martedì 13 gennaio 2015

L' unicità dell' uomo

Cosa differenzia l' uomo dall' animale?


  1. Autonomia. Se gli animali fossero autonomi il barboncino di casa sarebbe uno schiavo e il cane che morde un violentatore da denunciare. Poiché nessuno li sente come tali cio' indica che non li reputiamo esseri dotati di personalità, ovvero si autonomia.
  2. Giudizi morali complessi. Sono preclusi all' animale. Vedi trolley problem o aborto. Solo l' uomo "calcola" il comportamento etico più corretto.
  3. Principi astratti. Anche se un certo comportamento etico (pro-sociale) si osserva pure negli animali non è mai riferibile a principi astratti ma sempre  all' utilità del gruppo specifico di appartenenza.
  4. Linguaggio generativo. Lo possiede solo l' uomo e con esso elabora in modo ricorsivo i concetti che ottiene ottenendone un assortimento potenzialmente infinito. L' animale si limita a poche e limitate elaborazioni.
  5. Astrazioni. Le scimmie più simili all' uomo possono programmare giusto per 20 minuti: il tempo che ci mette il maschio alfa a sfamarsi. L' uomo, al contrario, sa che se mangia una fetta di torta non ingrassa tuttavia non la mangia ugualmente perché sa generalizzare e vede gli effetti nocivi a lungo termine, questa è una caratteristica sua propria e spiega come self control e coscienza siano connessi.
  6. Coordinamento. Una distinzione qualitativa si rende necessaria per coordinare epistemologia e filosofia politica in tutto armonico: non posso dire "gli uomini sono eguali tra loro" senza avere una chiaro e distinto concetto di Uomo.
  7. Differenze qualitative. Confrontate l' elaborato di uno scimpanzé che scrive a macchina e la Divina Commedia. Esistono differenze qualitative? Forse no, ma...
  8. Cultura e simboli. L'animale cucciolo reimpara cio' che in precedenza ha imparato suo padre, in questo senso non progredisce. L'uomo, attraverso i simboli, trasmette in breve tempo il sapere accumulato alle nuove generazioni, anche per questo il progresso è possibile.
  9. Solo l'uomo ha il desiderio di giustificare cio' che fa. Fornire ragioni che vincolino anche i comportamenti futuri.
  10. Some we love di Hal Herzog
  • Oggetto: l interazione uomo animale.
  • Pensare agli animali è una sfida logica continua. Le contraddizioni sono la norma. Ottima occasione x vedere quanto conti la pancia.
  • La grande e confusa morale di mezzo.
  • Gli ex vegetariani sono più numerosi dei vegetariani
  • Che bello rilasciare uccelli che moriranno certamente.
  • Per il cane nn si va in vacanza.
  • Nutrire il boa con i gattini. Ci si lamenta ma i gatti sono killer spietati. Il boa mangia molta meno carne. Milioni di gatti sono soppressi
  • Gente che dopo l incidente cambia il suo rapporto con gli animali
  • Gente che ha due tipi di cane caccia e compagnia e li tratta molto diversamente
  • Il cane: prima ragione di conflitto tra o vicini. Dopo i rumori.
  • Corea: il cane cucciolo di casa x anni viene poi mangiato.
  • Cap 1
  • Abbiamo il diritto di usare animali intelligenti x curare un autistico?
  • Il tuo cane ti somiglia? Sì.
  • Chi a i cani è più: empatico estroverso scrupoloso. Il gattaro è più emotivo e curioso.
  • I ragazzi che torturano animali sono violenti? No solo curiosi.
  • Cap 2 l importanza di essere carini.
  • L amore x i gattini è istintivo. L odio x i serpenti è un misto natura cultura. È molto più prob morire x un cane.
  • Il linguaggio che utilizziamo guida la ns relazione con a: l esempio della cucina. Attivisti: prigione d acqua x acquario.
  • la cultura conta. gli insetti: in usa sono odiati in giap amati e considerati carini
  • l'esecuzione di un cane pericoloso: assurda per la ragione, soddisfacente per la pancia.
  • haidt: nelle decisioni etiche il cuore prevale. pulire il cesso con la bandiera americana. l'incesto protetto: comportamenti offensivi senza danno per nessuno. disgusto: condanniamo senza saper dire perché.
  • trolley problem: 1) uomini > animale 2) con solo animali coinvolti l'utilitarismo è molto più spinto
  • altra stranezza: più lontani siamo dagli animali più ne abbiamo considerazione 8oggi viviamo tutti in città).
  • l animalismo avanzato dei nazi
  • antropomorfizzazione (proiezione della ns mente sugli animali. spesso errata: il sorriso del delfino, lo sbadiglio del babbuino, lo strofinio del gatto, il pentimento del cane che l ha fatta sul tappeto. d altronde l'antropomorfismo è tutto cio' che abbiamo. per un antropomorfismo critico.
  • a che ci serve il nostro cervello? a metterci nei panni degli altri. forse qs funzione ci è servita per predare
  • cap. II perché solo gli uomini amano i cuccioli?
  • l effetto cuccioli come lubrificante sociale
  • regalare un cucciolo. due storie opposte: una tragedia e una favola.
  • una teoria: amiamo i cuccioli perchè ci fanno sentire necessari.
  • altra teoria: soddisfa il ns istinto materno/paterno
  • cap. 8 l uso degli animali nella scienza
  • esperimento di milgram: la violenza di routine passa inosservata. con gli animali da laboratorio puo' essere così.
  • per cartesio l animale è un robot non puo' soffrire
  • sondaggio tra scienziati: sì gli animali soffrono
  • esperimenti: il gatto è empatico: soffre nel vedere un suo compagno soffrire (ma solo se è stretto parente)
  • lo status morale degli alieni e dei bambini handicappati
  • lo sguardo il cervello di et e la coscienza di et
  • teoria 1: gli animali con cervello più grosso possono sottomettere quelli con cervello più piccolo
  • teoria 2: gli animali dotati di certe abilità linguistiche possono sottomettere gli altri
  • inconveniente teoria 2: i down?
  • difficile trovare una asticella abbastanza alta da escludere i non umani e abbastanza bassa da includere gli umani difettosi.
  • eppure la pancia ci dice che sarebbe crudele sperimentare sui bimbi senza cervello. dobbiamo considerarla un'eccezione. eppure la pancia di altri parla loro altrimenti: meglio un anacefalico che un gattino.
  • la ricerca è utile? chi nega l' utilità sui topi chiede scimmie.
  • per gli animali l etichetta conta anche di più: per noi c è un abisso tra il randagio e il cucciolo di casa. molto più che tra il familiare e lo sconosciuto.
  • sono i gattini animali? per alcuni psicologi sono solo costruzioni sociali.
  • l animalista che fomenta il risentimento verso gli animali.
  • cap 10 come convivere conl'incoerenza
  • complessità morale implica paralisi morale?
  • le intuizioni morali variano da soggetto a soggetto
  • una buona filosofia: tutto è più complicato di quel che si pensa
  • imho: una soluzione: kantismo per gli uomini utilitarismo per gli animali. tutti gli altri soggetti sono cose. considerato che la sensibilità tra i soggetti varia molto l'utilitarismo è piuttosto spinto a favore dell'uomo.
continua
  1. Il giudice Posner sui diritti degli animali (dibattito con Singer):


    1. Gli animali sono diversi dagli uomini, chiunque lo riconosce. Il fatto poi che la loro diversità si concentri nelle facoltà cognitive li rende "radicalmente diversi";
    2. Concedere diritti agli animali non sembra beneficiare in alcun modo la comunità umana.
    continua 
  2. il biologo evoluzionista Marc Hauser, docente presso l’Harvard University e uno dei maggiori esperti nel campo della cognizione animale e umana, ha proposto che sia più interessante studiare le differenze tra animali e uomo piuttosto che rimarcare le analogie, tanto da coniare il termine, “humaniqueness”, per sottolineare il divario insormontabile tra uomini e animali. «Non siamo animali», ha scritto nel 2008 il celebre evoluzionista americano. «Dimenticate tutte le notizie sul nostro patrimonio genetico comune con gli scimpanzé. Questi dati sul patrimonio genetico comune non ci danno alcuna informazione sul problema della nostra unicità, la nostra humaniqueness
  3. GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY Christian Foundations of 'John Locke's Political Thought di  JEREMY WALDRON -     prima parte cap- 3 Species and the Shape of Equality
    • xchè nn possiamo omettere la dimensione religiosa in locke?
    • rawls ha bisogno di premettere il valore dell uguaglianza ma nn vuole compromissioni religiose
    • relazione comando/comandante
    • es. nn uccidere l altro... xchè anch esso è a immagine di dio... che relazione c è tra la prima e la seconda parte (quella religiosa)
    • le ragioni di un comando ci consentono di capirlo meglio? sì quando il predicato è astratto e indeterminato
    • nel precetto dell eguaglianza tra uomini il termine umano riceve il suo contenuto dall affermazione religiosa
    • contenuto del comando e ragioni del comando nn sono sempre separabili ma interagiscono specie nei comandi astratti: siate onesti. questo fatto mette in crisi i nn cognitivisti
    • "gli uomini sono uguali"... il concetto di uomo è in parte determinato dal comando e nn solo viceversa
    • la necessità di definire l umano spiazza rawls e i laici
    • @@@
    • il principio di eguaglianza fa della specie umana qualcosa di speciale
    • una filosofia che nn distingue tra specie crea grave danno alla filosofia ma x distinguere occorre introdurre l elemento religioso
    • il dominio dell uomo sul creato
    • .....
    • Macintyre's observation:... arguments of John Locke concerning basic equality and individual rights were so imbued with religious content that they were not fit, constitutionally, stitutionally, to be taught in the public schools
    • Why are we not able to bracket off the theological dimension of Locke's commitment to equality?
    • Why can't we put the religious premises in parentheses?...this hope is crucial for modern secular liberalism.... Rawls's system definitely requires a premise of equality... but I am doubtful that this Rawlsian strategy will work.
    • Rawlsian strategy... religious content has a purely external relation to the equality principle. By an external relation, I mean a relation that does not go to the meaning
    • Consider, for example, the relation of some proposition about a commander to the content of his command.
    • For example, the Sixth Commandment has a content "Thou shalt not kill" which seems logically quite independent of any proposition about... what one might call the preface to the Decalogue "I am the Lord thy God,
    • The commandment to Noah prohibiting murder cites as a reason the fact that potential victims of murder are made in the image of the person (God) who has issued the commandment.... There the religious aspect seems to have an internal relation to the commandment,
    • Someone might object that this confuses content with reasons....the fact that P is cited as a reason for Q doesn't mean that P is indispensable for understanding the meaning of Q
    • Now this is sometimes true, especially where the reasons in question establish nothing but an instrumental relationship.....I think the Rawlsians overestimate the extent to which it is true generally,
    • Abstract principles of justice and rights characteristically need to be filled
    • I have argued this elsewhere with regard to John Stuart Mill's "Harm Principle."8
    • I think this is particularly the case where a moral principle involves predicates whose extension is not given determinately apart from the principle in question.
    • I believe this is also true of the predicate "human" in the principle of basic human equality.
    • in Locke's account, the shape of human.....is not in the end separable from the religious reasons... If someone arrives at what purports to be a principle of human equality on other grounds (e.g., non-religious grounds), there is little reason to believe that that principle will have the same shape or texture as the Lockean principle....
    • Many non-cognitivists assume that moral positions are subjective responses to factual features
    • They think this is true not just of moral positions like "Causing pain is wrong," where it is clear that we can use the descriptive words "causing pain" to identify the actions concerned... but also that it is true of moral positions involving "thick" moral concepts, positions tions like "Honesty is the best policy" and "Courage cannot be taught."... concepts like honesty and courage can be analyzed into descriptive components referring to some fact about the world
    • John McDowell and others have expressed doubts about the general applicability of this pattern of analysis. What, asks McDowell, makes us so confident that we can always disentangle the descriptive properties from the evaluative response?
    • The descriptive features underlying a given normative attitude might well seem weird or "shapeless""
    • I think a version of McDowell's point may apply to the concept human embedded in our commitment to equality.... But our concept human may be partly shaped by our commitment to equality,
    • Locke's religious premises help to make sense of or give shape to a certain cluster of human characteristics
    • shapelessness point deprives the Rawlsians and others who favor the bracketing approach
    • All men are equal...These are familiar egalitarian propositions. To whom do they apply?...I shall devote the rest of this chapter to an exploration of some of the extraordinary difficulties thatJohn Locke gets into as he tries to answer these questions,
    • John Locke asserts as a matter of principle the fundamental equality of all members of the human species. Members of this species have a special status, or occupy a special moral position quite unlike that of any other animal....any parallel for the co-members of any other species.
    • But in his philosophy of science...Locke comes very close to saying that there are no such things as species....species are at best just human conventions... The danger that this poses to the moral and political argument is enormous.
    • Locke is not a pragmatist, like (say) Richard Rorty, proposing to keep a whole moral system tem afloat by using some conventional commitments to evaluate others.13 His approach in the Two Treatises and in his other political writings is explicitly plicitly foundationalist,
    • A causa di qs difficoltà... we have been taught by historians of the Cambridge school- in particular ular Peter Laslett and his followers to assume that Locke's politics can and should be studied in more or less complete isolation from the rest of his philosophy...."Locke is, perhaps, the least consistent of all the great philosophers,
    • Ma... The actual evidence cited for Locke's having contradicted himself was always quite slight
    • Well, I believe they are wrong...it is not just a matter of noticing the difficulty and then winching down God to resolve it.
    • Locke talks about God's decision to "make a Species of Creatures, that should have Dominion over the other Species
    continua
  4. GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY Christian Foundations of 'John Locke's Political Thought di  JEREMY WALDRON -     seconda parte cap. 3 Species and the Shape of Equality
    • the importance that Locke attaches to the dividing line between human and non-human species
    • "The entire cosmos is the work of God....It is an ordered hierarchy, a `great chain of being', in which every species has its station, its rank."...
    • Locke's human egalitarianism depends crucially on the clarity and intelligibility of the species-boundaries.
    • we turn to the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. standing. What Locke says there about species is almost entirely at odds with the conception of species-hierarchy
    • Locke envisages ages a series of created beings, ascending from the lowest entity to the highest... But it ascends up from us "by gentle degrees"... this chain of being forms a continuous series of entities..."no Chasms, or gaps" between beings
    • We language-users have no choice but to confront this continuum with words............difference between this particular cat and that particular dog. Nothing in nature shows that these resemblances and differences categorize themselves into essences.... there is no reason to think that our tendency to organize resemblances into clusters under the auspices of general species-terms reflects anything other than our propensity as language-users to make use of general words.
    • I think this offers little in the way of assistance for our use of the concept species in moral and political theory....Locke's account of real essences is far from straightforward...I believe it is basically a pragmatic one:
    • Sometimes Locke presents the unavailability to us of objective real essences as a reflection of the limitations on our knowledge.
    • In general, we seem to have here a pretty thorough-going anti-realism, so far as species are concerned.
    • the putative boundaries between humans mans and other animals are blurred in a number of ways. Fetuses are sometimes oddly shaped, familiarly shaped humans often vary enormously mously in their rational abilities, some allegedly non-human animals have been rumored to have the power of speech, humans have been known to interbreed with apes (Locke alleges), and so on:
    • The fact is, says Locke, that you are likely to get disagreement among people as to how to draw the boundaries of the species:
    • which internal features caught our attention would be a matter ter of which were inherently interesting to us....it is our interests that would dictate what revisions we made in (what we called) the essence of man.
    • when he talks about fetal monstrosities, Locke says that there is a question about whether the entity is entitled to baptism.....I think this shows the absurdity of the Laslett suggestion that we have, on the one hand, Locke the philosopher (uninterested in normative implications) and, on the other hand, Locke the political theorist (uninterested in philosophy).
    • On the face of it, the implications of Locke's skepticism about species are pretty serious. If the boundaries of species are made by men and not given by our Creator... "the same individual will be a true Man to the one [party], which is not so to the other"... Locke's comment in Book IV of the Essay, on how an English child might "prove" that a negro is not a man, is really quite disconcerting in this regard.4°
    • by rejecting essentialism, Locke is undercutting those theories of human inequality that depend on "essentializing" superficial characteristics like skin color or sex organs. Kathy Squadrito says, for example, that Locke's rejection of external form as real essence means that he doesn't really think there is an important portant difference between men and women.4'
    • the point about Locke's anti-essentialism is that it leaves the field wide open for anyone to draw the boundaries...It leaves him with no naturalistic basis whatsoever for distinguishing those creatures
    • Maybe this should boost the morale of anti-speciesist defenders of animal rights; but it is hardly calculated to cheer those who think there is something special about humans and human equality.
    • Locke is also supposed to have committed himself to a fundamental principle of equality: members of the same species are naturally equal in authority, whatever the other differences between them. But now that species-based notion has collapsed...Locke seems to have deprived himself of the resource he needs to limit
    • My strategy in this chapter is to show the indispensability for Locke's theory of equality of the religious aspect of his argument
    • In biblical revelation, the only direct intimation of a basis for the distinction of the human species is descent from Adam.... Anyway, a purely genealogical basis for equality and inequality would be practically inadequate.
    • Locke says in his political philosophy that any basis for inequality must be evident, clear, and mmnifest.
    • Senso comune. So what is to be done? I think that in order to make Locke's account of equality in the Two Treatises consistent with his discussion in Book III ofthe Essay, we have to forget about real essences, and abandon the emphasis on species altogether. I think we should focus instead on   real resemblances between particulars:... We must ask which resemblances are actually doing the crucial work... That will give us his definition of humanity...
    • .The emphasis now is on characteristics not on species or ranks of species. The domain of equality will simply be the domain of relevant similarity ity i.e. the possession of faculties that can be regarded as the same or (relevantly) similar.
    • Our heuristic now is emphatically...we have to start from the idea of a similarity among faculties that would be robust enough to sustain
    • focusing moral attention not on species, but on the complex property of corporeal rationality.... the detail of the issue about species can be left as a purely speculative problem for the naturalists and philosophers.
    • Locke. The key, he says, is corporeal rationality...It is intriguing, though, that corporeality is also invoked... This little point, I believe, is quite unintelligible apart from the moral theology. ogy. Locke speculates that there are all sorts of rational beings in the cosmos
    • .I don't think he is attempting to commit the naturalistic fallacy by inferring our normative equality from some factual similarity. He says in the Second Treatise that the connection is "evident" (2nd T: 4), but that this is not the same as saying that it is logically implied... like angels, for instance,
    • Let us turn now to the rationality criterion....Unfortunately,...non-human animals have minds,... Since they are "not bare Machins (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some Reason"
    • There are degrees of rationality, both among those we are pre-theoretically inclined to call humans and in a broader class of animals...On this gradual scale, who gets the benefit of equality?
    • There is, for example, the human fetus, which, Locke says, "dfers not much from the State of a Vegetable...lunacy, idiocy.......Infants are a slightly different case,.... Locke's argument is that they are to be treated as beings destined for equality, though not our equals at present.... And finally there are the familiar distinctions between the wise and the silly,
    • If there is, as Locke says, "a difference of degrees in Men's Understandings...there is a greater distance between some Men and others in this respect than between tween some Men and some Beasts" (E: 4.20.5), then how can we work with or justify any notion of basic equality?
    • that, considered as tabulae rasae, our minds are all the same, and that the intellectual differences between us are simply a matter of input and exercise.
    • In Book II of the Essay, he argued that what distinguishes humans from other animals is not their capacity to reason per se - for brute animals have some sort of reason - but rather the "power of Abstracting," the capacity to reason on the basis of general ideas.... So, maybe this is Locke's equality-threshold.
    • But he quickly indicates that many who bear the nominal essence of man lack the ability to abstract. Many of those we call idiots
    • Locke is not offering this capacity to abstract as the real essence of the species human. He is offering it as an interesting resemblance among all the beings
    • for Locke the real resemblance on which basic equality rests the ability to form and work with abstract ideas must work rather like what modern political philosophers call a range property....A range property may be understood in terms of a region on a scale.... we may use the binary property of being within the range,l... In John Rawls's own use of the idea, the relevant range property is the capacity for moral personality.
    • Relative to the interest driving the specification of the range property, the precise location tion of an entity on the scale is uninteresting. That it is Within the range is all we need to know...Is there anything which can do this work for Locke?
    • No matter how inadequate the average human intellect is for a "universal, sal, or perfect Comprehension," it yet secures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their Maker, and the sight of their own Duties... The existence of God, Locke believes, is something that can be established by the unaided human intellect, whatever that intellect's other limitations.
    • God .... He has conferred on those whom He intends to serve Him the rational power that is required for easy recognition of His existence.... Anyone with the capacity for abstraction can reason to the existence of God... he has the minimal capacity to think of himself as a person.
    • The fact that a being can get this far, intellectually, by whatever route, shows that he is a creature with a special moral relation to God.
    • if I catch a human in full possession of his faculties, I know I should be careful how I deal with him. Because creatures capable of abstraction can be conceived as "all the servants of one Sovereign Master,
    • That, it seems to me, is the interest that is driving and shaping Locke's moral conception of "man," and motivating the interest in the particular range of capacities that forms the basis for Lockean equality.
    • Someone in denial of or indifferent to the existence of God is not going to be able to come up with anything like the sort of basis for equality that Locke came up with.
    • There is no reason for an atheist to recognize such a threshold... The atheist has no basis in his philosophy for thinking that beings endowed with the capacity that Locke emphasizes are for that reason to be treated as special and sacred in the way Locke thought.
    • Locke's equality claims are not separable from the theological content that shapes and organizes them. The theological content cannot simply ply be bracketed off as a curiosity
    • Lockean equality is not fit to be taught as a secular doctrine; it is a conception of equality that makes no sense except in the light of a particular account of the relation between man and God.
    continua
  5. 2. 1 PT - L’importanza di essere teneri Perché pensiamo ciò che pensiamo delle creature che non pensano come noi - Amati, odiati, mangiati: Perché è così difficile agire bene con gli animali  by Hal Herzog - #animalenazista #noncirestacheantropomorfizzare #neipannialtrui #alleradicidelpeccato originale
  6. 2. L’importanza di essere teneri Perché pensiamo ciò che pensiamo delle creature che non pensano come noi - Amati, odiati, mangiati: Perché è così difficile agire bene con gli animali by Hal Herzog - #waltdisneybiofoliaco #lesteticaètutto #irrazionaliconanimali #guerradiparole #trolleyperanimali
  7. CHAPTER 1 A PUZZLING PRIMATE - The Secret of Our Success: How Culture Is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter by Joseph Henrich #giocodelsopravvissuto - #intelligenzachenonspiega @obbedienzarito #ilgrandecumulo @infanziavecchiaia
  8. PREFACE - The Secret of Our Success: How Culture Is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter di Joseph Henrich - #untipomoltospeciale #redelpianeta
  9. CHAPTER 2 IT’S NOT OUR INTELLIGENCE - The Secret of Our Success: How Culture Is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter by Joseph Henrich - ildominiodelpianeta adattamentosenzamutazione lesploratoredisperso bambinovsscimmia rattiemanocalda