3 ASSICURAZIONI GENETICHE Entrepreneurial Economics: Bright Ideas from the Dismal Science by Alexander Tabarrok

Entrepreneurial Economics: Bright Ideas from the Dismal Science by Alexander Tabarrok

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Last annotated on August 27, 2016

3 Read more at location 698

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Now, thanks to advances in genetic research, medical practitioners are increasingly able to read your health future from a much more reliable source-your individual genetic code. The correlation between specific genes and some diseases is now well established,Read more at location 699

Note: LEGGERE IL FUTURO Edit

However, accurate genetic information also brings fear that health insurance could become unaffordable or even unavailableRead more at location 701

Note: ASSICURAZIONI Edit

And because most individuals are insured through their employer, some people worry that knowledge of genetic traits might lead to employment discrimination.Read more at location 702

Note: DISCRIMINAZIONI SUL LAVORO Edit

Solutions that would maintain access to health insurance have been proposed, but most would almost inevitably lead to antiselection and a disruption of the underwriting process, with potentially dire impact on the solvency of insurers. Read more at location 703

Note: SOLUZIONI INEFFICIENTI Edit

Adam Smith's invisible hand points to a better approach:Read more at location 704

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One such product is genetic insuranceRead more at location 705

Note: ASSICURAZIONE GENETICA Edit

Insuring Your Genes Read more at location 705

Note: T Edit

For a small premium cost, genetic insurance would insure against possessing a "bad" gene. Policies would be sold to all individuals before they underwent genetic testing.Read more at location 705

Note: RISCHIO GENI CATTIVI Edit

For example, if a woman is found to be carrying BRCAI (the gene related to a higher probability of breast cancer), she would be paid enough to purchase actuarially sound risk premiums.Read more at location 708

Note: ESEMPIO Edit

We are used to thinking of insuring against sickness; genetic insurance makes it equally possible to insure against a high probability of sickness.Read more at location 709

Note: MALATTIA E PROB MALATTIA Edit

All the benefits of genetic testing, such as improved treatment and health planning targeted to offset a genetic vulnerability, could be exploitedRead more at location 710

Note: BENEFICI Edit

The single ground rule of mandatory purchase would avoid the problem of adverse selection.Read more at location 712

Note: ADVERSE SELEC Edit

First, most people do not carry serious genetic defects, so the expected gain from concealing a positive result, and thereby cheating an insurer, is small.Read more at location 712

Note: RISCHIO BARI Edit

enforcement would be carried out through medical institutions rather than by individuals.Read more at location 713

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In the near future, genetic testing is likely to be fully integrated into the medical process.Read more at location 718

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Insurance firms, under this proposal, would no longer have an incentive to drop customers with genetic defects.Read more at location 720

Note: BENEFICIO ASS Edit

Individuals with serious genetic defects would buy their insurance individually (or as part of a special genetic group) rather than through their employer. Employers also would have far fewer incentives to genetically discriminate. Read more at location 722

Note: EMPLOYER Edit

Life Insurance Uses Read more at location 723

Note: T Edit

Genetic insurance also could improve the life insurance market. Life insurance contracts usually are written for much longer terms than health insurance contracts.Read more at location 723

Note: IMPATTO SULLE ASS. VITA Edit

If insurance companies have access to information from genetic tests, many people will want to buy long-term life insurance before the tests are taken. Under this scenario, genetic tests will not cause great difficulties for the life insurance market. But if legislation makes genetic information "private," very serious adverse selection problems could occur.Read more at location 725

Note: INFO PROVATE? Edit

Genetic information should be accessible by life insurance companies along with other types of health information.Read more at location 727

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What Will it Cost? Read more at location 732

Note: T Edit

It seems likely that everyone who today purchases health insurance also will be able to purchase genetic insurance.Read more at location 733

Note: AFFORDABLE Edit

Genetic insurance cannot raise the total cost of health insurance because today's health insurance already covers the possibility of possessing a defective gene, but it does so implicitly, and given today's technology, inefficiently.Read more at location 734

Note: COSTO TOTALE Edit

Separating the genetic and nongenetic health insurance markets cannot raise the total price of health insurance because the same product is being sold.Read more at location 737

Note: CONCLUSIONE Edit

In fact, the total price of health insurance will fall under this proposal. Individuals who gain early knowledge of a genetic defect can seek earlier treatment, which is usually cheaper and more effective.Read more at location 738

Note: CURE ANTICIPATE Edit

Delta Insurance Read more at location 741

Note: T Edit

A 1995 essay by economist J. H. Cochrane, reprinted in this volume, has shown how this idea may be extended so that unexpected changes in the price of health insurance from any source can be insured. Read more at location 741

Note: GENERALIZZAZIONE Edit

the essence of the idea is to sell two contracts. The first contract covers health expenses in the next year; the second insures against any changes in expected future health expenses.Read more at location 743

Note: DUE CONTRATTI Edit