71 RAWLS’ THEORY - SOCIAL COOPERATION - Anarchy, State, and Utopia by Robert Nozick - idiecirobinson soluzionemarginalista
The problem of distributive social justice, according to Rawls, is how these benefits of cooperation are to be distributed or allocated.Read more at location 3716
Would there be no problem of justice and no need for a theory of justice, if there was no social cooperation at all, if each person got his share solely by his own efforts?Read more at location 3730
What is it about social cooperation that gives rise to issues of justice? It cannot be said that there will be conflicting claims only where there is social cooperation;Read more at location 3732
If there were ten Robinson Crusoes, each working alone for two years on separate islands, who discovered each other and the facts of their different allotments by radio communication via transmitters left twenty years earlier, could they not make claims on each other, supposing it were possible to transfer goods from one island to the next? 17 Wouldn’t the one with least make a claim on ground of need,Read more at location 3734
He might go on to say that the different individual non-cooperative shares stem from differential natural endowments,Read more at location 3739
Rather than saying that no theory of justice applies to this noncooperative case, (wouldn’t it be unjust if someone stole another’s products in the noncooperative situation?), I would say that it is a clear case of application of the correct theory of justice: the entitlement theory.Read more at location 3745
How does social cooperation change things so that the same entitlement principles that apply to the noncooperative cases become inapplicable or inappropriate to cooperative ones?Read more at location 3748
Note: PERCHÈ LA COOPERAZIONE MUTA RADICALMENTE LE COSE E I PRINCIPI DI GIUSTIZIA A CUI APPELLARSI? Edit
It might be said that one cannot disentangle the contributions of distinct individuals who cooperate; everything is everyone’s joint product.Read more at location 3749
suppose that social cooperation is based upon division of labor, specialization, comparative advantage, and exchange; each person works singly to transform some input he receives, contracting with others who further transform or transport his product until it reaches its ultimate consumer. People cooperate in making things but they work separately; each person is a miniature firm.18 The products of each person are easily identifiable,Read more at location 3754
Why isn’t the appropriate (a not inappropriate) set of holdings just the one which actually occurs via this process of mutually-agreed-to exchangesRead more at location 3764
consider people who work together jointly to produce something. Is it now impossible to disentangle people’s respective contributions?Read more at location 3767
question here is not whether marginal productivity theory is an appropriate theory of fair or just shares, but whether there is some coherent notion of identifiable marginal product. It seems unlikely that Rawls’ theory rests on the strong claim that there is no such reasonably serviceable notion.Read more at location 3768
If marginal productivity theory is reasonably adequate, people will be receiving, in these voluntary transfers of holdings, roughly their marginal products.Read more at location 3773
an entitlement theorist would find acceptable whatever distribution resulted from the party’s voluntary exchanges