Notebook per
Dibattendo EMH
Citation (APA): Harford, E. F. J. F. T. (2014). Dibattendo EMH [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com
Parte introduttiva
Nota - Posizione 7
Definizione 2 categorie di scettici: 1. i contrari ideologicamente e 2. i consulenti che non avrebbero niente da consigliare Shiller: hindsight bias Perchè esiste una regolamentazione e una banca centrale se vale EMH? Nel momento in cui reputi buone alcune regole cesi di credere a EMH! MIT Chicago Mason. Sapendo che il mercato è imprrfetto (pur considerandolo il meglio a disosizione) le regole ci saranno sempre come segno di speranza e di cammino verso la xfezione Krugman e LTCM Le bolle possono coesistere con EMH? The peso problem
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 7
The Price Isn't Always Right justin fox
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 8
"security prices at any time 'fully reflect' all available information."
Nota - Posizione 8
FORMULAZIONI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 18
Finally, if all one means by "efficient market" is a market that's hard to beat, that's not such a wrongheaded idea at all
Nota - Posizione 19
ACCORDO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 21
Robert Shiller -- a long-time critic of the efficient market hypothesis -- cobbled together an inflation-adjusted index of U.S. real estate prices going back to 1890 and found that (a) in the past, prices had declined for decades on end and (b) the rise in real home prices since 1997 was by far the sharpest on record. From these two pieces of data he drew the common-sense conclusion that the rise in housing prices wouldn't go on forever and was likely to be followed by a sharp fall.
Nota - Posizione 25
SHILLER
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 30
In Defense of Efficient Markets eric falkenstein
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 31
you make many gracious acknowledgements to the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), such as the basic implication that it is very, very difficult to outperform the market.
Nota - Posizione 32
CONCESSIONE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 34
This is not a minor acknowledgment, but basically is the EMH theory.
Nota - Posizione 34
CONCESSIONE DECISIVA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 37
I think this distaste for efficient markets comes from two sources. First, many people distrust the "invisible hand."
Nota - Posizione 38
MANO INVISIBILE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 38
Secondly, there are critics (stockbrokers, talking heads on CNBC, financial journalists) whose livelihood depends on markets being wrong;
Nota - Posizione 39
CONFLITTO D INTRRESSE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 40
Government fails more often than markets do
Nota - Posizione 40
GOVERNO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 42
Yet I think government power should be minimized, because government failure is far more common than market failure, as the I.Q. of a group is diminished by centralized interaction.
Nota - Posizione 43
IQ GROUP
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 45
Shiller did not predict an aggregate housing decline; instead, he merely stated the recent increase in home prices was unlikely to continue.
Nota - Posizione 46
SHILLET
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 48
Now, compare this modest warning by a lone economist to the forces promoting home lending from all directions. It was not just a Wall Street phenomenon, but one pushed by our government, legislators, regulators, and even academics (for evidence, see Stan Liebowitz's "Anatomy of a Train Wreck").
Nota - Posizione 50
LONE ECONOMIST
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 57
The market diagnosed the bubble
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 60
ket prices, not legislators, instigated the end of the insanity. How quickly are failed governmental initiatives usually stopped, once identified?
Nota - Posizione 61
IL MERCATO SI È CORRETTO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 63
That you were able to find one person in 2004 and turn his measured warning into something that would have drastically reversed the regulatory emphasis on weakening underwriting standards is classic hindsight wisdom.
Nota - Posizione 64
A POSTERIORI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 67
Markets Can Do Many Things Well, But Not Everything justin fox
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 74
This reality is why over the past two centuries we've developed central banks and financial regulations. Yet it is a reality almost completely ignored by the efficient-market approach to finance.
Nota - Posizione 75
BANCHE CENTRALI E EMH
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 75
The housing bubble was driven by the market
Nota - Posizione 76
BUBBLE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 81
I'll be honest: I don't know what exactly the new rules should be.
Nota - Posizione 81
REGOLE? Boh
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 86
The big lesson that came out of the confluence of the efficient market hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model (which holds that stocks with higher sensitivity to market fluctuations will deliver higher returns) was that you should hold a widely diversified portfolio, preferably in some kind of index fund.
Nota - Posizione 87
COME INVESTIRE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 89
Jack Bogle's "cost matters hypothesis," which states that: No matter how efficient or inefficient markets may be, the returns earned by investors as a group must fall short of the market returns by precisely the amount of the aggregate costs they incur. It is the central fact of investing. So I invest in index funds not because I think the market is all that efficient, but because index funds charge the lowest fees.
Nota - Posizione 93
FEES
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 94
passive approach
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 96
Why Most Market Regulation is Useless And/Or Harmful eric falkenstein
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 98
As George Will writes, most regulation is championed by a confluence of Baptists and bootleggers, the first group with high motives, usually naïve, and the second more cynical group who hide behind them.
Nota - Posizione 99
TEGOLAZIONE DANNOSA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 100
Regulatory efforts fall into three categories. The first is exemplified by things like short-sale downtick prohibitions, Glass-Steagall, and mortgage disclosure requirements, all of which are really irrelevant to protecting the retail investor.
Nota - Posizione 101
3 TIPI DI REGOLE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 105
A second type of financial regulation is downright counterproductive, because it sows the seeds for future problems.
Nota - Posizione 105
PROBLEMI FUTIRI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 113
Without regulation, markets correct themselves
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 115
In the bad old days prior to much financial regulation, or even a central bank, we had crisesevery twenty years: in 1819, 1838, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907. After a couple of years, though, things always got better, and growth was strong over this period.
Nota - Posizione 117
REGOLA DEI 20 ANNI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 119
Businesses lobby for regulation to stifle competition Much regulation is really about preventing competition,
Nota - Posizione 120
INCUMBENT
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 124
For the 95 percent of investors who have no conceivable investing alpha, the best strategy is to avoid costs from overtrading, and avoid risk by diversifying.
Nota - Posizione 125
STRATEGIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 129
Bold regulation is the triumph of hope over experience,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 132
Back to the Myth of the Rational Market justin fox
Nota - Posizione 132
TITOLO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 133
So Eric, you're saying that some financial regulations are pointless, some are counterproductive, and some actually do good. Sounds about right to me. But it's not what the die-hard rational marketeers of the 1970s and 1980s were saying.
Nota - Posizione 134
TI CONTRADDICI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 139
Financial regulation is not going away
Nota - Posizione 140
TITOLO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 141
MIT economists think markets are imperfect, therefore we need regulation. Chicago economists think markets are perfect, therefore we don't need regulation. George Mason economists think markets are imperfect, therefore we don't need regulation.
Nota - Posizione 143
TRE SCUOLE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 146
Richard Thaler offered this verdict: While imperfect, financial markets are still the best way to allocate capital. Even so, knowing that prices can be wrong suggests that governments could usefully adopt automatic stabilising activity,
Nota - Posizione 148
THALER
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 150
We Need Less Regulation, Not More eric falkenstein
Nota - Posizione 151
TITOLO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 153
I agree with Kling, in that when you say something is imperfect, it should always be asked, "compared to what?" Some theoretical nirvana where a social planner
Nota - Posizione 154
COMPARE TO WHAT
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 175
Krugman Reviews Book He Didn't Read eric falkenstein
Nota - Posizione 175
TITOLO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 176
Justin Fox noted that I didn't read his book, because if I did he would have noted Fox's rather balanced treatment.
Nota - Posizione 177
LE AMMISSIONI DI FOX
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 184
Krugman demonstrates he has strong opinions disproportionate to any evidence, and displays the measured analysis of an anonymous blog commenter.
Nota - Posizione 185
GAFFE KRUGG
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 195
The quintessential collaboration between big money and academic superstars was the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, whose partners included Scholes and Robert Merton, with whom Scholes shared another finance Nobel. L.T.C.M. eventually imploded, nearly taking the world economy down with it. But efficient-markets theory retained its hold on financial thought.
Nota - Posizione 197
KRUGG LEGGENDA LTCM
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 198
If he actually knew something about hedge funds in general, or LTCM in particular, he would know that Merton and Scholes where marketing props. The strategies LTCM employed were neither derived by, or managed by Scholes and Merton. The LTCM strategy had nothing to do with a tweak to the Black-Scholes option formula.
Nota - Posizione 200
NOBEL PROP.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 207
It is much smarter to approach markets as if markets are rational. As there are literally thousands of prices in thousands of markets, some are too low or too high, but it is not obvious which because most are priced 'just right' given the information available. If you think it is easy, as implied by an irrational market, you don't check your assumptions enough. Several, perhaps hundreds, prices are wrong, but it takes a lot of smart analysis to figure out which.
Nota - Posizione 210
EMH È PIÙ SMART
Nota - Posizione 211
L IPOTESI PIÙ DIFFICILE DA CONFUTARR
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 217
The theory has esteemed detractors, but that's about it. Indeed, it seems ultimately a semantics debate (ie, 'efficient' implies 'perfect' to some).
Nota - Posizione 219
SEMANTICA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 223
Such a book has its place on the bookshelf, but it is not part of the intellectual debate, more like learning about Hitler's childhood, which is interesting but really doesn't explain the concentration camps or Operation Barbarossa.
Nota - Posizione 224
INFANZIA DI HOTLER
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 231
'Education is an admirable thing, but is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught.'
Nota - Posizione 232
INSEGNARE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 234
Do Crashes Support or Disprove 'Rational' Markets? eric falkenstein
Nota - Posizione 235
TITOLO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 235
Noneconomists tend to think 'rational markets' is patently absurd, pointing to various asset bubbles such as the internet bubble,
Nota - Posizione 236
BOLLE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 242
To assert markets are irrational or inefficient, however, one needs to propose a measure of 'true value', and then show that actual market prices diverge from this.
Nota - Posizione 242
TRUE VALUE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 245
It is essential to have a specific alternative, because how do you know they are wrong unless you know the right answer?
Nota - Posizione 245
RISPOSTA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 249
One big issue in tests of whether prices are 'right' or not is the Peso Problem. The term 'peso problem'
Nota - Posizione 250
PESO PEOBLEM
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 269
So why can’t market participants also be considered rational and yet have their collective opinions vary wildly over time and space?
Nota - Posizione 270
VOLATILE MA NN IRRAZIONALE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 283
Prices fluctuate more than we would like. But is it too much?
Nota - Posizione 283
TROPPO VOLATILE?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 287
How to make money from a Nobel cause tim harford
Nota - Posizione 288
TITOLO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 296
Fama and Shiller disagree with each other.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 298
it’s hard to beat the market, and you should probably be suspicious of people who claim to be able to pull off the trick.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 304
a second reason to disbelieve the EMH is the experience of the dotcom and subprime bubbles.
Nota - Posizione 304
BOLLE
