2 Read more at location 274
Note: 2@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ suono prorietà vs suono evento (della coscienza): i sordi e i suono fenomeni vs oggetti... internalismo vs estrrnalismo... x' un sordo non saprà mai cos è un suono? la comprensione dei suoni è sganciata dalla comprensione della loro produzione (musicista vs non musicista) psicologia sperimentale: non sembra che la connessione tra suoni e fonte sia privilegiata, come ritengono gli evoluzionisti Edit
Sounds, I suggest, are objects in their own right, bearers of properties, and identifiable separately both from the things that emit them and the places where they are located.Read more at location 276
The theory of sounds as events has been defended by others, notably by Roberto Casati and Jerome Dokic in their pioneering study La philosophie du son (1994), and in more recent work by Casey O'Callaghan.'Read more at location 283
But those authors take a resolutely `physicalist' approach, repudiating all suggestion that sounds might be essentially connected to the experience of hearing things,Read more at location 284
Robert Pasnau, for example, who thinks of sounds as properties of the objects that emit them, is also a physicalist in my sense.Read more at location 289
Hence they are absent from the world of the deaf person in the way that colours are absent from the world of the blind.Read more at location 295
The physicalist view has the consequence that deaf people could be fully acquainted with sounds (for instance by using a vibrometer which registers pitch and overtones), and also that people could see sounds without hearing them.Read more at location 296
We attribute them to the sounds themselves, conceived as independently existing events, located in a region of space. When I hear a car passing what 1 hear is the sound of a car passing, an event caused by the car's passing but distinct from any event involving the car.Read more at location 300
The information conveyed by sounds is not, typically, information about a vibration in any object,Read more at location 303
Psychologists have studied auditory grouping, asking themselves what evolutionary function it might serve.' For example, we tend to group quiet sounds interrupted by bangs together, as though they formed a continuous sequence, just as we continue in imagination the lines on a page that are interrupted by blots.Read more at location 304
Albert Bregman, perhaps the most noted researcher into these phenomena, is of the view that `the perceptual stream-forming process has the job of grouping those acoustic features that are likely to have arisen from the same physical source'.'Read more at location 307
Sounds can be detached completely from their source, as by radio or gramophone, and listened to in isolation.Read more at location 311
It seems to me that what we hear, both when we hear sounds in our day-to-day environment and when we listen to sounds acousmatically, is not merely a subjective impression but a real part of the objective world. That is what I mean by describing sounds as secondary objects.Read more at location 319
there are other examples of secondary objects? It seems to me that there are, and that they include two extremely important instances: rainbows and smells.Read more at location 321
To say that there is a rainbow visible over the hill is to say that a person located in a certain place and looking towards the hill would see the arch of a rainbow lying over it.Read more at location 329
None of that implies that we could not give a full explanation of rainbows in terms of the primary-qualityRead more at location 336
There is every reason to treat sounds as audibilia, in just the way that we treat rainbows as visibilia. In doing so we deny nothing that the physicalist affirms, other than a statement of identityRead more at location 343
Once we acknowledge the existence of events which are also secondary objects, the way is open to the `pure event': the event which happens, even though it does not happen to anything,Read more at location 346
This gives me another reason to be dissatisfied with the physicalist view. For it seems to tie sounds too firmly to their sources.Read more at location 353
In particular it does not recognize the `pure event' as a distinct ontological category, andRead more at location 355
It is here that we should return to the psychologist's investigations into auditory streaming. Our ears are presented at every moment with an enormous perceptual task, which is to group sounds together in such a way as to make sense of them-either by assigning them to their causes, or by discovering what they mean.Read more at location 359
In certain applications this search for the good Gestalt can be explained as the evolutionary epistemologist would explain it, namely as a first step towards tracing a sound to its cause.Read more at location 362
Suppose you are looking at a dot-picture, and unable to make out the figure that the dots compose.Read more at location 364
It seems that we have an inherent tendency to group sound events as `auditory figures', without making bridges to the physical world.10Read more at location 370
The physical events that cause my auditory perceptions are not represented within my auditory field, so a description of the intentional object is not a description of the physical events. The auditory field, unlike the visual field, does not depict its cause." Read more at location 373
examples show that this correspondence is not what we hear, even when it explains what we hear.Read more at location 387
There is another matter that needs to be touched on in this connection, which is the effect on hearing of the human voice.Read more at location 398
The intentionality of perceptual experiences is determined by the concepts that inform them-either through perceptual beliefs or through acts of imagination.Read more at location 423
In other words the concepts that provide the fundamental framework for musical perception are applied figuratively, in the act of acousmatic attention. Read more at location 425
