Notebook per
Constitutions and Economic Policy
Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini
Citation (APA): Tabellini, T. P. G. (2016). Constitutions and Economic Policy [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com
Parte introduttiva
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 14
Constitutions and Economic Policy Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 37
Our overall message is loud and clear: constitutional rules systematically shape economic policy.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 38
extent of political corruption,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 39
fiscal policy,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 40
Constitutional Objectives
Nota - Posizione 40
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 46
constitution design entails a tradeoff between accountability and representation
Nota - Posizione 46
IL TRADE OFF
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 46
Bing- ham Powell, 2000; Prezworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999).
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 47
Constitutional features that clarify policy responsibilities and make it easy to replace an incumbent gov- ernment strengthen accountability, but at the same time increase the political influence of the groups to whom policymakers are accountable.
Nota - Posizione 48
x TRSSPARENZA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 49
Elections using plurality rule, in which legislators are often elected in many individual districts each using majority rule, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini 77 translate swings in voter sentiment into larger changes in legislative majorities than elections using proportional representation, where legislators are often elected by the share of a national vote received.
Nota - Posizione 51
X MAGGIORITARIO E PROP
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 52
strengthens the incentives of politicians to please the voters and could result in smaller political rents and less corruption.
Nota - Posizione 52
MAGGIORITARIO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 53
this greater accountability also raises the propensity to target benefits to narrow constituencies, at the expense of broad spending programs.
Nota - Posizione 54
MAGGIORITAROO R VOSTO ESTRNI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 54
similar tradeoff between accountability and representation also arises in the choice between pres- idential and parliamentary
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 56
Constitutional Inertia and Systematic Selection
Nota - Posizione 56
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 57
constitutions have changed very seldom in the post-World War II
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 57
sample of 60 democracies
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 58
no democratic country changed its form of government between 1960 and 1998,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 64
experiments with constitutional reforms are very seldom observed,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 64
cross-country estimates risk confounding constitutional effects with other country characteristics.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 65
Self-selection of countries into constitutions is clearly nonrandom and most likely correlated with other unobserved variables that also influence a country's policy outcomes.
Nota - Posizione 66
x IL PROBLEMA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 70
we have exploited the econometric methodology
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 72
we rely on instrumental variables to try to isolate exogenous variation
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 74
We have used the broad period in which the constitution was adopted as an instrument for the constitutional feature of interest.
Nota - Posizione 74
X PERIODO DI ADOZIONE COME VARIABILE STRU. VARIABILE CORRELATA ALLA COST MA NN ALLE XFORMANCE. NON SI ABBINA LA COST A UN PAESE MA A UN GRUPPO DI PAESI ETEROGENEI CON SOLO IL XIODO DI ADOZIONE IN COMUNE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 75
there are "fashions" in constitution
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 75
period of birth of the current constitution is related to its broad features;
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 75
identifying assumption is
Nota - Posizione 76
........
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 76
birth period of the constitution is not directly related to current policy outcomes.
Nota - Posizione 77
ASSUNTO FONDAMENTALE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 78
"matching methods"
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 79
Comparisons of countries with similar propensity scores, but with different constitutions, receive more weight.
Nota - Posizione 80
ALTRO ESPEDIENTE MM
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 84
Categorizing Political Institutions
Nota - Posizione 85
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 86
its electoral rules and its form of government.
Nota - Posizione 86
2 ASPETTI PRINCIPALI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 86
two dimensions.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 89
Electoral Rules
Nota - Posizione 90
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 90
three dimensions
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 91
District magnitudes
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 92
One polar case is when all legislators are elected in districts with a single seat,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 92
U.S. House of Representatives,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 93
elected in a single, all-encompassing district, such as the Israeli Knesset.
Nota - Posizione 93
ALTRO POLO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 93
formulas translate votes into seats.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 94
Under plurality rule, only the winner( s) of the highest vote share( s) get represented
Nota - Posizione 94
UNINOMINALE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 95
proportional representation awards seats in proportion to votes in each district.
Nota - Posizione 95
PROPORZIONALE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 96
plurality rule is often amended by a system of "adjustment seats" at the national level.
Nota - Posizione 96
EMENDAMENTO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 96
Ballot structures, finally, determine how citizens cast their ballot.
Nota - Posizione 97
BALLOT
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 97
choose among individual
Nota - Posizione 97
PRIMO CASO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 98
chooses among lists of candidates
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 100
Anglo-Saxon countries often implement plurality rule with voting for individual candidates in single-member districts.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 101
proportional representation is often implemented through a system of party lists
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 102
"majoritarian" and "proportional"
Nota - Posizione 102
CLASSIFICAZIONE DOVUTA AD ABBINAMENTI DI FATTO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 103
"mixed" electoral systems
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 103
In Germany, for example, voters cast two ballots, electing half the Bundestag by plurality in single-member districts, and the other half by proportional representation at a national level, to achieve pro- portionality between national vote and seat shares.
Nota - Posizione 105
X ES GERMANIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 105
propor- tional representation systems, such as the Irish, do not rely on party lists. 2
Nota - Posizione 106
ANOMALIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 106
Forms of Government
Nota - Posizione 106
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 107
two main forms of government: presidential and parliamentary regimes.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 108
presiden- tial regime, the citizens directly elect the (top) executive;
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 110
gov- ernment has executive powers and acts as the agenda setter, initiating all major legislation and drafting the budget.
Nota - Posizione 111
REGIME PARLAMENTARE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 112
president has full executive powers, but smaller agenda-setting powers.
Nota - Posizione 112
PRESIDENZIALE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 112
For domestic policy, the president has a veto,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 112
power to propose and amend typically rests with the legislature.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 114
government remains in office only as long as it enjoys the support of a majority
Nota - Posizione 114
PARLAMENTO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 121
president, the executive can hold onto its powers without the support of a legislative majority.
Nota - Posizione 122
PRESIDENZIALISMO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 124
several mixed systems are observed,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 130
Political Accountability
Nota - Posizione 130
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 139
how the constitution affects corruption, rent seeking and electoral budget cycles.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 140
Political Accountability and Electoral Rules
Nota - Posizione 140
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 143
Politicians may have stronger direct incentives to please the voters if they are held accountable individually, rather than collectively.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 144
party lists discourage effort by officeholders,
Nota - Posizione 144
PROP
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 144
they disconnect individual efforts and re-election
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 145
political rents will be higher under electoral systems that rely on list voting,
Nota - Posizione 146
COSA CI SI ASPETTA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 147
open lists (where voters can modify the order of candidates) should be more conducive to good behavior
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 150
corruption is only an imperfect proxy for political rents.
Nota - Posizione 150
PROXY
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 152
study about 80 democracies in the 1990s, mea- suring perceived corruption
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 154
per capita income, openness to international trade, the citizens' education and religious beliefs, a country's history as captured by colonial heritage, and geographic location
Nota - Posizione 155
X CONFOUNDER
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 155
voting over individuals does indeed correlate with lower corruption:
Nota - Posizione 156
ESITO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 168
Summarizing, both theory and evidence suggest that individual accountability under plurality rule strengthens the incentives of politicians to please the voters and is conducive to good behavior.
Nota - Posizione 169
X VONCLUSIONI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 169
effects of individual accountability under proportional representation, implemented with open rather than closed lists, are more controversial.
Nota - Posizione 170
x PREFERENZE CONTROVERSE. FAVORI. COMPET INTRAPARTY
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 174
if seats are next to certain, little effort goes into pleasing the voters of those districts. 4
Nota - Posizione 175
SE LA VITTORIA È CHIARA L UNINOMINALWE NN GIOVA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 181
Myerson (1993) presents a model
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 185
two dimensions: honesty and ideology.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 187
in single-member districts, only one candidate can win the election. Voters may then cast their ballot, strategically, for dishonest but ideologically preferred
Nota - Posizione 188
MAYERSON
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 191
If many factions are represented in parliament, the government is more likely to be supported by a coalition of parties, rather than by a single party.
Nota - Posizione 192
X RENT SEEKING DEL PROP
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 192
Under single-party government, voters know precisely whom to blame or reward for observed performance. Under coalition government, voters may not know whom to blame,
Nota - Posizione 194
x RESP NEL BIPARTITISMO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 195
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003) show that proportional representation and multimember districts lead to a higher incidence of coalition governments and thereby higher political rents, compared to plurality rule and small district mag- nitude.
Nota - Posizione 195
X RISULTATI EMPIRICI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 197
The hypothesis that coalition governments are associated with more corruption remains untested, as far as we know, though some of the blatant corruption scandals in Europe-Belgium and Italy-have been intimately associated with such governments.
Nota - Posizione 199
DATI INFORMALI SU CORRUZIONE NEL PROP.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 199
evidence does support the idea that barriers to entry raise corruption,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 201
Alt and Lassen (2002) show that restrictions on primaries
Nota - Posizione 201
.....
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 202
are positively associated with perceptions of corrup- tion in U.S. states.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 204
electoral cycles in taxation, government spending, or macroeconomic policies stimulating aggregate demand.
Nota - Posizione 205
ALTRI INDICATORI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 205
consider panel data from 1960 covering about 500 elections in over 50 democracies.
Nota - Posizione 205
DATABASE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 205
classify countries in two groups according to the electoral formula
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 207
democracies that use plurality rule cut
Nota - Posizione 207
.....
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 208
taxes, as well as government spending,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 209
This finding may be consistent with better accountability
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 210
allowing voters to punish governments for high taxes and spending
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 211
Political Accountability and Forms of Government
Nota - Posizione 211
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 213
comparison between presidential and parliamen- tary regimes,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 214
accountability is likely to be stronger in pres- idential
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 215
the chain of delegation is simpler and more direct under presidential
Nota - Posizione 215
XCHÈ PIÙ TRASPARENTE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 217
Second, many presidential regimes have a strong separation of powers-between
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 219
In parliamentary regimes, instead, the government concentrates all the executive prerogatives
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 220
Checks and balances are thus stronger under presidential government.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 221
voters can exploit conflict between different offices to prevent abuse
Nota - Posizione 221
ELEZIONI PIÙ FREQUWENTI NE CHECK AND BALANCE. MAGGIORE PISSIBILITÀ DI PUNIRE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 224
Among "good" democracies, Persson and Tabellini (2003) do find that presidential regimes have less widespread corruption than do parliamentary regimes, but the result does not hold among regimes classified as bad democracies. "Good" and "bad" are defined in terms of democracy scores in the Freedom House and Polity IV datasets, which measure aspects such as constraints on the executive's use of powers and freedom of political participation across societies and time. Since many presidential regimes fall in the latter group, the negative correlation between corruption and presiden- tialism in the sample of good democracies is due to relatively few observations and, hence, not very robust.
Nota - Posizione 226
x EMPIRIA. CONFERMATA SOLO NELLKE BUONE DEM
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 231
Overall Lessons
Nota - Posizione 231
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 232
When it comes to the form of government, our knowledge is not yet precise
Nota - Posizione 233
INSEGNAMENTO X RIFORME ANTICORRUZIONE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 235
A switch from propor- tional representation to plurality rule, accompanied by a change in the ballot structure from party lists to voting over individuals, would strengthen political incentives for good behavior, both directly and indirectly through the type of government.
Nota - Posizione 236
x RIFORMA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 237
erecting barriers to entry
Nota - Posizione 237
DA EVITARE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 241
Political Representation
Nota - Posizione 241
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 246
Electoral Rules and Incentives for Politicians and Voters
Nota - Posizione 246
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 246
Single member districts
Nota - Posizione 246
....
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 247
programs benefiting small geographic constituencies.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 247
multimember districts and proportional representation both pull in the direction of programs targeting broad groups.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 253
universalistic redistributive programs such as public pensions or other welfare state programs.
Nota - Posizione 253
TIPICI DEL PROP
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 255
strong incentives to target voters in these swing districts.
Nota - Posizione 255
IL MAGGIORITARIO SI CONCENTRA SUL SWING
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 267
Is the evidence consistent with the prediction
Nota - Posizione 267
DOMANDA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 268
Table 1 (panel A) suggests that it is.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 269
proportional electoral systems spend more in social security and welfare by as much as 8 percent of GDP,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 283
a reform from plurality rule to proportional representation would boost welfare
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 287
Electoral Rules, Party Formation and Types of Government
Nota - Posizione 288
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 289
electoral rules also shape party structure and types of government.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 289
Plurality rule and small district magni- tude produce fewer parties
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 291
few parties mean more frequent single-party majority governments, and less frequent coalition
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 293
proportional electoral rule is associated with a more fragmented party system,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 295
surprising if such large political effects did not also show up in the economic policies
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 296
more fractionalized party systems induced by proportional elections lead to a greater overall size of government spending.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 297
Austen-Smith (2000)
Nota - Posizione 297
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 299
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003) and Bawn and Rosenbluth (2003)
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 300
proportional representation leads to more government spending
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 303
If instead the government is supported by a coalition of parties, voters can discriminate between the parties in government and this dynamic creates electoral conflict inside the governing coalition.
Nota - Posizione 304
x CONFLITTO INTERNO E POCA TRASPA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 305
inefficiencies in bargaining induce excessive government spending.
Nota - Posizione 305
CONFLITTO INTDRNO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 306
theoretical predictions are supported by the data:
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 338
Ticchi and Vindigni (2003) and Iversen and Soskice (2003)
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 339
proportional electoral rule is frequently associated with center-left gov- ernments, while right-wing governments are more frequent under majoritarian elections.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 340
could explain why proportional representation systems spend more.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 341
But why should the electoral rule be correlated with the ideological government type?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 342
majoritarian elections concentrate power, which tends to favor the wealthy.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 359
in winner-takes-all systems, conservative parties have an electoral advantage.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 360
If electoral rules are chosen on the basis of the policies they will deliver, this might explain explain the observed correlation:
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 362
where the center-left voters dominate, propor- tional systems have been selected,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 378
Alesina and Perotti (1995)
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 378
coalition governments are more prone to run deficits.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 380
These arguments find some support in the experiences of European and Latin American countries.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 381
coalition governments have more players who could potentially veto a change,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 383
When governments must often face a vote on their own survival, it could lead to greater policy myopia
Nota - Posizione 384
FIDUCIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 385
a larger number of veto players tends to "lock in"' economic policy
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 392
electoral rule is correlated with the reaction of government to economic shocks:
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 392
in proportional democracies, spend- ing as a share of GDP rises in recessions but does not decline in booms,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 394
Forms of Government and Political Representation
Nota - Posizione 394
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 394
parliamentary democracies
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 395
executive can be removed
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 396
parties represented in government thus hold valuable bargaining powers
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 398
strong incentives to maintain discipline inside the governing party
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 399
the confidence requirement creates "legislative cohe- sion"-a
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 401
in a presidential system, the result is unstable coalitions and less discipline within the majority.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 402
In parliamentary democracies, a stable majority of legislators pursues the joint interest of its voters.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 403
Spending thus opti- mally becomes directed toward a broad majority of voters, as in the case of broad social transfer programs
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 404
In presidential democracies, the (relative) lack of such a majority instead pits the interests of different minorities
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 405
As a result, programs with broad benefits suffer,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 405
allocation of spending favors minor- ities
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 411
presidential regimes are predicted to have lower overall spending and taxation
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 411
because presidential regimes never face the risk of a no-confidence vote
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 413
associated with more targeted programs at the expenses of broad spending programs.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 413
The evidence is strongly supportive
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 435
Baqir (2002) contrasts public spending in U.S. municipalities differing in their form of govern- ment. Some are parliamentary,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 436
Baqir finds that presidential governments indeed spend less
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 439
Types of Government and Political Representation
Nota - Posizione 439
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 442
greater durability of the executive in presidential regimes could reduce policy myopia,
Nota - Posizione 442
DEFICIT
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 443
more rapid reactions to adverse events.
Nota - Posizione 443
IN CASO DI CRISI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 448
Persson and Tabellini (2003) find no robust evidence for government deficits being systematically influenced by the form of government.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 454
Concluding Remarks
Nota - Posizione 454
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 467
negative effect of presidentialism is only present among the democracies with lowest scores
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 468
perhaps it is not presidential government per se that is detrimental to economic performance, but rather the combination of a strong and directly elected executive in a weak institutional environment
Nota - Posizione 469
x NN OL PRES DI X SÈ
