Notebook per
Is It Really Conscious Bryan Caplan EconLog Library of Economics and Liberty
Citation (APA): riccardo-mariani@libero.it. (2016). Is It Really Conscious Bryan Caplan EconLog Library of Economics and Liberty [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com
Parte introduttiva
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 2
Is It Really Conscious?, Bryan Caplan
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 5
Suppose AIs perfectly simulate thoughts and feelings even though they experience neither. If so, claims about their "welfare" are nonsense.
Nota - Posizione 6
IL WELFARE DEI ROBOT
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 10
No one literally observes anyone's thoughts and feelings but his own.
Nota - Posizione 11
SOLIPSISMO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 13
How, if at all, can you justify your belief that anything besides yourself has thoughts and feelings? Since you never observe others' thoughts and feelings directly, you can only know them by inference .
Nota - Posizione 14
INFERORE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 15
the world is full of things that suggest thoughts and feelings even though virtually everyone is virtually sure they don't have thoughts and feelings. Take a diary.
Nota - Posizione 16
PRETESE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 17
The same goes for a long list of things: Movies, t.v. shows, tape recordings, audio files, runes carved on stone.
Nota - Posizione 18
ESEMPI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 22
Many of the things we're virtually sure aren't conscious express more complex thoughts and feelings than the typical human. Like War and Peace .
Nota - Posizione 23
GUERRA E PACE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 23
Many of the things we're virtually sure are conscious express far simpler thoughts and feelings than the typical human. Like a mouse.
Nota - Posizione 24
TOPO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 24
The vast majority of things that never express thoughts and feelings don't seem conscious to us. Even things that look visibly human, like people in long-term comas.
Nota - Posizione 26
COMA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 28
At this point, there are two ways
Nota - Posizione 28
LE DUE VIE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 29
solipsism - to say either, "I have no idea if anything other than myself is conscious" or even "I alone am conscious."
Nota - Posizione 29
SOLIPSISMO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 29
materialism - to say either, "I have no idea if anything, including myself, is conscious" or even "Nothing is conscious."
Nota - Posizione 30
MATERIALISMO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 30
Both views are so absurd there's little point arguing with convinced adherents.
Nota - Posizione 31
ASSURDITÀ
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 33
things. Most of the AI enthusiasts I've encountered think the Problem of Other Minds is simple: If it quacks like a duck, it's a duck; if a machine acts like it has thoughts and feelings, it has thoughts and feelings. But how can this simple solution be right when the world is already full of duck calls ? In
Nota - Posizione 34
AI
