sabato 29 giugno 2019

2 VOTE FOR BLACKBEARD THE ECONOMICS OF PIRATE DEMOCRACY

2   VOTE FOR BLACKBEARD THE ECONOMICS OF PIRATE DEMOCRACY
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a presidential candidate’s campaign tour.
Note:SE ASCOLTASSE UN DISCORSO DELLA CAMPAGNA ELETTORALE DI BARBANERA

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eighteenth-century pirate ship, the Royal Rover. Crew member “Lord” Dennis delivered the speech,
Note:IL LUOGO E IL TEMPO DI QUELLE PAROLE

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“This speech was loudly applauded by all but Lord Sympson,”
Note:IL RIVALE

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this model of democracy was staged not only on a pirate ship, of all places, but took place more than half a century before the Continental Congress approved the Declaration of Independence
Note:PRECURSORI

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Pirates’ institutional separation of power
Note:NN SOLO DEMOCR... ANCHE QUI PRECURSORI

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1789.
Note:FRANCIA

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1812.
Note:SPAGNA

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piratical checks and balances
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The first democracy was in ancient Athens.
Note:NON I PRIMI IN ASSOLUTO

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when the buccaneers began converging on Tortuga,
Note:SECONDI

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Massachusetts Bay Colony—
Note:COLONIE DEL NUOVO MONDO

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Puritan settlers’ church organization.
Note:L ORIGINE DELLA DEMOCRAZIE NUOVO MONDO

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the competing interests of church and crown,
Note:I PRECEDENTI NELLA DIVISIONE DEI POTERI

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In the thirteenth century the Venetian Republic developed an explicit division of power
Note:VENEZIA

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under ancient Athenian and colonial New England democracy only a minority could actually vote.
Note:MA IL SUFFRAGIO UNIVERSALE

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Pirate democracy was radical,
Note:FORSE NN I PRIMISSIMI MA I PIÙ RADICALI

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“they acknowledged no countrymen”
Note:MOTTO COSMOPOLITA

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A pirate, another state official declared, is “denied common humanity,
Note:IL DISPREZZO X I PIRATI

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abominable Society,” but it was a society nonetheless.
Note:PUR SEMPRE UNA SOCIETÀ

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One Pirate, One Vote:
Note:Ttttttt

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how to engage a potential target, the method to pursue when chasing a target or being chased by authorities, and how to react if attacked,
Note:LE DECISIONI

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no time for disagreement or debate
Note:LA VELOCITÀ....IL SEGRETO DEI CRIMINALI

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“But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
Note:IL PARADOSSO DEL POTERE NELLE PAROLE DI MADISON...CONTROLLARE I CTRL

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Unconstrained governments in many of these countries prey on their citizens,
Note:STATI SUBSahariani

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This solution was democracy. As Madison put it, “A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control
Note:SUPERARE IL PARADOSSO...LA SOLUZIONE DEI PIRATI

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If citizens can popularly depose their leaders and replace them with new ones, leaders who want to retain their positions of authority must refrain
Note:SUPERATO IL PROB DELLA SUCCESSIONE

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pirates required the unrestricted right to depose any captain for any reason.
Note:LA GARANZIA

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Captain Benjamin Hornigold’s crew, for example, deposed him from command because he “refused to take and plunder English Vessels.”
Note:ESEMPIO

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For instance, Captain Charles Vane’s “behaviour was obliged to stand the Test of a Vote, and a Resolution passed against his Honour and Dignity … deposing him from the Command.”
Note:ALTRO ESEMPIO

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In a few cases pirate crews physically punished their captains for behavior they deemed inconsistent with their interests. Oliver La Bouche’s crew, for example, deprived him of his captainship and flogged him for attempting to desert them.
Note:NN SOLO DEMOCRAZ

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The specter of pirate popular opinion looming over them like the Sword of Damocles, pirate captains faithfully executed their crews’ wills.
Note:UNO SPETTRO SI AGGIRA X LA NAVE

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Their lodging, provisions, and even pay were similar to that of ordinary crew members.
Note:PARITÀ ASSOLUTA DEI BOSS....NN COME SUI MERCANTILI

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unlike on merchant or Royal Navy vessels, “any body might come and eat and drink” with the captain as they please.
Note:NO PARTICULAR RESPECT

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sleep with rest of the crew
Note:CAPITANI SEMPRE IN TRINCEA

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The Separation of Piratical Powers
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“The constant aim is to divide and arrange several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other—that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.”
Note:HAMILTON VUOLE AGGIUNGERE QUALCOSA AL CTRL DEMOCRATICO

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The primary “other officer” pirates constituted for this purpose was the quartermaster. The way this office worked is straightforward.
Note:IL PRIMO CONTROPOTERE

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power to allocate provisions, select and distribute loot (there was rarely room aboard pirate ships to take all they seized from a prize), adjudicate crew member conflicts, and administer discipline to the quartermaster,
Note:CONTENUTI DEL SUO POTERE

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We may say, the Quarter-Master is an humble Imitation of the Roman Tribune of the People; he speaks for, and looks after the Interest of the Crew.”
Note:IL TRIBUNO

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Under pirates’ system of divided power, crew members democratically elected both captains and quartermasters. Indeed, pirates often elected quartermasters to replace deposed captains. After Charles Vane’s crew removed him from command, for instance, it elected its quartermaster to captain in his place.
Note:IL GIRO DI VALZER

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Three Cheers for Criminals?
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Because they were absentee owners, merchant shipowners confronted what economists call a “principal-agent problem” with respect to the crews they hired.
Note:IL PROBLEMA DEI MERCANTILI

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Opportunism included negligence in caring for the ship, carelessness that damaged cargo, liberality with provisions, embezzlement of freight or advances required to finance the vessel’s voyage, and outright theft of the vessel itself.
Note:Ccccccccc

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Centralizing power in a captain’s hands to direct sailors’ tasks, control the distribution of victuals and payment, and discipline and punish crew members allowed merchant shipowners to minimize sailor opportunism.
Note:IL RIMEDIO...UN BUON MANAGER

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To align their interests with their captain’s interests, owners used two devices. First, they hired captains who held small shares in the vessels
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PRIMO INCENTIVO

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Second, whenever possible, absentee owners appointed captains with familial connections to one of the members of their group.
Note:SECONDO INCENTIVO

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Reducing the captain’s power over victuals, payments, labor assignment, or discipline, and vesting it in some other sailor’s hands instead, would reduce the captain’s power to make sailors behave in the absentee owners’ interest.
Note:RAGIONI AUTOCRAZIA

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while merchant ship autocracy overcame the principal-agent problem absentee owners confronted with respect to their crews, in doing so it created potential for a different kind of problem we’ve already examined: captain predation.
Note:PROBLEMA COLLATERALE DEI MERCANTILI

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Predatory captains who abused their authority created the miserable situations for sailors discussed in chapter 1. Some of these captains, such as the sadistic Captain Norman, were bad people.
Note:I SADICI

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pirates jointly owned and operated their ship themselves. As historian Patrick Pringle described it, in this sense a pirate ship was like a “sea-going stock company.”
Note:AZIONISTI A BORDO

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In short, because pirates stole their ships they could organize their polity democratically.
Note:IN BREVE

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Merchant sailors, recall from chapter 1, could at least appeal to government to prevent captain predation. As we already saw, in some cases such appeal was useless. But many other times it was effective. Pirates, in contrast, couldn’t appeal to government to protect them from tyrannical captains
Note:RICORERE AL GOVERNO

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pirate democracy didn’t emerge out of pirates’ adherence to romantic democratic ideals about man’s right to have a say in who governs him. It emerged out of pirate profit seeking à la the “invisible hook.”
DEMOCRAZIA E MANO INVISIBILE