lunedì 27 marzo 2017

Sui diritti degli animali Bryan Caplan e Michael Huemer

Sui diritti degli animali
Bryan Caplan e Michael Huemert
Citation (APA): Huemert, B. C. e. M. (2017). Sui diritti degli animali [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com

Parte introduttiva
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 1
BUGS BRYAN CAPLAN
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 3
The most compelling objection to animal rights, to my mind, has long been... bugs. Bugs are animals. Every human being directly kills bugs just by walking
Nota - Posizione 4
L OBIEZIONE ALL ANIMALISMO. I VERMI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 5
Yet I've never heard even a strict vegan express a word of moral condemnation
Nota - Posizione 5
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Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 8
1. If even morally scrupulous advocates of view X don't live in accordance with X, the best explanation is that they don't really believe X. 2. If even the dedicated advocates of X don't really believe X, X is probably false.
Nota - Posizione 10
L ARGOMENTO INTROSPETTIVO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 22
PETA on bugs:
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 23
All animals have feelings and have a right to live free from unnecessary suffering--regardless of whether they are considered "pests" or "ugly." As with our dealings with our fellow humans, the determination of when lethal defense against insects and animals is acceptable must be judged on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the level of the threat and the alternatives that are available.
Nota - Posizione 26
CASE BY CASE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 28
A bizarre juxtaposition. No one would say that humans have a "right to live free from unnecessary suffering," then immediately talk about killing them on a "case-by-case basis." And if someone killed hundreds of humans with his car on a cross-country trip, no one would accept the excuse, "It was necessary to cross the country."
Nota - Posizione 31
PARALLELO BIZZARRO CON L UOMO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 35
Here's what the Animal Rights FAQ tells us about bugs:
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 37
Singer quotes three criteria for deciding if an organism has the capacity to suffer from pain: 1) there are behavioral indications, 2) there is an appropriate nervous system, and 3) there is an evolutionary usefulness for the experience of pain.
Nota - Posizione 38
SINGER. QUANDO SOFFRE UN ANIMALE?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 38
These criteria seem to satisfied for insects,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 41
large industries are built around honey production, silk production, and cochineal/ carmine production, and, of course, mass insect death results from our use of insecticides.
Nota - Posizione 42
SFRUTTAMENTO DEGLI INSETTI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 46
Insects are a part of the Animal Kingdom and some special arguments would be required to exclude them from the general AR argument.
Nota - Posizione 47
AMMISSIONE DELL ANIMAL RIGHTS
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 49
Some may postulate a scale of life with an ascending capacity to feel pain and suffer. They might also mark a cut-off on the scale, below which rights are not actively asserted.
Nota - Posizione 50
SOLUZIONE SOLITA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 53
The overarching problem with these "exclusion" arguments: They try to justify a massive difference in treatment with a totally debatable difference in capacity for pain. It's easy to show that some creatures are much smarter than others; but how on earth could we ever convincingly show that some feel much less pain than others?
Nota - Posizione 56
IL PROBLEMA DELLA SOLUZIONE
Nota - Posizione 57
SOFFERENZA E STUPIDITÀ NN SONO CORRELATE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 58
If there's a real possibility that killing bugs is very wrong, we should refrain until we know better.
Nota - Posizione 58
METTICI ANCHE LA PRECAUZIONE
Segnalibro - Posizione 61
Segnalibro - Posizione 83
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 85
Reply to Huemer on Ethical Treatment of Animals (including Bugs) Bryan Caplan
Nota - Posizione 86
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Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 96
I never claimed it was the best way. But I do claim that the Argument from Hypocrisy and the Argument from Conscience provide us with additional moral insight,
Nota - Posizione 100
OB. L INTROSP NN È UN BUON METODO. RISPOSTA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 102
Thomas Jefferson would presumably have declared that slavery is probably right,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 104
Jefferson's hypocrisy at least slightly undermined the credibility of the case against slavery.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 106
the best way to find out whether x is true is to just look at the arguments for and against x, especially if those arguments are simple and easy to find.
Nota - Posizione 107
OB. COME SI GIUDICA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 109
It seems wrong to cause extreme amounts of pain and suffering for the sake of minor benefits to oneself.
Nota - Posizione 109
L ARGOMENTO ANIMALISTA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 110
I agree this claim has great superficial appeal. But I think that like utilitarianism, Kantianism, and other grand moral theories, it's subject to devastating counter-examples. Like: "What if you have to painfully kill one bug to build a house rather live in a tent?"
Nota - Posizione 112
RISP: ECCEZIONI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 113
If you just look at some of the things that go on on factory farms, you're going to be horrified.
Nota - Posizione 114
OB DELL ORRORE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 115
I would also be horrified to watch life-saving surgery on humans. On reflection, both seem morally fine to me despite my squeamishness.
Nota - Posizione 116
RISP. CHIRURGIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 116
If you think it is not wrong to inflict severe suffering as long as the victim of the suffering is stupid, then you'd have to say that it is permissible to torture retarded people for fun.
Nota - Posizione 118
OB DELLA TORTURA DEGLI STUPIDI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 119
It depends on the degree of stupidity.
Nota - Posizione 120
RISP. CONTA IL GRADO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 121
Almost all humans classified as mentally retarded are far smarter than that, of course.
Nota - Posizione 122
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 122
A stronger objection is that human babies are much stupider than adult humans, but everyone knows it's wrong to inflict pain on babies. The obvious amendment here, though, is that creatures that will normally develop human-level intelligence are also of great moral importance, though probably not as much as creatures that already possess such intelligence.*
Nota - Posizione 126
BAMBINI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 127
You also have to explain why pain isn't bad when the victim is stupid.
Nota - Posizione 127
OB. XCHÈ LO STUPIDO NN RILEVA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 128
stupid as a bug? At minimum, it seems obvious that the pain of such a creature is extremely morally unimportant.
Nota - Posizione 129
RISPOSTA: INSETTI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 137
a good argument to me - good enough to break what otherwise looks like a moral impasse.
Nota - Posizione 138
INTROSPEZIONE E MORAL IMPASSE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 144
pain depends on the intelligence
Nota - Posizione 144
OB: COME POSSIAMO STABILIRE UNA CORRELAZIONE TRA SOFF E INTELLIG?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 147
It seems obvious once you ponder basic counter-examples to your general principle. Do you really think painfully killing bugs to build a house is morally wrong?
Nota - Posizione 148
RISP. BASTA FARE ESEMPI E TRARRE UNA REGOLA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 156
But suppose we grant that bugs don't feel pain. Your position still implies that if bugs did feel pain, it would be morally impermissible to build a house. After all, you could just live in a tent and leave the bugs in peace.
Nota - Posizione 158
IL NODO DELLA PRECAUZIONE