Sul fine ultimo.

Se vuoi spiegare X, spiega a cosa serve X e avrai fatto un buon lavoro. Tuttavia, illustrare le funzioni di qualcosa rimanda al fine di quella cosa, e i fini intermedi rimandano al fine ultimo. In natura, a quanto pare, il fine ultimo è l'immortalità. Tutte le cose vogliono eternarsi. Ma l'immortalità è difficile da ottenere, per cui si ripiega su obbiettivi subottimali, come fare figli, ovvero eternarsi in una copia anomala ma ancora abbastanza simile a noi.

Scala dei fini ultimi:

1) Immortalità.
2) Fare figli da soli (ermafroditismo).
3) Fare figli in due.
4) Fare figli in tre.
5) Fare figli in quattro...
...
1000) Fare figli in 999.
...

Fare figli in tanti consente ai genitori di specializzarsi producendo una protezione più adeguata ai propri figli, in modo che facciano tanti nipoti (una categoria di persone che ha ancora molto a che fare con noi). D'altro canto, fare figli in tanti significa che tali figli saranno meno simili a te. In genere il numero di equilibrio che fissa la natura per fare figli è 2.

Se proprio vuoi dare una patina scientifica alla cosa, tieni presente che questo discorso funziona ancora anche se riduci la persona ai suoi geni. Non c'è molta differenza, almeno qui, tra il gene egoista e l'individuo egoista.

Tuttavia, se guardi il mondo in cui vivi non sembra proprio che la gente abbia l'ossessione di questo fine ultimo, ovvero fare figli. Evidentemente compie degli errori. Perché? Una risposta prevede che ci siamo alienati: lo status sociale è un mezzo per giungere al fine ultimo ma noi ci siamo talmente preoccupati di combattere per ottenere questo mezzo prezioso che ora lo scambiamo per il nostro fine. L'ossessione per lo status, in effetti, questa sì che la vedi ovunque (e i finti umili non fanno eccezione). Ma un'altra risposta potrebbe essere che l'istinto veramente primario, ovvero l'immortalità, interferisce indebitamente e spiega molti dei nostri comportamenti anomali. 

HL 6. The Surprise Quiz

6. The Surprise Quiz Michael Huemer1
Note:6@@@@@@@@@@POSSIBILE APPLICAZIONE A EAAN E ALL EVOLUZIONIAMOIL TEISMO E' UNA CREDENZA STABILE (UNA VOLTA ADOTTATA NON VA RETTIFICATA)L'EVOLUZIONISMO ATEO E' UNA CREDENZA AUTORIMUOVENTE (UNA VOLTA ADOTTATA DEVE ESSERE RETTIFICATA DA MAGGIORI DUBBI)COME AVVIENE QUESTA RETTIFICA?: QUESTO CAPITOLO LO SPIEGA POICHé ANCHE LA CREDENZA DEL QUIZ SORPRENDENTE E' INSTABILE

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6.1 The Paradox
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A professor announces to his class that there will be a surprise quiz next week.
Note:DESCRIZIONE

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The class meets five days a week, Monday through Friday.
Note:Ccccccccccc

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The students go home and try to deduce when the quiz will occur. “Suppose it comes on Friday,” one student reasons. “Then we’d know by the end of Thursday’s class that it was coming on Friday, since that would be the only day of the week left. So then it wouldn’t be a surprise. So the quiz can’t be on Friday.” “What about Thursday?” says another. “Since we’ve just eliminated Friday, that means that if it hasn’t come by Wednesday evening, we’d know it was coming on Thursday, and it wouldn’t be a surprise. So it can’t be on Thursday either.” By similar reasoning, they eliminate Wednesday, then Tuesday, then Monday.
Note:Ccccccccc

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E COSÌ VIA

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The students breathe a sigh of relief, knowing that the surprise quiz cannot be given at all. They spend the weekend partying and getting drunk instead of studying. The next week, the professor gives a quiz on Wednesday. Everyone is surprised.
Note:CONCLUSIONE

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6.2 Rejecting the Assumptions
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The students believe without question everything the professor asserts
Note:PRIMO ASSUNTI

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The students believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs.
Note:SECONDO ASSUNTO...RAZIONALISMO DEI RAGAZZI

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The students are fully aware of their own mental states and abilities.
Note:Ccccccccc

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these are not realistic assumptions
Note:GIUDIZIO

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Perhaps it would be impossible to surprise ideal (perfectly-reasoning, perfectly self-aware, credulous) students.
Note:SOLUZIINE VENTILATA...MA NSODDISFACENTE

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it is highly implausible that one cannot give a surprise quiz to an ideal student
Note:INFATTI

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If the ideal student reasons to the conclusion that the surprise quiz cannot be given on any day, then the student will, after all, be surprised
Note:E POI LA CONTRADDIZ RESTA

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a perfect reasoner cannot be perfectly credulous.
Note:FORSE LE PREMESSE NN SONO FALSE MA CONTRADDITTORIE

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They are, however, reasonably credulous: they are prima facie disposed to accept the professor’s statements about the conduct of the class, unless and until they have good reasons for doubting those statements. This looks like enough to get the paradox going.
Note:MA IL PARADOSSO PUÓ ESSERE RILASSATO E RESO PIÙ CREDIBILE ELIMINANDO IL RISCHIO DI CONTRADDIZIONE

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6.3 What Is Surprise?
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thinking in terms of vague,
Note:L ORIGINE DI MOLTI PARADOSSI

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You are surprised by an event when you previously had zero credence that it would occur.
Note:PRIMA DEF DI SORPRESA

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You are surprised by an event when you previously assigned it less than 100% credence.
Note:SECONDA

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You are surprised by an event when you previously considered it sufficiently unlikely, that is, your credence that it would occur fell below some threshold, t.
Note:TERZA E PIÙ PLAUSIBILE

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“surprise threshold”
Note:CONCETTO

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This is both vague and context-dependent.
Note:VAGHEZZA NN ELIMINATA

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the teacher’s initial announcement, strictly speaking, lacks propositional content.
Note:CONSEGUENZA DELLA VAGHEZZA

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nor is this vagueness the source of the paradox. The teacher’s announcement has sufficient meaning to be aptly made,
Note:MA QUI IL PARADOSSO CONTINUA A REGGERE

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we aptly use vague language all the time in ordinary life.
Note:COME LA VAGHEZZA CHE REGGE NEL LINGUAGGIO COMUNE

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6.4 Quiz Comes if and Only if Surprising
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If the quiz has not come by the end of class on Thursday,
Note:COSA PENSA LO STUDENTE IN QS CONDIZIONI?

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The professor is committed to giving a quiz,
Note:1

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The professor is committed to giving a quiz if and only if it will be a surprise.
Note:2

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Case (ii), however, generates a (sub-)paradox, which is the subject of the present section;
Note:SUB PARADOX

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6.4.1 Self-Undermining Beliefs with a Vague Surprise Threshold
Note:TtttttttttttttttCAPITOLO CHIAVE

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Thursday night, one student says, “Well, it looks like the quiz is coming tomorrow.” Another says, “But wait. Since you just predicted that, that means it won’t be a surprise. Since he has no interest in giving a non-surprise quiz, the prof won’t give a quiz at all.” A third replies, “But wait. Since you just predicted no quiz, that means that it would be a surprise if he gave one.
Note:IL SUB PARADOSSO...DESCRIZIONE

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A fourth replies, “But wait . . .”
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If the students think there will be a quiz, they can infer that there won’t.
Note:IN SINTESI

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What can the students rationally do?
Note:LA DOMANDA.....

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Answer: assign an intermediate degree of belief.
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assign a degree of belief such that, if a quiz is given, it will be a borderline case of a surprise.
Note:Ccccccccccc

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Fig. 6.1 Optimal credence with a vague surprise threshold
Note:CI CREDENZA INIZIALE: CHE PROB CI SONO CHE LO DARÀ?CF CREDENZA INFERITA: DATA CI INFERISCO CHE LO DARÀ ALLA PROB XCI E CF SI INSEGUONO.L UNICA CREDENZA STABILE È QIELLA SULLA BOSETTRICE

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6.4.2 Self-Undermining Beliefs with a Precise Threshold
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if your credence in some event is exactly 60% or below, then the event will count as “surprising”
Note:SUPPONIAMO DI ESSERE PRECISI

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if your credence is 60%, it should be much more than 60%. There is no stable credence.
Note:NN C È STABILITÀ

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For example, imagine a series of one thousand cups of water, cup 1 through cup 1,000, each having a very slightly higher physical temperature than the last. You try feeling the water in each cup, in sequence. For any two adjacent cups, you can’t tell which one feels warmer to you. But by the end, you can tell that cup 1,000 feels much warmer than cup 1. This shows that there can be temperature sensations so similar that one cannot introspectively distinguish them, even though one is in fact warmer-feeling than the other.
Note:SULLA CONTINUITÀ DEGLI STATI MENTALI

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A credence of 0.6 would be introspectively indistinguishable from a credence of 0.600001 or 0.599999.
Note:LA CONTINUITÁ DEGLI STATI MENTALI NN ESISTE....QUINDI LA SOGLIA PRECISA È IMPOSSIBILE

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if the quiz were on Friday, it would be a borderline case of a surprise (if “surprise” is vague),
Note:CONCLUSIONE

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6.4.3 The Rest of the Week
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6.5 Quiz Comes, with or without Surprise
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The professor is committed to giving a quiz, whether or not it will be a surprise.
Note:CONSIDERIAMO QS EVENTUALITÀ

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the professor would prefer the quiz to be a surprise,
Note:PRECISAZIONE

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6.5.1 No Friday Surprise
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the students should adopt a very high credence that a quiz will come on Friday. Not 100%, because there is always a chance that the professor will have forgotten,
Note:GIOVEDÌ SERA E ANCORA NESSUN QUIZ

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the quiz very probably will not be on Friday.
Note:IL PENSIERO DELLA DOMENICA SERA

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6.5.2 Borderline Thursday Surprise
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he’ll probably give it Thursday.
Note:MERCOLEDÍ SERA...CONSIDERANDO CHE VENE SAREBBE POCO SORPRENDENTE...

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Since you just made that prediction, it wouldn’t be a surprise on Thursday
Note:MA....SI RIPETE LA SITAUZIONE PRECEDENTE IL GIOVEDÌ ANZICHÈ VENERDÌ

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Since you just made that prediction, it would be a surprise tomorrow.
Note:INFATTI

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we have a self-undermining belief system.
Note:ANCORA COME PRIMA

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The solution is to assign a credence at about the threshold.
Note:LO STUDENTE RAZIONALE

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if the quiz occurred on Thursday, it would be a borderline case of a surprise,
Note:QUINDI

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6.6 Surprising as Not-Most-Expected
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There is a version of the story where it would be impossible to give a surprise quiz. Suppose we define an “expected” event as one that was antecedently considered the most likely of the alternatives
Note:UN CASO OSTICO

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On this definition of “surprise quiz”, the professor cannot follow through on his promise
Note:PROMESSA IMPOSSIBILE

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He cannot do it on Friday, since on Thursday night, trivially, the students would consider Friday the most likely day
Note:ESEMPIO

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So the professor can’t give a surprise quiz. But this is not paradoxical. This is just a result of the peculiar definition of “surprise”,
NESSUN PARADOSSO

Il pensiero che si cancella da sè

Il pensiero che si cancella da sé

THEORIES THAT ARE INDIRECTLY SELF-DEFEATING – Reasons and Persons – Derek Parfit

***

Trigger warnings: – il problema dello specchio – inefficienza del mercato competitivo (vedi Sen) – rational irrational – teoria dell’autonganno – irrazionalità strategica – quando è bene agire male non significa che si sta agendo bene –

***

WHAT do we have most reason to do? Several theories answer this question. Some of these are moral theories; others are theories about rationality.

Note:CHE FARE?

It claims that a theory fails even in its own terms, and thus condemns itself.

Note:L’ARGOMENTO AUTOCONFUTANTE

all of the best known theories are in certain ways self-defeating. What does this show? In some cases, nothing. In other cases, what is shown is that a theory must be developed further, or extended. And in other cases what is shown is that a theory must be either rejected or revised.

Note:VALE PER TUTTI

1. THE SELF-INTEREST THEORY

According to all moral theories, we ought to try to act morally. According to all theories about rationality, we ought to try to act rationally.

Note:PRESCRIZIONI

Self-interest Theory, or S.

This is a theory about rationality. S gives to each person this aim: the outcomes that would be best for himself,

Note:OBBIETTIVO DI S

On the Hedonistic Theory, what would be best for someone is what would give him most happiness.

Note:FELICITÀ

On the Desire-Fulfilment Theory, what would be best for someone is what would best fulfil his desires throughout his life.

Note:REALIZZAZIONE

All these theories also claim that, in deciding what would be best for someone, we should give equal weight to all the parts of this person’s future.

Note:UNIFORMI NEL TEMPO

It will help to call some aims ultimate. Other aims are instrumental…being rich is not an ultimate aim. ..

Note:FINE ULTIMO

HOW S CAN BE INDIRECTLY SELF-DEFEATING

My S-given aim is that my life go, for me, as well as possible. It can be true that, if I try to do whatever will be best for me, this will be worse for me.

Note:PROBLEMA DELLO SPECCHIO

Suppose that I steal whenever I believe that I will not be caught. I may be often caught, and punished. Even in self-interested terms, honesty may therefore be the best policy for me. These cases are not worth discussing.

Note:IL LADRO INCOMPETENTE

The cases worth discussing are of kind (b). In these cases it will be worse for me if I am purely self-interested,

Note:IL CASO INTERESSANTE

What does this fact involve? I could be purely self-interested without being purely selfish. Suppose that I love my family and friends. …Much of my happiness comes from knowing about, and helping to cause, the happiness of those I love. …

Note:SCAPPATOIA

Hedonists have long known that happiness, when aimed at, is harder to achieve.

Note:L’EDONISTA SA…

I have described two ways in which it would be worse for someone if he was never self-denying.

Note:SOLO L’AUTOINGANNO SALVA

DOES S TELL US TO BE NEVER SELF-DENYING?

It may seem obvious that S tells everyone to be never self-denying. But, as described so far, S claims only that, for each person, there is one supremely rational ultimate aim: that his life go, for him, as well as possible.

Note:S NON CI CHIEDE DI AUTOINGANNARCI

This misinterprets S. When S claims that one disposition is supremely rational, it does not tell us to have this disposition.

Note:AUTOINGANNARSI È COERENTE CON S?

Does this imply that, for S, being rational is a mere means? This depends on what is the best theory about self-interest. On the Hedonistic Theory, S gives to each person this substantive aim: the greatest possible happiness for himself. Being rational is not an essential part of this aim. It is a mere means.

Note:LA RAZIONALITÀ È UN MEZZO?

WHY S DOES NOT FAIL IN ITS OWN TERMS

Does this make S fail in its own terms? Does S condemn itself? The answer is No. S is indirectly self-defeating because it would be worse for these people if they were never self-denying. But S does not tell these people to be never self-denying, and it tells them, if they can, not to be.

Note:INDEBOLIMENTO… NON CONFUTAZIONE

COULD IT BE RATIONAL TO CAUSE ONESELF TO ACT IRRATIONALLY?

Since it would be worse for him if he was never self-denying, it would be better for him if he was sometimes self-denying. It would be better for him if he was sometimes disposed to do what he believes will be worse for him. S claims that acting in this way is irrational. If such a person believes S, it tells him to cause himself to be disposed to act in a way that S claims to be irrational.

Note:QUANDO È RAZIONALE AGIRE IRRAZIONALMENTE

Schelling’s Answer to Armed Robbery. A man breaks into my house. He hears me calling the police. But, since the nearest town is far away, the police cannot arrive in less then fifteen minutes. The man orders me to open the safe in which I hoard my gold. He threatens that, unless he gets the gold in the next five minutes, he will start shooting my children, one by one. What is it rational for me to do? I need the answer fast. I realize that it would not be rational to give this man the gold. The man knows that, if he simply takes the gold, either I or my children could tell the police the make and number of the car in which he drives away. So there is a great risk that, if he gets the gold, he will kill me and my children before he drives away. Since it would be irrational to give this man the gold, should I ignore his threat? This would also be irrational. There is a great risk that he will kill one of my children, to make me believe his threat that, unless he gets the gold, he will kill my other children. What should I do? It is very likely that, whether or not I give this man the gold, he will kill us all. I am in a desperate position. Fortunately, I remember reading Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict.3 I also have a special drug, conveniently at hand. This drug causes one to be, for a brief period, very irrational. Before the man can stop me, I reach for the bottle and drink. Within a few seconds, it becomes apparent that I am crazy. Reeling about the room, I say to the man: ‘Go ahead. I love my children. So please kill them.’ The man tries to get the gold by torturing me. I cry out: ‘This is agony. So please go on.’ Given the state that I am in, the man is now powerless. He can do nothing that will induce me to open the safe.

Note:IRRAZIONALITÀ STRATEGICA

It may be objected, to these claims, that they falsely assume Psychological Determinism.

Note:POSSIAMO DECIDERE DI ESSERE IRRAZIONALI?

AN ARGUMENT FOR REJECTING S WHEN IT CONFLICTS WITH MORALITY

It has been argued that the Self-interest Theory might tell us to believe, not itself, but some other theory. This is clearly possible. According to S, it would be rational for each of us to cause himself to believe some other theory, if this would be better for him.

Note:QUANDO ESSERE MORALI CI RENDE FELICI

It may be best for me if I appear to be trustworthy but remain really never self-denying.

Note:IL CASO AMBIGUO DEL SEGNALE

If we were all transparent, it would be better for each of us if he became trustworthy:

Note:SINCERITÀ CHE CONVIENE

Assume next that, to become trustworthy, we would have to change our beliefs about rationality. We would have to make ourselves believe that it is rational for each of us to keep his promises,

Note:MUTAMENTO DELLA RAZIONALITÀ

It is hard to change our beliefs when our reason for doing so is merely that this change will be in our interests.

Note:MUTAMENTO DIFFICILE

S would tell us to believe, not itself, but a revised form of S. …If S told us to believe this revised theory, would this be an objection to S? …

Note:OBIEZIONE

It would show that, in many kinds of case, it is rational to act morally, even when we believe that this will be worse for us.

Note:RAZIONALE ESSERE MORALI ANCHE CONTRO I NOSTRI INTERESSI

WHY THIS ARGUMENT FAILS

There is a simple objection to this argument. The argument appeals to the fact that S would tell us to make ourselves believe that it is rational to keep our promises, even when we know that this will be worse for us. Call this belief B. B is incompatible with S,

Note:CONFUTAZIONE DELL’ARGOMENTO DELLA MORALITA’ RAZIONALE

My Slavery. You and I share a desert island. We are both transparent, and never self-denying. You now bring about one change in your dispositions, becoming a threat-fulfiller. And you have a bomb that could blow the island up. By regularly threatening to explode this bomb, you force me to toil on your behalf. The only limit on your power is that you must leave my life worth living. If my life became worse than that, it would cease to be better for me to give in to your threats. How can I end my slavery? It would be no good killing you, since your bomb will automatically explode unless you regularly dial some secret number. But suppose that I could make myself transparently a threat-ignorer. Foolishly, you have not threatened that you would ignore this change in my dispositions. So this change would end my slavery.

Note:ALTRO ESEMPIO DI IRRAZIONALITÁ RAZIONALE

Is my act rational? It is not. …I am rationally irrational. But what I am doing is not rational. It is irrational to ignore some threat …

Note:SIAMO FUORI DALLA RAZIONALITÁ

HOW S MIGHT BE SELF-EFFACING

If S told us to believe some other theory, this would not support this other theory. But would it be an objection to S?

Note:SOMMARIO

S would not be failing in its own terms. S is a theory about practical not theoretical rationality. S may tell us to make ourselves have false beliefs.

Note:NON CONFUTANTE MA AUTORIMUOVENTE

Suppose that S told everyone to cause himself to believe some other theory. S would then be self-effacing. If we all believed S, but could also change our beliefs, S would remove itself from the scene.

Note:AUTORIMUOVENTE

HOW CONSEQUENTIALISM IS INDIRECTLY SELF-DEFEATING

Most of my claims could, with little change, cover one group of moral theories. These are the different versions of Consequentialism, or C. C’s central claim is (C1) There is one ultimate moral aim: that outcomes be as good as possible.

Note:IL CONSEGUENZIALISMO COME TEORIA AUTORIMUOVENTE

To apply C, we must ask what makes outcomes better or worse. The simplest answer is given by Utilitarianism. This theory combines C with the following claim: the best outcome is the one that gives to people the greatest net sum of benefits minus burdens, or, on the Hedonistic version of this claim, the greatest net sum of happiness minus misery.

Note:UTILITARISMO

Consequentialism appeals to many different principles, it ceases to be a distinctive theory, since it can be made to cover all moral theories. This is a mistake. C appeals only to principles about what makes outcomes better or worse.

Note:AUTORIMOZIONE

I shall now describe a different way in which some theory T might be self-defeating. Call T indirectly collectively self-defeating when it is true that, if several people try to achieve their T-given aims, these aims will be worse achieved.

Note:IL MODO CLASSICO DI AUTOCONFUTARSI

THE ETHICS OF FANTASY

I have assumed that C is indirectly collectively self-defeating. I have assumed that, if we were all pure do-gooders, the outcome would be worse than it would be if we had certain other sets of motives. If this claim is true, C tells us that we should try to have one of these other sets of motives.

Note:RIASSUNTINO SU C

I also believe that, even if we became convinced that Consequentialism was the best moral theory, most of us would not in fact become pure do-gooders. Because he makes a similar assumption, Mackie calls Act Utilitarianism ‘the ethics of fantasy’.11 Like several other writers, he assumes that we should reject a moral theory if it is in this sense unrealistically demanding: if it is true that, even if we all accepted this theory, most of us would in fact seldom do what this theory claims that we ought to do.

Note:UTILITARISMO TOO DEMANDING

COLLECTIVE CONSEQUENTIALISM

It is worth distinguishing C from another form of Consequentialism. As stated so far, C is individualistic and concerned with actual effects. According to C, each of us should try to do what would make the outcome best, given what others will actually do.

Note:C COLLETTIVO E INDIVIDUALE

On this theory, each of us should try to have one of the sets of desires and dispositions which is such that, if everyone had one of these sets, this would make the outcome better than if everyone had other sets.

Note:C KANTIANO

CC does not differ from C only in its claims about our desires and dispositions. The two theories disagree about what we ought to do.

Note:DIFFERENZE TRA C E CC

Collective Consequentialism is much less demanding. It does not tell me to give the amount that would in fact make the outcome best.

Note:LESS DEMANDING

BLAMELESS WRONGDOING

Case One. Clare could either give her child some benefit, or give much greater benefits to some unfortunate stranger. Because she loves her child, she benefits him rather than the stranger. …She may therefore believe that she is acting wrongly. …

Note:ESEMPIO DEL TOO DEMANDING

If someone freely does what she believes to be wrong, she is usually open to serious moral criticism.

Note:OVVIA OBIEZIONE

Case Two. Clare could either save her child’s life, or save the lives of several strangers. Because she loves her child, she saves him, and the strangers all die.

Note:ALTRO CASO

My Moral Corruption. Suppose that I have some public career that would be wrecked if I was involved in a scandal. I have an enemy, a criminal whom I exposed. This enemy, now released, wants revenge. Rather than simply injuring me, he decides to force me to corrupt myself, knowing that I shall think this worse than most injuries. He threatens that either he or some member of his gang will kill all my children, unless I act in some obscene way, that he will film. If he later sent this film to some journalist, my career would be wrecked. He will thus be able later, by threatening to wreck my career, to cause me to choose to act wrongly. He will cause me to choose to help him commit various minor crimes. …Knowing my enemy, I have good reason to believe what he says. Since it is the only way to save my children’s lives, I ought to let him make his film. I ought to make myself disposed to help him commit his minor crimes. And it would be wrong for me to cause myself to lose this disposition, since, if I do, my children will be killed. …

Note:QUANDO E’ BENE AGIRE MALE

I shall now state together four similar mistakes. Some people claim that, if it is rational for me to cause myself to have some disposition, it cannot be irrational to act upon this disposition. This was shown to be false by the case I called Schelling’s Answer to Armed Robbery. A second claim is that, if it is rational for me to cause myself to believe that some act is rational, this act is rational. This was shown to be false by the case that I called My Slavery. A third claim is that, if there is some disposition that I ought to cause myself to have, and that it would be wrong for me to cause myself to lose, it cannot be wrong for me to act upon this disposition. The case just given shows this to be false.

I QUATTRO ERRORI CANONICI