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venerdì 24 marzo 2017

HL Non esiste una connessione tra voto e interesse - dal Chapter 5 RATIONAL IRRATIONALITY

The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies by Bryan Caplan
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Last annotated on March 24, 2017
CHAPTER 1 Empirically, there is little connection between voting and material interests. Contrary to popular stereotypes of the rich Republican and the poor Democrat, income and party identity are only loosely related. The elderly are if anything slightly less supportive of Social Security and Medicare than the rest of the population. Men are more pro-choice than women.Read more at location 500
Note: ELETTORI E INTERESSE: CONNESSIONE DEBOLE Edit
Chapter 5 RATIONAL IRRATIONALITYRead more at location 2107
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Both economists and the public almost automatically accept the view that poor people are liberal Democrats and rich people are conservative Republicans. The data paint a quite different picture. At least in the United States, there is only a flimsy connection between individuals’ incomes and their ideology or party. The sign fits the stereotype: As your income rises, you are more likely to be conservative and Republican. But the effect is small, and shrinks further after controlling for race. A black millionaire is more likely to be a Democrat than a white janitor.25 The Republicans might be the party for the rich, but they are not the party of the rich.Read more at location 2789
Note: RICCHEZZA E AFFILIAZIONE POLITICA*** Edit
the rich are not trying to advance upper-class interests, it does not follow that the interests of the poor suffer. Similarly, just because the old vote in greater numbers, it does not follow that the young lose out. For that fear to be justified, the young would have to be less supportive of old-age programs than their seniors. They are not.Read more at location 2937
Note: RICCHI E VECCHI Edit
For overviews of the empirical evidence on the self-interested voter hypothesis, see Mansbridge (1990), Sears and Funk (1990), Citrin and Green (1990), and Sears et al. (1980). On income and party identification, see Gelman et al. (2005), Luttbeg and Martinez (1990), and Kamieniecki (1985). On age and policy preferences, see Ponza et al. (1988). On gender and public opinion about abortion, see Shapiro and Mahajan (1986).Read more at location 4059
Note: ELETTORI NON GUIDATI DALL'INTERESSE NOTA Edit