It is a recurring American nightmare: The accused criminal out on bail commits a grisly murder while awaiting trial.Read more at location 1514
There are two separate problems here. The first is to decide where we stand regarding the trade-off between public safety and rights of the accused.Read more at location 1516
The second problem, once the legislature has agreed on a standard, is to induce judges to abide by it.Read more at location 1519
Judges will begin to have the right incentives when we make them personally liable for criminal damage done by the defendants they release.Read more at location 1522
Judges would be loath to release those defendants whom they believe to be the most dangerous. Unfortunately, they would be loath to release any defendants. So I propose a simultaneous countervailing incentive in the form of a cash bounty to the judge for each defendant he releases.Read more at location 1523
Whether judges would release more or fewer defendants than they do today would depend on the size of the cash bounty, which could be adjusted to reflect the wishes of the legislature.Read more at location 1525
The advantage of my proposal is not its effect on the number of defendants who are granted bail but its effect on which defendants are granted bail.Read more at location 1526
My proposal's second advantage is that it would encourage clarity. Through ongoing debate about adjustments to the cash bounty, legislators would be forced to take unambiguous stands on fundamental issues of safety versus freedom.Read more at location 1529
You might object that we should not trivialize a complex issue by asking legislators to commit themselves to a single number. I respond that they commit themselves to a single number already.Read more at location 1531
