lunedì 20 febbraio 2017

Sindacato_ prassi e teoria - Will Wilkinson Bryan Caplan David Henderson

Notebook per
Sindacato_ prassi e teoria -
Will Wilkinson Bryan Caplan David Hender
Citation (APA): Hender, W. W. B. C. D. (2014). Sindacato_ prassi e teoria - [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from

Parte introduttiva
Segnalibro - Posizione 3
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 4
Do Labor Unions Promote the Middle Class? David Henderson
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 4
In today's WaPost, political scientists Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson
Nota - Posizione 5
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 5
unions promote a strong middle class.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 5
Their main argument
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 6
unions are a strong political force that lobbies for pro-middle-class policies.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 7
the direct impact of unions on wages,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 8
unions defend their members. They also create changes in social norms, such as pressures for nonunion employers to match union gains.
Nota - Posizione 9
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 12
are legal monopolies.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 12
pro-union Harvard economists Richard Freeman and James Medoff, put it, "Most, if not all, unions have monopoly
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 13
They have this monopoly power mainly because the federal government gives them the power,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 15
unions drive wages above competitive levels, they cause some of the workers to be put out of work.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 18
they go out and find other work.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 18
that drives down wages there.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 19
one of the main findings of the late H. Gregg Lewis, the famous labor economist at the University of Chicago, is that unions in their heyday, the 1950s and early 1960s, caused union wages to be 10 to 15 percent higher and non-union wages to be 3 to 4 percent lower.
Nota - Posizione 20
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 21
"threat effect" would undercut my claim
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 24
The wages of those who are not working will be zero.
Nota - Posizione 24
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 25
larger lower class with people, especially younger people,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 26
Union Disillusion: Journalists vs. Economists Bryan Caplan
Nota - Posizione 26
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 33
two different families of complaints about unions.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 34
unionsare corrupt, and aren't fighting hard enough
Nota - Posizione 34
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 38
Pushing up wages creates unemployment
Nota - Posizione 38
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 41
The way to improve conditions for workers in general, and not just lucky members of successful unions, is to raise worker productivity. Instead of burning up energy fighting with employers, most workers would be better off learning English and acquiring more job skills.
Nota - Posizione 42
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 44
In the best-case scenario, unions engineer a transfer from consumers
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 48
Effect of Unions David Henderson
Nota - Posizione 48
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 55
unions use their monopoly power to increase wages. But at these higher wages, employers employ fewer people.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 56
workers who lose their jobs or don't get hired in the first place move to the nonunion sector,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 56
nonunion wages to fall.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 57
gains of union workers are at the expense of nonunion
Nota - Posizione 58
migliori condizioni e meno posti di lavoro... lege d/o monopolio e privilegi vittime: consumatori non sindacalizzati disoccupati contribuenti inmprenditori privilegi: esenzione tasse antitrust sciopero distacchi contratto obbligatorio antidiscr. politicizzazione del sindacato il sindacato si sposa con la regolamentazione: guarda ai tassi di sindacalizzazione wage gap: 20% cause: 1 monopolio 2 spiazzamento gli acvordi sindacali sono rigidi: una volta siglati ci si disinteressa dello sviluppo il sindacato e discriminazione innovazione e declino del sindacato... il peggior nemico l alternativa: libere associazioni tra lavoratori (caccia alle collusioni)
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 58
Labor Unions by Morgan O. Reynolds
Nota - Posizione 59
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 59
chief economist at the U.S. Department of Labor
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 60
celebrated in folk songs
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 61
this is not how economists see them.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 62
raise wages above competitive levels
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 62
restricting the supply of labor
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 63
reduced the number of jobs
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 64
basic law of demand:
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 65
Their gains come at the expense of consumers, nonunion workers, the jobless, taxpayers, and owners of corporations.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 66
Richard Freeman and James Medoff,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 67
“Most, if not all, unions have monopoly power,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 68
legal privileges
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 69
antiunion economist Ludwig von Mises
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 70
“The long and short of trade union rights is in fact the right to proceed against the strikebreaker with primitive violence.”
Nota - Posizione 71
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 72
U.S. unions
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 72
immune from taxation
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 72
antitrust laws.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 72
Companies are legally compelled to bargain with unions
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 75
Unions also can force companies to make their property available for union use.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 76
it represents them exclusively, whether or not particular employees want collective representation.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 78
union officials can force compulsory union dues from employees— members
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 79
Unions often use these funds for political purposes— political
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 84
Like other successful cartels, they depend on government patronage
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 84
Worker cartels grew in surges during the two world wars and the Great Depression
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 85
the Railway Act of 1926 (amended in 1934), the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Walsh-Healy Act of 1936, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, various war labor boards, and the Kennedy administration’s encouragement of public-sector unionism in 1962— all added to unions’ monopoly power.
Nota - Posizione 87
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 90
unionization rate of 37.5 percent in the government sector,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 91
8.5 percent rate in the private
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 91
unions do best in heavily regulated, monopolistic environments.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 92
Even within the private sector, the highest unionization rates (23.8 percent) are in transportation (airlines, railroads, trucking, urban transit, etc.) and public utilities (21.8 percent), two heavily regulated industries.
Nota - Posizione 93
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 93
economic consequences of unions?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 93
In 2002, full-time nonunion workers had usual weekly earnings of $ 587, 21 percent lower than the $ 740 earned by union members. H. Gregg Lewis’s 1985 survey of two hundred economic studies concluded that unions caused their members’ wages to be, on average, 14– 15 percent higher than wages of similarly skilled nonunion workers.
Nota - Posizione 96
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 96
Other economists— Harvard’s Freeman and Medoff, and Peter Linneman and Michael Wachter of the University of Pennsylvania— claimed that the union premium was 20– 30 percent or higher during the 1980s.
Nota - Posizione 97
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 97
In a recent National Bureau of Economic Analysis study, David Blanchflower and Alex Bryson found a union wage differential of 18 percent, a relatively stable premium from 1973 through 1995.
Nota - Posizione 98
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 98
premium varies by industry
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 99
Unions representing garment workers, textile workers, white-collar government workers, and teachers seem to have little impact on wages.
Nota - Posizione 100
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 100
But wages of unionized mine workers, building trades people, airline pilots, merchant seamen, postal workers, teamsters, rail workers, and auto and steel workers exceed wages of similarly skilled nonunion employees by 25 percent or more.
Nota - Posizione 101
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 102
Union wage agreements tend to be relatively rigid for three years, so gains lag behind the more responsive and flexible nonunion sector during a boom.
Nota - Posizione 103
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 103
The reverse happens during an employment slump
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 104
advantage enjoyed by union members results from two factors. First, monopoly
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 105
Second, nonunion wages fall because workers priced out of jobs by high union wages
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 107
unions have blocked the economic advance of blacks, women, and other minorities.
Nota - Posizione 108
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 108
once they have raised wages above competitive levels, is to ration the jobs that remain.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 113
discrimination exercised by union officials depends on their ability and willingness to exclude.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 115
Economist Ray Marshall, although a prounion secretary of labor under President Jimmy Carter,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 116
documenting how unions excluded blacks from membership in the 1930s and 1940s.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 116
Marshall also wrote of incidents in which union members assaulted black workers hired to replace them during strikes. During the 1911 strike against the Illinois Central, noted Marshall, whites killed two black strikebreakers and wounded three others at McComb, Mississippi. He also noted that white strikers killed ten black firemen in 1911 because the New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railroad had granted them equal seniority. Not surprisingly, therefore, black leader Booker T. Washington opposed unions all his life, and W. E. B. DuBois called unions the greatest enemy of the black working class.
Nota - Posizione 120
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 120
the “union label” was started in the 1880s to proclaim that a product was made by white rather than yellow (Chinese) hands.
Nota - Posizione 121
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 122
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 124
Linneman and Wachter, along with economist William Carter, found that the rising union wage premium was responsible for up to 64 percent of the decline in unions’ share of employment in the last twenty years.
Nota - Posizione 125
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 125
The average union wage premium for railroad workers over similarly skilled nonrailroad workers, for example, increased from 32 percent to 50 percent between 1973 and 1987; at the same time, employment on railroads declined from 520,000 to 249,000. By 2002, railroad employment had slipped to 216,000, down 13 percent since 1987, while total nonfarm employment grew 26 percent during the same period.
Nota - Posizione 127
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 130
union representation of workers has declined in all private industries in the United States.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 130
employees do not like unions.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 131
According to a Louis Harris poll commissioned by the AFLCIO in 1984, only one in three U.S. employees would vote for union representation in a secret ballot election. The Harris poll found, as have other surveys, that nonunion employees are more satisfied than union workers with job security, recognition of job performance, and participation in decisions that affect their jobs.
Nota - Posizione 132
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 133
smaller companies,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 134
higher-technology products,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 134
more professional and technical
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 134
erode union membership.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 135
peaked at 17 million in 1970 and had fallen by nearly half— to 8.8 million— by 2002.
Nota - Posizione 135
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 138
public-sector unions are on schedule to claim an absolute majority of union members
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 139
what organized labor wanted,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 140
“More government.”
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 141
conflict between union members and workers in general
Nota - Posizione 141
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 142
what organizations might replace them?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 142
“Worker associations” that lack legal privileges
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 143
voluntary worker associations could
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 145
associations could also institute legal proceedings against collusion by employers,
Segnalibro - Posizione 147
Nota - Posizione 147
tesi dello sfrutamento vs tesi della concorrenza il lavoro è flessibile il capitale è fisso: + probabile che il primo sfrutti il secondo a parità di concorenza
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 147
Unions and Exploitation of Labor, Capital, and Taxpayers Morgan O. Reynolds
Nota - Posizione 148
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 148
Workers and employers are natural opponents;
Nota - Posizione 149
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 149
employers have a powerful advantage
Nota - Posizione 149
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 150
help employees who are otherwise at the mercy
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 150
public has considerable sympathy for the “underpayment” thesis
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 153
Yet economists point out that the U.S. labor market is highly competitive,
Nota - Posizione 153
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 154
entrepreneurs establishing new businesses daily,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 154
A “powerful” employer cannot depress labor prices
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 155
because other firms are attracted by the cheaper labor.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 157
if employer clout depresses wage rates in one location, labor supply will decrease as mobile workers leave,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 161
removing government barriers that block new employers from entering
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 162
Even the historical image of corporate power dominating isolated “company mining towns” is mostly fiction.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 162
Nineteenthcentury Appalachian coal miners, for example, were highly mobile, and literally hundreds of companies competed in the same coal and labor markets in both company-owned and independent towns. In fact, extensive mineral deposits mined by a single company are rare.
Nota - Posizione 164
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 165
These situations are highly limited.
Nota - Posizione 165
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 165
It is much easier for a labor organization to exploit vulnerable owners of ports, mines, plants, utilities, and other massive fixed facilities
Nota - Posizione 166
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 166
labor is the most versatile and flexible
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 167
owners of large fixed-capital investments
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 168
Sports teams at both the collegiate and professional levels offer rare examples of durable underpayment. Today, colleges still maintain a successful cartel to suppress the pay of college athletes below competitive levels. While there are tremendous advantages to cheating, thereby spawning “under-the-table” benefits to recruit superior athletes, the NCAA system suppresses member violations by sanctions and ultimately threatening termination of academic accreditation, thereby cutting off the elaborate network of subsidies each college depends on.
Nota - Posizione 172
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 185
Unions and Productivity Arnold Kling
Nota - Posizione 185
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 188
In the private sector, a union should raise wages. When it raises wages, the firm should substitute capital for labor, raising productivity.
Nota - Posizione 188
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 189
is as a tax on labor--causing the firm to substitute
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 193
In the public sector, I can believe that unions lower productivity.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 212
Labor Unions and Liberty di Will Wilkinson
Nota - Posizione 212
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 214
public-sector unions cannot be justified on liberal-democratic grounds while private-sector unions are not only unobjectionable, but desirable.
Nota - Posizione 214
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 215
private-sector unions as a safeguard against economic exploitation
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 217
Jacob Levy makes a case for unions on libertarian-ish grounds
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 219
points in unions' favor:
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 219
indispensable for the mitigation of workplace power imbalances between managers and employees; they provide due process protections, protection against favoritism and nepotism and retaliation and harassment sexual and otherwise, protection against unjust dismissal
Nota - Posizione 221
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 228
The fact that workers have so often and in so many places sought to organize, and the fact that firms have so often and in so many places resorted to illiberal restrictions on freedom of association if not outright violence to prevent them from doing so, itself looks like prima facie evidence from the world in unions’ favor.
Nota - Posizione 231
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 232
There is widespread revealed-preference
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 236
it ought to be easier to organize workplaces more generally.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 250
If You Don't Like It Bryan Caplan
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 250
Suppose your boss screams all the time, has extremely bad breath, or requires all his employees to speak in a faux British accent. Even today, the law usually offers you no recourse Even today, the law usually offers you no recourse - except, of course, for "If you don't like it, except, of course, for "If you don't like it, quit."
Nota - Posizione 253
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 258
freedom of contract,
Nota - Posizione 258
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 259
standard rejoinder
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 260
"consent" to at-will employment is, in many instances, neither voluntary nor informed
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 263
Let's start with "inequality in bargaining power." Let's
Nota - Posizione 263
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 264
"some people have more to offer than others
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 265
what would the economy look like if people could only make deals when they happened to have "equal bargaining power"?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 266
Almost all trade would be forbidden.Almost
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 268
"asymmetric information"
Nota - Posizione 268
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 269
the effect is not to "favor" parties with more information, but to scare off parties with less information, leading to fewer trades and making both sides poorer. The upshot: If the law somehow solved the asymmetric information problem, the result would be a big increase in labor supply
Nota - Posizione 271
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 272
Why don't the same arguments make you want to tightly regulate the dating market?
Nota - Posizione 273
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 273
modern dating markets are based on a strong version of "If you don't like it, break up."
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 276
"unequal bargaining power" or "asymmetric information"
Nota - Posizione 276
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 276
current rules of the dating market should outrage you.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 282
You could say we have a double standard because personal relationships, unlike work relationships, are too complicated to regulate. Maybe so, but I doubt it. Work relationships are incredibly complex, too.
Nota - Posizione 284
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 286
The simple story works best: The apparent double standard is real.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 289
The fact that Channing Tatum has incredibly high value in the dating market is a flimsy excuse to restrict his freedom to date.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 293
If You Want to Keep Dating Me, You’d Better Let Me Fuck You by JASON BRENNAN
Nota - Posizione 293
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 296
if we take those arguments seriously, then those arguments also seem to be grounds to limit civil liberty as well.
Nota - Posizione 296
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 300
Why not also have government intervene to help naturally shy or uninteresting or ugly
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 301
left-liberals just assert that civil liberties are important while economic liberties are not. That’s the difference.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 305
good example of this problem occurs in Murphy and Nagel’s The Myth of Ownership.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 305
Murphy and Nagel point out (as if libertarians didn’t already know this) that the current scheme of income, property ownership, and wealth would not exist without the government and taxes that support it.
Nota - Posizione 307
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 308
In the state of nature, I’d make, let’s say, 1/ 200th of my current income.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 308
Murphy and Nagel conclude that I don’t thereby have a natural right to my income,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 309
Call this argument the Institutional Dependency Argument( IDA).
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 310
it’s dangerous argument for liberals to advance.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 311
liberalism holds that people have a special claim to their bodies
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 312
Why can’t the government set up a corvée— a tax paid by labor— or
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 312
I do not own my pre-corvée time any more than I own my pre-tax income.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 313
in the state of nature (which Murphy and Nagel use as a baseline to judge our benefit from government), I would not have 80 + years of expected life;
Nota - Posizione 314
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 317
by the IDA, I cannot be said to have a natural right to choose how to spend my time.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 317
In the state of nature, I have no time to spend.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 321
we can extend their argument to defend the corvée, not just the income tax.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 324
answer, which they offer while responding to a libertarian comparison
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 325
“Egalitarian liberals simply see no moral similarity
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 327
say that some liberties are at “the core of the self”
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 329
Okay, maybe Murphy and Nagel are right.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 330
this response just neuters their entire book.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 330
Murphy and Nagel’s book doesn’t prove natural rights libertarianism is false;
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 343
Riffing on Bargaining Power da Cafe Hayek di Don Boudreaux
Nota - Posizione 344
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 347
“Equal bargaining power” sounds nice.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 354
“the Bargaining Game.”)
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 354
each of 15 students in a room– is given an initial endowment
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 355
Each paper bag contains an assortment of different everyday items
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 361
each student is asked to examine the contents
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 362
proctor asks each student to rank, on a scale of oneto-ten,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 363
One” is “hate!”; ten is “love!”)
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 365
A typical number for a group of 15 student might be, say, 71.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 366
Then the proctor invites– not orders, simply invites- the students to bargain
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 369
presumably makes every party to the exchanges better off.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 370
When the time for bargaining and exchanging expires (many minutes later), the game’s proctor asks each student to again rank,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 372
the ‘aggregate utility’ or ‘total reported satisfaction’ after trading is completed is always higher
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 374
But one thing that I’ve noticed every time that I’ve seen the game played– which is probably 50 or 55 times– is that the players who are lucky enough to get unusually good initial endowments– for example, the student who gets the bag with the bottle of beer and premium chocolate– are less likely to trade than are students with lesser-valued initial endowments.
Nota - Posizione 376
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 376
what lessons to draw
Nota - Posizione 376
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 377
trade is more valuable to poorer
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 382
The market– people’s ability to trade more or less freely– was necessary for Bill Gates to acquire his fortune; it is less (which isn’t to say un) necessary for Bill Gates to keep and to enjoy his fortune.
Nota - Posizione 384
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 384
Another lesson
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 384
bargaining power.
Nota - Posizione 384
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 385
this result stems from the fact that Gates doesn’t haveto bargain as desperately.
Nota - Posizione 386
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 390
If You Don't Like It: Reply to Some Comments, by Bryan Caplan
Nota - Posizione 390
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 395
Firms gives workers training, access to crucial information, personal contacts (including clients they can steal), etc.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 396
"monopoly power" in both directions.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 399
reason for what you call the "double standard." To put it simply, a job is a necessity;
Nota - Posizione 400
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 404
many romantic relationships include financial support.
Nota - Posizione 404
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 405
The causal chain from unemployment to hunger and homelessness is far weaker than you suggest.