Was Jesus God?
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Last annotated on September 2, 2016
INTRODUCTIONRead more at location 64
Note: Il mondo è fatto in modo tale da rendere probabile l' esistenza di Dio. Ma x' proprio quella del Dio cristiano? Edit
I have argued elsewhere, and especially in my book Is There a God?, that the general character of the natural world (and in particular the fact that it is governed by laws of nature which lead to the evolution of human beings) makes it probable that there is a God. But why should we suppose that God (if there is a God) is the Christian God?Read more at location 65
1 GODRead more at location 74
Note: Programma: Parte I la dottrina cristiana è vera x ragioni a priori (inerenti alla natura del dio che prob. esiste); Parte II: evidenza storica e ragioni a posteriori. Definizione di Dio Ragioni x credere all' esistenza di dio: esperienza xsonale e testimonianza. Esperienza e testimonianza vanno bene finché si vive in un contesto senza obiezioni, in caso contrario il tutto va rafforzato con delle ragioni. Il teismo è una teoria del tutto che ha come punto di forza la sua semplicità. Rapina prob. a priori dell' ipotesi: prob. indipendenti dalle possibili conseguenze dell' ipotesi: es. precedenti del colpevole ipotizzato. Rapina prob. a posteriori: prob. dell' ipotesi che dipendono dalle conseguenze dell' ipotesi. Es.: impronte digitali del presunto colpevole. I fatti (impronte digitali) aumentano la prob. dell' ipotesi quanto + l' ip. è semplice. Semplicità: poche sostanze e facile descrizione delle proprietà Dio ha una sostanza sua propria? Agostino dice di no, dice che la sua sostanza consiste nelle sue proprietà (vedi cap. sulla definizione di dio) E il rasoio di Occam? Mettiamo tra parentesi questa questione, qui potremmo anche vedere dio come persona naturale. In altra sede, discutendo il dualismo, potremmo anche sostenere l' evidenza della mente umana e quindi la necessità di postulare forme di dualismo. A quel punto la trascendenza divina n sarà + un problema L' ipotesi teista è talmente vasta da non avere ipotesi a priori: tutto è conseguenza del dio onnipotente. L' evidenza a posteriori usata x dimostrare l' ip. teista è evidenza a priori x dimostrare lip. cristiana Teodicea 1@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ RAZIONALITÀ BAYESIANA O DELL INVESTGATORE. PROB. A PRIORI E A POSTERIORI. DATI Edit
I assume in this book that, on the basis of evidence such as the general character of the natural world or a person’s own religious experience, there is a moderate probability that there is a God of the kind worshipped by Christians, Jews, and Muslims.Read more at location 75
in the remaining chapters of Part I, I shall set out the central theological doctrines of Christianity (that is, doctrines about the nature and actions of God), and give a priori reasons for believing them to be true. By ‘a priori reasons’ I mean reasons arising from the very nature of GodRead more at location 78
Then, in Part II, I shall argue that, given the moderate probability on other evidence that there is a God and given these a priori reasons, the historical evidence about the life and Resurrection of Jesus and the subsequent teaching of the Church makes it very probable that these doctrines are true. This historical evidence provides what I shall call ‘a posteriori’ reasons.Read more at location 81
Note: TESI II. LE EVIDENZE STORICHE AUMENTANO NOTEVOLMENTE LE PROB A POSTERIORI DELLA DOTTR CRISTIANA Edit
What I mean by my claim that there is a God is that there is (at least) one divine person, who is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly free, and eternal.Read more at location 85
A person is a being who has (or, when fully developed, will have) powers (to perform intentional actions, that is, actions which he or she means to do), beliefs, and free willRead more at location 91
God is supposed to be unlimited in his power; that is, God is omnipotent, he can do any action. He can make a physical universe exist, or move the stars, or sustain or abolish the physical causesRead more at location 97
He cannot do a logically impossible action, that is, an action which cannot be described without contradiction;Read more at location 99
God is supposed to be unlimited in his beliefs; that is, God is omniscient; he has all true beliefs about everythingRead more at location 102
God is supposed to be a perfectly free person in the sense of one whose choices are in no way limited by, that is, influenced by, irrational forces. He only desires to do an action in so far as he sees a reason for doing it, that is, in so far as he believes that it is a good action to do.Read more at location 111
The best action is that which there is most reason to do. Although we humans are not in general perfectly free, we are sometimes in this situation where we are not influenced by irrational forces.Read more at location 115
Sometimes, however, a perfectly free being will have a choice between two or more possible actions, only one of which he can do, when he believes that none of these actions are better than the other actions. There is, he believes, no best action but there are two or more equal best actions.Read more at location 119
In so far as someone believes that an action is good, they will have a desire to do it. Such desires are rational desires;Read more at location 128
But humans are sometimes subject to irrational desires, that is, desires to do bad actions, or desires to do actions less good than a best action, which are stronger than the desire to do the best action.Read more at location 129
Suppose that I have a choice between mowing the lawn and watching the television; I believe that it would be the best action to mow the lawn but I am subject to a stronger irrational desire to watch the television. What I will do depends on my free choice at that time. If you believe beforehand that I will watch the television, I have it in my power (by mowing the lawn) to bring it about that your belief proved false. Certainly if you know that my desire to watch the television is a strong one, you may rightly think it probable that I will watch the television, but you cannot be certain. It seems to follow that not even God can have an infallible true belief and so infallible knowledge about whether I will watch the television or mow the lawn. Generally it looks as if it is not logically possible for God to know infallibly beforehand what a free agent will do in such circumstances. But since God is omnipotent, it is only because he permits this that we have free will and are sometimes situated in circumstances where we are subject to irrational desires or have a choice between what we believe to be equal best actions.Read more at location 143
So although not influenced by irrational forces, God cannot always do the best action. He cannot do this when two or more possible actions are equal best; or where—as in the example just given—there is no best or equal best possible action; and he has then to exercise his choice between the actions in an arbitrary way.Read more at location 166
Good actions can be divided into those that are obligatory (or duties), and those that go beyond obligation and which we call supererogatory. I am obliged (it is my duty) to pay my debts, but not to give my life to save that of a comrade—supremely, ‘supererogatorily’ good though it is that I should do so. To fail to fulfil an obligation is to do something wrong. A person is in some way at fault for doing what is wrong, and if he believes that he is doing wrong, he is blameworthy for doing it;Read more at location 178
since it is always a best action to fulfil an obligation when one has no conflicting obligations, God will fulfil all his obligations.Read more at location 192
It follows from the argument of the last few pages that we must understand God being perfectly goodRead more at location 194
God is also a source of moral obligation in that his command to us to do some action makes it obligatory for us to do that action when it would not otherwise be obligatory.Read more at location 196
God is eternal. But this has been understood in two different senses: either as the claim that God is timeless (he does not exist in time, or at any rate in our time) or as the claim that God is everlasting (he existed at every moment of past time, exists now, and will exist at every moment of future time). In my opinion the timeless view is incompatible with everything else that religious believers have wanted to say about God. For example, it does seem strongly that God being omniscient entails that he hears the prayers of humans at the same time as they utter them; yet on the timeless view God does not exist at the same time as (simultaneously with) any moment on our timescale. For this and other reasons I shall in future understand God being eternal as God being everlasting; though it might be possible to re-express much of the rest of what I have to say on the assumption that God is timeless rather than everlasting. Being everlasting, God is unlimited in the time during which he exists.Read more at location 207
God is creator and sustainer of the universe and of all that it contains.Read more at location 217
But God has other properties which are non-essential (accidental or contingent); he has these accidental properties because he chooses to have them. Among these properties is being creator and sustainer of the universe:Read more at location 231
Philosophers sometimes express this point by saying that each human being has (as well as some properties essential for all humans) a thisness, which is not a property or combination of properties but something underlying those properties which makes him or her the particular human they are.Read more at location 242
properties which makes him or her the particular human they are.Read more at location 244
Does God have thisness? Fairly few philosophers and theologians have faced this question, but those who have claim in effect that God does not have thisness. For example, Augustine (the great theologian who was a bishop in North Africa in the fourth century AD) denied that God is properly called a ‘substance’ that ‘has’ properties. God, Augustine claimed, is more properly called an ‘essence’ because he ‘is’ his properties.Read more at location 248
For reasons of a kind which I shall give later in this chapter, I think that Augustine’s view is correct: if there is a God, God does not have thisness.Read more at location 254
But all theists wish to maintain that God is an ontologically necessary being in that his existence is not contingent on anything else: no other individual or physical or metaphysical principle causes (or has any share in causing) the existence of God.Read more at location 260
Some people have deep private ‘religious’ experiences, as it seems to them, of the presence of God. Others believe that there is a God on the basis of testimony; that is, because their parents or teachers or priest tell them that there is a God, and they think their parents or whoever are knowledgeable and trustworthy. It seems to me that religious experience provides a good reason for believing—so long as that experience is overwhelming, and you don’t know of any strong objections to the existence of God.Read more at location 265
And the testimony of others that there is a God also provides a good reason for believing—Read more at location 271
But I think that very few people have overwhelming religious experiences, and in the modern world most people come into contact not merely with those who tell them that there is a God but also with those who tell them that there is no God, and most people are aware of strong objections to the existence of God.Read more at location 273
So I think that most people in the modern world need to have their experiences or the testimony of others reinforced by reasons to suppose that the objections to the existence of God do not work. But instead or as well as such reasons, they also need a positive argument for the existence of God which starts from very obvious observable dataRead more at location 276
Theism, the claim that there is a God, is an explanatory hypothesis,Read more at location 282
Such a hypothesis is probably true in so far as it is a simple hypothesis which leads us to expect the data which are otherwise unexpected (that is, make it probable that those data would occur, when otherwise it is not probable that they would occur), and fits in with ‘background evidence’ or ‘prior evidence’.Read more at location 285
Suppose that there has been a burglary: money has been stolen from a safe. The detective puts forward the hypothesis, to explain the money having been stolen, that John robbed the safe. If John did rob the safe, it would be quite probable that his fingerprints would be on the safe, that someone might report having seen him near the scene of the crime at the time it was committed, and that money of the amount stolen might be found in his house. These are data to be expected with some modest degree of probability if John robbed the safe, and much less to be expected if he did not rob the safe; they therefore constitute positive evidence, evidence favouring the hypothesis. On the other hand, if John robbed the safe, it would be most unexpected (it would be most improbable) that many people would report seeing him in a foreign country at the time of the burglary. Such reports would constitute negative evidence, evidence counting strongly against the hypothesis. I shall call evidence of either kind posterior evidence, the consequences to be expected or not to be expected if the hypothesis were true. In so far as a hypothesis makes it probable that we would find all the data we find, and in so far as it would be improbable that we would find these data if the hypothesis were false, that increases the probability of the hypothesis.Read more at location 287
But a hypothesis is only rendered probable by data in so far as it is simple.Read more at location 298
A hypothesis is simple in so far as it postulates few substances and simply describable properties,Read more at location 304
The detective’s original hypothesis postulates only one substance (John) doing one thing (robbing the safe) which leads us to expect the data;Read more at location 305
But as well as the posterior evidence of the kind which I illustrated, there may be background evidence, or prior evidence: evidence which is not a (probable) consequence of the truth or falsity of the hypothesis in question, but comes from an area outside the scope of that hypothesis. We may have evidence about what John has done on other occasions, for example, that he has often robbed safes in the past.Read more at location 307
prior evidence: evidence which is not a (probable) consequence of the truth or falsity of the hypothesis in question, but comes from an area outside the scope of that hypothesis.Read more at location 308
We may have evidence about what John has done on otherRead more at location 310
The criteria for assessing the detective’s hypothesis apply generally to assessing hypotheses proposed by scientists or historians.Read more at location 314
The data (the posterior evidence for theism) to which arguments of natural theology typically appeal include the most general features of the universe: that every particle of matter behaves in exactly the same lawlike way as every other particle (obeys the same ‘laws of nature’, for example, Newton’s law of gravity); that the initial state of the universe (the Big Bang) and the laws of nature are such as to bring about the eventual existence (some 13 billion years later) of human beings; and that these humans are conscious beings (have a mental life of thought, feeling, and choice).Read more at location 323
conscious beings (have a mental life of thought, feeling, and choice).Read more at location 327
it is quite probable that these data would occur if there were a God (because he would bring them about); and very improbable that they would occur if there were no God.Read more at location 328
theism is a very simple hypothesis. It postulates the existence of one entity (one god, not many gods), with very few very simply describable properties. A person with no limits to his power, knowledge, freedom, and life is the simplest kind of person there could be.Read more at location 330
theism is a very simple hypothesis. It postulates the existence of one entity (one god, not many gods), with very few very simply describable properties.Read more at location 330
Infinite power is power with zero limits. Infinite knowledge is knowledge with zero limits because it involves no limit (except one imposed by logic) to the number of well-justified true beliefs. Perfect freedom means that the person’s choices are unlimited by irrational desires. Eternity means no temporal limit to life. And God being ontologically necessary, meaning that there are no others on whom he depends, obviously fits well with his other properties. It is also simpler to suppose that God has these properties essentially, for that makes God a more unified being;Read more at location 332
it is simpler to suppose that God is what he is solely in virtue of his essential properties; that is, he has no underlying ‘thisness’—for that is a more economical supposition.Read more at location 337
If God does not have thisness, any God in charge of the universe would be the same God as any God in charge of the universe.Read more at location 339
Theism is such a wide-ranging hypothesis (it purports to explain all the most general features of the universe) that there is no prior evidence; all the evidence (whether positive or negative) is within its scope—posterior evidence.Read more at location 341
arguments against the existence of God from the fact that there is much pain and other suffering in the world do not work.Read more at location 349
God wants to give us deep responsibility for ourselves and each other. And he wants us to choose to exercise our responsibility in the right way. So he takes a big risk with us.Read more at location 355
So gradually over time we change the desires which influence us, and we may eventually form either a very good character or a very bad character.Read more at location 364
Humans need the pain and disability caused by disease and old age if we are to have the opportunity to choose freely whether to be patient and cheerful, or to be gloomy and resentful, in the face of our own suffering; and the opportunity to choose freely to show or not to show compassion to others who suffer, and to give or not to give our time and money to helping them.Read more at location 367
God has the right to impose on some of us bad things—Read more at location 376
Parents have a very limited right to allow their children to suffer for the sake of some good to others. They have the right to send a daughter to a neighbourhood school which she will not enjoy very much, in order to cement community relations.Read more at location 377
It is nevertheless a great privilege to be of use to someone else, not just by what you choose to do but by what you are allowed to suffer.Read more at location 381
But if there are any humans in whose lives (not as a consequence of their own choices) the bad exceeds the good, God has an obligation to give to those humans at least a limited life after death in which the good exceeds the bad; and in his omnipotence he can and must do this.Read more at location 388
Christianity makes certain further claims about God, what he is like and what he has done and will do, beyond those described in the opening section of this chapter. The purpose of this book is to discuss these further claims, the doctrines which distinguish Christianity from other religions.Read more at location 393
Most of these doctrines concern Jesus, a Jew who was born around the first year of the Christian era (AD 1), lived and taught in what is now IsraelRead more at location 395
Other doctrines are sophisticated metaphysical doctrines: for example, the doctrine of the Trinity,Read more at location 399
And Christian doctrines also include certain moral doctrines,Read more at location 402
The earlier evidence which formed the posterior evidence for bare theism forms the prior evidence for Christian theism.Read more at location 413
I contrast this prior evidence with the posterior evidence for Christian theism, which is the historical evidence about Jesus and the subsequent Christian Church. (This provides a posteriori reasons for believing Christian theism to be true.)Read more at location 420
In so far as the historical evidence is to be expected if Christian theism is true and not otherwise (that is, in so far as Christian theism makes it probable that this historical evidence will occur, when it would not be probable otherwise), that will raise the probability of Christian theism well above its prior probability, and give it what is called its posterior probability, its probability on the total available evidence.Read more at location 421
In the case of divine action, the posterior evidence is historical evidenceRead more at location 447
I shall be concerned only with the central doctrines of Christianity, common to virtually all Christians from very early in the Christian era.Read more at location 460
