mercoledì 26 ottobre 2016

Why did religiosity decrease in the Western World during the twentieth century? Raphaël Franck Laurence R. Iannaccone

Why did religiosity decrease in the Western World during the twentieth century?
Why did religiosity decrease in the W Raphaël Franck Laurence R. Iannaccone
Citation (APA): Iannaccone, W. d. r. d. i. t. W. R. F. L. R. (2014). Why did religiosity decrease in the Western World during the twentieth century? [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from

Parte introduttiva
Nota - Posizione 1
Secolarizzazione (+ ricchezza - religiosità) vs Securizzazione ( - rischi - religiosità) Dati: la frequenza USA è stabile; in occidente crolla. Ip. secu.: la Chiesa spiazzata nei servizi di welfare L' ipotesi secu. sembra prevalere anche se l' ip. seco. conserva un suo valore. Ad ogni modo, mentre opporsi a seco. sembra impossibile, opporsi a secu è più realistico e offre l' alleanza dei liberisti.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 1
Why did religiosity decrease in the Western World during the twentieth century? Raphaël Franck Laurence R. Iannaccone
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 19
1. Introduction
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 20
almost always focus on church attendance,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 20
United States,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 21
remarkable long-run stability,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 21
Yet scholars continue sifting through these data,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 23
Hadaway et al. (1993)
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 23
hypothesize a form of invisible secularization
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 27
There are actually two major theories of religiosity: the religion-market model and the secularization hypothesis.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 27
The religion-market model,
Nota - Posizione 27
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 28
Iannaccone and Stark
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 28
religious participation is mainly “supply-driven”.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 29
They view governmental interventions as major determinants of religiosity. As such, the existence of a state religion is expected to increase church participation (Barro and McCleary, 2005). A case in point is the policy of French King Louis XIV (1638-1715) who compelled the inhabitants of Paris to attend mass on Sundays lest they go to jail (Bluche, 1990). Conversely, the development of the welfare state is thought to decrease church attendance by crowding out the churches’ charitable activities (Gruber and Hungerman, 2007; Hungerman, 2005, 2009) and reducing their ability to insure their members against adverse income shocks (see Dehejia et al., 2007).3 Indeed, Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004) find there is a negative relationship between public spending and church attendance in cross-sectional data for a sample of countries in 1995.
Nota - Posizione 35
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 35
following Weber
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 36
secularization hypothesis
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 36
Chaves (1994) and Bruce (2001)
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 36
consider that religious participation is “demanddriven”.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 37
They argue that economic development, which includes industrialization, increases in literacy and wealth, and a decrease in fertility rates, entails a decline in religiosity. This secularization process supposedly leads individuals to define themselves as less religious and decreases the influence of religion on social and political institutions.
Nota - Posizione 39
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 40
economic development has an overall negative effect on religiosity.
Nota - Posizione 40
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 41
Urbanization also makes individuals less observant
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 41
Still, studies by Finke and Stark (1992), Iannaccone and Stark (1994), and Stark (1999) among others, argue that there is no empirical evidence to support secularization theories.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 45
it focuses on the changes in religiosity in the Western World during the twentieth century
Nota - Posizione 46
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 47
polls conducted by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).
Nota - Posizione 47
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 48
United States, Canada and most of Western Europe,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 51
The ISSP data unequivocally show that church attendance decreased in the West during the twentieth century.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 52
particularly noticeable in some countries,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 53
Great Britain,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 53
less so in others like Ireland,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 54
decline in church attendance was particularly pronounced after the 1960s,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 54
high growth rates and the development of the welfare state.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 55
Our regression results suggest that the factors which are associated with the secularization hypothesis, e.g., lower fertility, higher income and increased urbanization, had little or no effect on church attendance in the Western World during the twentieth century. Instead, they relate the decline in religiosity to the growth of the welfare state.
Nota - Posizione 57
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 58
Before the 1960s,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 58
individuals would look to churches to obtain welfare
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 59
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 59
stopped attending church because the welfare state provided them with a secular alternative
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 60
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 60
healthcare benefits.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 63
2. Data
Nota - Posizione 63
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 64
we first present the ISSP data
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 64
twentieth century.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 64
religiosity declined in Western European
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 65
as well as in the USA and in Canada.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 67
2.1. Long-run data on church attendance
Nota - Posizione 67
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 68
Survey Program (ISSP) allow us to reconstruct long-run church attendance
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 68
30 different countries
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 69
between 1925 and 1990,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 69
Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 71
they were democracies throughout the twentieth century.4
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 71
they did not undertake policies to encourage or discourage church attendance,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 72
these ten countries have historically been Christian,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 76
2.1.1. Retrospective data on church attendance
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 77
ISSP surveys asked the following: 1) “[W]hen you were around 11 or 12, how often did you attend religious services then?” 2) “When you were a child, how often did your father attend religious services?” 3) “When you were a child, how often did your mother attend religious services?” Replies were coded into standard categories, ranging from “never” to “several times each week.”
Nota - Posizione 79
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 111
2.2.2. Trends in church attendance
Nota - Posizione 111
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 117
U.S. surveys have consistently found attendance rates around 40% per week
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 118
a downturn in childhood attendance starting in the mid-1960s and converging to parental rates by the mid-1980s.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 121
it took place as welfare state programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid and the “War on Poverty”,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 122
developed during the 1960s under the presidencies of John Fitzgerald Kennedy
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 126
Great Britain
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 127
steady and substantial decline in rates of adult religious participation throughout the twentieth century
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 129
In the Netherlands, the decline arrived more suddenly and proceeded more rapidly.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 130
The data reviewed by Laeyendecker (1995), Lechner (1996), Sengers (2001), and others identify the 1960s as a period of crisis for the Catholic Church, after which Dutch religious activity trends sharply downward.
Nota - Posizione 131
x 1960
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 135
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 135
decisive turning point
Nota - Posizione 135
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 136
long term decline
Nota - Posizione 136
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 136
relatively long-term stability
Nota - Posizione 136
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 141
2.2. The causes of the decline in church attendance: the secularization hypothesis and the religion-market model
Nota - Posizione 141
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 145
2.2.1. Income
Nota - Posizione 145
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 145
secularization hypothesis suggests that higher income entails a decrease in religiosity.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 147
The religion-market model would however suggest that the growth in GDP per capita would have no effect on religious observance.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 150
2.2.2. Human capital
Nota - Posizione 150
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 152
The secularization hypothesis predicts that an increase in human capital, measured by higher education levels and lower fertility, decreases religiosity.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 155
However, the religion-market model would suggest that there is no straightforward relationship
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 156
For instance, McCleary and Barro (2006a) show that church attendance increases with education.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 157
it is also not clear whether the decline in religiosity during the twentieth century can be attributed to the technological advances
Nota - Posizione 158
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 158
It would indeed seem that Einstein’s relativity theory and the personal computer are less of a challenge to faith than nineteenth century theories such as Darwin’s evolution theory and the documentary hypothesis.12 In addition, it seems unlikely that these nineteenth-century discoveries, which some view as questioning the very basis of religion, would only have an impact after 1900.
Nota - Posizione 160
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 167
2.2.3. Urbanization and industrialization
Nota - Posizione 167
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 167
If economic development decreases religiosity
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 168
then countries where a growing share of the population works in industry, which we assess with the Industries variable, should become more secular.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 169
industrialization usually goes hand in hand with urbanization,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 171
The religion market model however makes opposite
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 171
in rural areas, there are tightly-knit communities where individuals can rely on each other for support.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 172
in urban areas, individuals seeking relief would turn to religious
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 174
2.2.4. The welfare state
Nota - Posizione 175
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 175
secularization hypothesis,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 175
does not have any specific predictions
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 176
religion-market model
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 176
increase in public spending
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 177
lowered charity donations
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 178
as a result, limited their charity endeavors.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 181
On the one hand, we use the Govt-Spending-Education and Govt-Spending-Health variables, which respectively represent the share of education- and health-related expenditures in the country’s total public expenditures. On the other hand, we employ the Govt-Spending-Family and Govt-Spending-Old-Age variables, which measure the share of family- and old age-related expenditures in the country’s GDP. These four variables capture the scope of public spending
Nota - Posizione 184
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 269
4. Results
Nota - Posizione 269
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 280
4.1 Wealth and human capital
Nota - Posizione 280
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 280
In all but two regressions
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 281
GDP per capita variable does not have any effect on religiosity.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 281
In those two regressions where it is significant
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 282
Log GDP per capita is shown to have a positive impact on religiosity.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 283
invalidation of the secularization hypothesis.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 283
This result also suggests that McCleary and Barro (2006a)’s finding on the negative relationship between GDP growth and religious observance, which they obtained by using data on church attendance in the 1980s and 1990s, does not hold when data going back to the 1920s are included in a panel data specification.
Nota - Posizione 285
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 287
Actually, such a result would be in line with the historical studies which showed that the dechristianization of Western Europe occurred during the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, i.e., before the rapid growth in GDP per capita that took place during the twentieth century.
Nota - Posizione 288
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 291
higher education
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 291
McCleary and Barro (2006a) had already remarked that higher levels of education could be associated with higher religiosity.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 292
In our study, the Secondary Education variable is positive and significant in several regressions
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 294
However it is negative and significant in two of our regressions
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 295
the Post-Secondary Education variable is not significant in any of our regressions.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 296
Hence, while our results on the increase in education during the twentieth century are not in line with secularization theories, they are also not robust enough for us to suggest that they invalidate another prediction of the secularization hypothesis.
Nota - Posizione 297
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 299
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 299
has a positive and significant effect in only one of our regressions
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 301
in line with the secularization hypothesis
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 301
not altogether inconsistent with the religion-market model. This is because proponents of the religion-market model would suggest that individuals with either few or no children would not attend church since they do not need its social services, such as child day care.
Nota - Posizione 303
x MA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 303
4.2 Urbanization and Industrialization
Nota - Posizione 304
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 306
has a positive and significant coefficient in almost all the OLS regressions
Nota - Posizione 306
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 307
Urban variable has a positive and significant coefficient in several OLS
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 309
these results fail to confirm the predictions of secularization
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 310
consistent with the claims of the religion-market model,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 313
4.3 Public spending on welfare services
Nota - Posizione 313
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 314
growth in public spending on education led to a decline in religiosity.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 316
a one percent increase in the share of education-related expenditures in the country’s total public expenditures (Govt-Spending-Education) decreased the religiosity of our survey respondents (the Children variable) by an estimated 0.411% to 0.887% on average and of their Parents by 0.323% to 0.591%.
Nota - Posizione 318
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 319
the same order of magnitude as the findings of Gill and Lundsgaarde (2004).
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 327
5. Who stopped attending church during the twentieth century?
Nota - Posizione 327
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 329
breaking them down between gender and denomination.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 330
men, women, Catholics and Protestants.22
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 330
reduces the sample
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 331
This is because there are no Catholics in Denmark, Norway and Sweden
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 352
the effects of the welfare state are larger
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 353
for women than for men, and more systematic for Catholics than for Protestants.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 358
welfare state. It crowded out the charitable activities of the churches
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 362
when an activity, namely church attendance, becomes less valuable, fewer self-interested rational individuals take part in it.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 363
effect of public spending is larger on the religiosity of young
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 364
rational behavior of agents who are dynamic optimizers.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 365
older parishioners who had been going to church throughout their lives would obviously be less influenced
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 367
such a perspective on religiosity implies an instrumental view of religious
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 368
our results do suggest that a sizeable fraction of religious participants were motivated by the churches’ provisions
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 370
6. Conclusion
Nota - Posizione 370
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 373
These data,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 373
span the 1925-1990 period,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 375
Our results provide scant evidence for the secularization hypothesis. They do not support the claims that the growth in income had a negative effect on religiosity. In addition, they fail to find any negative effect of fertility, education, industrialization and urbanization on church attendance. Conversely, our findings are consistent with the claims of the religion market model, which argues that governmental interventions have an impact on religious participation.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 379
the development of the welfare state significantly decreased religiosity.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 380
churches funded welfare services which the State did not provide; they became secular when the welfare state crowded out
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 382
there are still countries notably in the Middle East and in Central Asia, where extremist religious movements are pointed out as a major source of political instability and violence. This paper thus suggests that the promotion of a secular welfare state may represent the best way to undermine these movements
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 385
while this paper shows that the growth of the welfare state explains the decline in church participation during the twentieth century, it also calls into question the relevance of the factors, like education and wealth, which have traditionally been used to explain the demand for religiosity. As such, this study suggests that other factors, such as habit formation, may perhaps provide a better explanation of the demand for religion. sss sss sss