione, nessun test, nessun esito fastidioso da razionalizzare…
… questions are difficult to investigate because of the unavailability of controlled experiments. If we want to test whether fiscal stimulus cures recessions, we cannot prepare two identical societies, with identical recessions, and then apply fiscal stimulus in one society but not the other… social phenomena are vastly more complex than the phenomena studied by physicists and chemists…
Le generalizzazioni delle scienze valgono “a parità di condizioni”. Ma in politica le condizioni non sono mai “pari”, cambiano sempre come cambia sempre una nube gassosa…
… Generalizations about human behavior almost always contain “ceteris paribus” clauses. Almost any factor influencing our behavior can be amplified or moderated by numerous other factors. When we move to the behavior of an entire society, matters are only that much more complicated. If there are laws of social evolution, they are no doubt incredibly complex… But as Tetlock found, this rarely happens; most experts prefer to explain away their errors in ways that preserve the experts’ theoretical beliefs…
Ma non lasciamoci sedurre dallo scetticismo assoluto: non siamo completamente ignoranti…
… Fortunately, however, we are not completely ignorant, and we can derive some plausible recommendations for political agents…
Traiamo allora alcune conseguenze pratiche dalle considerazioni svolte.
Primo, meglio non votare.
Analogia…
… Imagine that someone asks you for directions to a local restaurant. If you have no idea where the restaurant is, you should not make it up. You should not tell the person some guess that seems sort of plausible to you. You should tell them you don’t know and let them get directions from someone more knowledgeable… Ignorant voting is even worse than ignorant giving of directions, because voting is an exercise of political power (albeit a very small one)– to vote for a policy is not only to make a recommendation, but to request that the policy be imposed on others by force…
Si potrebbe imporre all’elettore lo studio e la razionalità, ma sarebbe una forma di schiavismo vista la mole di studi e di sforzo cognitivo richiesto…
… One might suggest that citizens have an obligation to become informed, and then vote. But becoming sufficiently informed to know who is the best candidate in a given election is typically extremely difficult…
Seconda conseguenza pratica: trascurare i problemi sociali.
Analogia della droga…
… Consider for example the problem of recreational drug use, which leads to health problems, addiction, and general deterioration of the lives of drug users and their families. Perhaps there is something government could do to solve the problem. But given the ignorance of political leaders, activists, and the public, a government attempt to solve the problem is unlikely to succeed…
Obiezione: ma se qualcosina so, qualcosina posso fare… magari poco ma qualcosina…
… one might think that, if we were completely ignorant, our policies would be as likely to increase as to reduce the problem; but as long as we have some relevant knowledge and understanding, and we are aiming at a reduction in the problem, we should be at least slightly more likely to alleviate the problem than to exacerbate it….
Sbagliato per almeno quattro ragioni. Innanzitutto, intervenire produce già dei costi certi a terzi (esempio proibizioni) a fronte di benefici incertissimi…
… First, any government policy that imposes requirements or prohibitions on citizens automatically has certain costs. One cost is the reduction of citizens’ freedom…
Ci sono poi i costi delle punizioni inflitte…
… suffering on the part of those who violate the law and are subsequently punished by the legal system…
C’è il costo della burocrazia necessaria da mettere in piedi…
… the monetary cost involved in implementing the policy…
C’è poi una questione morale: se per te vale il principio “liberty first” non ha senso agire di fronte a tanta incertezza e tanta ignoranza…
… moral presumption against coercive interventions…
L’omissione ci rende meno colpevoli da un punto di vista etico…
… when the state actively intervenes in society– for example, by issuing commands and coercively harming those who disobey its commands– the state then becomes responsible for any resulting harms, in a way that the state would not be responsible for harms that it merely (through lack of knowledge) fails to prevent…
Ma l’argomento più forte è l’ultimo: la possibilità di produrre danni è sempre preponderante.
Se turbo un ordine naturale complesso e non lo faccio dominando tutte le variabili in gioco, avrò degli scompensi, anche se magari la mia conoscenza di quel sistema è molto avanzata. Conoscere poco non serve perché non serve nemmeno conoscere molto: bisogna conoscere tutto quando si toccano sistemi complessi…
… Fourth and finally, a policy made under conditions of extreme ignorance is not equally likely to be beneficial as harmful; it is much more likely to be harmful…
Torniamo ai medici medievali, ma anche a quelli che curarono il povero George Washington per comprendere meglio l’idea di fondo…
… It is here that we must recall the case of George Washington. Washington’s doctors, ignorant of the germ theory of disease and lacking in antibiotics, had no chance of curing Washington’s infection. The human body is a complex mechanism with parts that work together in specific ways. Nearly all things one might add to or take away from the body, and nearly all ways in which one might rearrange the parts of the body, will interfere with that mechanism. Indeed, almost all large changes in the body are fatal. Thus, given their state of ignorance, almost any treatment the former President’s doctors prescribed could be expected to be harmful. Society can be viewed as a vast mechanism, whose parts (individual human beings), like the parts of an organism, work together in extremely complex ways…
Non è questo un invito all’inazione, molte soluzioni registrano un consenso e debbono essere implementate…
… I am not arguing that states should never intervene in society. Some interventions are clearly justified. For instance, prohibitions on murder, theft, and assault are justified. What differentiates these from, say, a prohibition on recreational drug use? A number of differences might be cited, 10 but what is most relevant to this paper is the difference in the state of our knowledge with respect to these prohibitions. We know that prohibitions on murder are beneficial– there are no real counter-arguments to the claim, and all experts agree…
Il non-intervento prudenziale non è un dogma quanto un modo per attribuire l’onere della prova…
… Rather than recommending universal non-intervention, I am advocating a strong burden of proof for those who advocate legal demands or prohibitions…
Ora sappiamo come trattare i casi dubbi di intervento: alcuni esempi…
… The same lesson applies to many other controversial issues, such as gun control, fiscal stimulus, the minimum wage, immigration, and so on…
Altra raccomandazione pratica: indebolire la democrazia.
Qual è il difetto delle democrazie? possono sempre “agire” anche in assenza senza un consenso diffuso…
… for issues that are controversial or require careful reasoning or specialized knowledge, democracy is about the equivalent of drawing policies out of a hat… When an issue is controversial, the best solution is not to simply take a vote; the best solution is to remove the issue from the political arena…
Una soluzione pratica: super-maggioranze…
… It is perhaps infeasible for a Constitution to include prohibitions on all the policies that would be controversial or whose effects would be unknown. A reasonable proxy would be to require large supermajority votes for the passage of any law. For example, a state could be designed in which a 70% vote of the legislature would be required to pass any new law, while a 30% vote would suffice to repeal any existing law…
Altra conseguenza pratica: non lottare mai per cio’ in cui credi.
Qui do’ per scontato che si “lotta” solo per ideali controversi…
… Fighting for something, as I understand the term, involves fighting against someone. If one’s goal faces no (human) opposition, then one might be described as working for a cause (for instance, working to reduce tuberculosis, working to feed the poor) but not fighting for it. Thus, one normally fights for a cause only when what one is promoting is controversial…
Lottare per qualcosa di controverso produce molti costi che paghiamo in prima persona e riversiamo su terzi, e in molti casi l’esito è deprecabile… non ne vale la pena…
… Fighting for a cause has significant costs. Typically, one expends a great deal of time and energy, while simultaneously imposing costs on others, particularly those who oppose one’s own political position. This time and energy is very likely to be wasted, since neither side knows the answer to the issue over which they contend… In many cases, the effort is expended in bringing about a policy that turns out to be harmful or unjust…
Un caso esemplare…
… Thus, suppose you are deciding between donating time or money to Moveon.org (a left-wing political advocacy group), and donating time or money to the Against Malaria Foundation (a charity that fights malaria in the developing world). For those concerned about human welfare, the choice should be clear. Donations to Moveon.org may or may not affect public policy, and if they do, the effect may be either good or bad– that is a matter for debate. But donations to Against Malaria definitely save lives. No one disputes that…
Scegliete allora solo cause non controverse e dedicatevi a quelle, sono più che sufficienti per assorbire tutte le vostre energie.
***
Rolf Dobelli spiega bene i bias dell’iper-reazione parlando di calcio…
…I calciatori che devono tirare un rigore calciano per un terzo nel mezzo, per un terzo a sinistra e per un altro terzo a destra. E i portieri che fanno? Nel 50 per cento dei casi si buttano a sinistra, e nel restante 50 a destra. Ma in pochissimi casi rimangono fermi nel mezzo, anche se un terzo delle palle finisce proprio lì. Perché? Perché sembra loro preferibile e meno doloroso buttarsi dalla parte sbagliata invece di rimanere fermi come scemi e vedere sfrecciare la palla a sinistra o a destra. Questo comportamento si chiama action bias (traducibile con iperattività): agire anche quando non serve…
L’action bias è più forte nelle situazioni nuove o poco chiare…
…Quindi: nelle situazioni incerte sentiamo il bisogno di fare qualcosa, qualunque cosa, poco importa se serve o meno. Ci fa sentire meglio, a prescindere dal fatto che la situazione sia migliorata. Spesso non lo è…
Chiudo citando Pascal…
… «La più grande sventura dell’umanità consiste nel fatto di non essere in grado di restarsene tranquilli nella propria stanza»…
COMMENTO PERSONALE
La preghiera è il modo migliore per coltivare una sana e razionale abitudine alla passività, per tenere a bada cioè lo sciagurato istinto di reagire in modo eccessivo (overeaction) quando capita qualcosa di spiacevole. I terroristi compiono un attentato? Prega, prega per almeno una settimana e invita i politici a farlo. La crisi economica colpisce duro? Prega, prega a lungo e invita i politici a farlo. Si scatena il terremoto o l’alluvione? Limitati all’emergenza, dopodiché prega a lungo invitando i politici a fare altrettanto. Pregare a lungo ci impedisce di agire, l’attività interiore genera passività esteriore, e quindi anche un mondo migliore. I motivi sono finalmente ben spiegati nel saggio di Huemer.
giovedì 12 gennaio 2017
Praise of Passivity Michael Huemer
Notebook per
In Praise of Passivity Michael Huemer
Citation (APA): riccardo-mariani@libero.it. (2014). In Praise of Passivity Michael Huemer [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com
Parte introduttiva
Nota - Posizione 2
esempi di ignoranza: protezionismo e terrorismo l ignoranza degli esperti valori: disaccordo disaccordo su tutta la linea come riconoscere quel che sappiamo xchè tanta ignoranza? 2 teorie (rat ign rat irrat) come distinguere l idealista dall ipocrita le scienze sociali sono scienze? conseguenze pratiche: nn votare trascura i problemi sociali indebolisci la democrazia non lottare x i tuoi ideali male fatto e male non impedito. asimmetria complessità. intervenire o no. asimmetrie
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 2
In Praise of Passivity Michael Huemer
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 11
1. Introduction
Nota - Posizione 11
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 23
Voters, activists, and political leaders of the present day are in the position of medieval doctors. They hold simple, prescientific theories about the workings of society and the causes of social problems, from which they derive a variety of remedies– almost all of which prove either ineffectual or harmful. Society is a complex mechanism whose repair, if possible at all, would require a precise and detailed understanding of a kind that no one today possesses.
Nota - Posizione 26
x SOCIETÀ E IGNORANZA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 27
the wisest course for political agents is often simply to stop trying to solve society’s problems.
Nota - Posizione 28
x LA SOLUZIONE SUBOTTIMA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 32
2. What Don’t We Know?
Nota - Posizione 32
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 33
2.1. Public Ignorance of the Political System
Nota - Posizione 33
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 37
Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter give the flavor of public political knowledge in America: The most commonly known fact about George [H.W.] Bush’s opinions while he was president was that he hated broccoli. During the 1992 presidential campaign 89 percent of the public knew that Vice President Quayle was feuding with the television character Murphy Brown, but only 19 percent could characterize Bill Clinton’s record on the environment. Also during that campaign, 86 percent of the public knew that the Bushes’ dog was named Millie, yet only 15 percent knew that both presidential candidates supported the death penalty.
Nota - Posizione 40
x IGNORANZA PROV DEGLI AMERICANI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 47
International data indicate that Americans’ political knowledge is no more than moderately below average.[ 12,
Nota - Posizione 48
x APPENA SOTTO LA MEDIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 59
2.2. Descriptive Social Theory: The Neglect of Expert Knowledge
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 60
Fortunately, in some areas of social theory, one can find a clear, policy-relevant consensus among the experts. Unfortunately, this consensus is often boldly defied by both political leaders and the general public.
Nota - Posizione 62
x ESPERTI E PUBBLICO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 66
The vast majority of economists– the people whose profession is to study these kinds of things– oppose protectionism and believe that it harms the domestic economy. 2
Nota - Posizione 67
x PROTEZIONISMO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 73
even left-wing economists such as Paul Krugman, famous for advocating government management of the economy,[ 21] have signed on to this consensus.
Nota - Posizione 75
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 75
When experts from opposite sides of the political spectrum converge on a given position, in contradiction to conventional opinion, who is the more likely victim of a cognitive bias: the community of experts, or the uneducated masses?
Nota - Posizione 77
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 77
A second example is provided by the issue of terrorism,
Nota - Posizione 78
X ES TERRORISMO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 79
Experts whose careers center on the study of terrorism generally agree that terrorism functions as retaliation for specific government policies, especially for foreign military occupation of territories that the terrorists prize.[ 27,
Nota - Posizione 81
x ESPERTI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 87
Political leaders in countries subject to terrorist attacks, however, typically blame the attacks on fundamental and irreconcilable clashes of values, on the moral virtue of their own country and the sheer evil of the terrorists.
Nota - Posizione 89
x POPOLO E SCONTRO DI CIVILTÀ
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 91
They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.
Nota - Posizione 91
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 109
2.3. Descriptive Social Theory: The Limits of Expertise
Nota - Posizione 109
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 110
In light of the ignorance of typical political leaders and members of the general public, we might be tempted by the idea of rule by experts, as in Plato’s Republic.[ 28] [4] Unfortunately, when it comes to descriptive social theory, even the experts’ knowledge is unimpressive, as demonstrated recently by the social psychologist Phillip Tetlock.
Nota - Posizione 113
x ESPERTI E TETLOCK
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 115
the best experts did only slightly better than chance at predicting outcomes.
Nota - Posizione 116
x POCO MEGLIO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 118
What the experts were good at was rationalizing their failures.
Nota - Posizione 118
x RAZIONALIZZAZIONE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 134
Might it be that experts have highly reliable beliefs about these untestable matters? There is no reason to think so. Typically, if a person proves unreliable whenever you actually test that person’s claims, it is reasonable to assume that that person is also unreliable with regard to the claims you did not test.
Nota - Posizione 136
x MATERIE NN TESTABILI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 138
Thus, experts are probably even less reliable when it comes to these untestable matters.
Nota - Posizione 138
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 139
2.4. Evaluative Knowledge
Nota - Posizione 139
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 143
There is no generally accepted theory– either among ordinary people or among experts– for any of the central evaluative categories of moral or political philosophy. There is no generally accepted theory of the good, the right, justice, authority, human rights, equality, or liberty.
Nota - Posizione 145
x DISACCORDO SULL ETICA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 154
We may be tempted to argue that while other people are unreliable about evaluative questions, we ourselves have the correct values.
Nota - Posizione 155
x IO HO RAGIONE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 159
I would suggest that we ought to be very suspicious of any attempt to treat ourselves as special,
Nota - Posizione 159
x IO NN SONO SPECIALE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 167
2.5. What We Know
Nota - Posizione 167
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 168
I think we know that slavery is unjust, that democracy is superior to dictatorship, that torture is almost always wrong, that free markets work better than communist planning.
Nota - Posizione 169
x COSE CHE SAPPIAMO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 171
People often vociferously defend a policy while having no awareness of the literature on the subject.
Nota - Posizione 172
x LA LETTERATURA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 175
How can we recognize genuine political knowledge? I cannot offer a precise or complete answer to this question.
Nota - Posizione 176
x COME RICONOSCERE LA CONOSC
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 176
Genuine political knowledge tends to be: 1. Simple.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 179
2. Accepted by experts.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 182
3. Non-ideological.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 185
4. Weak.
Nota - Posizione 185
x SOGGETTA A ECCEZIONI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 187
5. Specific and concrete.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 190
6. Supported by appropriate evidence.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 193
7. Undefeated by counter-evidence.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 197
Consider now the claim that democracy is better than dictatorship. This claim fares reasonably well with respect to the above list.
Nota - Posizione 198
x ES DEMOCR
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 203
3. Why Don’t We Know?
Nota - Posizione 203
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 204
3.1. Rational Ignorance and Irrationality
Nota - Posizione 204
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 208
The benefits of political knowledge are dubious. For the overwhelming majority of individuals, political knowledge makes no practical difference to how their lives go, since the probability of their causing a change in public policy is approximately zero.
Nota - Posizione 210
x L IGNORANZA POLITICA È RAZIONALE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 212
The costs of political knowledge, however, can be enormous, beginning with the costs in sheer time and effort.
Nota - Posizione 213
x COSTIVELEVATISSIMI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 219
cultivation of habits of epistemic rationality.
Nota - Posizione 219
x UN COSTO PARTICOLARE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 225
1. People act only when the benefits exceed the costs. 2. The benefits of acquiring political knowledge are minimal. 3. The costs of acquiring political knowledge are substantial. 4. Therefore, people will not acquire political knowledge.
Nota - Posizione 227
x CONCLUSIONE IN TRE PUNTI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 235
politician may have strong motives to discover which positions are popular among voters and campaign contributors. But this is quite a different matter from discovering which policies are truly best.
Nota - Posizione 237
x L INFORMAZ NEI POLITICI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 242
3.2. Who Cares about the Good of Society?
Nota - Posizione 242
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 248
most of those who think of themselves as deeply moved by high ideals are not in fact so moved. This may seem a surprising claim. How
Nota - Posizione 250
x SENTIRSI SANTI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 252
I suggest that these individuals are chiefly moved, not by a desire for some noble ideal, but by a desire to perceive themselves as working for the noble ideal– not,
Nota - Posizione 253
x SENTIRSI IN PACE CON SE STESSI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 257
there is at least one way of distinguishing the desire for X from the desire to perceive oneself as promoting X. This is to observe the subject’s efforts at finding out what promotes X.
Nota - Posizione 259
x DISCERNERE I FALSI SANTI. COME FARE?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 270
It seems to me that most people who expend a great deal of effort promoting political causes expend very little effort attempting to make sure their beliefs are correct.
Nota - Posizione 271
x I FATTTI. NESSUNO STUDIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 278
3.3. Social Theory Is Harder than You Think
Nota - Posizione 278
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 278
There is another reason why human beings are terrible at figuring out political issues: it is a lot harder to figure things out than it appears.
Nota - Posizione 280
x SS È DIFFICILE. PIÙ CHE LA SCIENZA DURA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 287
We now know that all of these theories are utterly wrong, not even close to the truth. Yet all were widely accepted by the experts for centuries.
Nota - Posizione 289
x ELENCO TEORIE FALSE PER SECOLI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 294
the number of possible theories of any given phenomenon is enormous, if not infinite. Of these, all but one are false. So given just the information that T is a theory, the probability that T is correct is approximately zero.
Nota - Posizione 296
x NUMERO DELLE TEORIE POSSIBILI: INFIN
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 303
Another factor is the widespread phenomenon of confirmation bias: when we think about a hypothesis, our natural tendency is to look for evidence supporting the hypothesis, not to look for ways of falsifying it. 7
Nota - Posizione 305
x BIAS OVUNQUE. CONF BIAS
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 310
We now test hypotheses experimentally, making serious and explicit efforts at falsification. But when it comes to political ideology, no such techniques have been developed.
Nota - Posizione 311
x POLITICA E IDEOLOGIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 316
questions are difficult to investigate because of the unavailability of controlled experiments. If we want to test whether fiscal stimulus cures recessions, we cannot prepare two identical societies, with identical recessions, and then apply fiscal stimulus in one society but not the other.
Nota - Posizione 318
x NO LABORATORI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 320
social phenomena are vastly more complex than the phenomena studied by physicists and chemists.
Nota - Posizione 320
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 332
Generalizations about human behavior almost always contain “ceteris paribus” clauses. Almost any factor influencing our behavior can be amplified or moderated by numerous other factors. When we move to the behavior of an entire society, matters are only that much more complicated. If there are laws of social evolution, they are no doubt incredibly complex.
Nota - Posizione 334
x COETERIS PARIBUS
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 336
But as Tetlock found, this rarely happens; most experts prefer to explain away their errors in ways that preserve the experts’ theoretical beliefs.
Nota - Posizione 337
x RAZIONALIZZAZIONI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 338
rationalizations.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 344
4. Practical Lessons
Nota - Posizione 344
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 350
Fortunately, however, we are not completely ignorant, and we can derive some plausible recommendations for political agents.
Nota - Posizione 350
x NO ALLO SCETYICSMO ASSOLUTO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 352
4.1. Don’t Vote
Nota - Posizione 352
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 357
Imagine that someone asks you for directions to a local restaurant. If you have no idea where the restaurant is, you should not make it up. You should not tell the person some guess that seems sort of plausible to you. You should tell them you don’t know and let them get directions from someone more knowledgeable.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 361
Ignorant voting is even worse than ignorant giving of directions, because voting is an exercise of political power (albeit a very small one)– to vote for a policy is not only to make a recommendation, but to request that the policy be imposed on others by force.
Nota - Posizione 363
x ANALOGIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 367
One might suggest that citizens have an obligation to become informed, and then vote. But becoming sufficiently informed to know who is the best candidate in a given election is typically extremely difficult.
Nota - Posizione 369
x TROPPO ONEROSO IMPORRE L INFO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 377
4.2. Neglect Social Problems
Nota - Posizione 377
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 380
Consider for example the problem of recreational drug use, which leads to health problems, addiction, and general deterioration of the lives of drug users and their families. Perhaps there is something government could do to solve the problem. But given the ignorance of political leaders, activists, and the public, a government attempt to solve the problem is unlikely to succeed.
Nota - Posizione 384
x ESEMPIO DROGA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 385
one might think that, if we were completely ignorant, our policies would be as likely to increase as to reduce the problem; but as long as we have some relevant knowledge and understanding, and we are aiming at a reduction in the problem, we should be at least slightly more likely to alleviate the problem than to exacerbate it.
Nota - Posizione 387
x OBIEZIONE: QUALCOSINA SO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 389
four reasons why this is wrong.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 389
First, any government policy that imposes requirements or prohibitions on citizens automatically has certain costs. One cost is the reduction of citizens’ freedom.
Nota - Posizione 391
x LA PROIB È GIÀ UN COSTO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 391
suffering on the part of those who violate the law and are subsequently punished by the legal system.
Nota - Posizione 392
x COSTO DEL PUNITO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 392
the monetary cost involved in implementing the policy.
Nota - Posizione 392
x COSTO BUROCRAZIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 395
moral presumption against coercive interventions.
Nota - Posizione 395
x ETICA LIBERTY FIRST
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 401
when the state actively intervenes in society– for example, by issuing commands and coercively harming those who disobey its commands– the state then becomes responsible for any resulting harms, in a way that the state would not be responsible for harms that it merely (through lack of knowledge) fails to prevent.
Nota - Posizione 404
x L OMISSIONE CI RENDE MENO COLPEVOLI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 412
Fourth and finally, a policy made under conditions of extreme ignorance is not equally likely to be beneficial as harmful; it is much more likely to be harmful.
Nota - Posizione 413
x PROB DANNO SEMPRE MAGGIORI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 422
It is here that we must recall the case of George Washington. Washington’s doctors, ignorant of the germ theory of disease and lacking in antibiotics, had no chance of curing Washington’s infection. The human body is a complex mechanism with parts that work together in specific ways. Nearly all things one might add to or take away from the body, and nearly all ways in which one might rearrange the parts of the body, will interfere with that mechanism. Indeed, almost all large changes in the body are fatal. Thus, given their state of ignorance, almost any treatment the former President’s doctors prescribed could be expected to be harmful. Society can be viewed as a vast mechanism, whose parts (individual human beings), like the parts of an organism, work together in extremely complex ways. 9
Nota - Posizione 427
x ESISTE UN EQ NATURALE: TURBARLO IN MODO INAPPROPRIATO È SEMPRE DANNOSO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 431
I am not arguing that states should never intervene in society. Some interventions are clearly justified. For instance, prohibitions on murder, theft, and assault are justified. What differentiates these from, say, a prohibition on recreational drug use? A number of differences might be cited, 10 but what is most relevant to this paper is the difference in the state of our knowledge with respect to these prohibitions. We know that prohibitions on murder are beneficial– there are no real counter-arguments to the claim, and all experts agree.
Nota - Posizione 434
x INTERVENTI PLAUSIBILI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 436
Rather than recommending universal non-intervention, I am advocating a strong burden of proof for those who advocate legal demands or prohibitions.
Nota - Posizione 437
x ONERE DELLA PROVA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 439
The same lesson applies to many other controversial issues, such as gun control, fiscal stimulus, the minimum wage, immigration, and so on.
Nota - Posizione 440
x CASI DUBBI DI NN INTERVENTO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 445
4.3. Weaken Democracy
Nota - Posizione 445
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 449
for issues that are controversial or require careful reasoning or specialized knowledge, democracy is about the equivalent of drawing policies out of a hat.
Nota - Posizione 450
x DOVE NN FUNZIONA LA DEMOCR
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 452
When an issue is controversial, the best solution is not to simply take a vote; the best solution is to remove the issue from the political arena– that
Nota - Posizione 453
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 459
It is perhaps infeasible for a Constitution to include prohibitions on all the policies that would be controversial or whose effects would be unknown. A reasonable proxy would be to require large supermajority votes for the passage of any law. For example, a state could be designed in which a 70% vote of the legislature would be required to pass any new law, while a 30% vote would suffice to repeal any existing law.
Nota - Posizione 462
x SUPERMAGGIORANZE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 465
4.4. Don’t Fight for What You Believe In
Nota - Posizione 465
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 466
Fighting for something, as I understand the term, involves fighting against someone. If one’s goal faces no (human) opposition, then one might be described as working for a cause (for instance, working to reduce tuberculosis, working to feed the poor) but not fighting for it. Thus, one normally fights for a cause only when what one is promoting is controversial.
Nota - Posizione 470
x SI LOTA SOLO SE C È era N NEMICO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 474
Fighting for a cause has significant costs. Typically, one expends a great deal of time and energy, while simultaneously imposing costs on others, particularly those who oppose one’s own political position. This time and energy is very likely to be wasted, since neither side knows the answer to the issue over which they contend.
Nota - Posizione 476
x I COSTI DELLA CAUSA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 476
In many cases, the effort is expended in bringing about a policy that turns out to be harmful or unjust.
Nota - Posizione 477
x ESIYI DEPRECABILI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 479
Thus, suppose you are deciding between donating time or money to Moveon.org (a left-wing political advocacy group), and donating time or money to the Against Malaria Foundation (a charity that fights malaria in the developing world). For those concerned about human welfare, the choice should be clear. Donations to Moveon.org may or may not affect public policy, and if they do, the effect may be either good or bad– that is a matter for debate. But donations to Against Malaria definitely save lives. No one disputes that. 12
Nota - Posizione 483
x UN CSSO ESEMPLARE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 490
5. Conclusion
Nota - Posizione 490
t
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