As the market efficiency ideas took shape, itdawned on me that the reason the trading rules I’ddeveloped earlier didn’t work out of sample wasbecause price changes were random, which at thatpoint was what people thought an efficient marketmeant. We know now it doesn’t. Market efficiencymeans that deviations from equilibrium expectedreturns are unpredictable based on currently available information. But equilibrium expected returnscan vary through time in a predictable way, whichmeans price changes need not be entirely random...
: I think the global crisis was first a problem of political pressure to encourage the financing of subprime mortgages... . I don’t think the crisis was a problem with markets.
The worst thing to come out of thatexperience, in my view, is the concept of “too bigto fail.” Basically, the institutions that are considered to be too big to fail have their debt pricedas if it’s riskless, which gives them a low cost ofcapital and makes it very easy for them to expandand become an even bigger problem. Plus, everybody now accepts the assertion that they are toobig to fail, which creates a terrible moral hazardfor the management of these financial institutions.
The simplest solution would be to raise the capitalrequirements of banks. A nice place to start wouldbe a 25% equity capital ratio, and if that doesn’twork, raise it more. The equity capital ratio needsto be high enough that a too-big-to-fail financialinstitution’s debt is riskless,
is ex post storytelling and doesn’tgenerate new testable hypotheses It’s not ascience. In Daniel Kahneman’s book Thinking, Fastand Slow, he states that our brains have two sides:One is rational, and one is impulsive and irrational.What behavior can’t be explained by that model?
Simple. Balance the budget. I heard avery prominent person say in private that we couldbalance the budget by going back to the level ofgovernment expenditures in 2007. The economyis currently about the size it was then. If you justrolled expenditures back to that point, I think itwould come close to balancing the budget.
here is something I never would have expected. The failure of LTCM, a firm founded and run on the premise that the EMH was wrong, actually shows that . . . the EMH is wrong!
Eppure:
The efficient market hypothesis implies that it should be very difficult to beat the markets, as asset prices should already reflect all publicly available information. Many people found this hard to accept; surely really smart people are better investors than the average schmuck! Not surprisingly, the very smartest people of all, including not one but two Nobel Prize-winning finance professors, gave in to temptation and joined a hedge fund that was set up to find market anomalies and to make investments that took advantage of the market’s inefficiencies. That hedge fund was called “Long Term Capital Management.” Of course anyone who has read ancient Greek tragedies knows what happened next...
E qui ci sta a fagiolo l' aneddoto con Fama:
You have to be impressed by the resourcefulness of the anti-EMH, crowd. If LTCM and its merry band of Nobel-Prize winning economists had actually beat the market, if they had used market anomalies to get rich, well then it would have been the death knell of the EMH. Every time Fama said “if you’re so smart how come you’re not rich,” people would have responded that Scholes and Merton did get rich by spotting market inefficiencies. Instead they failed miserably, and this shows . . . it show that markets are inefficient because the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.
La cosa non vi ricorda qualcosa?
It reminds me of people who see monopoly everywhere. High prices? Clearly monopolistic exploitation. Low prices? Ah, that’s predatory pricing. The same price as your competitor? Obviously price fixing.http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=4121