8 DIRITTO E TEORIA DEI GIOCHI Games, Bargains, Bluffs, and Other Really Hard Stuff

8 Games, Bargains, Bluffs, and Other Really Hard Stuff
Note:8@@@@@@@@ ci sono proplemi facili x cui basta un piano e problemi difficili x cui occorre una strategia.teoria dei giochi. Le coluzioni latitano.l economia tenta di schivare i giochi ka il diritto nn puö. L esempio della curva dei contratti.ma xché i giochi e il diritto s incrociano? perché i costi di transazione sono una fonte di giochi.la teoria dei giochi é deludente. Quelli realusti hanno sempre solyzioni ambigue. Il diavolo sta nei dettaglu e il giurista si occupa di dettagli.il monopolio bilaterale. La curva dei contratti e altri esempi. La deterrenza dei crimini passionali.nel mp la strategia é quelle del pred commitment. Schelling.il dilemma del prigioniere e i patteggiamenti.ddp emblema di tutti i costi di transazione. Si vince con regole di coordinamento tipo tenere la destra. La voce autorevole e la conoscenza comune.

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one where, in deciding what to do, I can safely treat the rest of the world as things
Note:Il contesto facile. Servono piani.

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take full account of the fact that other people out there are seeking their objectives, and that they know that I am seeking my objectives
Note:Contesto difficile. Servono strategie.

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figuring out the shortest route home from my office.
Note:Esempio di piano.

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roads, bridges, paths, gates—can be trusted

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assume I am in a car headed for an intersection with no stop light or stop sign, and someone else is in a car on the cross-street, about the same distance from the intersection.
Note:Esempio di strategia.

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assume that both I and the other driver are male teenagers. Each of us puts what others might regard as an unreasonably low value on his own life
Note:Per ravvivare il problema.

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a variant of the ancient game of “Chicken,”

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Popolare tra gli adolescenti. Prova di coraggio. Chi frena x primo ha perso.

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The branch of mathematics that deals with such problems, invented by John von Neumann almost sixty years ago, is called game theory.

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what choices a rational player would make
Note:Obbiettivo

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solving the general problem was extraordinarily difficult, so difficult that we are still working on it.
Note:Esito dopo 50 anni.

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chess,
Note:i benefici di a danneggiano b

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games such as Chicken,
Note:Ci si puõ danneggiare entrambi

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games like democratic voting,
Note:Ci si puö accordare danneggiando terzi

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Wherever possible, problems are set up, the world is modeled, in ways that make strategic behavior unimportant.
Note:Nell ambito economico

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perfect competition,
Note:Esempio

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actions have no significant effect on the others,

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In chapter 2 John was buying an apple that was worth a dollar to him from Mary, to whom it was worth fifty cents.
Note:Riprendiamo un vecchio probolema. É facile trasfirmarlo ne chicken. La curva dei contratti

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concealed under the name of transaction costs.
Note:La fatica syrategica.

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strategic behavior,
Note:Il free riding

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our underlying theory is largely built on the ideas of Coase, transaction costs are central to Coase’s analysis, and transaction costs often involve strategic behavior.
Note:Xché i giochi sono importanti nel analusi del diritto

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if a game is simple enough so that game theory provides a reasonably unambiguous answer, there are probably other ways of getting there.
Note:Ma la teoria dei giochi nn serve a molto

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In most real-world applications of game theory the answer is ambiguous until you assume away large parts of the problem
Note:Una teoria deludente

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two games: bilateral monopoly and prisoner’s dilemma.
Note:Da quu in poi

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Bilateral Monopoly
Note:Tttttttttttt

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Mary has the world’s only apple, worth fifty cents to her. John is the world’s only customer for the apple, worth a dollar to him.
Note:Il vcaso

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Mary announces that her price is ninety cents,
Note:Se j le crede pagherá

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If, however, John announces that his maximum price is sixty cents
Note:Se m gli crede venderá

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Each is using the threat of the zero outcome to try to force a fifty cent outcome as favorable to himself as possible.
Note:La minaccia

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A small child wants to get her way and will throw a tantrum if she doesn’t.
Note:Situazione simile. Escalation delle minacce. Ti mando a letto. E io grido piú forte.

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Prospective parents resolve never to give in to such threats and think they will succeed. They are wrong.

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she has hundreds of millions of years of evolution on her side,
Note:I vcapricci sono tutt altro che banali

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if you call her bluff, you will frequently find that it is not a bluff.

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the Doomsday Machine. The idea was for the United States to bury lots of very dirty thermonuclear weapons under the Rocky Mountains, enough so that if they went off, their fallout would kill everyone on earth.
Note:Altro caso

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Once the Russians know we have a Doomsday Machine we are safe

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the central plot device for the movie Doctor Strange-love.

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Kahn described a Doomsday Machine not because he thought we should build one but because he thought we already had.

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Fortunately, the real-world Doomsday Machines worked,

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consider someone who is big, strong, and likes to get his own way. He adopts a policy of beating up anyone
Note:Altro esempio

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Beating someone up is costly;

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But as long as everyone knows he is committed to that strategy, other people don’t cross him,
Note:Non arretrare

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Think of the bully as a Doomsday Machine on an individual level.

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His strategy works as long as only one person is playing it.

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Do penalties deter?
Note:Veniamo alla rilevanza giuridica della situazione.

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crime of passion
Note:Una situazione in cui si risponde negativamente

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seems to be an irrational act, one the perpetrator regrets as soon as it happens.

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The economist’s answer is that the brawl was not chosen rationally, but the strategy that led to it was.
Note:Invece

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The higher the penalty for such acts, the less profitable the bully strategy.
Note:E quindi.

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fewer bullies, fewer barroom brawls, and fewer “irrational” killings.
Note:L eesito di pene elevate.

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crimes of passion are not necessarily undeterrable.
Note:Conclusione.

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The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Note:Ttttttttttt

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Two men are arrested for a burglary. The District Attorney puts them in separate cells.
Note:Caso classico

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if he confesses

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If Mike also confesses,

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If Joe refuses to confess,

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If Mike confesses, Joe will be convicted,

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If neither confesses,

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If Mike confesses
Note:Mi conviene confessare

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If Mike stays silent
Note:Mi conviene ancora confessared. Mi conviene sempre confessare!!!!!

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Mike has made the same calculation,

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Both Joe and Mike have acted rationally, and both are, as a result, worse off.

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Mike and Joe expect to continue their criminal career and may find themselves in the same situation again.
Note:Il gioco rioetuto.

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Intuitively, it seems that prisoner’s dilemma many times repeated, with the same players each time, should produce a more attractive outcome

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but there is an elegant if counterintuitive argument against it.
Note:Uno può sempre speeare di fregare l altro

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Joe and Mike confess every time.

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The prosecutor calls up the defense lawyer and offers a deal. If the client will plead guilty to second-degree murder, the District Attorney will drop the charge of first-degree murder.
Note:Patteggiamento

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Such bargains are widely criticized as a way of letting criminals off lightly.
Note:La critica comune

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A rational criminal will accept a plea bargain only if doing so makes him better off
Note:Premessa

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consider the situation of a hypothetical District Attorney

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There are a hundred cases per year;

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a budget of a hundred thousand dollars.

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only a thousand dollars to spend investigating and prosecuting each case,

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if he can get ninety defendants to cop pleas, the DA can concentrate his resources on the ten who refuse, spend ten thousand dollars on each case, and get a conviction rate of 90 percent.

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A defendant faces a 90 percent chance of conviction if he goes to trial

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He will reject any proposed deal that is worse for him than a 90 percent

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All defendants would be better off if none of them accepted the DA’s offer,
Note:Il dilemna dei patteggianti

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Individual rationality does not always lead to group rationality.
Note:La lezione generale di dp

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if I install a converter in my car, I pay all of the cost and receive only a small fraction of the benefit, so it is not worth doing.

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Constructing efficient legal rules is largely an attempt to get out of prisoner’s dilemmas:

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two motorists approaching the same intersection
Note:Riprendiamo l edsempio iniziale

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there is a legal rule to solve that problem,

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The rule is “Starboard right of way.”
Note:Una regola di coordinamento azzera i costi di transazione

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Conclusions
Note:TtttttttttRicapitoliamo

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making a fight between two bullies or two hawks more costly, decreases the fraction of players who commit to the bully strategy.
Note:Conclusione 1

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other clear conclusion was that rational players of a game with the payoff structure of prisoner’s dilemma will betray each other.
Note:Conclusione due

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Real-world games do not come with payoff matrices printed on the box.
Note:Il mondo reale

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commitment, reputation, altruism,
Note:Strumenti con cui giochiamo

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cross my heart and hope to die.”
Note:Il giuramento é un istinto infantile di impegno