Notebook per
Lesson from Gurgaon Shruti Rajagopalan and Alexander Tabarrok
Citation (APA): riccardo-mariani@libero.it. (2017). Lesson from Gurgaon Shruti Rajagopalan and Alexander Tabarrok [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com
Parte introduttiva
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Lessons from Gurgaon, India’s private city Shruti Rajagopalan and Alexander Tabarrok
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NEW CITIES FOR AN URBAN WORLD
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t
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The world’s urban population quadrupled between 1950 and 2000.
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By 2050, it will have doubled again.
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Total population and the rate of urbanization are both increasing faster
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The McKinsey Global Institute (2010) estimates that such an expansion will require over a trillion US dollars in capital investment including 700 to 900 million square metres of new commercial and residential space every year– on the order of a new Chicago– and 2.5 billion square metres of roads as well as 7,400 kilometres of metros and subways.
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x COSA CI SERVE
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The problem with these numbers is not the expense required
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The problem is political and organizational.
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high in corruption and low in efficiency,
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PAESI COME INDIA
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space for future
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Unfortunately, the developing nations where much of the urban growth will occur do not have a successful history of advance planning. Indeed, foresighted, capable, independent, and uncorrupted bureaucracies are rare everywhere.
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x MANCA CAPACITÀ DI PIANIFICARE UN POSTO
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will need to build the equivalent of hundreds of new cities and megacities
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In this chapter, we explore to what extent private urban planning may substitute for government planning.
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We use Gurgaon, India, as a case study
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In Gurgaon, the private sector has filled many gaps
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some gaps have been too large for the private sector
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INTRODUCTION TO GURGAON
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t
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Gurgaon is a district in the state of Haryana located just to the southwest of Delhi
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little more than a village in 1979,
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it was split administratively from the more populous and developed area of Faridabad in Haryana.
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Faridabad had access to transport and public utilities and was a strong industrial city
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Gurgaon was largely barren, with no local government, public utilities, or transportation.
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Faridabad has struggled while Gurgaon has thrived,
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becoming an information technology (IT) hub
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As late as 1991, the Gurgaon district had an urban population of some 121,000; by 2001, this had expanded to 870,000 and by 2011 to 1.5 million (1991 Census). 3 As of 2013, nearly half of the Fortune 500 companies have operations in Gurgaon, including American Express, General Electric, Motorola, Dell, Microsoft, IBM, and Google. Many other leading firms from around the world have also chosen to locate in Gurgaon (Hindustan Times, 2013a).
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x POP E SUCCESSO
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leading destination for India’s young middle-class workers in the tech industry.
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Gurgaon has 43 shopping malls,
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luxurious apartment towers,
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seven golf courses,
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half a dozen large five-star hotels.
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‘the Singapore of India,’
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the public infrastructure in Gurgaon is poor.
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no citywide sewage, water, or electricity system.
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Sewage is often dumped in nearby rivers
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Power outages are frequent.
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public transport is poor to nonexistent
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police are undersupplied.
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like other Indian cities in terms of public-sector
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GURGAON: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
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Haryana’s lifting of restrictions on the land-acquisition
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CAUSA DELL ESPLOSIONE
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the unusual lack of local government in Gurgaon.
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advantage in being close to Delhi
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Land Acquisition
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t
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In India the process is much more politicized, bureaucratic, and slow,
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LOTTOZZAZIONE
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converting and buying agricultural land for non-agricultural use.
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As a general rule, each landowner must apply for permission for non-agricultural use under the specific zoning laws governing the city and state, and each application is considered on a case-by-case basis. A non-agricultural use clearance (NAC) is usually given only for a specific non-agricultural use, not as a general right that flows with the land. In other words, farmers cannot obtain the right to use their land for a non-agricultural use and then convey this right to any buyer.
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x PROCEDURA
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only large firms with the ability to manage the government
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obtaining a NAC permission is only a first step.
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moving through many government bureaucracies.
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there is a loophole.
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a private company is exempt from the restrictions of the Land Acquisition Act and permitted to acquire land if licensed by the state government.
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x TRUCCO
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t
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Haryana,
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First, in the 1970s, the Haryana state government removed the tedious NAC requirement.
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licences were given to private developers to develop the townships
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Easier land acquisition in Gurgaon helped private developers assemble parcels of land and also meant roads and highways could be more easily routed
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Since the land in Gurgaon was unproductive and sparsely populated, few objected
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administration has been praised for having a ‘single window’ clearance,
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Local Government
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t
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Faridabad, like Gurgaon, is in the state of Haryana and so also benefited from simplification
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Faridabad also had a municipal government.
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TUTTAVIA
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Gurgaon, which was mainly agricultural wasteland, did not have a municipal government
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not categorized as an urban area until 2001;
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Gurgaon create a municipal body only in 2008.
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the chief minister in Haryana had the key veto power in allowing land conversion
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Thus decisions about land regulation have been the responsibility of a single office,
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Monopoly Corruption and Serial, Competitive Corruption
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t
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Corruption in obtaining CLU permissions is common
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obtaining CLUs was still easier in Gurgaon than in other cities.
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there were fewer legal or regulatory complexities.
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distinction between ‘monopoly corruption’ and ‘serial, competitive corruption.’
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A corrupt monopolist chooses the revenuemaximizing ‘toll’– that is, a bribe– which entails not killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. In contrast, if the developer must pay a series of independent tolls, each being necessary to reach the final destination, the sum of the tolls can easily exceed the single monopolist’s revenue-maximizing toll, thereby killing the goose. This is because the serial monopolists do not take into account the effect of their tolls on the profits of the other toll takers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Gardner et al., 2002; Heller, 2008).
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x CORRUZIONE MONOPOLISTA E SERIALE
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Gurgaon was governed by a monopolist,
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Chief Minister’s Office of Haryana.
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In contrast in Faridabad, decision-making and toll-taking was spread across many different bureaucracies
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Private Developers
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t
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land and infrastructure problems in nearby New Delhi,
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LA CAUSA DEL BOOM DI G
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Delhi Lease and Finance (DLF)
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SPECULATORE A DHELI
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Formed in 1946, DLF was active in developing neighbourhoods in Delhi
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Delhi Development Authority in 1957 squeezed out private developers
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rigid control mechanisms of socialist planning.
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Zoning and land-use rules restricted the supply of land in Delhi,
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heightened scarcity,
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proliferation of illegal construction and corruption
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With no revisions in the Delhi Master Plan until 2007, opportunities for legal real estate development shrank.
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Businesses and citizens looked to nearby Faridabad and Gurgaon
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proximity to Delhi, as well as the Indira Gandhi International Airport (just 15 kilometres away)
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From 1981 to 1982, DLF and Ansal Properties, another big Delhi-based property developer, received licences from the Haryana state government to build large private-sector residential townships.
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DLF assembled parcels of land for commercial use.
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Gurgaon developed as Delhi’s industrial and residential suburb,
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The industrial era of Gurgaon began with the establishment of an Indo-Japanese joint venture in 1982, the Maruti-Suzuki automobile plant and its ancillary factories.
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Hero Motors and Honda set up a plant
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one of the major information technology/ business process outsourcing (IT/ BPO) hubs in India,
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when Jack Welch, then chairman of General Electric (GE), met with the telecommunications minister
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TURNING POINT
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General Electric started partnering with Indian firms and started the outsourcing revolution in India
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After the 1991 reforms liberalizing various sectors of the Indian economy,
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it was the service industries, and IT
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...
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that became the most important export industries.
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c
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American Express, for example, followed the example of GE
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The city grew rapidly, following an agglomeration process familiar from the history of other industrial cities such as Detroit, Michigan; Bollywood in Mumbai, and Silicon Valley in California (Glaeser, 2008).
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x DEJA VU
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these multinational corporations leased parcels that had been developed as business parks by private developers such as DLF.
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All these business parks came with full electricity backup
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security personnel and infrastructure, parking lots, cafeterias, and so on.
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Leasing space tailored to the needs of IT
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provided operational flexibility to these corporations.
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multinational firms did not have to struggle with land-acquisition problems
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Urban Government in Contemporary Gurgaon
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t
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In 2008, the Municipal Corporation of Gurgaon (MCG) was created but its authority is limited.
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On paper, once HUDA or private developers build roads, public infrastructure, drainage systems, and so on, they need to hand these developments over to the MCG for maintenance. However, there is neither any timeframe nor any agreement between the two bodies on how to account for the civil works undertaken so far and the extent of the tasks still pending. It is still unclear where the responsibility lies for maintenance of public utilities and infrastructure in Gurgaon.
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x RAPPORTO TRA MCG E PRIVATI
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no clear link between the authority and the citizens
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jurisdiction of the MCG is still unclear and it wields little authority
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PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSES
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t
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private sector has stepped in to address many of the failings of the public sector, with mixed success.
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private sewage, water, electricity, and security.
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these private systems work well for those paying,
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Private sewage systems, for example, often do not connect to official sewage
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IRRAZIONALITÀ
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lead to tanks that are periodically dumped, sometimes illegally.
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PRATICHE ILLEGALI
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groundwater is being dissipated and tanked water is expensive.
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ACQUA CARA
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Private electricity is far more reliable than the public
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smaller-than-efficient scales of production and excessive pollution.
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MA
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Private security does a good job protecting the middle class,
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but public spaces are unprotected,
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developed a siege mentality.
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Sewage
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no master plan for water, sewage, and drainage lines.
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organizational confusion
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lack of a unified water and sewage system
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Fire Stations
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t
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another area where the private sector has stepped in.
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When the MCG took over in 2008, Gurgaon had only 14 public fire engines and 23 fire officials to tackle potential emergencies in a city with 400 high-rise buildings (15 metres or higher) and about 7,000 industrial units, spread over 1,500 square kilometres. The federal Indian government’s norms require that urban areas have one fire engine and five firemen for every 50,000 persons.
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x SOTTOPRODUZIONE DEL PUBBLICO
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Government norms also require a three-minute response time in case of a fire (Chowdhury, 2009). It is no surprise that the response time for publicly provided firemen in Gurgaon is much longer, at 25 minutes.
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c
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Gurgaon had two hydraulic pumps that enabled water to reach a maximum height of 40 metres, less than half the height of the tallest high-rise.
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x CARENZA DI INFRASTRUTTURE
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Most big commercial and residential parks, however, have a fire protocol in place, some required by multinational corporations using the space, and others demanded by citizens and residents.
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x AIL PRIVATO SUPPLISCE
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As well as fire-fighting equipment in its various buildings, DLF has fire protocols.
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DLF set up India’s first private fire stations in Gurgaon’s districts Cyber City and DLF Phase V, with equipment specifically fitted to deal with high-rise buildings. The DLF fire station has two 90-metre-high hydraulic platforms, capable of reaching Gurgaon’s tallest buildings.
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x PRIVATI
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Not only does DLF provide for a fire brigade privately, the equipment in DLF fire stations is better than the equipment elsewhere, including the city of Mumbai, which only operates up to a height of 70 metres.
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c
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The government equipment is a joke. They are using a pichkari12 to fight fires in high-rise buildings. DLF cannot do that. We have thousands of crores’ 13 worth of investment that we must protect. Now we have built a world-class fire brigade.
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x QUI IL PRIVATO SURCLASSA
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When asked about fires in non-DLF properties, he explained that ‘a fire accident in Gurgaon is not good for anyone.
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DLF is now synonymous with Gurgaon,
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Roads and Transport
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t
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transport delivery in Gurgaon is abysmal.
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Gurgaon has no unified agency for building and maintaining roads.
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Gurgaon has a poorly maintained road network;
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no provision for public transport,
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city adds 60,000 cars
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rely on auto-rickshaws, cycle rickshaws, and overflowing private buses.
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x MEZZI DEI POVERI
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Congestion is an enormous problem.
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only 1.6 kilometres of surfaced road per thousand persons.
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problem is not just too few roads, but also poor-quality
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In public areas, the roads usually do not have working traffic lights or traffic police.
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For instance, the Delhi-Gurgaon Expressway, a 28-kilometre toll expressway, is one of the most modern roads in India. The road’s quality is good but a poorly run toll collection system means regular traffic jams with queues of over one kilometre and up to an hour in waiting time twice a day, leading one news source to ask, ‘Is the Delhi-Gurgaon Toll Road the Worst in the World?’ 16 Courts recently ordered the suspension of toll collection until the authorities can figure out a way to remove congestion at the tollbooths (Ahuja, 2013b).
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x PROBLEMI ANCHE X LE STRADE NUOVE
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Within private developments in Gurgaon, the roads are of good quality.
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For example, DLF and HUDA are building a 16-lane, 8.3-kilometre road network within Gurgaon to connect the National Highway, the DelhiGurgaon Expressway, and the main sector roads of Gurgaon to the Delhi Metro and the new Rapid Metro lines. This network mostly connects DLF developments, both industrial and residential.
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x ES DI STRADE PRIVATE
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Gurgaon also has a bus depot and a bus fleet (Haryana Roadways), but both are quite dysfunctional.
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does not cover important routes
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is not frequent or reliable
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Once again, the shortfall is covered by the private sector:
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bus, autorickshaw, and taxi operators, many of whom are unlicensed.
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filled with twice the suggested capacity
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Most companies provide or contract out their own bus service for employees and also have a car fleet available for employees who work unconventional hours to meet foreign customers’ schedules.
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x CORP.
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In 2013, the Haryana government announced a new policy to help develop a private bus fleet in Gurgaon, including approving 21 new inter-district bus routes and granting 90 licences to private operators (TNN, 2013b).
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c
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Gurgaon is an ideal place for rapid mass transport.
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The new Rapid Metro in Gurgaon was built by DLF and Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Limited (IL& FS),
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This 5.5-kilometre line connects Delhi Metro’s Sikanderpur station to DLF Phase III,
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This is India’s first fully privately financed metro
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carbon emissions in Gurgaon are expected to fall by 90,000 tons
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THE FAILURE OF GURGAON’S DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT
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Nota - Posizione 304
t
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Gurgaon has suffered from the lack of a cohesive urban plan,
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urban growth has vastly outpaced planning efforts in almost all Indian cities.
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Indian cities as a group have failed
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Though public sewage provision in Gurgaon is appalling
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...
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it is actually of above average quality by Indian standards.
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c
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4,861 out of the 5,161 cities and towns in India do not have even a partial sewage network.
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In Bangalore and Hyderabad, two of India’s other large ‘hightech’ cities, almost 50 per cent of households do not have sewage connections (Ahluwalia, 2011).
Nota - Posizione 310
x FOGNE ALTRE CITTÀ
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 310
National Urban Sanitation Policy ranking
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Gurgaon ranked 88th out of 423 large Indian cities
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second-best ranking in the state of Haryana.
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well above its sister city of Faridabad (ranked 240th),
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city of comparable size in the same state
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Water supply is also poor in most of India.
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Half of India’s cities have no piped water supply
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cities with a piped supply, the daily duration ranges from one hour to six hours
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Most of India’s cities face severe water shortage problems and groundwater dissipation.
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Power failures are common in Gurgaon; they are also common throughout most of India.
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In July 2012 India faced the world’s largest power failure when 680 million people (about 10 per cent of the world’s population) were thrown into the dark (Sharma et al., 2012).
Nota - Posizione 319
x BLACK OUT
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more than 300 million people in India still have no access
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 320
public transportation.
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Ministry of Urban Development’s Report on Indian Urban Infrastructure
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GIÙ
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‘only 20 out of India’s 85 cities with a population of 0.5 million or more in 2009 had a city bus service’ (Ahluwalia, 2011).
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x BUS
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the result is due to inadequate investment, a tax structure that is biased against public transport, and infamous red tape from multiple and overlapping regulatory authorities.
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x CAUSE INEFFICIENZA
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Fully 25 per cent of Indian villages still have poor road links. 19 Of India’s two million kilometres of roads, only. 96 million are surfaced and about one million are poorly constructed. India’s 53 national highways carry about 40 per cent of the total road traffic.
Segnalibro - Posizione 326
Nota - Posizione 326
x STRADE INDIANE
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ANALYSIS: A FAILURE TO INTERNALIZE EXTERNALITIES
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t. DUE PROBLEMI: 1 sottoproduzione beni pubblici 2 esternalità
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support for the standard economic model:
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profitseeking firms are challenged by externalities and public goods.
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Externalities and public goods do not necessarily lead to market failure
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Private firms have addressed most challenges and they have provided sewage, water, electricity, roads, transportation, security, fire prevention, and other goods. But to address is not necessarily to overcome,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 331
Crime prevention has been good and fire prevention arguably better than that publicly provided, but few would argue that Gurgaon’s sewage, water, transport, and electricity systems are ideal, even if they are sometimes better than the Indian average.
Nota - Posizione 333
x ESITO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 333
The government has failed to provide Gurgaon with large-scale infrastructure.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 335
Competition among private suppliers has produced two failures.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 336
First, prices of water, electricity, sewage,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 336
failure to exploit economies of scale.
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Second, competitive suppliers have produced negative externalities such as excess pollution, sewage dumping, and groundwater dissipation.
Nota - Posizione 338
ESTERNALITÀ
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Natural Monopolies
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t PRIMO DEI DUE FALKIM
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Why hasn’t Gurgaon developed natural monopolies,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 339
It is far more expensive to build urban infrastructure after development than before development.
Nota - Posizione 340
FATTO
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Negotiation costs increase with more players;
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Political transaction costs may also increase with development.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 343
multiple layers of local and central governments
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 349
corruption means that members of the government can actually profit from shortages
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 352
Compare Gurgaon’s development with that of New York. In 1807,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 353
the Common Council of the City of New York created a commission that laid out roads and public squares for the entire island (Angel, 2012).
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 354
The commissioners planned for a sevenfold expansion, an expansion that would not occur for many decades (the population of the planned area would eventually number over two million). When Manhattan did expand, however, public rights of way for streets, sewers, parks, and other urban infrastructure had already been provided for, greatly reducing the cost of expansion. In essence, the Common Council planned the future rules of the game behind a ‘veil of uncertainty’ that gave them stronger incentives to plan for efficiency and the common good. Once the veil is lifted, however, the constitutional moment is lost (Buchanan and Tullock, [1962] 1999).
Nota - Posizione 359
x NY
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 359
Transaction costs appear to be the key barrier
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 359
DLF, have provided infrastructure in keeping with the scale of their operations.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 360
Private developers have built sewage lines and even small treatment plants within a development
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 362
Private developers, however, have mostly been unable to provide goods beyond their own property
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 363
Gurgaon is a new city and we may see more co-operation in the future as breakneck growth slows
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 364
More recently, for example, DLF and IL& FS have cooperated to produce the Gurgaon Rapid Metro system, India’s first privately financed metro.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 368
The Tragedy of the Commons
Nota - Posizione 369
t SECONDO FALLIMENTO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 369
they have overused common resources by dumping waste,
Nota - Posizione 370
x I PRIVATI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 371
Gurgaon has too many state agencies and too little state enforcement.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 373
One way to ensure that private developers do not dump waste in common land is to privatize the common land
Nota - Posizione 374
x SOLUZIONE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 374
private-enterprise system cannot function properly unless property rights are created in resources, and, when this is done, someone wishing to use a resource has to pay the owner to obtain it. Chaos disappears; and so does the government except that a legal system to define property rights and to arbitrate disputes is, of course, necessary.
Nota - Posizione 377
x COASE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 377
In Gurgaon, private developers manage their properties well.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 377
One does not hear of instances where DLF dumps its sewage wastewater on land belonging to ANSALS.
Nota - Posizione 378
x FOGNE PRIVATE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 380
A third solution is the evolution of local institutions
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 381
In Gurgaon, there has been a slow emergence of citizens groups,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 382
Citizen groups, for example, have used judicial activism as a tool to prevent overextraction of groundwater
Segnalibro - Posizione 384
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 384
NEW CITIES OF THE FUTURE: LESSONS FROM WALT DISNEY WORLD AND JAMSHEDPUR
Nota - Posizione 385
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 386
Is there an alternative path that could have performed better
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 386
Pramod Bhasin, non-executive vice chairman of Genpact,
Nota - Posizione 387
GIÙ
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 388
.] We provide our own security, our own transport, power, education and training. At some point I feel like telling them to give the city to us and we’ll run it’ (Kumar and Misra, 2012).
Nota - Posizione 389
x FRUSTRAZIONE. DATECI LA CITTÀ!
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 389
Is it viable to turn a city over to the private sector?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 390
Recall that developers have developed infrastructure within their own property line. If the property line were to be extended so would the infrastructure.
Nota - Posizione 390
x IL RAGIONAMENTO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 391
if the government had allowed, or even required, much larger initial purchases
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 392
A single firm seeking to maximize the rents from a large urbanizing area would have an incentive to build infrastructure
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 393
Walt Disney World: The City as a Hotel
Nota - Posizione 394
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 394
Are there examples of such systems in practice? Yes.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 394
Reedy Creek Improvement District in Florida,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 395
Walt Disney World.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 395
Disney bought up 25,000 acres
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 395
a bit smaller than San Francisco)
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 396
remote, undeveloped, and uninhabited Florida
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 396
The property had no infrastructure,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 398
The legislature created a special taxing district, the Reedy Creek Improvement District (RCID), which in essence ceded governance to the Walt Disney World Company (WDWC). 20 The RCID has control over planning, zoning, building codes, water, waste disposal, airports, roads, fire fighting and prevention, utility services, and security. It has built and maintains 215 kilometres of roadway, which brings 250,000 guests to Walt Disney World daily. The district has also built and maintains 107 kilometres of waterways. Fire prevention and emergency medical services for the millions of yearly guests are handled by the RDIC. The district includes its own electricity generation and distribution system, a water treatment facility and recycling centre, a potable water production and distribution system, a natural gas distribution system, public transport systems– buses, ferries, and monorail– that carry millions of passengers a year (both within Disney and between the airport and Disney), a wildlife conservancy area, 40,000 hotel rooms, hundreds of shops and restaurants, and the rides and attractions that have made Disney famous. Disney collects 60,000 tons of waste and 30 tons of aluminium, paper, steel cans, cardboard, and plastic containers for recycling every year. The garbage disposal system is innovative, using underground vacuum tubes to whisk garbage to a central processing station.
Nota - Posizione 399
x CESSIONE DI SOVRANITÀ
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 408
infrastructure and public goods increase the value of Walt Disney World.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 409
(see Mieszkowski and Zodrow, 1989; Scotchmer, 2002).
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 415
in the United States there are also hundreds of thousands of typically smaller private governments in the form of homeowner associations, planned communities, condominiums, and co-operatives. In 2012 these private associations governed some 25.9 million housing units and 63.4 million residents (Foundation for Community Association Research, 2012).
Nota - Posizione 416
x ESPERIENZE AFFINI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 419
Jamshedpur: A Privately Run City
Nota - Posizione 419
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 420
Jamshedpur is a private township and one of the best-governed cities in India.
Nota - Posizione 420
NON SOLO FUORI DALL INDIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 421
the idea of visionary businessman Jamshetji Nusserwanji Tata,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 423
Tata wrote to his son
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 423
Be sure to lay wide streets planted with shady trees, every other of a quick growing variety. Be sure that there is plenty of space for lawns and gardens. Reserve large areas for football, hockey and parks. Earmark areas for Hindu temples, Mohammedan mosques and Christian churches.’
Nota - Posizione 425
x LETTERA AL FIGLIO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 426
Tata Steel needed infrastructure to attract workers.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 427
it is now the largest city (population of 1.3 million) in the state of Jharkhand
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 428
From 1907 to 2004, municipal services including water, sewage, electricity and even education were provided by the Town Division of Tata Steel.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 432
Jamshedpur is widely regarded as having some of the best urban infrastructure
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 433
Jamshedpur was rated the second best in the country by ORG Marg Nielsen,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 434
its quality-of-life index in 2008 and in 2010 ranked seventh of 441 cities
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 435
water is drinkable from the tap– unusual in India.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 437
Power availability in Jamshedpur is 99.42 per cent, the highest in India,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 438
Jamshedpur has lower tariffs than other cities
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 439
the sole city in India where 100 per cent of the sewage is collected and treated before disposal.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 440
Gurgaon are dysfunctional because they are typically characterized by conflicts between multiple agencies
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 442
Jamshedpur, on the other hand, has succeeded, because through Tata Steel it began with a single owner,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 445
Other Private Developments in India
Nota - Posizione 445
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 445
Lavasa is another privately planned city being built by the Hindustan Construction Company (HCC),
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 446
in the state of Maharashtra.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 446
a private hill city of about 100 square kilometres
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 447
Lavasa will have five small townships, developed for residential, commercial, and non-polluting industrial uses.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 450
Another example is the 43-acre Infosys Campus at Electronic City in Bangalore.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 450
city for its 20,000 workers, and contains shops, hotels, restaurants, health club, and a golf course.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 452
providing various public goods and civic services up
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 454
Infosys has replicated the Bangalore campus in Pune, Mangalore, and Mysore.
Segnalibro - Posizione 456
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 456
LESSONS FOR FUTURE CITIES
Nota - Posizione 456
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 456
How can we build on the examples of Walt Disney World and Jamshedpur?
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 460
If the rights to develop Gurgaon had originally been sold in very large packages,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 461
five to seven proprietary but competitive cities could have been created
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 462
the role of the state is to make it possible to auction large parcels of land.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 463
private developers will provision public goods
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 464
competitive cities would have every incentive to invest in and especially to plan for appropriate infrastructure.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 465
competitive pressures would keep rents low
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 467
Competitive private governments would also generate experimentation and innovation in new rules that would then spread through intercity learning (Romer, 2010).
Nota - Posizione 468
x I VANTAGGI DELLA COMPET
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 469
transaction costs would likely be low enough to support joint projects,
Nota - Posizione 469
JOINT
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 470
It would also be possible for cities to contract out very large projects– say, electricity– to other cities or to private firms.
Nota - Posizione 471
CONTRACT OUT
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 471
Creating such a system would not have required much more power than the Chief Minister’s Office in Haryana needed to establish Gurgaon
Segnalibro - Posizione 473
Nota - Posizione 474
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 474
CONCLUSIONS
Segnalibro - Posizione 491
