giovedì 17 marzo 2016

A Short Essay on the Freedom of the Will Bryan Caplan

#caplan libero arbitrio
A Short Essay on the Freedom of the Will Bryan Caplan
  • Cos'è il l.a. the ability to choose more than one thing.
  • Obiezione: "Every effect must have a cause;
  • Quantum confusion. a probabilistic theory of choice is just as contrary to the freedom of the will as a fully deterministic one. The argument here is extremely simple. Imagine that my action is determined by the roll of a six-sided die; if it comes up six, I raise my arm.
  • COSA SCEGLIAMO. To begin with, we choose our beliefs. Secondly, we choose many of our bodily movements. Thirdly, we choose many of our mental processes
  • 6 argomenti
  • 1 osservazione. mi sembra di essere libero. la scienza si basa sull osservazione. ogni argomento contro l introspezoone si applica immediatamante a vista udito... tatto
  • 2 assurdità dello scetticismo... se siamo determinati ogni discussione è insensata visto che la ragione nn esiste o comunque nn è accessibile
  • 3 argomento do moore. vince l argomento con le premesse più solide. sono libero è la premessa più solida. qs discussione è sensata è un altre solida premessa
  • 4 argomento della falsificazione. i deterministi dovranno portarmi una legge che predice quando alzerò la mano a quel punto io la confuterò nn alzando la mia mano
  • OSSERVAZIONE. I observe that I choose freely, at least sometimes; and if you introspect, you will see it too. There is no reason to assume that these observations are illusory... argument against the validity of introspection might be applied, ipso facto, to sight, hearing, touch, taste,
  • ASSURDITÀ DELLO SCETTICISMO. I shall begin with the assumption of determinism, and show that it leads to the self-contradictory position of abject skepticism. Now it is a fact that people disagree on many questions; this leads us to wonder if on any given issue we are correct. How is the determinist to come to grips with this?
  • MOORE. C. Moore's Proof of the External World Extended. Since no premise has greater initial plausibility than "This is a hand," said Moore, it is in principle impossible for that claim to be overturned.
  • IL PREDITTORE ASSOLUTO. Thought Experiment... Our brilliant neurophysiologists come up with an equation that they claim will predict all of our behavior.... Suppose that the equation says that the next thing that you will do is raise your arm. Do you seriously believe that you couldn't falsify this prediction by failing to raise your arm?
  • OBIEZIONI
  • 1 le dipendenze ci tolgono la libertà. c è confusione tra scelte e piacere. una scelta piacevole è più facile ma non meno libera di una scelta spiacevole. il caso del bottone che stermina l umanità
  • 2 la massa è un gregge che nn sa cosa sia la libertà. la massa dimostra tutti giorni di sapere cosa sia usando il trrmine libertà in modo appropriato
  • 3 xchè gruppi differenti fanno scelte differenti se tutti gli individui sono librri? ma il fenomeno nn presenta alcuna contraddizione
  • 4 la dottrina del la. non consente spiegazioni complete. ma qs considrrazione non segnala alcun paradosso
  • DIPENDENZE. normal person is free to use or not use alcohol; but certain people are not free to not use it. The choice is "too hard" for them to make.
  • My objection to this is basically that it just contradicts experience. Imagine that there were a button in front of you, the pressing of which would instantly exterminate all human life. You would not (I hope) want to press this button. But can you really say that you do not feel just as _free_ to do so as you would to dial a phone number? Suppose someone pointed a gun at you and told you to push the button. Would you not be free to refrain? But if you are free in these extreme cases, how could you be unfree to refrain from drinking alcohol
  • Pleasant choices are "easier" not in the sense that they are more free
  • L INDUZIONE NN È UNA LOGICA. Almost all humans use the language and concepts of free will.... experience of free will permeates the lives of ordinary people
  • STRANE REGOLARITÀ. different groups behave consistently differently. There is nothing amazing about this. The typical criminal makes a long series of brutal choices over his life; there is a systematic pattern to his choices. Does this show that each of his actions was not a choice?
  • TROPPI TIPI STRANI.   Another objection to the doctrine of free will is that it renders a persons choices inexplicable. But there is really no paradox here, anyway. Of course it is possible to "explain" a choice, in the sense of describing the actor's motives, goals, impulses, and so on. But we must remember that these were simply the factors that the agent chose to go along with; we are explaining which factors out of the cosmos of possibilities that the actor drew upon when making his choice.
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