GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY Christian Foundations of 'John Locke's Political Thought di JEREMY WALDRON - seconsa parte cap. 3 Species and the Shape of Equality

GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY Christian Foundations of 'John Locke's Political Thought di  JEREMY WALDRON -     seconda parte cap. 3 Species and the Shape of Equality

• the importance that Locke attaches to the dividing line between human and non-human species
• "The entire cosmos is the work of God....It is an ordered hierarchy, a `great chain of being', in which every species has its station, its rank."...
• Locke's human egalitarianism depends crucially on the clarity and intelligibility of the species-boundaries.
• we turn to the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. standing. What Locke says there about species is almost entirely at odds with the conception of species-hierarchy
• Locke envisages ages a series of created beings, ascending from the lowest entity to the highest... But it ascends up from us "by gentle degrees"... this chain of being forms a continuous series of entities..."no Chasms, or gaps" between beings
• We language-users have no choice but to confront this continuum with words............difference between this particular cat and that particular dog. Nothing in nature shows that these resemblances and differences categorize themselves into essences.... there is no reason to think that our tendency to organize resemblances into clusters under the auspices of general species-terms reflects anything other than our propensity as language-users to make use of general words.
• I think this offers little in the way of assistance for our use of the concept species in moral and political theory....Locke's account of real essences is far from straightforward...I believe it is basically a pragmatic one:
• Sometimes Locke presents the unavailability to us of objective real essences as a reflection of the limitations on our knowledge.
• In general, we seem to have here a pretty thorough-going anti-realism, so far as species are concerned.
• the putative boundaries between humans mans and other animals are blurred in a number of ways. Fetuses are sometimes oddly shaped, familiarly shaped humans often vary enormously mously in their rational abilities, some allegedly non-human animals have been rumored to have the power of speech, humans have been known to interbreed with apes (Locke alleges), and so on:
• The fact is, says Locke, that you are likely to get disagreement among people as to how to draw the boundaries of the species:
• which internal features caught our attention would be a matter ter of which were inherently interesting to us....it is our interests that would dictate what revisions we made in (what we called) the essence of man.
• when he talks about fetal monstrosities, Locke says that there is a question about whether the entity is entitled to baptism.....I think this shows the absurdity of the Laslett suggestion that we have, on the one hand, Locke the philosopher (uninterested in normative implications) and, on the other hand, Locke the political theorist (uninterested in philosophy).
• On the face of it, the implications of Locke's skepticism about species are pretty serious. If the boundaries of species are made by men and not given by our Creator... "the same individual will be a true Man to the one [party], which is not so to the other"... Locke's comment in Book IV of the Essay, on how an English child might "prove" that a negro is not a man, is really quite disconcerting in this regard.4°
• by rejecting essentialism, Locke is undercutting those theories of human inequality that depend on "essentializing" superficial characteristics like skin color or sex organs. Kathy Squadrito says, for example, that Locke's rejection of external form as real essence means that he doesn't really think there is an important portant difference between men and women.4'
• the point about Locke's anti-essentialism is that it leaves the field wide open for anyone to draw the boundaries...It leaves him with no naturalistic basis whatsoever for distinguishing those creatures
• Maybe this should boost the morale of anti-speciesist defenders of animal rights; but it is hardly calculated to cheer those who think there is something special about humans and human equality.
• Locke is also supposed to have committed himself to a fundamental principle of equality: members of the same species are naturally equal in authority, whatever the other differences between them. But now that species-based notion has collapsed...Locke seems to have deprived himself of the resource he needs to limit
• My strategy in this chapter is to show the indispensability for Locke's theory of equality of the religious aspect of his argument
• In biblical revelation, the only direct intimation of a basis for the distinction of the human species is descent from Adam.... Anyway, a purely genealogical basis for equality and inequality would be practically inadequate.
• Locke says in his political philosophy that any basis for inequality must be evident, clear, and mmnifest.
• Senso comune. So what is to be done? I think that in order to make Locke's account of equality in the Two Treatises consistent with his discussion in Book III ofthe Essay, we have to forget about real essences, and abandon the emphasis on species altogether. I think we should focus instead on   real resemblances between particulars:... We must ask which resemblances are actually doing the crucial work... That will give us his definition of humanity...
• .The emphasis now is on characteristics not on species or ranks of species. The domain of equality will simply be the domain of relevant similarity ity i.e. the possession of faculties that can be regarded as the same or (relevantly) similar.
• Our heuristic now is emphatically...we have to start from the idea of a similarity among faculties that would be robust enough to sustain
• focusing moral attention not on species, but on the complex property of corporeal rationality.... the detail of the issue about species can be left as a purely speculative problem for the naturalists and philosophers.
• Locke. The key, he says, is corporeal rationality...It is intriguing, though, that corporeality is also invoked... This little point, I believe, is quite unintelligible apart from the moral theology. ogy. Locke speculates that there are all sorts of rational beings in the cosmos
• .I don't think he is attempting to commit the naturalistic fallacy by inferring our normative equality from some factual similarity. He says in the Second Treatise that the connection is "evident" (2nd T: 4), but that this is not the same as saying that it is logically implied... like angels, for instance,
• Let us turn now to the rationality criterion....Unfortunately,...non-human animals have minds,... Since they are "not bare Machins (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some Reason"
• There are degrees of rationality, both among those we are pre-theoretically inclined to call humans and in a broader class of animals...On this gradual scale, who gets the benefit of equality?
• There is, for example, the human fetus, which, Locke says, "dfers not much from the State of a Vegetable...lunacy, idiocy.......Infants are a slightly different case,.... Locke's argument is that they are to be treated as beings destined for equality, though not our equals at present.... And finally there are the familiar distinctions between the wise and the silly,
• If there is, as Locke says, "a difference of degrees in Men's Understandings...there is a greater distance between some Men and others in this respect than between tween some Men and some Beasts" (E: 4.20.5), then how can we work with or justify any notion of basic equality?
• that, considered as tabulae rasae, our minds are all the same, and that the intellectual differences between us are simply a matter of input and exercise.
• In Book II of the Essay, he argued that what distinguishes humans from other animals is not their capacity to reason per se - for brute animals have some sort of reason - but rather the "power of Abstracting," the capacity to reason on the basis of general ideas.... So, maybe this is Locke's equality-threshold.
• But he quickly indicates that many who bear the nominal essence of man lack the ability to abstract. Many of those we call idiots
• Locke is not offering this capacity to abstract as the real essence of the species human. He is offering it as an interesting resemblance among all the beings
• for Locke the real resemblance on which basic equality rests the ability to form and work with abstract ideas must work rather like what modern political philosophers call a range property....A range property may be understood in terms of a region on a scale.... we may use the binary property of being within the range,l... In John Rawls's own use of the idea, the relevant range property is the capacity for moral personality.
• Relative to the interest driving the specification of the range property, the precise location tion of an entity on the scale is uninteresting. That it is Within the range is all we need to know...Is there anything which can do this work for Locke?
• No matter how inadequate the average human intellect is for a "universal, sal, or perfect Comprehension," it yet secures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own Duties... The existence of God, Locke believes, is something that can be established by the unaided human intellect, whatever that intellect's other limitations.
• God .... He has conferred on those whom He intends to serve Him the rational power that is required for easy recognition of His existence.... Anyone with the capacity for abstraction can reason to the existence of God... he has the minimal capacity to think of himself as a person.
• The fact that a being can get this far, intellectually, by whatever route, shows that he is a creature with a special moral relation to God.
• if I catch a human in full possession of his faculties, I know I should be careful how I deal with him. Because creatures capable of abstraction can be conceived as "all the servants of one Sovereign Master,
• That, it seems to me, is the interest that is driving and shaping Locke's moral conception of "man," and motivating the interest in the particular range of capacities that forms the basis for Lockean equality.
• Someone in denial of or indifferent to the existence of God is not going to be able to come up with anything like the sort of basis for equality that Locke came up with.
• There is no reason for an atheist to recognize such a threshold... The atheist has no basis in his philosophy for thinking that beings endowed with the capacity that Locke emphasizes are for that reason to be treated as special and sacred in the way Locke thought.
• Locke's equality claims are not separable from the theological content that shapes and organizes them. The theological content cannot simply ply be bracketed off as a curiosity
• Lockean equality is not fit to be taught as a secular doctrine; it is a conception of equality that makes no sense except in the light of a particular account of the relation between man and God.

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GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY Christian Foundations of 'John Locke's Political Thought di JEREMY WALDRON - prima parte cap. 3 Species and the Shape of Equality

GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY Christian Foundations of 'John Locke's Political Thought di  JEREMY WALDRON -     prima parte cap- 3 Species and the Shape of Equality

• xchè nn possiamo omettere la dimensione religiosa in locke?
• rawls ha bisogno di premettere il valore dell uguaglianza ma nn vuole compromissioni religiose
• relazione comando/comandante
• es. nn uccidere l altro... xchè anch esso è a immagine di dio... che relazione c è tra la prima e la seconda parte (quella religiosa)
• le ragioni di un comando ci consentono di capirlo meglio? sì quando il predicato è astratto e indeterminato
• nel precetto dell eguaglianza tra uomini il termine umano riceve il suo contenuto dall affermazione religiosa
• contenuto del comando e ragioni del comando nn sono sempre separabili ma interagiscono specie nei comandi astratti: siate onesti. questo fatto mette in crisi i nn cognitivisti
• "gli uomini sono uguali"... il concetto di uomo è in parte determinato dal comando e nn solo viceversa
• la necessità di definire l umano spiazza rawls e i laici
• @@@
• il principio di eguaglianza fa della specie umana qualcosa di speciale
• una filosofia che nn distingue tra specie crea grave danno alla filosofia ma x distinguere occorre introdurre l elemento religioso
• il dominio dell uomo sul creato
• .....
• Macintyre's observation:... arguments of John Locke concerning basic equality and individual rights were so imbued with religious content that they were not fit, constitutionally, stitutionally, to be taught in the public schools
• Why are we not able to bracket off the theological dimension of Locke's commitment to equality?
• Why can't we put the religious premises in parentheses?...this hope is crucial for modern secular liberalism.... Rawls's system definitely requires a premise of equality... but I am doubtful that this Rawlsian strategy will work.
• Rawlsian strategy... religious content has a purely external relation to the equality principle. By an external relation, I mean a relation that does not go to the meaning
• Consider, for example, the relation of some proposition about a commander to the content of his command.
• For example, the Sixth Commandment has a content "Thou shalt not kill" which seems logically quite independent of any proposition about... what one might call the preface to the Decalogue "I am the Lord thy God,
• The commandment to Noah prohibiting murder cites as a reason the fact that potential victims of murder are made in the image of the person (God) who has issued the commandment.... There the religious aspect seems to have an internal relation to the commandment,
• Someone might object that this confuses content with reasons....the fact that P is cited as a reason for Q doesn't mean that P is indispensable for understanding the meaning of Q
• Now this is sometimes true, especially where the reasons in question establish nothing but an instrumental relationship.....I think the Rawlsians overestimate the extent to which it is true generally,
• Abstract principles of justice and rights characteristically need to be filled
• I have argued this elsewhere with regard to John Stuart Mill's "Harm Principle."8
• I think this is particularly the case where a moral principle involves predicates whose extension is not given determinately apart from the principle in question.
• I believe this is also true of the predicate "human" in the principle of basic human equality.
• in Locke's account, the shape of human.....is not in the end separable from the religious reasons... If someone arrives at what purports to be a principle of human equality on other grounds (e.g., non-religious grounds), there is little reason to believe that that principle will have the same shape or texture as the Lockean principle....
• Many non-cognitivists assume that moral positions are subjective responses to factual features
• They think this is true not just of moral positions like "Causing pain is wrong," where it is clear that we can use the descriptive words "causing pain" to identify the actions concerned... but also that it is true of moral positions involving "thick" moral concepts, positions tions like "Honesty is the best policy" and "Courage cannot be taught."... concepts like honesty and courage can be analyzed into descriptive components referring to some fact about the world
• John McDowell and others have expressed doubts about the general applicability of this pattern of analysis. What, asks McDowell, makes us so confident that we can always disentangle the descriptive properties from the evaluative response?
• The descriptive features underlying a given normative attitude might well seem weird or "shapeless""
• I think a version of McDowell's point may apply to the concept human embedded in our commitment to equality.... But our concept human may be partly shaped by our commitment to equality,
• Locke's religious premises help to make sense of or give shape to a certain cluster of human characteristics
• shapelessness point deprives the Rawlsians and others who favor the bracketing approach
• All men are equal...These are familiar egalitarian propositions. To whom do they apply?...I shall devote the rest of this chapter to an exploration of some of the extraordinary difficulties thatJohn Locke gets into as he tries to answer these questions,
• John Locke asserts as a matter of principle the fundamental equality of all members of the human species. Members of this species have a special status, or occupy a special moral position quite unlike that of any other animal....any parallel for the co-members of any other species.
• But in his philosophy of science...Locke comes very close to saying that there are no such things as species....species are at best just human conventions... The danger that this poses to the moral and political argument is enormous.
• Locke is not a pragmatist, like (say) Richard Rorty, proposing to keep a whole moral system tem afloat by using some conventional commitments to evaluate others.13 His approach in the Two Treatises and in his other political writings is explicitly plicitly foundationalist,
• A causa di qs difficoltà... we have been taught by historians of the Cambridge school- in particular ular Peter Laslett and his followers to assume that Locke's politics can and should be studied in more or less complete isolation from the rest of his philosophy...."Locke is, perhaps, the least consistent of all the great philosophers,
• Ma... The actual evidence cited for Locke's having contradicted himself was always quite slight
• Well, I believe they are wrong...it is not just a matter of noticing the difficulty and then winching down God to resolve it.
• Locke talks about God's decision to "make a Species of Creatures, that should have Dominion over the other Species

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GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY Christian Foundations of 'John Locke's Political Thought di JEREMY WALDRON - 2Adam and Eve

GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY Christian Foundations of 'John Locke's Political Thought di  JEREMY WALDRON - 2 Adam and Eve - nn finito

• uomo donna
• 1 entrambi a immagine di dio 2 entrambi dotati di ragione => la diseguaglianza prospettata è quindi di ruolo
• ....
• There is, first, an awkwardness...at having to make explicit... that humans are special and that some of the more obvious differences between them are irrelevant to the fundamentals of moral
• Secondly, we are discomfited at the prospect of having to take seriously, even if only for the sake of clarity and refutation, racist and sexist positions
• Filmer sottolinea... The biblical subordination of Eve to Adam
• women as much as men are created in the image of God and endowed with the modicum of reason that is, for Locke, the criterion of human equality.

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GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITYChristian Foundations of 'John Locke's Political Thought di JEREMY WALDRON - Introduction

GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITYChristian Foundations of 'John Locke's Political Thought di  JEREMY WALDRON - Introduction

• messaggio cristiano: creati eguali...eg. di base...raccolto da locke
• domanda consueta: quale uguaglianza?
• nostra domanda: xchè l uguaglianza
• Dworkin: l eguaglianza data x scontata (il dibattito è su quale). Ma xchè tanta sicumera?
• xchè giustificare l uguaglianza?: nessuno la nega.
• ai tempi di locke era negata: filmer
• x locke l assioma dell eg. è un assioma teologico
• che fatica tradurre locke nel linguaggio di oggi
• il ponte: anche x noi l eguaglianza è un valore difficilmente relativizzabile... col relativista qui casca l asino
• il ponte: l uguaglianza come valore pre politico
• il fondamento cristiano: secondo l a. è necessario x difendere la causa dell e.
• alternative:isaia berlin e la difesa utilitaristica... argomento circolare
• confutazione di filmer: 1 primo trattato: sulla base delle scritture 2 sec. trattato: sulla base della ragione
• 1 trattato: fissa l eguaglianza 2 trattato: spiega l eguaglianza
• filmer e aristotele... inegalitarismo particolare e generale... diritto divino dei re contro schiavi naturali
• l argomento religioso x la libertà è spesso caricaturizzato... cpn locke c è l occasione di prenderlo sul serio
• .......
• equality: the proposition that humans are all one another's equals created equal,
• I propose to explore in the company ofthe seventeenth-century English political philosopher John Locke.
• Testo. The Reasonableness of Christianity is as well-worked-out a theory of basic equality as we have in the canon of political philosophy.
• Philosophers ask whether we should be aiming for equality ofwealth, equality ofincome, equality of happiness, or equality of opportunity... mitigation of poverty;
• La questino del libro. Not "What are its implications?" but "What does this foundational equality amount to?"... "What is the character of our deeper commitment to treating all human beings as equals
• Il silenzio degli egalitaristi. Distinction between basic equality and equality as an aim is fundamental to Dworkin's work. Yet Dworkin has said next to nothing... He has devoted very little energy to the task of considering what that principle amounts to in itself... He maintains that it is an obvious and generally accepted truth
• .If he is right and I think he is then there is a failure of argument on a very broad front indeed.
• No doubt part of the reason for reticence here has to do with the unpleasantness or offensiveness of the views - sexist and racist
• Esperimento mentale. In philosophy generally erally one sometimes has to pretend to be a weirdo... In political philosophy, one has to appear to take seriously positions that in other contexts would be dismissed out of hand as offensive...
• By contrast John Locke and his contemporaries...were confronted with such denials,
• Sir Robert Filmer, the great proponent of patriarchalism... and the divine right of kings...in the same Multitude ... there is one Man amongst them, that in Nature hath a Right to be king
• It was the contrary position the principle of equality that seemed radical, disreputable, beyond reason, valid only as a philosophical hypothesis
• Locke, beyond doubt, was one of these equality-radicals... Political correctness argued the other way,
• Locke accorded basic equality the strongest grounding that a principle could have: it was an axiom of theology, understood as perhaps the most important truth about God's way
• Locke attempting to think through the consequences of this radicalism.... holding fast to what he knew was a counter-intuitive position,
• We are not accustomed to debate public controversies about equality using Old Testament sources;
• "Creatures of the same Species and rank"... "there is no appeal but to Heaven"
• Even if we say it is "just" a metaphor, it is a forbidding enough task to explain to a modern student what makes the metaphor apt,
• potential for anachronism and misunderstanding,
• many of us believe that this business of respecting one another as equals might have to be referred, in turn, to the idea of something important in or about human nature.
• Locke was exploring the possibility that humans were by nature worthy of respect as one another's equals, not just one another's equals in the politics of late seventeenth-century England,
• The title of my Carlyle Lectures and the sub-title of this book refer to the Christian foundations of Locke's political thought......Why "Christian"? Why not just "Religious Foundations of Equality"?...Locke was intensely interested in Christian doctrine...Dunn has argued that the whole frame of discussion in the Two Treatises of Government is "saturated with Christian assumptions..... Jesus Christ (and Saint Paul) may not appear in person in the text of the Two Treatises but their presence can hardly be missed
• I want to ask, not only whether we can discern the influence of Christian teaching... but also whether one can even make sense of a position like Locke's.........apart from the specifically biblical and Christian teaching that he associated with it.
• For Dunn, I suspect, the theological logical and specifically biblical and Christian aspects ofLockean equality are features of Locke's theory that make it largely irrelevant to our concerns. Locke's political theory of its theological foundations is a way of confining Locke to the seventeenth century.
• the deep philosophical commitments ments of a modern theory would likely be oriented to secular values such as autonomy or dignity or human flourishing,
• Tesi. I actually don't think it is clear that we now can shape and defend an adequate conception of basic human equality apart from some religious foundation.
• Isaiah Berlin, for example, imagines that there might be a utilitarian defense of basic equality.... But that is hopelessly confused.
• "Every man to count for one, nobody for more than one"32 is partly constitutive of utilitarianism, and so cannot be defended on utilitarian grounds except in a question-begging way.
• Locke confronted the claim, put forward in his own time, that these fundamental, apparently transcendent positions, could be understood on a purely secular basis. He had grave reservations about these claims,
• To treat Locke's argument as though it were a secular argument.... is one sort of anachronism.
• One has only to read the first of Locke's Two Treatises to become aware that we are in a quite different intellectual world
• Every Locke scholar, and not just those of a secular bent, views the methods and substance of the First Treatise as strange and disconcerting... "reason" part of the argument is mostly presented in the Second Treatise... So it is tempting to say that the First Treatise is just irrelevant to our modern concerns.
• Of course, part of John Locke's interest in the specifically biblical part of his argument is connected with the determination, driving his work in the Two Treatises, to refute the specific claims of Sir Robert Filmer,
• the most familiar philosophic defense of general inegalitarianism, namely Aristotle's theory of natural slavery.
• Filmer's primary interest is in identifying specific individuals who have authority over others, rather than classes or types of individual in some general hierarchy.4° A theory of the divine right of kings is particularistic... So this too seems to deprive Filmer's theory and its refutation of most of its interest for us.
• as Locke points out, Filmer is not consistent in his particularism....but much ofthe time he seems to be arguing for absolute authority in the abstract... Locke's attack at this point is one of the most powerful
• nobody in particular could possibly have the authority that Filmer says Adam and his heirs have had because of the relation that God has established among people in general.
• dispel the impression, which John Dunn's article might leave us with, that Locke is so different from us... Locke like us is interested in the meta-theoretical question
• First Treatise is an indispensable resource in the reconstruction of Locke's theory of equality... The First Treatise is nothing but a defense of the proposition that humans are, basically, one another's equals; it is a defense of the basis on which the Second Treatise proceeds.
• Secular theorists often assume that they know what a religious argument is like........a crude prescription from God,l.......they contrast it with the elegant complexity of a philosophical argument by Rawls (say) or Dworkin.... I suspect that it might be as caricatural.... ma.... Religious arguments ments are more challenging
• One virtue, then, of devoting all this time and all this space to an analysis and elaboration of Locke's religious case for equality is that it promises not only to deepen our understanding

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God and Morality Richard Swinburne

Richard Swinburne sul legame tra morale es esistenza di Dio.

• In cosa l'esistenza di Dio fa differenza in materia di etica?..
• Tesi: nessuna differenza sul fatto che esistano delle verità morali, molte differenze su quali siano...
• Una tassonomia utile: 1) doveri obbligatori (nn rubare) 2) doveri supererogatori (salvare una vita di estranei rischiando la propria) 3) doveri necessari (sempre validi) 4) doveri contingenti (validi in un certo contesto)...
• Religiosi e atei spesso hanno le stesse intuizioni morali ed è raro che le dispute in materia dipendano dall'esistenza di un Dio...
• Tesi: mentre le verità morali necessarie sono (x definizione) necessarie le verità contingenti dipendono dall'esistenza di Dio...
• Ecco un modo semplice per capire i doveri contingenti, ovvero quelli che dipendono dall'esistenza di Dio: pensa a doveri supererogatori trasformati in obbligatori dal riconoscimento di un Dio.
• Analogia: se mio padre mi ordina di fare la spesa al vicino è mio dovere contingente farla. Contingente perché riconosco l'autorità del Padre. Infatti fare la spesa al vicino nn è un dovere necessario in sè...
• Onorare il ns benefattore (ubbidendogli) è invece un dovere necessario. Onorare il Dio cristiano è un dovere contingente che deriva dalla sua esistenza o meno...
• Un ordine di Dio ha il potere di rendere ciò che è necessariamente supererogatorio in obbligo contingente...
• Tesi: come un genitore ha dei limiti nell'ordinare ai figli, così anche Dio ha dei limiti nel suo comando...
• Due tradizioni. Cattolici: abbondano i doveri supererogatori trasformati in obbligatori. Protestanti: abbandono della tradizione supererogatoria...
• Ma Dio ordina anche doveri obbligatori (nn uccidere). Dilemma: Dio dà qs ordini xchè si tratta di doveri obbligatori o qs doveri sono obbligatori xchè ordinati da Dio?...
• Bisogna distinguere tra doveri obbligatori e supererogatori. Legge Naturale: ci sono precetti che prescindono dal comando di Dio (per esempio il "non uccidere" citato prima). Ma ci sono anche doveri che diventano obbligatori solo grazie al comando divino...
• Ma xchè Dio rende obbligatori doveri morali che nn lo sono? : 1) x darci ulteriori motivazioni e contribuire alla ns realizzazione 2) x coordinarci indirizzandoci su azioni specifiche 3) x abituarci al sacrificio e a controllare la ns volontà 4) fornire dei modelli...
• Esempio: Dio ordina di nn divorziare anche a chi è meglio che divorzi x fornire un modello a chi è meglio che nn divorzi (la maggioranza).
• imho: utile confrontare qs esposizione con il discorso di carron (la bellezza disarmata) in cui, riprendendo Ratzinger, si sostiene che una morale senza la fede finisce per diventare disumana. Il tentativo illuminista di una morale autonoma è fallito. Forse, senza doveri supererogatori perdono di forza anche quelli necessari.

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Michela Marzano. O dell' ombelico accademico.

MM ha sofferto di gravi disturbi psicologici in... - Riccardo Mariani:

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