8 SPLIT BRAIN - The Evolution of the Soul by Richard Swinburne - illegamecontingente ilchirurgopazzo ilmodellopiùsemplice svegliarsiinunastanzabuia continuitàdicervello lanimachevolavia
THE SOUL 8.Read more at location 1943
Note: Dualismo sostanziale: esiste una mente che si può sganciare dal corpo... nel dualismo ommanentista la mente esiste solo se c è una base matrriale argomento parte 1: è logicamente possibile continuare ad esistere qundo il suo corpo è distrutto. cosa impedisce di formulare qs opotesi? argomento parte 2: parlare solo del corpo nn ci dice cosa succede alla xsona (vedi sotto brain split e teletrasporto) quindi... Conclusione: la soluzione più semplice consiste nel pensare all esistenza di un anima sganciabile dal corpo. se l anima è concepibile senza corpo allora l immortalità dell anima nn è un assurdo e se l ipotesi di dio è sensata anche l immortalità dell anima è la via più sensata Identità: brain split e chirurgo pazzo. Tutte le teorie falliscono nel rendicontare i trasferimenti di identità => l' anima è decisiva. Quel che succede al corpo non ci dice tutto quel che succede ala xsona , quindi... 8@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ è facile concepire una mente anima senza corpo: immaginati in una stanza buia... è così difficile? altre prova: teletrasporto con distruttore: teletrasporta una scrivania e teletrasporta una xsona, magari un uxoricida. Come spieghi il diverso trattamento delle identità? Solo il dualismo sostanziale può farlo. l anima si stacca dal corpo distrutto x unirsi a quello in formazione... evidentemente può farlo xchè esiste in sè Edit
This second part of the book is a defence of substance dualism.Read more at location 1946
The crucial point that Descartes' and others were presumably trying to make is not that (in the case of men) the living body is not part of the person, but that it is not essentially, only contingently, part of the person. The body is separable from the person and the person can continue even if the body is destroyed. Just as I continue to exist wholly and completely if you cut off my hair, so, the dualist holds, it is possible that I continue to exist if you destroy my body. The soul, by contrast, is the necessary core which must continue if I am to continue;Read more at location 1963
Note: DUALISMO SOSTANZIALE: LEGAME CONTINGENTE TRA ANIMA E CORPO. L ANIMA PUÒ CONTINUARE AD ESISTERE ANCHE SENZA CORPO Edit
it is the part of the person which is necessary for his continuing existence. The person is the soul together with whatever, if any, body is linked temporarily to it. By saying that the person `can' continue if the body is destroyed I mean only that this is logically possible, that there is no contradiction in supposing the soul to continue to exist without its present body or indeed any body at all (although such a soul would not then, on the understanding which I have given to `man'-sec pp. 4 f.-he a man or part of a man, although it would have been part of a man). Whether this normally happens, is another question;Read more at location 1967
will not suffice to give you knowledge of what happens to those personsRead more at location 1974
Talk about persons is not analysable in terms of talk about bodiesRead more at location 1974
Secondly, I argue that the most natural way of making sense of this fact is talking of persons as consisting of two parts, body and soul-the soul being the essential part, whose continuing alone makes for the continuing of the person. Read more at location 1975
But what if only some of my brain is removed'? Do I survive or not? Read more at location 1985
It might be possible one day to remove a whole hemisphere, without killing the person, and to transplant it into the skull of a living body from which the brain has just been removed, so that the transplant takes. There would then appear to be two separate living persons. Since both are controlled by hemispheres originating from the original person p, and since apparent memory and character and their manifestation in behaviour are dependent on factors present in both hemispheres, we would expect each publicly to affirm such apparent memories and to behave as if he had p's character.Read more at location 1991
two persons, both with p's apparent memories and character. But they cannot both be p.Read more at location 1996
person-we may have our views about which (if either) resultant person p is, but we could be wrong. And that is my basic point-howeverRead more at location 1997
I can bring the uncertainty out strongly by adapting Bernard Williams's famous mad surgeon story.3Read more at location 1999
He is going to torture one of the resulting persons and free the other with a gift of a million pounds. You can choose which person is to be tortured and which to be rewarded,Read more at location 2001
Whichever way you choose, the choice would, in Williams's telling word about his similar story, be a `risk'-which shows that there is something other to the continuity of the person, than any continuity of parts of brain or body. Read more at location 2004
My argument has been that knowledge of what has happened to a person's body and its parts will not necessarily give you knowledge of what has happened to the person, and so, that persons are not the same as their bodies.Read more at location 2025
My arguments so far, however, show only that some brain continuity (or other bodily continuity) is not sufficient for personal identity; which is something over and above that. They do not rule out the possibility that some bodily matter needs to continue as well, if personal identity is to continue.Read more at location 2030
Thought-experiments of more extravagant kinds rule out this latter possibility.Read more at location 2031
life after death. It seems self-consistent to affirm with respect to any person who is the subject of mental properties that he continue to have them, while his body is annihilated.Read more at location 2034
Suppose that one morning a man wakes up to find himself unable to control the right side of his body, including his right arm and leg. When he tries to move the right-side parts of his body, he finds that the corresponding left-side parts of his body move; and when he tries to move the left-side parts, the corresponding parts of his wife's body move.Read more at location 2037
One may suppose the process completed as the man's control is shifted to the wife's body,Read more at location 2041
suppose that a person who has been a man now finds himself no longer able to operate on the world, nor to acquire true beliefs about it; yet still to have a full mental life, some of it subject to his voluntary control. He would be disembodied.Read more at location 2044
The supposition that a person who is currently a man might become disembodied in one or other of these ways seems coherent. Not merely is it not logically necessary that a person have a body or brain made of certain matter, if he is to be the person which he is; it is not even necessitated by laws of nature.`'Read more at location 2050
My point now is that what natural laws still in no way determine is which animate body is yours and which is mine.Read more at location 2055
My conclusion-that truths about persons are other than truths about their bodies and parts thereof-is, I suggest, forced upon anyone who reflects seriously on the fact of the unity of consciousness over time and at a time.Read more at location 2160
A framework of thought which makes sense of this fact is provided if we think of a person as body plus soul, such that the continuing of the soul alone guarantees the continuing of the person. i i Read more at location 2161
Note: IL MODELLO PIÙ COERENTE
