4 Read more at location 592
Note: 4@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ tesi: la metafora è indispensabile x comprendere cosa sia la musica. gestalt: il tutto nn è la somma delle parti oggetto secondario: ciò che emerge dalle parti oggetto intenzionale: oggetto visibile solo grazie alla volontà e al esperienza pregressa immaginazione: facoltà che xcrpisce gli oggetti intenzionali quello che senti (suoni) e quello che immagini (movimento) seeing and seeing in immaginazione oggetti intenzionali: xcepiti con l immaginazione grazie a metafore. es: il volto di donna schizzato dall artista Edit
In The Aesthetics of Music I make the claim that musical movement (such as we hear in a melody) must be explained in spatial terms: the melody moves from one place to another in a one-dimensional continuum. I also claim that when melodies sound, nothing that we hear literally moves.Read more at location 592
You hear a succession of sounds, ordered in time, and this is something you believe to be occurring-something you `literally hear'. And you hear in those sounds a melody that moves through the imaginary space of music. This is not something you believe to be occurring, but something you imagine: just as you imagine the face in the picture, while seeing that it is not literally there.Read more at location 595
The literal perception and the imaginative perception can cohabit the same experience, since they do not compete.Read more at location 599
Your experience of the music involves the concept of movement, but it is a concept that is being metaphorically applied to what is literally a sequence.Read more at location 600
Malcolm Budd has mounted an interesting challenge to all that.' His argument seems to me to involve the following claims:Read more at location 602
The concept of `double intentionality' stands in need of clarification. (b) It is not clear what is meant by saying that an experience `involves' a metaphor. Read more at location 603
Wollheim, for example, in Painting as an Art, offers us the distinction between seeing and seeing in, but stops short of clarifying how these radically different mental acts can actually be united in a single experience.Read more at location 611
Double intentionality arises when a mental state involves both belief and imagination: the first focused on realities, the second on what can be imagined in those realities. And because they belong to different orders of mental organization, beliefs and imaginings can co-exist, with a common focus, so that the one informs and controls the other: that, in short, is the origin of the `double intentionality' that governs our experience of art.Read more at location 623
Kant was probably the first philosopher to recognize that the empiricist account of experience is untenable, since experience has both a sensory and an intellectual component-thereRead more at location 626
However, we must distinguish sound from tone. The first is a physical event, occurring in the ordinary three-dimensional space in which we too exist. The second is an intentional object, one that we hear in a sound, but which has properties that no sound can have: for example direction, energy, a kind of internal `wanting', together with relations of attraction and repulsion towards other tones. Read more at location 636
When we hear music, three things occur. There is a vibration in the air; by virtue of this vibration we hear a sound, which is a `secondary object', heard as a pure event; and in this sound we hear an organization that is not reducible to any properties of the sound, nor to any properties of the vibration that causes it. As a result of hearing this organization we may also feel an urge to move in time to the music, to dance or sing along with it.Read more at location 655
