72 TERMS OF COOPERATION AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE - Anarchy, State, and Utopia by Robert Nozick - idueprincipidirawls perchèsolounaspecificadiseguaglianza? ricchisemprepiùricchi unapropostaindecente lontanodalsentirecomune
TERMS OF COOPERATION AND THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLERead more at location 3797
Rawls imagines rational, mutually disinterested individuals meeting in a certain situation,Read more at location 3799
The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.Read more at location 3803
Persons in the initial situation would choose two . . . principles: the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example, inequalities of wealth and authority are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.Read more at location 3808
we should question why individuals in the original position would choose a principle that focuses upon groups, rather than individuals.Read more at location 3823
why exclude the group of depressives or alcoholics or the representative paraplegic?Read more at location 3828
is this a fair agreement on the basis of which those worse endowed could expect the willing cooperation of others?Read more at location 3868
the difference principle is not neutral between the better and the worse endowed.Read more at location 3870
Perhaps the symmetry is upset if one asks how much each gains from the social cooperation.Read more at location 3871
how much does each individual gain from general social cooperation, as compared, not with no cooperation, but with more limited cooperation?Read more at location 3874
we must try to imagine less extensive schemes of partitioned social cooperation in which the better endowed cooperate only among themselves and the worse endowed cooperate only among themselves,Read more at location 3879
If the better-endowed group includes those who manage to accomplish something of great economic advantage to others, such as new inventions, new ideas about production or ways of doing things, skill at economic tasks, and so on,* it is difficult to avoid concluding that the less well endowed gain more than the better endowed do from the scheme of general cooperation.Read more at location 3887
What follows from this conclusion? I do not mean to imply that the better endowed should get even more than they get under the entitlement system of general social cooperation.+ What does follow from the conclusion is a deep suspicion of imposing, in the name of fairness, constraints upon voluntaryRead more at location 3890
“Look, worse endowed: you gain by cooperating with us. If you want our cooperation you’ll have to accept reasonable terms. We propose these terms: We’ll cooperate with you so long as we get as much as possible. That is, the terms of our cooperation should give us the maximal share such that, if it was tried to give us more, we’d end up with less.” If these terms seem outrageous, as they are, why don’t the terms proposed by those worse endowed seem the same?Read more at location 3898
neutral between his proposal and any other proposal, the conclusion that the difference principle presents a fair basis for cooperation cannot follow from what precedes it in this passage. Rawls is merely repeating that it seems reasonable; hardly a convincing reply to anyone to whom it doesn’t seem reasonable.Read more at location 3922
Note: LS NEUTRALITÀ FATTUALE DI RAWLS
