Notebook per
A Quick Case for Charter Cities
Citation (APA): romer, p. (2017). A Quick Case for Charter Cities [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com
Parte introduttiva
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 1
A Quick Case for Charter Cities: Memo to the Gates Foundation
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 16
Redistribution from rich to poor has not and cannot solve more than a tiny fraction of the problem. Even if you could perfectly equalize income in Third World nations with zero effect on production, the citizens of Third World countries would remain mired in poverty.
Nota - Posizione 16
x PUNTO DI PARTENZA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 20
sharing production
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 21
increasing production
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 23
there turns out to be one foolproof way for people from the Third World to drastically increase their production overnight: move to the First World.
Nota - Posizione 24
x UN MODO SEMPLICE X FAR ESPLODERE LA POVERTA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 25
Michael Clemens, Claudio Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett[
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 29
Holding workers' traits fixed, moving a Haitian from Haiti to the United States increases his wage about ten times - a gain of 900%. The lesson: Third World workers are less productive than First World workers largely because they live in the dysfunctional countries.
Nota - Posizione 31
x ES HAIGI E LEZIONE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 35
figure out a close substitute
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 36
"charter cities" proposal
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 37
create pockets of high-quality First World governance in the heart of the Third World. How? By persuading Third World governments to create new self-governing cities exempt from most existing laws. These new cities could be governed by foreign law, and administered by foreign governments - or even a for-profit corporation.
Nota - Posizione 37
x L IDEA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 47
The success of Hong Kong is a key inspiration. At the dawn of British rule, the land area that is now Hong Kong was sparsely inhabited. But it had one blessing denied to the rest of China: British rules
Nota - Posizione 48
x LA FORTUNA DI HONG KONG
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 52
By the time Hong Kong reverted to mainland rule, it was not only a First World country, but a model for the rest of China to emulate.
Nota - Posizione 53
x PROSPERITÀ E MODELLO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 55
Intense populist opposition aside, it is hard to graft one country's institutions on to another's - especially when entrenched interests fight you every step of the way.
Nota - Posizione 56
x LA TABULA RASA UNICA VIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 56
This is true in the business world as well. Competitors often try and fail to adopt leading firms' "best practices."
Nota - Posizione 57
x VEDI LE AZIENDE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 58
It is easier to open a new WalMart than to make the Kmart chain better. Advocates of charter cities argue that is also easier to bring in "outside management" to make a new city that works than to reform existing countries that don't.
Nota - Posizione 59
x ES
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 63
If the native entrepreneurs who built Hong Kong had been trapped in mainland China, most would have wasted their lives in dead-end jobs on Maoist communes or joined the Communist elite. Hong Kong gave them opportunities to use talents that otherwise would have gone to waste.
Nota - Posizione 65
x IMPRENDITORI CINESI. BENEFICI DIRETTI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 66
Hong Kong shined brightly enough to convince even dogmatic Chinese Communist elites that private property, foreign investment, and economic integration with the world economy were the way to go.
Nota - Posizione 67
x BENEFICI INDIRETTI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 68
laboratories
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 68
"copied and pasted"
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 79
Another upside of charter cities is that there is virtually no downside. A charter city begins on empty land. It can only grow by voluntary migration of workers and investors. If no one chooses to relocate, they're no worse off
Nota - Posizione 80
x NESSUN EQ TURBATO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 82
the paths the Gates Foundation currently intends to pursue sound worse than doing nothing. "Build capacity of organizations working on-the-ground with the urban poor" and "Integrate the voice of the poor into the planning process" sound compassionate. But they could easily further retard the only poverty-reduction process that really works: economic growth.
Nota - Posizione 85
x MOLTI AIUTI FANNO MALE OLTRE A NN FAR BENE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 87
economic illiteracy is especially pronounced among the least educated. They are especially likely to misperceive the economy as a zero-sum game, to fear economic interaction with foreigners, and to naively focus on employment rather than production.
Nota - Posizione 88
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 94
Can "Charter Cities" Change the World? A Q& A With Paul Romer
Nota - Posizione 95
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 125
In the developing world, most people don’t yet live in big well-run cities. Given the chance to move to one, hundreds of millions of people would go there to get a job, get an education for their children, and live in a place that is clean, safe, and healthy. Other people will make a profit by hiring them or supplying them with infrastructure and other services.
Nota - Posizione 127
x AFFARI X TUTTI. NESSUNA UMILIANTE ELEMOSITÀ LA DIGNITÀ RISPETTATA SUL SERIO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 127
It doesn’t take any charity to build well-run cities.
Nota - Posizione 128
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 135
In many cities in poor countries, health is bad because governments don’t enforce basic rules about sanitation. The crime rate is appallingly high because the government doesn’t enforce rules that prohibit theft and violence. Traffic fatalities and congestion are both high because they don’t have good traffic rules or if they do, they don’t enforce them. The fact that people still flock to cities with such bad rules tells us something about how big the other benefits from living in a city must be.
Nota - Posizione 139
x LE COITTÀ DI OGGI NEL TERZO MONDO. CMQ IL MEGLIO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 142
Economists tend to assume that societies will naturally adopt good rules.
Nota - Posizione 143
x ECONOMISTI: TEORA E PRATICA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 144
The evidence suggests to the contrary that many societies are stuck with bad rules. Moving from bad rules to better ones may be much harder than most economists have allowed. The construct of a charter city is a suggestion about how we can change the dynamics of rules.
Nota - Posizione 145
c
Nota - Posizione 146
x COME CAMBIARE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 155
Who might grant the charter
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 158
If a national government has sufficient credibility, it could start a charter city within its own territory and administer it from the national capital.
Nota - Posizione 159
x IPOTESI DI CHARTER
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 161
In poorer countries that don’t have the same kind of credibility with international investors, a more interesting but controversial possibility is that two or more countries might sign a treaty specifying the charter for a new city and allocate between them responsibilities for administering different parts of the treaty.
Nota - Posizione 164
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 164
Right now, the United States and Cuba have a treaty that gives the United States administrative control in perpetuity over a piece of sovereign Cuban territory, Guantanamo Bay. I’ve suggested that Canada and Cuba sign a new treaty in which Canada would take over administration of this area, bring Canadian rule of law there, and let a city grow up that could bring to Cuba some of the advantages that Hong Kong brought to China.
Nota - Posizione 167
x ES DI CUBA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 168
Why will governments, particularly the entrenched, corrupt governments found in many countries, be willing to cede control of these zones?
Nota - Posizione 169
x DUBBIO. NA I CATTIVI NN LO CONSENTIRANNO!
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 173
Narratives about good guys and bad guys are always entertaining, but there is a deeper reason why people get stuck under bad rules.
Nota - Posizione 174
x BUONI VS CATTOVI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 176
Systems of rules are “sticky”; they are difficult for any leader or group to change. With this in mind, suppose you were the president of Cuba. Suppose you wanted to do for Cuba what Deng Xiaoping did for China: engineer the transition from communism to rapid market-led growth. To do this, you might want to create a special zone where some of your citizens could opt-in to the market system without forcing others to make this change.
Nota - Posizione 177
c
Nota - Posizione 180
x LA PROPOSTA È UN MODO X CAMBIARE E UN GOVERNANTE CHE VUOLE CAMBIARE L ADOTTERÀ
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 194
Another good example is Hong Kong. The British clearly did not want to live up to the terms of the treaty they signed, which returned control of important parts of Hong Kong to China after 99 years. China didn’t want to wait that long to get Hong Kong back. But in the end, for 99 years, they stuck to the terms of the treaty they signed.
Nota - Posizione 196
x I FATTI SI CONSOLIDANO. VEDI HONG KONG
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 215
Think about the truly important changes in political systems. Back in the middle ages, suppose that someone described a legal system that enforced rules and contracts that everyone had to obey, even the country’s leaders. What would informed opinion of the day have been? “Great idea, but it will never happen.” No question it was hard to pull off, but it did happen. People always think that the unfamiliar is impossible. Many times, all that holds us back is a failure of imagination.
Nota - Posizione 218
x L ECONOMISTA DEVE DIRE LE COSE COME STANNO NN QUELL CHE LA POLITICA VUOL SENTIRSI DIRE. IMMAGINAZIONE AL POTERE
