12 EXPLAINING CHAVISMO: THE UNEXPECTED ALLIANCE OF RADICAL LEFTISTS AND THE MILITARY IN VENEZUELA UNDER HUGO CHÁVEZ Javier CorralesRead more at location 7049
Knowing that a severe episode of growth collapse preceded Chávez is perhaps enough to understand why this change occurred: most political scientists agree with Przeworski and colleagues (2000) that severe economic crises jeopardize not just the incumbents, but also the very continuity of democratic regimes in non-rich countries.Read more at location 7052
personalistic, popular, populist, pro-poor, revolutionary, participatory, socialist, Castroite, fascist, competitive authoritarian, soft authoritarian, third-world-oriented, hybrid, statist, polarizing, oil-addicted, Caesaristic, counterhegemonic,Read more at location 7058
chavismo consists not simply of a “civilian–military alliance,” to quote the man himself (Chávez, Harnecker, and Boudin 2005, 81), but an alliance of radical–leftistcivilians and the militaryRead more at location 7061
it was clear that chavismo, as a political regime, occupied a “gray zone” between democracy and authoritarianism (Coppedge 2003; McCoy 2004).Read more at location 7065
There is no question that leftist–military ruling alliances are not new in Latin America (Remmer 1991), dating back to Cuba in the 1930s, when a young sergeant, Fulgencio Batista, sought to dominate Cuban politics by courting radical leftist civilians (first, student leaders, and then communists).Read more at location 7071
In the early 1990s, the common response to the economic woes of the region was the emergence of market-oriented administrations.Read more at location 7076
Most of the scholarship seeking to explain chavismo argues that the previous regime, the “Fourth Republic” or the “Punto Fijo regime,” suffered from excessively exclusionary politics: political institutions became too rigid to give entry to new, smaller, nondominant political forces, which led to accumulated resentment,Read more at location 7082
The old regime benefited two parties, AD and COPEI, and no one else. According to this view, chavismo was, at its core, a movement designed to break down institutional barriers,Read more at location 7086
I seek to modify the view of pre-existing institutional rigidity and closure. While some institutions did remain closed and even ossified, the most important story is how many other political institutions actually offered shelter to a number of nondominant forces, which I will call small opposition forces (SOFs).Read more at location 7088
It was this degree of institutional sheltering, together with two decades of growth collapse, that explains why leftist SOFs grew in numbers large enough to sustain a new ruling coalition and learned to work with the military to a degree that had few parallels in the region.Read more at location 7094
rise of the left in Latin America in the 2000s is the result of both gripes (i.e., complaints about the socioeconomic status quo) and institutional opportunities.Read more at location 7097
I agree with scholars on Venezuela, who almost unanimously argue that citizens by the late 1990s had ample reasons to vote for an anti–status quo option, but I disagree with those who underplay the institutional openings of the Punto Fijo era.Read more at location 7098
Chávez has had to deal with two different sources of tensions within his initial coalition: (1) the defection of moderate leftists, and (2) divisions within the military.Read more at location 7112
(1) polarization, (2) corruption and impunity for supporters, and (3) job discrimination and other legal abuses for opponents.Read more at location 7117
A Look at the First ChavistasRead more at location 7125
