giovedì 31 marzo 2016
Finanza e civiltà
http://www.amazon.com/Money-Changes-Everything-Civilization-Possible/dp/0691143781/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1459300615&sr=1-1&keywords=money+changes+everything/marginalrevol-20
Does Science Need Philosophy?
Does Science Need Philosophy? Why the “Gotcha” Argument Fails | Bleeding Heart Libertarians: "A: “Science doesn’t need philosophy! Science gets by on its own.”
B: “Why is science worth doing?”
A: “Well…”
B: “And you’re doing philosophy!”"
'via Blog this'
A: “Science doesn’t need philosophy! Science gets by on its own.”
B: “Why is science worth doing?”
A: “Well…”
B: “And you’re doing philosophy!”
Intervento di Caplan che equipara la filosofia al senso comune:
A: "Science doesn't need common sense! Science gets by on its own."
B: "How do you know that the universe is uniform? How do you know that the scientific laws won't just change tomorrow for no reason? How do you know that just because past electrons have all behaved one way that future electrons will behave the same way? How do you know that your experiments aren't modifying the behavior of the things you observe in such a way that makes your conclusions irrelevant for predicting outside behavior? How do you know..."
A: "Well..."
B: "And you're relying on common sense!"
B: "Ok, you got me. Those are interesting questions and science itself doesn't really answer them. So, does common sense have good answers to these questions? Have they solved these problems?"
A: "Basically. Common sense affirms all the assumptions science takes for granted: The uniformity of nature. The stability of causal laws over time. The existence of the physical world, the validity of sense perception, the reliability of human reason, and so on."
B: "But what about all the common-sense claims science has refuted?"
A: "Science only achieves this by using more fundamental common-sense claims to undermine less fundamental common-sense claims. For example, the validity of sense perception is a more fundamental common-sense principle than the apparent flatness of the Earth. So when observations show the Earth is round, the common-sense response is to change our mind about the shape of the Earth, not the validity of the senses. The same goes for, say, special relativity. It's weird, but it's what our eyes tell us when we scrupulously measure."
B:
B: “Why is science worth doing?”
A: “Well…”
B: “And you’re doing philosophy!”"
'via Blog this'
A: “Science doesn’t need philosophy! Science gets by on its own.”
B: “Why is science worth doing?”
A: “Well…”
B: “And you’re doing philosophy!”
Intervento di Caplan che equipara la filosofia al senso comune:
A: "Science doesn't need common sense! Science gets by on its own."
B: "How do you know that the universe is uniform? How do you know that the scientific laws won't just change tomorrow for no reason? How do you know that just because past electrons have all behaved one way that future electrons will behave the same way? How do you know that your experiments aren't modifying the behavior of the things you observe in such a way that makes your conclusions irrelevant for predicting outside behavior? How do you know..."
A: "Well..."
B: "And you're relying on common sense!"
B: "Ok, you got me. Those are interesting questions and science itself doesn't really answer them. So, does common sense have good answers to these questions? Have they solved these problems?"
A: "Basically. Common sense affirms all the assumptions science takes for granted: The uniformity of nature. The stability of causal laws over time. The existence of the physical world, the validity of sense perception, the reliability of human reason, and so on."
B: "But what about all the common-sense claims science has refuted?"
A: "Science only achieves this by using more fundamental common-sense claims to undermine less fundamental common-sense claims. For example, the validity of sense perception is a more fundamental common-sense principle than the apparent flatness of the Earth. So when observations show the Earth is round, the common-sense response is to change our mind about the shape of the Earth, not the validity of the senses. The same goes for, say, special relativity. It's weird, but it's what our eyes tell us when we scrupulously measure."
B:
Labor Market Rigidity and the Disaffection of European Muslim Youth by Alex Tabarrok
- the Pew Research Center found that Muslim Americans are “highly assimilated into American society and . . . largely content with their lives.” More than 80 percent of US Muslims expressed satisfaction with life in America, and 63 percent said they felt no conflict “between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society.” The rates at which they participate in various everyday American activities — from following local sports teams to watching entertainment TV — are similar to those of the American public generally. Half of all Muslim immigrants display the US flag at home, in the office, or on their car.
- One reason is the greater flexibility of American labor markets compared to those in Europe. Institutions that make it more difficult to hire and fire workers or adjust wages can increase unemployment and reduce employment, especially among immigrant youth...Huber, for example...The problem of labor market rigidity is especially acute in Belgium where the differences between native and immigrant unemployment, employment and wages are among the highest in the OECD...
72 TERMS OF COOPERATION AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE - Anarchy, State, and Utopia by Robert Nozick
72 TERMS OF COOPERATION AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE - Anarchy, State, and Utopia by Robert Nozick - idueprincipidirawls perchèsolounaspecificadiseguaglianza? ricchisemprepiùricchi unapropostaindecente lontanodalsentirecomune
TERMS OF COOPERATION AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLERead more at location 3797
Rawls imagines rational, mutually disinterested individuals meeting in a certain situation,Read more at location 3799
The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.Read more at location 3803
Persons in the initial situation would choose two . . . principles: the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example, inequalities of wealth and authority are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.Read more at location 3808
we should question why individuals in the original position would choose a principle that focuses upon groups, rather than individuals.Read more at location 3823
why exclude the group of depressives or alcoholics or the representative paraplegic?Read more at location 3828
is this a fair agreement on the basis of which those worse endowed could expect the willing cooperation of others?Read more at location 3868
the difference principle is not neutral between the better and the worse endowed.Read more at location 3870
Perhaps the symmetry is upset if one asks how much each gains from the social cooperation.Read more at location 3871
how much does each individual gain from general social cooperation, as compared, not with no cooperation, but with more limited cooperation?Read more at location 3874
we must try to imagine less extensive schemes of partitioned social cooperation in which the better endowed cooperate only among themselves and the worse endowed cooperate only among themselves,Read more at location 3879
If the better-endowed group includes those who manage to accomplish something of great economic advantage to others, such as new inventions, new ideas about production or ways of doing things, skill at economic tasks, and so on,* it is difficult to avoid concluding that the less well endowed gain more than the better endowed do from the scheme of general cooperation.Read more at location 3887
What follows from this conclusion? I do not mean to imply that the better endowed should get even more than they get under the entitlement system of general social cooperation.+ What does follow from the conclusion is a deep suspicion of imposing, in the name of fairness, constraints upon voluntaryRead more at location 3890
“Look, worse endowed: you gain by cooperating with us. If you want our cooperation you’ll have to accept reasonable terms. We propose these terms: We’ll cooperate with you so long as we get as much as possible. That is, the terms of our cooperation should give us the maximal share such that, if it was tried to give us more, we’d end up with less.” If these terms seem outrageous, as they are, why don’t the terms proposed by those worse endowed seem the same?Read more at location 3898
neutral between his proposal and any other proposal, the conclusion that the difference principle presents a fair basis for cooperation cannot follow from what precedes it in this passage. Rawls is merely repeating that it seems reasonable; hardly a convincing reply to anyone to whom it doesn’t seem reasonable.Read more at location 3922
Note: LS NEUTRALITÀ FATTUALE DI RAWLS
10-14 The Hanson-Yudkowsky AI-Foom Debate by Robin Hanson, Eliezer Yudkowsky
10-14 The Hanson-Yudkowsky AI-Foom Debate by Robin Hanson, Eliezer Yudkowsky - eugeneticainformatica analogiavscausalità tretransizioni rivoluzioneindustrialeconnessionetrafficoni cumuloconoscienzenopensieroscientifico
Chapter 10 AI Go FoomRead more at location 634
hand-coded AI will come soon and in the form of a single suddenly superpowerful AI.Read more at location 637
A machine intelligence can directly rewrite its entire source code and redesign its entire physical hardware. While human brains can in principle modify themselves arbitrarily, in practice our limited understanding of ourselves means we mainly only change ourselves by thinking new thoughts. All else equal this means that machine brains have an advantage in improving themselves.Read more at location 640
It seems as if you think object ones don’t increase growth rates while meta ones do.Read more at location 674
Chapter 12 Eliezer’s Meta-level DeterminismRead more at location 816
Note: Il metodi alternativi: H: analogie con contesti simili e analisi dei precedenti E: conoscenza dei meccanismi specifici del campo oggetto Le 3 transizioni analoghe: uomo, agricoltura, industria Cause: nn tanto la conoscenza quanto la messa in rete delle singole conoscenze. E: l' agricoltura raccontata da un ottimizatore. H dà + peso al caso e quindi alle capacità combinatorie del sistema. E dà+ peso all' intelligenza e al progetto. Edit
it seems the basis for Eliezer’s claim that my analysis is untrustworthy “surface analogies” vs. his reliable “deep causes” is that, while I use long-vetted general social science understandings of factors influencing innovation, he uses his own new untested meta-level determinism theory.Read more at location 826
The last three strong transitions were humans, farming, and industry, and in terms of growth rate changes these seem to be of similar magnitude. Eliezer seems to predict we will discover the first of these was much stronger than the other two. And while the key causes of these transitions have long been hotly disputed, with many theories in play, Eliezer seems to pick specific winners for these disputes: intergenerational culture, writing, and scientific thinking.Read more at location 866
Few could write and what they wrote didn’t help farming much. Farming seems more plausibly to have resulted from a scale effect in the accumulation of innovations in abilities to manage plants and animals—weRead more at location 871
Also for industry, the key innovation does not seem to have been a scientific way of thinking—that popped up periodically in many times and places, and by itself wasn’t particularly useful. My guess is that the key was the formation of networks of science-like specialists, which wasn’t possible until the previous economy had reached a critical scale and density.Read more at location 874
Note: INDUSTRIA: NETWORK DI TRAFFICONI E MASSA CRITICA DEL CAPITALE. NO PENSIERO SCIENTIFICO
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