giovedì 4 maggio 2017

2 Relative Deprivation in the Islamic World - Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education by Diego Gambetta, Steffen Hertog

2 Relative Deprivation in the Islamic WorldRead more at location 931
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many Muslim countries have suffered development crises and have failed to create decent jobs for university graduates.Read more at location 934
Note: ISTRUITI: FUTURO PRECARIO Edit
We might speculate that political rebellions grow out of the frustrated expectations of the educated.Read more at location 936
Note: IPOTESI FRUSTRAZ Edit
If acquiring a degree in higher education is a reflection of high hopes and ambition, does thwarted ambition produce militants among university graduates?Read more at location 936
Note: ALTE ASPETTATIVE ALTE FRISYRAZ Edit
FRUSTRATED AMBITIONS AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATIONRead more at location 939
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venerable tradition—aRead more at location 941
back to Aristotle and Tocqueville.Read more at location 941
The theory is not about absolute deprivation or poverty as such, factors that are not necessarily linked to militancy (Krueger 2007). It is about expectations of social advancement—both individual and collective—that first are raised and then disappointed.Read more at location 941
Note: ATTENZ: RELATIVO. NN ASSOLUTO Edit
(Berman et al. 2011; Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; Salert 1976; Finkel and Rule 1986; Piazza 2006).Read more at location 946
Note: L EVIDENZA È PRECARIA Edit
The process might not be limited to individual economic failure but could also involve “group relative deprivation,” a concept originally proposed by sociologist W. G. Runciman as “fraternal deprivation” (1966). This occurs when an individual feels that the group he belongs to is collectively deprivedRead more at location 950
Note: RETTIFICA DEL CONCETTO: FRUSTRAZIONE DI GRUPPO. NON INDIVIDUALE Edit
Unfulfilled Promises: EgyptRead more at location 959
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In our reading of relative deprivation, individuals with above-average skills, who have been selected for their university studies on merit, are particularly susceptible to frustration and a sense of injustice when they find their professional future hampered by a lack of opportunities.Read more at location 959
Note: PIÙ DOTATI PIÙ ESPOSTI Edit
Egypt, where our puzzle first emerged, perfectly epitomizes the story of militancy rooted in frustrated ambitions. During Nasser’s “socialist years,” from 1960 to 1966, the Egyptian university system was opened to lower-class students and enrollment greatly increased. Nasser offered state employment to all new graduates (Longuenesse 2007: 41).Read more at location 966
Note: NASSER E L UNIVERSITÀ APERTA A TUTTI Edit
Note: CON LAVORO STATALE X TUTTI Edit
When development sputtered and Egypt lost the 1967 war against Israel, students, who had been socialized and mobilized into Nasser’s ideology like no other group, were the most disillusioned. Protests occurred regularly, first dominated by leftist slogans but turning to Islamic rhetoric in the 1970s.Read more at location 971
Note: CRISI E SCONFOTTA CON OSRAELE. LE VITTIME E LE RETORICHE: ISLAM E SINISTRA Edit
Ibrahim, in his early study of 1970s radicals, noted that most activists in his sample ranked “decidedly high in both motivation and achievement.”Read more at location 977
Note: I RADICALI LAUREATI Edit
Many graduates preferred joblessness even to relatively well-paying menial jobs, and for numerous young Egyptians marriage became unaffordable. Making a virtue out of necessity, many graduates tried to restore their dignity by adopting an austere Islamic morality to compensate for their material deprivation (Hoffman 1995: 208).Read more at location 989
Note: ORGOGLIO LAUREA: SI RIFIUTA IL LAVORO MODESTO Edit
The gradual marginalization of the middle classes, previously the bedrock of regime support, became increasingly obvious. The dearth of opportunities was made all the more grating by the corrupt allocation of jobs by the state, whereby elites channeled the country’s few well-paying jobs to their own offspring.Read more at location 995
Note: CLASSE MEDIA ALL ANGOLO Edit
The Islamist opposition was able to provide an organized focus to this discontent, as documented by Wickham in her seminal study of grassroots Islamist mobilization.Read more at location 1002
Note: GLI ISLAMISTI CAPITALIZZARONO IL MALCONTENTO Edit
Muslim Brothers found strong support among lower-middle and middle-class students.Read more at location 1005
Note: FLLI MUS Edit
in the late 1990s Mohamed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers, wanted to return from his technical studies in Germany to work in Cairo but faced dire job prospects as his family lacked the “right connections.”3 When he left Germany for good in summer 2000, it was not to return to his home country but to enroll in a flight school in Florida on orders of Osama bin Laden.Read more at location 1009
Note: IL CASO ATTA È ESEMPLARE Edit
BEYOND EGYPTRead more at location 1013
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Willis reports that the economic crisis in Algeria pushed young men, particularly students, toward Islamist movements in the 1980s and 1990s (1996: 85, 109).Read more at location 1015
Note: ALGERIA Edit
According to Sageman—who briefly mentions relative deprivation as a necessary condition of radicalization—many Al-Qaida members, although academically gifted, did not have full-time jobs (2004: 92, 95).Read more at location 1016
Note: I MOLTI TALENTI IN AL QUAEDA Edit
Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010) show that high levels of unemployment enable militant Palestinian organizations to recruit more educated and experienced suicide terrorists, who in turn attack more important Israeli targets.Read more at location 1018
Note: AI LAUREATI PALESTINESI Edit
Meyersson Milgrom and Jasso (2004) demonstrate that higher levels of education are associated with lower support for the Roadmap to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while higher levels of income among Palestinians are associated with greater support.Read more at location 1020
Note: PIÙ ISTRUITI PIÚ OPPOSTI ALLA ROAD MAP Edit
Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and YemenRead more at location 1025
Note: ACASI SIMILI ALL EGITTO Edit
While Middle Eastern growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s had been impressive, the whole region fell behind in terms of per capita income compared to other developing economies from the mid-1970s on (see figure 2.2), exactly the time when Islamist opposition and, in most cases, militancy emerged as a major phenomenon across the region (Yazbeck Haddad, Esposito, and Voll 1991; Hunter 1988; Kepel 2002; Roy 1994).Read more at location 1037
Note: CONTA LA CRESCITA. NN LA XRICCHEZZA Edit
Elisabeth Longuenesse—who has written the foremost study of the social and educational history of the professional middle class in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria—provides a rich description of the emerging “discrepancy between expectations and possibilities” for graduates in the 1970s and 1980sRead more at location 1041
Note: UNA FONTE DI MERITO QUANDO SI PARLA DI FFRISTR Edit
there are some hard data that illustrate the limited mobility chances of average graduates in 1980s and 1990s Arab countries: private returns to higher education—the amount of extra earnings per year of education—in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen were considerably lower than they were in Latin American and Asian countries (see figure 2.3).Read more at location 1052
Note: MOBILITÀ SOCIALE BASSA Edit
In Palestine, the size of the educated labor force increased dramatically from 1981 to 1987 while income differences between secondary school and university graduates fell by half, meaning that a university degree paid off progressively less (Angrist 1995).Read more at location 1060
Note: COLLEGE PREMIUM IN PALESTINA Edit
If mobility closure for the highly educated explains their overrepresentation among militants, then Islamic countries with more successful economies should have fewer radicalized graduates than Arab countries.Read more at location 1069
Note: E LE NAZ CHE CRESCONO? HANNOENO UNIVERS TRA I TERORISTI Edit
Singapore, Indonesia, and India have not undergone economic crises as pronounced and protracted as those in the Arab world, and their output of university graduates is also more aligned with their level of development.6 These are the same countries that have the lowest presence of graduates in our sample (22.5 percent). The share is the lowest in Singapore (6 of 31 cases),7 which is the most successful economically, despite much higher levels of education in the population at large.Read more at location 1071
Note: I TRE PAESI SOTTO LA LENTE Edit
Note: L IPOT CONFERMATA Edit
Comparative international research has shown that a larger share of adults who have attained some level of higher education makes democratic revolutions more likely (Kurzman and Leahey 2004).Read more at location 1081
Note: REGOLA GENERALE: SONO LE CLASSI MEDIE A FARE LA RIV Edit
ARE ENGINEERS ESPECIALLY DEPRIVED?Read more at location 1084
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why should engineers stand outRead more at location 1086
In the MENA region, a degree in engineering carries more than mere technical status (Cornand 1990; Wickham 2002), and many students choose it as much because of their interest in the subject as because of the prestige it confers (Hanafi 1990: 173).Read more at location 1091
Note: INGEGERI ANCHE X LO STATUS Edit
Mobility failure for these students at the top of the educational pyramid must be all the more galling.Read more at location 1098
Note: FRUSYRAZ PIÙ FORTE Edit
As early as the 1820s, Egypt’s modernizing regimes under the Muhammad Ali dynasty glorified science and industry as a means of catching up with the West (Longuenesse 2007: 174).Read more at location 1102
Note: L ING SIMBOLO DELL INSEGUOMENTO ALL OVEST Edit
Under the Nasserist regime in Egypt and Ba‘athist rule in Syria in the 1960s, the “hegemony of modernist scientism became total” (Longuenesse 2007: 68).Read more at location 1112
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Among Egypt’s Nasserist technocrats, engineers had a heavier and more visible presence than any other category of graduates (Moore 1994: 9, 13,166ff.).Read more at location 1117
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No Politics among the Engineering AristocracyRead more at location 1120
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Arab engineers were apolitical for most of their history, primarily focused on serving governments in the interest of technical modernity (Longuenesse 2007: 60, 101). Compared to their dominant role in post-1970s Islamist militancy, they are strikingly absent from previous political movements. Early nationalist and socialist leaders and even early Islamists overwhelmingly came from other professions; many of them were lawyers and teachers.Read more at location 1121
Note: ING. DA SEMPRE SIMBOLO DI APOLITICITÀ Edit
Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the two founders of the secularnationalist Ba‘athist movement in Syria, were teachers, as was Zaki al-Arsuzi, the leader of a parallel movement that joined forces with the Ba‘ath in 1947.Read more at location 1127
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Engineers appeared later, as functionaries, not revolutionary leaders.Read more at location 1130
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Springborg (1978) describes the political mobilization of the lawyers’, doctors’, and journalists’ syndicates from the 1950s to the 1970s but does not mention engineers.Read more at location 1132
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Professionals were already present in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s and 1950s,13 but most of the leading Islamist activists in the 1950s and 1960s in Egypt and North Africa came from second-tier faculties like education.Read more at location 1137
Note: c Edit
Among early Islamists, teachers had the leading positions that engineers occupy today: the prime mover of twentieth-century Islamist organization, Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, was a teacher at Dar Al-Uloum school in Cairo,Read more at location 1143
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Note: c Edit
Isam Attar, leader of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood after 1957, was a teacher of Arabic literature. The Shabiba Islamist movement in Morocco was set up by an educational inspector in 1972, a job also held by the leader of the Moroccan justice and charity movement, Abdessalam Yassine (b. 1928, d. 2012).Read more at location 1145
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A Turn for the Worse, and toward RadicalizationRead more at location 1153
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But as cracks in the modernization projects widened from the 1970s onward, engineers began to show up in Islamist movements—notably in the early Egyptian militant groups studied by Ibrahim but also among the peaceful Islamist opposition in Egypt (Wickham 2002: 116, 184; Moore 1994: 208). The militant “Fighting Vanguard” group that led the mass insurrection in the Syrian city of Hama in 1982 was led by a civil engineer, Adnan Uqla (who had succeeded a dentist in leading the organization).Read more at location 1157
Note: L ING FA POLITICA E IMBRACCIA I FUCILI Edit
It seems hardly a coincidence that previously apolitical engineers appeared on the political scene precisely when development in the Islamic world started to wane and when the status of new cohorts of graduates, who were perceived to be their nations’ technical vanguard, was progressively undermined.Read more at location 1169
Note: L INGRESSO IN POLITICA NN È UNA CASO. COINCIDE CON LA CRISI Edit
“In less than half a century, the [Arab] engineer went from the status of a senior civil servant to that of a rank and file technical or bureaucratic employee, becoming a hindrance to administration and public enterprises” (2007: 81).17Read more at location 1180
Note: ING: DA SCIENZIATO A BUROCRATE. SPESSO DOSOCC MASCHERATO Edit
The employment situation for those in the engineering field in the 1970s worsened palpably, but it still compared favorably to that of other disciplines, not least due to heightened labor demand from the Gulf. A further dramatic deterioration came with the collapse of the price of oil after 1982.Read more at location 1191
Note: ANNI OTTANTA E COLLASSO DEL PEDTROLUO Edit
Individual and Collective FrustrationsRead more at location 1205
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Given their vaunted status as their nations’ pioneers, Muslim engineers were likely frustrated both individually and collectively, not only because of their personal labor market failures but also because of the technological and developmental failures of their societies.Read more at location 1206
Note: FRUSYRAZ COME PROFESSIONE. FRUSTRAZ COME ARABI Edit
Moreover, Muslim engineers who studied in the West, itself a sign of an even greater ambition and willingness to make sacrifices, should have felt more deprived, both individually and collectively.Read more at location 1218
Note: c IL CFR DI CHI HA STUDIATO ALL ESTERO Edit
Mohamed Atta often bemoaned Western influence in Arab cities (Holmes 2005): According to Dittmar Machule, his thesis supervisor at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg in Germany, Atta hated skyscrapers because in the Syrian city of Aleppo, on which he wrote his doctoral dissertation, tall buildings stole the privacy of the traditional Arab homes in whose courtyards women were once able to remove their veils unseen by strangers (Rose 2004).Read more at location 1226
Note: L ODIO DI AYTA X I GRATTACIELI Edit
Further Tests of Relative DeprivationRead more at location 1236
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if being an engineer indicates that one is hard-working and ambitious, and if these traits lead to particularly deep frustration when development stalls in one’s home country, then we should expect the less well equipped and ambitious to be much less represented among militant movements. This is exactly what the data presented in chapter 1 seem to show: courses of study that are associated with less prestige in the Islamic world—the arts, humanities, education—which also typically have less stringent admission requirements, are strongly underrepresented in the sample.Read more at location 1237
Note: I MENO BIZIOSI SONO PIÙ PACIFICI Edit
Frustrated expectations also seem to explain why teachers played a much larger role in all forms of militancy in the early years of political Islam. Before the age of mass higher education, when many towns and villages were proud to send even one young student to university, a degree in education carried some prestige and was a vehicle for upward mobility.Read more at location 1243
Note: FASE 1 I PRIMI FRUSTR SONO GLI INSEGN. POI L ISTR DI MASSA LI HA DEGRADATI RIDUCENDO LE FRUSTR DELLA CRISI Edit
The story for lawyers—hardly present in our sample at just 1.8 percent—matches that of teachers: in early twentieth-century Egypt a law degree was considered very prestigious (Longuenesse 2007: 56), but later it became one of the least regarded degrees (Moore 1994: 46). Lawyers were among the leaders in the early nationalist struggle (Longuenesse 2007: 57). In the 1950s, the lawyers’ syndicate still led the opposition to Nasser, playing a more active political role than either the doctors’ or engineers’ syndicate up to the 1970s (Springborg 1978: 281; Reid 1974: 46).Read more at location 1253
Note: AVVOCATI . STESSO MODELLO Edit
Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010) and Lee (2011) explain the presence of highly educated militants in stagnant economies in terms of opportunity costs:26 As economic opportunities dwindle, highly skilled individuals incur smaller relative costs by becoming militant.Read more at location 1260
Note: COSTO OPPORTINITÀ DELLE CONVERS TERROROSYA Edit
THE SAUDI EXCEPTION AGAINRead more at location 1267
Note: y Edit
Saudi Arabia, a country with only 1 engineer among 10 graduates in our main sample, no engineer among 14 graduates in the Sinjar sample, and only 1 engineer among 11 graduates in Thomas Hegghammer’s sample mentioned in chapter 1. This is true even though the proportion of engineers in the Saudi population is comparable to that of other Arab states.Read more at location 1269
Note: PO HI ING NEI TERRORISTI SAUDITI Edit
What is special about Saudi engineers? Most obviously, they have had much better labor market chances than their peers in any of the non-Gulf MENA states: the Saudi market has been able to absorb virtually all university graduates with prestigious technical degrees.Read more at location 1273
Note: OVVIO: IN AS L ECONOMIA TIRAVA Edit
Job market chances for the technically educated have further improved in recent years as the government has been exerting pressure on companies to hire nationals instead of foreigners.Read more at location 1277
Note: c Edit
There have been signs of scarcity of engineers during the recent oil boom (Saudi Gazette, 21 May 2006, 3 December 2006; Bahrain Tribune, 21 April 2006; Arab News, 12 April 2007; Khaleej Times, 21 June 2007).Read more at location 1282
Note: c Edit
Compared to the other Arab cases, the Saudi contingent in our Muslim world sample appears quite unaccomplished, with lower education levels and less prestigious courses of study among those who attended university.Read more at location 1285
Note: GLI UOMINI CHE FORNISCE AS AL TERRORISMO SONO I MENO PREP Edit
According to official sources, the main threat in Saudi domestic militancy comes from individuals who have dropped out of education, not elites (Saudi Gazette, 4 January 2011).Read more at location 1288
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CONCLUSIONS, AND FACTS THAT DO NOT FITRead more at location 1303
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the weaker presence of graduates among extremists from countries with better labor market opportunities (see also chapter 3); •  the prominent role of engineers in Islamist radicalism from the 1970s on in countries undergoing economic crises, and their absence among opposition movements in earlier decades; •  the absence from Islamist movements of engineers in Saudi Arabia, a country where they retain excellent labor market chances; and •  the waxing and waning of the role played by other professions, such as teachers and lawyers, in opposition movements in Islamic countries over nearly a century.Read more at location 1308
Note: RIASSUMAMO I FATTI CHE AVVALORANO LA FRUSTR COME MOLLA DEL TERRORI Edit
there are facts that do not fit into the relative deprivation explanation even if we consider only the educated militants: among the extremists we find some graduates who should not be there and do not find some other graduates who should be there. As for graduates who, according to the relative deprivation hypothesis, should be there and are not, consider the doctors who, compared to engineers, are significantly less overrepresented,Read more at location 1320
Note: COSE NN SPIEGATE: PERCHÈ GLI ING E NN I DOTTORI? Edit
proportional terms, medical faculties expanded almost as dramatically as those of engineers,36 leading to a surplus of doctors and, consequently, unmet expectations (Longuenesse 2007: 67).Read more at location 1326
Note: c Edit
There are two ways in which relative deprivation could explain this anomaly. First, engineers’ greater dependence on the state could have made them more vulnerable to budget cuts and to the downward mobility of bureaucrats from the 1970s on. It is arguably easier for doctors to practice even in a struggling economy than it is for engineers who rely on large projects or firms to employ them (Longuenesse 2007: 96).Read more at location 1329
Note: PRIMA IP DI SPIEGAZ: L ING LAVORA GRAZIE ALLO STATO. IL DOTTORE... ANXHE IN TEMPI DI CRISI... SI RICICLA NEL PROVATO Edit
Second, if engineering students came from lower social backgrounds than those in medicine did, they would have incurred greater relative costs for their education and entertained expectations of higher social advancement.Read more at location 1332
Note: SECONDA IPOTESI: L ING PARTE PIÙ DAL BASSO. LA SUA FRUSTR È MENO BRUCIANTE Edit
we have found no evidence to support it.Read more at location 1335
Note: NESSUN SUPPORTO. VEDREMO CHE A PESARE SARÀ LA MENTALITÀ LINK Edit
Kepel 1993: 73, 163–64; SonbolRead more at location 1336