8 SPLIT BRAIN - The Evolution of the Soul by Richard Swinburne

8 SPLIT BRAIN - The Evolution of the Soul by Richard Swinburne - illegamecontingente ilchirurgopazzo ilmodellopiùsemplice svegliarsiinunastanzabuia continuitàdicervello lanimachevolavia 

THE SOUL 8.Read more at location 1943

Note: Dualismo sostanziale: esiste una mente che si può sganciare dal corpo... nel dualismo ommanentista la mente esiste solo se c è una base matrriale argomento parte 1: è logicamente possibile continuare ad esistere qundo il suo corpo è distrutto. cosa impedisce di formulare qs opotesi? argomento parte 2: parlare solo del corpo nn ci dice cosa succede alla xsona (vedi sotto brain split e teletrasporto) quindi... Conclusione: la soluzione più semplice consiste nel pensare all esistenza di un anima sganciabile dal corpo. se l anima è concepibile senza corpo allora l immortalità dell anima nn è un assurdo e se l ipotesi di dio è sensata anche l immortalità dell anima è la via più sensata Identità: brain split e chirurgo pazzo. Tutte le teorie falliscono nel rendicontare i trasferimenti di identità => l' anima è decisiva. Quel che succede al corpo non ci dice tutto quel che succede ala xsona , quindi... 8@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ è facile concepire una mente anima senza corpo: immaginati in una stanza buia... è così difficile? altre prova: teletrasporto con distruttore: teletrasporta una scrivania e teletrasporta una xsona, magari un uxoricida. Come spieghi il diverso trattamento delle identità? Solo il dualismo sostanziale può farlo. l anima si stacca dal corpo distrutto x unirsi a quello in formazione... evidentemente può farlo xchè esiste in sè Edit

This second part of the book is a defence of substance dualism.Read more at location 1946

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The crucial point that Descartes' and others were presumably trying to make is not that (in the case of men) the living body is not part of the person, but that it is not essentially, only contingently, part of the person. The body is separable from the person and the person can continue even if the body is destroyed. Just as I continue to exist wholly and completely if you cut off my hair, so, the dualist holds, it is possible that I continue to exist if you destroy my body. The soul, by contrast, is the necessary core which must continue if I am to continue;Read more at location 1963

Note: DUALISMO SOSTANZIALE: LEGAME CONTINGENTE TRA ANIMA E CORPO. L ANIMA PUÒ CONTINUARE AD ESISTERE ANCHE SENZA CORPO Edit

it is the part of the person which is necessary for his continuing existence. The person is the soul together with whatever, if any, body is linked temporarily to it. By saying that the person `can' continue if the body is destroyed I mean only that this is logically possible, that there is no contradiction in supposing the soul to continue to exist without its present body or indeed any body at all (although such a soul would not then, on the understanding which I have given to `man'-sec pp. 4 f.-he a man or part of a man, although it would have been part of a man). Whether this normally happens, is another question;Read more at location 1967

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My initial argumentRead more at location 1973

Note: PRIMO ARGOMENTO Edit

knowledge of what happens to bodiesRead more at location 1973

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will not suffice to give you knowledge of what happens to those personsRead more at location 1974

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Talk about persons is not analysable in terms of talk about bodiesRead more at location 1974

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Secondly, I argue that the most natural way of making sense of this fact is talking of persons as consisting of two parts, body and soul-the soul being the essential part, whose continuing alone makes for the continuing of the person. Read more at location 1975

Note: L IPOTESI ANIMA COME IPOTESI SEMPLICE Edit

I go where my brain goes.Read more at location 1982

Note: PREMESSA Edit

But what if only some of my brain is removed'? Do I survive or not? Read more at location 1985

Note: TRAPIANTI Edit

It might be possible one day to remove a whole hemisphere, without killing the person, and to transplant it into the skull of a living body from which the brain has just been removed, so that the transplant takes. There would then appear to be two separate living persons. Since both are controlled by hemispheres originating from the original person p, and since apparent memory and character and their manifestation in behaviour are dependent on factors present in both hemispheres, we would expect each publicly to affirm such apparent memories and to behave as if he had p's character.Read more at location 1991

Note: ESPERIMENTO Edit

two persons, both with p's apparent memories and character. But they cannot both be p.Read more at location 1996

Note: DILEMMA Edit

person-we may have our views about which (if either) resultant person p is, but we could be wrong. And that is my basic point-howeverRead more at location 1997

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I can bring the uncertainty out strongly by adapting Bernard Williams's famous mad surgeon story.3Read more at location 1999

Note: INCERTEZZA CRESCENTE Edit

He is going to torture one of the resulting persons and free the other with a gift of a million pounds. You can choose which person is to be tortured and which to be rewarded,Read more at location 2001

Note: LA TORTURA Edit

Whichever way you choose, the choice would, in Williams's telling word about his similar story, be a `risk'-which shows that there is something other to the continuity of the person, than any continuity of parts of brain or body. Read more at location 2004

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My argument has been that knowledge of what has happened to a person's body and its parts will not necessarily give you knowledge of what has happened to the person, and so, that persons are not the same as their bodies.Read more at location 2025

Note: ANCORA L ARGOMENTO PRINCIPALE Edit

My arguments so far, however, show only that some brain continuity (or other bodily continuity) is not sufficient for personal identity; which is something over and above that. They do not rule out the possibility that some bodily matter needs to continue as well, if personal identity is to continue.Read more at location 2030

Note: LA CONTUINITÀ DEL CERVELLO NN GARANTISCE LA PRESENZA DELL ANIMA Edit

Thought-experiments of more extravagant kinds rule out this latter possibility.Read more at location 2031

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life after death. It seems self-consistent to affirm with respect to any person who is the subject of mental properties that he continue to have them, while his body is annihilated.Read more at location 2034

Note: L ANIMA PUÒ ESISTERE DA SOLA? Edit

Suppose that one morning a man wakes up to find himself unable to control the right side of his body, including his right arm and leg. When he tries to move the right-side parts of his body, he finds that the corresponding left-side parts of his body move; and when he tries to move the left-side parts, the corresponding parts of his wife's body move.Read more at location 2037

Note: SVEGLIARSI IN UN ALTRO CORPO Edit

One may suppose the process completed as the man's control is shifted to the wife's body,Read more at location 2041

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suppose that a person who has been a man now finds himself no longer able to operate on the world, nor to acquire true beliefs about it; yet still to have a full mental life, some of it subject to his voluntary control. He would be disembodied.Read more at location 2044

Note: SVEGLIARSI SENZA CORPO Edit

The supposition that a person who is currently a man might become disembodied in one or other of these ways seems coherent. Not merely is it not logically necessary that a person have a body or brain made of certain matter, if he is to be the person which he is; it is not even necessitated by laws of nature.`'Read more at location 2050

Note: COERENZA Edit

My point now is that what natural laws still in no way determine is which animate body is yours and which is mine.Read more at location 2055

Note: DI CHI È QS CORPO? Edit

My conclusion-that truths about persons are other than truths about their bodies and parts thereof-is, I suggest, forced upon anyone who reflects seriously on the fact of the unity of consciousness over time and at a time.Read more at location 2160

Note: UNITÀ DI COSCIENZA Edit

A framework of thought which makes sense of this fact is provided if we think of a person as body plus soul, such that the continuing of the soul alone guarantees the continuing of the person. i i Read more at location 2161

Note: IL MODELLO PIÙ COERENTE

INTRODUCTION - The Evolution of the Soul by Richard Swinburne

 INTRODUCTION - The Evolution of the Soul by Richard Swinburne - credulitàtestimonianzacarità sostanzialismoeproprietarismo

1@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Glossario Mind/Body problem: 3 posizioni (monismo, prop., sost.) Principi guida dell' inferenza: Principio di conservazione + principio di testimonianza + principio di semplicità + principio di carità Edit

Part I will analyse the different facets of the mental life, enjoyed by animals as well as men-sensations, thoughts, purposes, desires, and beliefs.Read more at location 127

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Part iI will argue that we can only make sense of the continuity of this conscious life by supposing that there are two parts to a man (and to many another animal)-a body and a soul (or mind).Read more at location 129

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Part III will go on to consider the differences between the mental life of men and that of other animals.Read more at location 134

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`person'.Read more at location 161

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'substance'Read more at location 170

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'Taller than' is a relation which relates two substances; 'lying between' is a relation which relates three substances.Read more at location 172

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All material objects are substances, but a crucial issue is whether there are substances other than material objects, things which interact with material objects, but which are not themselves material objects and perhaps do not even have spatial position. Read more at location 186

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Three Views on the Mind/Body Problem Read more at location 204

Note: TRE VISIONI Edit

The first position, which I shall call hard materialism, claims that the only substances are material objects, and personsRead more at location 207

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The second position on these issues I shall call soft materialism. (It is sometimes called attribute or property dualism.) Soft materialism agrees with hard materialism that the only substances are material objects, but it claims that some of these have mental properties which are distinct from physical properties.Read more at location 223

Note: DUALISMO DELLE PROPRIETÀ. NO VITA AUTONOMA DI CIÒ CHE EMERGE Edit

Soft materialism says that you have told the whole story of the world when you have said which material objects exist and which properties (mental and physical) they have. However, full information of this kind would still leave you ignorant of whether some person continued to live a conscious life or not. Knowledge of what happens to bodies and their parts will not show you for certain what happens to persons. I shall illustrate this in Chapter 8 with the example of brain transplants.Read more at location 232

Note: INSUFFICIENZA DEL PROPRIETARISMO Edit

The point, which I shall be developing at length, is that mere knowledge of what happens to bodies does not tell you what happens to persons. Hence there must be more to persons than bodies.Read more at location 243

Note: IL NOCCIOLO. LA VITA AUTONOMA DELL ANIMA DIMOSTRATA Edit

Mental events which happen to the human being do so in virtue of happening to his soul; bodily events which happen to the human being do so in virtue of happening to his body. This is dualism, the position which I shall defend. Read more at location 247

Note: SOSTANZIALISMO Edit

there can be no justified general account of the nature of the soul; all we can say is that under normal mundane conditions the functioning of the soul requires the functioning of the body. My form of dualism might be called `soft dualism'. Read more at location 250

Note: SOFT DUALISM Edit

The first and most general principle of inductive inference is the Principle of Credulity: that in the absence of counter-evidence probably things are as they seem to he,Read more at location 255

Note: PRINCIPIO DI CREDULITÁ Edit

Without this principle, there can be no knowledge at all.Read more at location 269

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The principle of credulity that an individual ought to believe that things are as they seem to him is backed up by the Principle of Testimony: that individuals ought to believe the reports of others about how things seemed to them, and so (given the principle of credulity) that things were as they report-in the absence of counter-evidence.Read more at location 281

Note: PRINCIPIO DI TESTIMONIANZA Edit

Principle of Simplicity. Among such theories we take the simplest one as that most likely to be true-or, more precisely, in a given field, we take as most likely to be true the simplest theory which fits best with other theories of neighbouring fields to produce the simplest set of theories of the world. The simplest theory is that which postulates few substances, few kinds of substances, mathematically simple properties of substances determining their mode of interaction with other substancesRead more at location 291

Note: PRINCIPIO DI SEMPLICITÀ Edit

Principle of Charity. Other things being equal, we suppose that other men are like ourselves-inRead more at location 314

Note: PRINCIPIO DI CARITÀ Edit

The above principles of inductive inference will be used from time to time in subsequent argument. They are, I suggest, the basic principles used by science.