Values in Sport (Ethics and Sport)
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Last annotated on May 13, 2016
Chapter 1 Is it fascistoid to admire sports heroes? Torbjörn TännsjöRead more at location 225
Note: 1@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ LO SPORT È FASCISTA XCHÈ AMMIRA LA FORZA E TOLLERA LA LOTTERIA DEI TALENTI... IMHO: 1 PROBLEMI CON LA DEF DI FASCISMO 2 PROVA A DISCARICO DEL FASCISMO 3 DISTINGUERE TRA DIRITTO ALLA MEDAGLIA E MEDAGLIA MERITATA. Edit
I realise that once again I was swept away with enthusiasm and admiration for those heroic athletes, who had stretched the limits of what is physically possibleRead more at location 228
is my enthusiasm for Johnson, Lewis and all the other athletic heroes respectable?Read more at location 231
Upon closer examination, my answer is no, my enthusiasm is not respectable. On the contrary, it is of a fascistoid1Read more at location 231
There was a time in many European countries when the Workers' Movement fought actively against the growing focus on sports.Read more at location 235
team sports have often been used by nationalist governments to create a chauvinist zeal in their own populations.Read more at location 236
But what about the public interest in the individual athletes in the Olympics? Should that be condemned because it reinforces an unhealthy nationalism?Read more at location 241
For my main interest is in the achievements of people like Johnson and Lewis. So perhaps much (the main part) of my admiration for their achievements is, after all, respectable?Read more at location 244
When big business in the form of international enterprises enters the arena, in the manner of sponsoring, advertising, and selling and buying television rights, national governments have to go.Read more at location 247
My thesis here is that our admiration for the achievements of the great sports heroes, such as the athletes who triumph at the Olympics, reflects a fascistoid ideology.Read more at location 252
Our enthusiasm springs from the very core of fascist ideology: admiration for strength and contempt for weakness.Read more at location 254
the exclusive target of my criticism is what goes on within the enormous worldwide public, watching sports, usually through television, taking advantage of sports as a cultural phenomenon.Read more at location 257
The main problem with nationalism is its orientation towards abstract symbols - the flag, the team (seen as an emblem);Read more at location 264
When such entities are celebrated, the individual tends to become replaceable.Read more at location 265
The nation can get strong, it can be successful, even if every one of its citizens suffers.Read more at location 266
Young women are treated as potential instruments that shall safeguard the strength and survival of the nation, and young men are viewed merely as potential soldiers.Read more at location 270
Why not stress the survival of a race or species rather than the survival of the individuals that make it up? The answer, as far as I can see, is that abstract entities as such are of no value.Read more at location 273
What matters, ultimately, from a moral point of view, is what happens to individuals, capable (at least) of feeling pleasure and pain.Read more at location 274
Even if this is conceded, it could be argued that the kind of nationalism fostered by the public interest in team sports events is innocent.Read more at location 285
It might even be argued that nationalism in relation to sports is a good replacement for political nationalism,Read more at location 286
I do not believe that this argument is tenable. The nationalism fostered by our interest for our 'own' national team, and the nationalism we exhibit in the political arena, tend to reinforce each other.Read more at location 289
But why is nationalism within sports becoming less important? This has to do with commercialisation and internationalisation.Read more at location 294
in his seminal book, Our Contempt for Weakness, Harald Ofstad has argued, convincingly in my opinion, that the nationalism of the Nazis was only a contingent fact. Yes, Hitler did put the German nation before all other nations, and he put the so-called Aryan race before all other races. However, the hard core of Nazism was something different - a contempt for weakness.Read more at location 300
To Hitler, the defeat showed not that there was something basically wrong with the Nazi ideology, but that there was something basically wrong with the German Nation.Read more at location 303
My thesis is this: when we give up nationalism, as a source of our interest in elite sports activities,Read more at location 305
we move from something that is only contingently associated with Nazism (nationalism) to something that is really at the core of Nazism (a contempt for weakness).Read more at location 307
Note: TESI RIPROPOSTA...IMO: SE DEFINISCI IL FASCISMO COME ANTI INDIVIDUALISMO IL DISPREZZO X IL DEBOLE CESSA DI COSTITUIRNR L ESSENZA Edit
It is one thing to admire the person who wins, who shows off as the strongest, but another thing entirely to feel contempt for those who do not win (and turn out to be weak). In order to reach my conclusion, I need the premise that, in doing the one thing, we cannot help but do the other.Read more at location 308
Admiration of the winner and contempt for the loser are only two sides of the same Olympic medal.Read more at location 311
My argument relates to those who view sports, not to those who perform.Read more at location 313
For simple phenomenological reasons we would be inconsistent if we did not feel any kind of contempt for the losers, once we sincerely admire the winner.Read more at location 318
we should think critically about why we admire those who excelRead more at location 319
Their excellence is, in an obvious manner, based on the strength they exhibit in the competition.Read more at location 321
And it is a kind of strength with a firm genetic basis. The winners are born winners, or, at least, they are born with a capacity for becoming winners.Read more at location 322
then this must mean that other people, those who do not win the fair competition (i.e the losers in the genetic lottery), those who are comparatively weak, are lessRead more at location 325
contempt, which is expressed in the popular saying, 'Being second is being the first of the losers.'Read more at location 327
Contempt can take an aggressive form, as was the case with the Nazis. They wanted to exterminate weaknessRead more at location 328
Contempt can take a negligent form. We try not to think at all about those for whom we feel contempt.Read more at location 330
Contempt can assume a paternalistic form. We want to 'take care' of those 'poorRead more at location 331
We admire Carl Lewis for his excellence and we feel some contempt for those who fall behind. However, we know that we would never stand a chance of beating Carl Lewis. Does this mean that we realise we are among those who are weak? It means, probably, that we fear this. But many of us believe we have other skills that compensate for those Carl Lewis possesses.Read more at location 338
But what if we do not? I believe that some of us may fear that we might fail on all relevant accounts. Those of us who do are the people who cheer loudest for people like Carl Lewis.Read more at location 341
Person S is 'better', in the relevant sense, than Person P if, and only if, S is more praiseworthy, admirable or deserving of the good things in life than P. This notion is given a fascistoid twist when betterness is conceived of in terms of strength.Read more at location 349
But must we feel contempt for those who are less successful (valuable)? Can we not just admire them less?Read more at location 351
when resources are scarce, treating one person well is tantamount to treating another person badly.Read more at location 353
Olympic medal (and the money and reputation that go with them) is a scarce resource.Read more at location 354
we ought to resist the idea that excellence consists of strength. The idea of excellence as a matter of strength of some kind is an idea with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and played a crucial role in the ethical thinking of Aristotle.Read more at location 356
even a utilitarian must concede that a person can be more or less virtuous, depending on whether he or she has a character conducive to general happiness in society.Read more at location 359
There is a point in praising him or her, since this may encourage others to develop the same kind of character.Read more at location 360
But there is no similar point in praising strength, since strength, in the relevant sense, is not a moral quality.Read more at location 364
The capacity for strength is genetically determined, so we cannot gain strength if we do not already have the genes for itRead more at location 365
obviously there is no point in praising a person for his or her good genes.Read more at location 365
Objection: similarities in the arts and scienceRead more at location 368
They may want to argue that, even if there is something fishy about the reaction of the sports public to athletic achievements, it is unfair to single out sports for exclusive concern.Read more at location 370
it is unfair to single out sports for exclusive concern. After all, even within science and the arts we meet with the same phenomenon. Some people exhibit an unusual scientific or creative skill (strength). They make important contributions to science or create valuable pieces of art. They are then met with admiration.Read more at location 371
Do we not exhibit contempt for weakness, when, for example, we give Nobel prizes to some 'outstanding' people?Read more at location 374
I consider this argument sound, at least to some extent. And to the extent that it is sound, we ought to be ashamed of ourselves. But I think it sound only to some extent. For when we become enthusiastic about scientific and cultural achievements, we need not have scientists or artists as the focus of our attention.Read more at location 375
But I think it sound only to some extent. For when we become enthusiastic about scientific and cultural achievements, we need not have scientists or artists as the focus of our attention. We can admire Wittgenstein's theories and Mozart's operas without feeling that Wittgenstein and Mozart are valuable persons. We can value the products of their ingenuity, but not necessarily their genius.Read more at location 376
They are merely instrumental to things of importance in themselves.Read more at location 380
We can and we ought to admire the products of skilful scientists and artists, not the persons themselves, at least not because of their skill (perhaps some of them deserve our admiration because of their moral qualities, but Wittgenstein is not among those).Read more at location 386
I believe that there may be something to the objection that sport is not very different from art. In both cases there is excitement over the results of people'sRead more at location 391
both cases there is excitement over the results of people's strivings.Read more at location 392
However, while the results are often, and should always be, the main focus of our attention within the arts, sports are different. Certainly, there is an aesthetic aspect even to sport. Some people are met with admiration not only because of their strength, but also because of the beauty with which they perform.Read more at location 392
Certainly, there is an aesthetic aspect even to sport. Some people are met with admiration not only because of their strength, but also because of the beauty with which they perform.Read more at location 393
In the final analysis, whoever breaks the tape is the person who counts.Read more at location 397
in the final analysis even their interest in the aesthetics of the play tend to be secondary to the outcome of the match.Read more at location 400
During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, there was a period when soccer competitions were reviewed with no mention of the final outcomeRead more at location 401
To remove our admiration for the winner of the genetic lottery, who has proved his or her superiority in a big sports manifestation, and you take away most of our interest in the manifestation.Read more at location 407
But could we not argue that what we admire is not really the excellence of the winner, but what the winner has achieved, given his or her natural endowments? And wouldn't this kind of reaction on our part be morally more acceptable? There is a grain of truth in this objection - a grain of truth explaining that there is a public interest in such things as female competition, competition between seniors, competition between handicapped persons, and so forth.Read more at location 410
There is a grain of truth in this objection - a grain of truth explaining that there is a public interest in such things as female competition, competition between seniors, competition between handicapped persons, and so forth.Read more at location 412
When someone wins the Olympics for handicapped persons, and we admire him or her for winning, we admire the achievement (given the constraints).Read more at location 414
However, the relatively weak public interest in such competitions, as compared to the interest in competitions of the absolute elite, shows that this kind of public interest in sports is of minor importance.Read more at location 415
even if we are prepared to admire people who have worked hard, at least if they succeed in the competitionRead more at location 420
I believe that we will have added admiration for a person who excels without having worked hard.Read more at location 422
Furthermore, the training of top athletes has now reached a point where all the best athletes train in an optimal fashion (given the scientific knowledge at hand). This means that moral characteristics, such as a readiness to work hard in order to obtain excellence, is of no decisive importance.Read more at location 426
All who compete try hard to become the best. It is the genetic lottery, not their ambition, that decides who will succeed.Read more at location 428
This elitism of ours is also revealed by the way we react to doping: we want the competition to be fair. We are not prepared to admire Ben Johnson only because he has run 100m faster than anyone before him. Why? We suspect that Carl Lewis is genetically more fit than Ben Johnson.Read more at location 429
If everybody were free to use whatever drugs he or she finds helpful, then the crucial test, the competition, would show who is most fit. The competition would then become fair.Read more at location 433
After all, there was a time when training was looked upon with suspicion.Read more at location 436
I can vividly recollect the disdain with which swimmers from Eastern Germany were regarded by the Western media during the 1960s.Read more at location 438
Today all successful athletes train on a professional and scientific basis.Read more at location 439
A special problem, of course, is posed by the possibility of genetic engineering. What if those who win the Olympic Games in some not-too-distant future are not winners in a natural genetic lottery, but have been genetically designedRead more at location 444
Would we still be prepared to admire those who make the best achievements?Read more at location 446
This question is discussed in Chapter 15. My conjecture, which is not shared by Christian Munthe, its author, is that we would not.Read more at location 447
Is not our admiration for strength, and a corresponding contempt for weakness, simply natural?Read more at location 451
It may be true that most of us are, by nature, competitive. We compete with each other and we enjoy doing so. But there is nothing wrong in this, or, at least, this competitiveness is not the target of my criticism.Read more at location 455
What I protest against is the admiration we show for the winners,Read more at location 461
This reaction of ours, not the natural pride felt by the winner himself or herself, is immoral.Read more at location 462
However, isn't this admiration for the winner, and the corresponding contempt for the loser, also only natural?Read more at location 464
One way of talking about 'natural' dispositions is this. A certain disposition is 'natural' if nature (evolution) has provided a species with it in the form of a blind instinct. If this is how the disposition is given to the species, then there is no room for blame when individual members of the species act on it.Read more at location 465
There is no point in blaming the lion for preying on the antelope, for example.Read more at location 468
Another way of understanding the idea that a certain disposition is 'natural' is as follows. Evolution has provided the species with the disposition, but not as a blind instinct.Read more at location 469
And there exists a good evolutionary explanation for why they do.Read more at location 471
an explanation cast not in terms of evolutionary biology but in cultural or psychological terms.Read more at location 472
It seems highly implausible that our admiration for strength and contempt for weakness is natural in the former sense.Read more at location 473
If contempt for weakness is immoral, in particular when it is directed against individuals who are 'weak' in a very literal sense of the word (people who are physically or mentally handicapped), does this mean that selective abortion (of foetuses with defected genes) is not acceptable?Read more at location 485
some grounds for selective abortion are not respectable.Read more at location 487
It is not respectable to abort a foetus because one feels a 'natural' contempt for the kind of handicap one knows it will be born with.Read more at location 488
But then the abortion would be carried out not because of contempt for this (possible) child but, rather, out of compassion.Read more at location 491
There may also exist selective abortions that are morally legitimate on the ground that they save the family from unnecessary burdens or, simply, because it allows a healthy child to be born rather than a handicapped one.Read more at location 492
However, in all these kinds of selective abortions, as has been repeatedly and correctly noted by representatives of the disabled people's movement, there is a risk that we might well be acting on an immoral contempt for weakness, rather than on a morally admirable compassion.Read more at location 494
There is little help in imposing sanctions and using force.Read more at location 512
The only way to make someone give up a bad habit is to convince the person in question that the habit is bad.Read more at location 514
That is why it is not an exaggeration to say, in closing, that if we are to grow as moral agents we need to cultivate a distaste for our present interest in and admiration for sports.Read more at location 518
Note: DISPREZZARE LO SPORT
