sabato 27 agosto 2016

3 What’s Wrong with the World, Part 1

3 What’s Wrong with the World, Part 1Read more at location 556
Note: 3@@@@@@@@@@@@@ PROBLEMA DELLE ESTERNALITÀ. REGOLE PIGOU COASE RENT SEEKING COME COSTO DEL TRASFERIMENTO IL DANNO NETTO DELLE FRODI. SORPRESA! Edit
under what circumstances does individual rationality fail to lead to group rationality—toRead more at location 559
Note: IL PROBLEMA Edit
For a simple example consider my decision of which computer game to play this evening. I own all of the alternative games already, so my decision has no effect on the revenue of the companies that produce them. My office is far enough from the bedrooms so that my decision has no effect on how well my wife or children can sleep. The only effect is on me,Read more at location 565
Note: CASO SEMPLICE DI ARMONIA Edit
We can expand the range of examples by considering cases in which my action affects other people but the effects cancel. Suppose I decide to put my house up for sale. One result is that my neighbor ends up selling his house for five thousand dollars less than he otherwise would have because he had to cut his price in order to keep his customer from buying my house instead. My neighbor is worse off by five thousand dollars as a result of my action, but the person who bought his house at the lower price is five thousand dollars better off, so the net effect on other people is zero.Read more at location 568
Note: COSTO NETTO SU TERXI PARI A ZERO Edit
When my steel mill produces a ton of steel, I pay my workers for the cost of their labor, I pay the mining firm for the cost of its ore, but I do not pay the people downwind for the sulfur dioxide I am putting into their air.Read more at location 583
Note: ESTERNALITÀ DELL INQUINAMENTO Edit
If I can eliminate two dollars worth of pollution damage at a cost of one dollar of pollution control, it is worth doing from the standpoint of efficiency—cost one dollar, benefit two. But the cost is paid by me, and the benefit goes to the people downwind, so it is not in my interest to do it.Read more at location 592
Note: INEFFICIENZA DA INQUINAMENTO Edit
One solution is direct regulation: some government agency such as the EPA makes rules requiring steel mills to filter their smoke, or build high smokestacks, or in various other ways reduce their pollution.Read more at location 598
Note: SOLUZIONE REGOLAMENTAZIONE Edit
While this is an obvious solution, it has some serious problems. The first is that the EPA may not be interested in maximizing efficiency.Read more at location 599
Note: PRIMO PROBLEMA: PUBLIC CHOICE Edit
The second problem is that, even if the EPA wants to maximize efficiency, it does not know how to do it. Figuring out what pollution control measures are or are not worth taking and how much steel ought to be produced after properly allowing for the external costs of producing it are hard problems.Read more at location 605
Note: SECONDO PROBLEMA: IGNORANZA Edit
Instead of telling the firm what it must do, the regulator simply charges the firm for its pollution. If making a ton of steel produces twenty pounds of sulfur dioxide, which does four dollars worth of damage, the firm is billed for its sulfur dioxide output at twenty cents a pound.Read more at location 613
Note: SOLUZIONE PIGOUVIANA Edit
the regulator does not have to know anything about the costs of pollution control;Read more at location 616
Note: VANTAGGIO Edit
A second advantage is that this approach generates not only the right amount of pollution control but the right amount of steel as well. When the firm produces steel, its costs now include both the cost of controlling pollution and the cost of any pollution it fails to control.Read more at location 620
Note: SECONDO VANTAGGIO Edit
Even if the regulators are trying to produce the efficient outcome, it may not be easy to measure the damage actually done by each additional pound of sulfur dioxide, or CO2, or whatever.Read more at location 626
Note: INCONVENIENTE Edit
the same analysis can be used to explain large parts of tort law. Instead of having the EPA impose effluent taxes, we permit the people downwind to sue the steel mill for the damage its pollution is doing to their houses, laundry, and lungs.Read more at location 632
Note: RISARCIMENTO DANNI COME TASA PIGOUVIANA Edit
The analysis can be applied to parking fines and speeding tickets as well. When I drive fast I am imposing a cost, in additional accident risk, on other drivers. The law forces me to take account of that cost in my actions by fining me when I am caught exceeding the speed limit.Read more at location 634
Note: MULTE X ECCESSO DI VELOCITÀ Edit
Rent Seeking: How Not to Give Things AwayRead more at location 644
Note: T Edit
I mentioned earlier a special sort of externality called a pecuniary externality, one that imposes no net cost, since the effects on other people cancel out.Read more at location 644
Note: COMPETIZIONE Edit
The implication of the argument is that my neighbor ought not to be able to collect damages from me for the reduction in the price of his house. Competition should not be, and is not, a tort.Read more at location 648
Note: RISASRCIMENTO DANN Edit
A clever—and mischievous—reader might suggest extending the argument from competition to theft.Read more at location 651
Note: FURTO Edit
Does it follow that, just as competition ought not to be a tort, theft ought not to be a crime?Read more at location 653
Note: NET COST Edit
Picking pockets is not a costless activity; it involves time, training, and a variety of risks.Read more at location 656
Note: RUBARE COSTA Edit
So far we have omitted the cost to the victims of their precautions—soreRead more at location 668
Note: COSTI PSICOLOGICI E DI ANTIFURTO Edit
The general term for this phenomenon is “rent seeking.” It occurs when there is an opportunity for people to spend resources transferring wealth from others to themselves.Read more at location 670
Note: CHI CSMPA SUI COSTI DI TRASFERIMENTO Edit
The term was coined to describe competition for government favors—in the original example import permits that permitted the holders to buy foreign currency at an artificially cheap price.Read more at location 676
Note: UN ESEMPIO Edit
For a somewhat less clear example, consider litigation. Each side is spending money on lawyers, expert witnesses, and the like in order to increase its chance of winning the case. The plaintiff is spending money to increase the chance of a transfer from the defendant to him, the defendant to decrease it. The transfer itself is neither a net gain nor a net loss; the expenditures on litigation are a net loss.Read more at location 682
Note: ESEMPIO TRIBUNALI Edit
Getting It Wrong: Fraud on the Market SuitsRead more at location 689
Note: T Edit
The CEO of a company gives an optimistic speech. Six months later the newest product turns out to be a flop, and the company’s stock falls. An enterprising lawyer files a class action suit on behalf of everyone who bought stock in the company between the speech and the stock drop. His argument is that the speech, by omitting relevant facts that might have led to a more pessimistic conclusion, fraudulently induced people to buy the stock for more than it was worth and that the company should therefore make up their losses.Read more at location 690
Note: ESEMPIO DI FRODE Edit
There are a number of problems with the theory underlying such suits. CEOs are no more omniscient than anyone else, making it a considerable stretch to treat an optimistic statement that turns out to be wrong as actionable fraud.Read more at location 696
Note: Oggi SCIENZA DEI CEO Edit
Customers are free to decide for themselves whose predictions to believe.Read more at location 698
Note: CLIENTI LIBERI Edit
One problem particularly relevant to this chapter has to do with the calculation of damages. Even if we concede that the speech was deliberately fraudulent, liability ought to depend on net damage done.Read more at location 699
Note: CALCOLO DEL DANNO NETTO Edit
Suppose I bought a share from you for a hundred dollars and it later fell to fifty. If the speech (and my purchase) had not been made, the stock would still have gone down; the only difference is that you, rather than I, would have been holding it.Read more at location 701
Note: DANNO NETTO ZERO Edit
We get a net externality only if I bought the stock from the CEO, making the effect of his speech a transfer from him to me and converting the situation from pecuniary externality to rent seeking.Read more at location 704
Note: L UNOCA VERA ESTERNALITÀ Edit
Note: DA ESTERNALITÀ MONEYARIA A RENMT SEEKING Edit
One result is to penalize executives for making predictions that might turn out to be wrong, thus reducing the total amount of information available to investors. Another is to divert real resources from producing useful goods and services to producing litigation.Read more at location 707
Note: I DANNI REALI E FALSI DRLLE FRODI Edit
Defenders of that theory might—and sometimes do—argue that even if the damage payment is unrelated to the actual damage done, it provides injured stockholders an incentive to sue and thus deters fraudulent statements by corporate executives.Read more at location 709
Note: RISPOSTA Edit
One might, on similar grounds, argue that since we want to deter illegal parking, anyone who finds an illegally parked vehicle should be allowed to claim it for his own. What we want, here as in many other cases, is not an incentive but the right incentive,Read more at location 712
Note: CONTRORISPOSTA. PARCHEGGI Edit
Note: NON UN INCENTIVO MA IL GIUSTO INCENTIVO Edit