Notebook per
Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election
Citation (APA): riccardo-mariani@libero.it. (2017). Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com
Parte introduttiva
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Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election Hunt Allcott, New York University and NBER ∗ Matthew Gentzkow,
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t
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Abstract
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Drawing on audience data, archives of fact-checking websites,
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(i) social media was an important but not dominant source
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DOMINANZA
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(ii) of the known false news stories that appeared in the three months before the election, those favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared eight million times;
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x CONDIVISIOONE
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(iii) the average American saw and remembered 0.92 pro-Trump fake news stories and 0.23 pro-Clinton fake news stories, with just over half of those who recalled seeing fake news stories believing them;
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x CHI SI RICORDA E CHI HA CREDUTO
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(iv) for fake news to have changed the outcome of the election, a single fake article would need to have had the same persuasive effect as 36 television campaign ads.
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x CFR CON CAMPAGNE TELEVISIVE
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1 Introduction
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t
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In the 19th century, cheap newsprint and better presses allowed partisan newspapers to dramatically expand their reach. Many have argued that the effectiveness of the press as a check on power was significantly compromised as a result (Kaplan 2002).
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x GIORNALI MILITANTI
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x FINE STAMPA CANE DA GUARDIA
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In the 20th century, as radio and then television became the dominant platforms, observers worried they would reduce substantive policy debates
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x RADIO E TV
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“telegenic” candidates
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(Lang and Lang 2002; Bagdikian 1983).
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su
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excess diversity of viewpoints would make it easier for like-minded citizens to form “echo chambers” or “filter bubbles”
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x PREOCCUPAZ SM
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(Sunstein 2001a, 2001b, 2009; Pariser 2011).
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su
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user with no track record or reputation can in some cases reach as many readers as Fox News,
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impact of false or misleading information
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Recent evidence shows that: (i) 62 percent of U.S. adults get news on social media (Pew 2016a); (ii) the most popular fake news stories were more widely shared on Facebook than the most popular mainstream news stories (Silverman 2016); (iii) many people who see fake news stories report that they believe them (Silverman and Singer-Vine 2016); and (iv) the most discussed fake news stories tended to favor Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton (Silverman 2016).
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x ALCUNI FATTI
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commentators have suggested that Donald Trump would not have been elected
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INFLUENZA
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quantifying the importance of social media
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PASSO 1
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Previous published work, new web browsing data, and a 1200-person post-election online survey we conducted for this paper during the week of November 28, 2016 are consistent in suggesting that social media was an important but not dominant source of information.
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x FONTI E CONC
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14 percent
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“most important”
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Second, we collect a database of election stories that have been categorized as fake by leading fact checking websites
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x COLLEZIONE BUFALE
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For each story, we record the number of times it has been shared on social media, and whether its assertion favored Hilary Clinton or Donald Trump. We confirm that fake news was both widely shared and tilted in favor of Donald Trump,
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c CONDIVISIONI E FAVORITISMI
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30 million times,
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PRO TRUMP
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7.6 million times.
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x PRO CLINTON
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we use the results of our new survey to estimate the share of Americans who saw and believed
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x VEDERE E CREDERE
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asking for each: (i) “Do you recall seeing this reported or discussed prior to the election?” and (ii) “At the time of the election, would your best guess have been that this statement was true?”
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c
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placebo fake news headlines
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about 15 percent of U.S. adults report that they recall seeing the average fake news headline. About 8 percent report seeing and believing it.
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c
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However, these numbers are statistically identical for our placebo headlines, suggesting that the raw responses could overstate true exposure by an order of magnitude.
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x PLACEBO SIMILE. OVERSTATE
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Using the difference between actual and placebo
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we estimate that 1.2 percent of people recall seeing the average story.
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x 1,2
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our point estimate suggests that the average voting-age American saw and remembered about 0.92 pro-Trump fake stories and 0.23 pro-Clinton fake stories
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c
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voter persuasion model
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DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007).
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SU E GIÙ
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We assume that each fake news story someone sees and remembers has a fixed probability f of inducing her to vote for the candidate the story favors,
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x CAMBIO VOTO
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Rather than estimate the persuasion rate, we benchmark it against recent estimates of the persuasive effects of television campaign advertisements from Spenkuch and Toniatti (2016).
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x PARAGONE CON LE CAMPAGNE TV
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We estimate that in order for fake news to have changed the election result, the average fake story would need to have f ≈ 0.0073, making it about as persuasive as 36 television campaign ads.
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x CONCLUSIONI
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our calibrated election model relies on a number of other strong assumptions, including a persuasion rate of fake news that is the same for all stories and voters and that cumulates linearly.
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x L ASSUNTO FORTE. FORZE NDECISI COME CONVONTI
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7 Conclusion
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