Notebook per
Why I Am Not an Objectivist
Citation (APA): Huemer, M. (2014). Why I Am Not an Objectivist [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com
Parte introduttiva
Nota - Posizione 1
i randiani derivano la loro etica da osservazioni oggettive obiezione: violano la legge di hume nn si passa impunemente dall essere al dover essere
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 30
five claims:
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 36
I agree with 1, 2, 3, and 5.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 40
1. MEANING
Nota - Posizione 40
@@@@@@@
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 41
failing to distinguish sense and reference.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 43
Oedipus, famously, wanted to marry Jocaste,
Nota - Posizione 43
ED
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 43
The following sentence, in other words, describes what Oedipus both wanted and believed to be the case: (J) Oedipus marries Jocaste.
Nota - Posizione 45
C
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 46
The following sentence, then, describes what Oedipus did not want or believe to be the case: (M) Oedipus marries Oedipus' mother.
Nota - Posizione 47
C
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 48
if the meaning of a word is simply what it refers to, then "Jocaste" and "Oedipus' mother" mean the same thing. And if that is the case, then (J) and (M) mean the same thing. But then how could it be that Oedipus could believe what (J) asserts without believing what (M) asserts, if they assert the same thing?
Nota - Posizione 50
C
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 60
Thus, "Jocaste" and "Oedipus' mother" have the same reference, but different sense.
Nota - Posizione 60
CONCLUSIONW
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 72
2. ANALYTIC & SYNTHETIC
Nota - Posizione 72
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 72
Objectivism's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on the failure to distinguish the sense and the reference of a word.
Nota - Posizione 73
DISTINZIONE NEGATA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 88
There are sentences like "Every rectangle has 4 sides," "Every bachelor is male," "Every cat is a cat," etc., which certainly appear, prima facie, to have something in common and to be different in some way from "Every rectangle is blue," "Every bachelor is a slob," etc. Every philosopher is able to reliably classify certain specimens of each category and to produce indefinitely many additional examples each of 'analytic' and 'synthetic' propositions that have never been explicitly discussed by any other philosopher before ("Every dodecahedron has 12 faces"). Is this not strong evidence that there is some distinction here?
Nota - Posizione 92
EVIDENZA DELLA DISTINZIONE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 94
If this is the case, what accounts for their intersubjective reliability?
Nota - Posizione 95
C
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 101
3. A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 102
A priori knowledge is that which is not empirical
Nota - Posizione 102
DEF
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 104
I do not say that the concepts required to understand it are innate or formed without the aid of experience. I only maintain that a priori knowledge is not logically based on observations.
Nota - Posizione 105
C
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 113
we have a lot of a priori knowledge, to wit:
Nota - Posizione 114
ESEMPI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 114
3.1. LOGIC IS A PRIORI
Nota - Posizione 114
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 131
3.2. MATHEMATICS IS A PRIORI
Nota - Posizione 131
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 172
3.3. ETHICS IS A PRIORI
Nota - Posizione 172
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 173
(1) Moral principles are not observations. The content of every observation is descriptive.
Nota - Posizione 174
DESCRIZIONE E NORME
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 199
(2) Moral principles can not be inferred from descriptive premises.
Nota - Posizione 199
FALLACIA NATURALISTA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 209
the truth of Hume's Law,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 211
Communism causes poverty, makes people miserable, and takes away people's freedom. Therefore, communism is bad. The premise is apparently a descriptive and empirical fact, while the conclusion is evaluative. Assume the premise is true. My question: Does the conclusion follow from thatalone? No, the conclusion also depends upon the suppressed premises that poverty and misery are bad,
Nota - Posizione 214
ES
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 216
Freedom is necessary to our survival. Therefore, freedom is good. Again, assume the premise is true, and ask, Does the conclusion follow from that alone? No, because the argument presupposes that survival is good, and that survival is good is an evaluative premise.
Nota - Posizione 219
Es
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 220
want to live. Eating is necessary to live (and also will not interfere with anything else I want). Therefore, I should eat. This requires the assumption that I ought to act on my desires, and/or that my desire to live is a morally acceptable one.
Nota - Posizione 222
Es
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 232
(iv) Social cooperation increases our evolutionary fitness. Therefore, we should cooperate. This presupposes that evolutionary fitness is good. One could try to prove this like so: (v) The process of evolution tends toward the survival of the fittest. Therefore, fitness is good. But this presupposes that survival is good and/or that what evolution tends towards is good.
Nota - Posizione 236
ES
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 237
If one tries to show that x is good because it produces y, one must presuppose that y is good.
Nota - Posizione 237
C
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 257
(b) Moral principles can not be inductively inferred from descriptive premises.
Nota - Posizione 258
NolzNo induzione
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 265
3.4. THE NATURE OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
Nota - Posizione 266
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 291
4. UNIVERSALS
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 292
I have here two white pieces of paper. They are not the same piece of paper, but they have something in common: they are both white.
Nota - Posizione 293
BISNCO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 296
A universal is a predicable: that is, it is the kind of thing that can be predicated of something. A particular can not be predicated of anything.
Nota - Posizione 297
PREDICATO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 311
Whiteness is not a concept; it is a color. When I have the concept of whiteness in my mind, I do not have whiteness in my mind (no part of my mind is actually white).
Nota - Posizione 312
COSA NN IDEA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 315
A universal can also be the subject of a judgement, and universals can possess properties of their own.
Nota - Posizione 316
PROP
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 332
4.2. THE (REAL) PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS
Nota - Posizione 332
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 333
(1) Do universals (as defined above) exist? (2) If not, why does it seem as if they do? (i.e., why do we have all these words and ideas apparently referring to them and knowledge apparently about them?) (3) If they do, does their existence depend on the existence of particulars? The people who answer #1 "Yes" are called "realists", and those who answer #1 "No" are called "nominalists". The nominalists then have to go on to answer #2. How they answer it determines what kind of nominalists they are. The realists have to go on to answer #3. Those who answer #3 "Yes" are called "immanent realists" (Rand: "moderate realists"), while those who answer #3 "No" are called "Platonic realists" or "transcendent realists".
Nota - Posizione 339
NOMINALISTI RESLISTI IMMANENTISTI REALISTI PLATONISTI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 343
I am not going to try to refute nominalism here, because it is just obviously false. It is obvious that there is such a thing as whiteness, and that's all I have to say about that. (David Armstrong does a good job on it though in Nominalism and Realism.) It also seems clear to me that universals exist in particulars, and so immanent realism is true.
Nota - Posizione 346
IL NOMINALISMO È OVVIAMENTE FALSO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 379
5. MORE ON ETHICS
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 379
5.1. THE VALUE OF LIFE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 380
Rand's attempted derivation of ethics is that it requires the evaluative presupposition that life is good, which has not been and cannot be inferred purely from observations.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 383
this view has the same problem as all attempts to bridge the is/ought gap,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 439
5.2. RAND'S DERIVATION (?) OF EGOISM
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 479
5.3. IS EGOISM SELF-EVIDENT?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 494
5.3.1. THE USE OF HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 545
5.3.2. THE CASE OF THE HURRIED OBJECTIVIST
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 621
5.3.3. EGOISM VS. RIGHTS
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 653
5.3.4. EGOISM VS. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF THE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 677
5.3.5. ARE THERE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN RATIONAL PEOPLE?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 697
5.3.6. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION OF EGOISM
essenze: riconoscere delle verità a priori è concessione necessaria per un pensiero essenzialista ma non lo implica. alla teologia essenzialista (deduttiva) si contrappone quella naturalista (induttiva) con un carattere scientifico.
