THREE Elephants RuleRead more at location 993
Note: Le razionalizzazioni del ns avvocato interiore Il modello socio intuitivo: 1 reason come first (qs capitolo) 2 la ragione strategica interviene dopo (prossimo capitolo) Edit
I was writing about the three basic principles of moral psychology.1 The first principle is Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second.That’s a six-word summary of the social intuitionist model.Read more at location 1000
So there I was at my desk, writing about how people automatically fabricate justifications of their gut feelings, when suddenly I realized that I had just done the same thing with my wife.Read more at location 1024
The instant I knew the content of the criticism (“ … leave dirty dishes on the …”), my inner lawyer went to work searching for an excuseRead more at location 1027
I’ve already quoted Jesus (on seeing “the speck in your neighbor’s eye”). Here’s the same idea from Buddha: It is easy to see the faults of others, but difficult to see one’s own faults. One shows the faults of others like chaff winnowed in the wind, but one conceals one’s own faults as a cunning gambler conceals his dice.5 Jesus and Buddha were right, and in this chapter and the next one I’ll show you how our automatic self-righteousness works.Read more at location 1035
Here are six major research findings that collectively illustrate the first half of the first principle: Intuitions Come First.(In the next chapter I’ll give evidence for the second half—Strategic Reasoning Second).Read more at location 1041
6. AFFECTIVE REACTIONS ARE IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME IN THE BRAINRead more at location 1215
when Hume said that reason is the “slave” of the passions, I think he went too far. A slave is never supposed to question his master,Read more at location 1264
Good lawyers do what they can to help their clients, but they sometimes refuse to go along with requests.Read more at location 1267
The elephant is far more powerful than the rider, but it is not an absolute dictator.Read more at location 1270
The main way that we change our minds on moral issues is by interacting with other people. We are terrible at seeking evidence that challenges our own beliefs, but other people do us this favor, just as we are quite good at finding errors in other people’s beliefs.Read more at location 1271
There are even times when we change our minds on our own, with no help from other people. Sometimes we have conflicting intuitions about something, as many people do about abortion and other controversial issues.Read more at location 1278
And finally, it is possible for people simply to reason their way to a moral conclusion that contradicts their initial intuitive judgment, although I believe this process is rare.Read more at location 1281
Joe Paxton and Josh Greene asked Harvard students to judge the story about Julie and Mark that I told you in chapter 2.47 They supplied half of the subjects with a really bad argument to justify consensual incest (“If Julie and Mark make love, then there is more love in the world”). They gave the other half a stronger supporting argument (about how the aversion to incest is really caused by an ancient evolutionary adaptation for avoiding birth defects in a world without contraception, but because Julie and Mark use contraception, that concern is not relevant). You’d think that Harvard students would be more persuaded by a good reason than a bad reason, but it made no difference.Read more at location 1287
Brains evaluate instantly and constantly (as Wundt and Zajonc said). Social and political judgments depend heavily on quick intuitive flashes (as Todorov and work with the IAT have shown). Our bodily states sometimes influence our moral judgments. Bad smells and tastes can make people more judgmental (as can anything that makes people think about purity and cleanliness). Psychopaths reason but don’t feel (and are severely deficient morally). Babies feel but don’t reason (and have the beginnings of morality). Affective reactions are in the right place at the right time in the brain (as shown by Damasio, Greene, and a wave of more recent studies).Read more at location 1306