Visualizzazione post con etichetta mike huemer the problem with political authority. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta mike huemer the problem with political authority. Mostra tutti i post

mercoledì 6 marzo 2019

COME DIFENDERE LA LIBERTA’?

COME DIFENDERE LA LIBERTA’?

Facendo appello al buon senso.

Per me è il modo migliore.

Ma che significa?

Guarda ai problemi etici più semplici: è giusto uccidere un innocente? E’ giusto rubare in casa altrui? E’ giusto violentare la vicina di casa? E’ giusto truffare il vecchietto?

Per fortuna ci sono una marea di problemi morali semplicissimi e facilmente risolvibili senza ambiguità attraverso la mera intuizione.

Ecco, adesso ricava dalla risoluzione dei problemi più semplici una regola generale. Sì, anche questo passaggio mi sembra fattibile.

E’ anche abbastanza facile constatare come tale regola generale sia in linea con la proclamazione dei diritti individuali tipicamente professati dai libertari.

Ma la base di tali diritti, nel nostro caso, non è una “rivelazione” e nemmeno la “ragione” ma il semplice buon senso. A chi non lo capisce puoi sempre proporre i casi elementari di cui sopra.

Passando poi ai problemi più complessi la tua regola traballerà ma potrai comunque partire da un punto fermo: mantengo la mia regola finché qualcuno non mi dimostra in modo convincente che in un certo caso specifico tale regola è inaccettabile, magari perché genera conseguenze inaccettabili.

Un atteggiamento del genere difende prima facie la libertà ma è anche aperto a deroghe in certi casi specifici. Insomma, non è dogmatico.

Dalla mia esperienza, e soprattutto grazie alla conoscenza sviluppata dalle discipline economiche, la regola di base regge in modo sorprendente anche dove non te lo aspetteresti mai.

https://www.facebook.com/mike.huemer/posts/10158195861049115

mercoledì 23 gennaio 2019

NE' JOHN LOCKE , NE' MILTON FRIEDMAN



Né diritti naturali, né utilitarismo.

Chiamato a fondare le mie timide inclinazioni libertarie lo farei sul senso comune.

Il libertarismo è solo il tentativo di estendere in modo coerente quei piccoli principi morali che tocchiamo con mano nel nostro agire quotidiano: chi si suda la paga ha poi diritto di spenderla, che crea qualcosa ha diritto di disporne e goderne, che fa una promessa ha il dovere di mantenerla...

Non c'è allora una regola aurea, solo delle evidenze del senso comune da utilizzare come indizi: costruiamo in modo coerente su questi indizi fermandoci quando ci portano troppo lontano: ogni (presunta) regola ha le sue eccezioni.

In questo senso Topolino è più formativo del "Secondo trattato sul governo" o di "Capitalismo e libertà": le torte di nonna papera sono di nonna papera, Paperino è responsabile delle sue strampalate iniziative e Gastone non è un criminale per il solo fatto di essere fortunato.

Ecco perché non avere un governo è un radicalismo sospetto mentre avere un governo che governi il meno possibile una mossa saggia figlia di una solida filosofia del senso comune.

Ieri è uscito un libro accademico che espone in modo più rigoroso il concetto.

https://www.amazon.com/Governing-Least-Libertarianism-Political-Philosophy/dp/0190863242/ref=sr_1_fkmrnull_1?keywords=governing+least&qid=1548010343&sr=8-1-fkmrnull/marginalrevol-20

https://feedly.com/i/entry/Od/Z0OrlTBzSrJtcae1t5qtueOtvOco3UFNx6gD9Pd4=_16879b33a3b:cd47:875042c9

lunedì 10 dicembre 2018

TEODICEA

TEODICEA

Da Platone a John Rawls la filosofia politica ha un solo scopo: giustificare la superiorità morale di alcuni individui (governanti) su altri (governati), e quindi i loro maggiori diritti.

In un certo senso la filosofia politica è una teodicea, ovvero una giustificazione del male.

https://feedly.com/i/entry//4+l7BW7+DDp+RS+igdsWNy9P2lXUW4d4A612kSr/rs=_1679329d4f9:114ab4f:c2ce2e2e

venerdì 7 dicembre 2018

LE TASSE SONO UN FURTO

LE TASSE SONO UN FURTO

Per i pignoli: più che un furto, un’estorsione. Per tutti: non capisco bene come si possa negare questa elementare verità.

Anche perché la cervellotica operazione intellettuale messa in piedi allo scopo di negare non è affatto necessaria per una difesa delle tasse: esistono i furti buoni e quelli cattivi.

lunedì 15 maggio 2017

L'autorità della democrazia

Perché mai la maggioranza dovrebbe dettar legge? Quale autorità morale ha una democrazia?
Alla domanda cerca di rispondere Michael Huemer nel suo saggio “The Authority of Democracy” senza riuscirvi.
A prima vista non esiste alcuna autorità della maggioranza, ce ne accorgiamo subito, basta andare al bar con gli amici…
… Bar Tab example. You have gone out for drinks with a few of your colleagues and graduate students. You are all busy talking about philosophy, when someone raises the question of who is going to pay the bill… A graduate student then suggests that you pay for everybody’s drinks. Reluctant to spend so much money, you decline. But the student persists: ‘Let’s take a vote.’ To your consternation, they proceed to take the vote, which reveals that everyone at the table except you wants you to pay…
Non esiste alcun obbligo morale di pagare il conto solo perché l’ha deciso la maggioranza. L’uso della forza con chi si rifiuta è palesemente illegittimo.
Di fronte a cotanta evidenza l’onere di provare il contrario spetta ai difensori del principio democratico.
Joshua Cohen e Jurgen Habermas difendono un’idea di democrazia deliberativa che puo’ essere articolata su quattro punti…
… 1.  Participants take their deliberation to be capable of determining action and to be unconstrained by any prior norms. 2.  Participants offer reasons for their proposals, with the (correct) expectation that those reasons alone will determine the fate of their proposals. 3.  Each participant has an equal voice. 4.  The deliberation aims at consensus. However, if consensus cannot be achieved, the deliberation ends with voting…
Perché questo modo di prendere le decisioni sia legittimo non viene spiegato, viene assunto. Sembra che sia necessario accettare una procedura come legittima indipendentemente dal contenuto delle decisioni che si prendono adottandola.
Anche accettando questo assunto problematico, la democrazia deliberativa resta comunque una fantasia. Non esiste niente del genere nella realtà.
Innanzitutto le persone non si sentono vincolate solo dalla politica, sentono l’esistenza di norme a priori…
… Actual people frequently regard themselves as bound by things other than the results of public deliberation. For instance, some believe in natural law, many believe in divinely mandated moral requirements, some believe themselves bound by a constitution that was established long ago, and so on…
Si assume poi che le deliberazioni siano razionali ed emergano da una discussione tra individui votati alla ragione. Habermas parla di “assenza della forza se non quella degli argomenti”…
… In actual democracies, no one is required (by the state or anyone else) to state their reasons for advancing policy proposals. Moreover, the quality of the reasons offered for a policy proposal is only one part of what determines the fate of that proposal, and nearly everyone knows this…
L’interesse non coincide certo con la ragione ma è difficile escluderlo quando si fa una proposta politica!
Poi si richiede ancora che le voci in contrapposizione siano sullo stesso piano. La richiesta è impossibile, basterebbe pensare al gigantesco media bias che affligge le nostre democrazie…
… There is of course no actual society in which these things are true. In any modern society, a small number of individuals – journalists, authors, professors, politicians, celebrities – play a large role in public discourse, while the vast majority of individuals play essentially no role in the discourse…
Cittadini ricchi e cittadini poveri non saranno mai sullo stesso piano, così come non lo saranno i potenti e i cittadini qualsiasi. Un capo di governo può convocare una conferenza stampa in dieci minuti e diffondere le sue parole in tutto il paese.
Si richiede poi che l’obbiettivo della discussione da cui scaturiranno le decisioni sia il consenso. Noi vediamo il politico fare ben altro: puntare sugli indecisi trascurando chi non puo’ essere realisticamente convinto.
Conclusione… 
… Cohen writes that ‘the ideal deliberative procedure is meant to provide a model for institutions to mirror.’10 Perhaps Cohen’s conception of deliberative democracy provides guidance for how society ought to change. While this may provide a useful role for Cohen’s construction, it brings us no closer to deriving political authority. A description of an ideal that our society ought to aim at but of which we in fact fall very far short hardly constitutes an argument that our state has political authority…
Di fronte a queste obiezioni Habermas e Cohen potrebbero ripiegare asumendo che la decisione democratica è legittima se ad essa avrebbero potuto aderire anche i suoi oppositori. Questa condizione è confutata dall’esempio del boxeur… 
… On one reading, Cohen’s principle is absurdly permissive. Imagine that you are walking down the street, when a boxer suddenly punches you in the face. ‘What did you do that for?!’ you demand. ‘Well’, the boxer explains, ‘you could have agreed to be punched in the face.’…
A Cohen e Habermas non resterebbe che ripiegare su posizioni “contrattualistiche”, ma i due problemi del contrattualismo sono ben noti…
… there were two main problems. First, there is no reason to think that the structure and principles of any actual state would in fact be agreed to after ideal deliberation. Second, even if the structure and principles of some actual state would be agreed to, there is no reason to think that this fact would confer authority on that state to coerce people
Ma esiste un altro modo per difendere la democrazia: solo un sistema democratico rispetta l’eguaglianza tra gli uomini.
Eppure nelle nostre democrazie gran parte delle leggi sono varate senza assicurarsi che rispettino il volere della maggioranza. E che dire della differenza tra cittadini ed elettori? E che dire delle regolamentazioni varate dai burocrati? E delle sentenze che derivano da un’interpretazione dei giudici?
Thomas Christiano ha esposto in modo formale l’argomento dell’eguaglianza…
… Thomas Christiano has developed the Argument from Equality as an argument for political obligation, roughly as follows: 1.  Individuals are obligated to treat other members of their society as equals and not to treat them as inferiors. 2.  To treat others as equals and not as inferiors, one must obey democratic laws. 3.  Therefore, individuals are obligated to obey democratic laws…
Anche qui si aspira ad una legittimità assoluta della democrazia e indipendente dal contenuto delle decisioni prese, l’oppressione delle minoranze non sembra preoccupare. Vasto programma…
… Christiano spends the most time justifying (2e). He argues that to truly advance individuals’ interests equally, a social system must satisfy a publicity requirement, meaning that it must be possible for citizens to see for themselves that they are being treated equally. He then argues that only democratic decision making, as a procedural form of equality, satisfies this requirement. There are other, substantive interpretations of equality – for example, that one treats others equally by equalizing their resources or that one treats others equally by granting them the same liberty rights. But these interpretations of equality do not satisfy the publicity requirement, because they are too controversial; only those who accept certain controversial ethical views could see themselves to be treated as equals in virtue of the implementation of one of these substantive forms of equality…
Ma la proposta di Christiano chiede troppo all’individuo. Chiede in modo assurdo. Basta un esempio per capirlo…
… Suppose I have $50. If I spend the money on myself, I would be advancing my interests more than the interests of others. To advance persons’ interests equally, I must spend the money on something that benefits everyone, or divide the money among all the members of my society, or perhaps donate the money to help people whose interests are presently less well advanced than the average…
Non si puo’ vivere avendo in mente solo l’interesse generale, ammesso che si sappia cosa sia.
In genere si pensa che sia il governo ad incarnare l’interesse generale. Ma anche così facendo arriviamo a degli assurdi: c’è una bella differenza tra carità e tasse, eppure i difensori della democrazia non sembrano vederla…
… Consider two examples: Charity Case: I have $50, which I am considering either donating to a very effective antipoverty charity or spending on my own personal consumption. If I give the money to charity, it will reduce the inequality in society and bring society closer to the equal advancement of all its members’ interests. However, I have already given a large amount of money to charity this year and do not wish to give more. I decide to keep the money. Tax Case: Tax laws require me to pay a large amount of money to the government. I am considering either paying all of the required taxes or cheating on my taxes in such a way as to pay $50 less than the legally required amount, in which case I will spend the $50 on personal consumption. Assume that I am certain that, if I cheat, I will not be caught or suffer any other negative personal consequences. I decide to cheatAdvocates of democratic authority would surely wish to deny that my action is permissible in the Tax Case, yet to avoid an absurdly demanding ethical theory, they would wish to allow that my action is permissible in the Charity Case
Se fondiamo l’obbligazione democratica sull’eguaglianza otteniamo un sistema di doveri o troppo esigente (fare ogni scelta pensando all’interesse pubblico) o troppo lasco (verso il governo abbiamo gli stessi doveri che verso una onolus). 
Secondo alcuni o si ubbidisce al governo o si finisce nell’anarchia. Questo molto semplicemente non è vero…
… The obvious problem with this inference is that a particular individual’s obedience or disobedience to a particular law has no actual impact on the functioning of the state. For instance, the government persists despite a large number of people who evade a large amount of taxes every year… most modern societies are nowhere near the threshold level of disobedience that would be required for government to collapse; thus, the individual’s marginal impact on the state’s survival is zero…
Il democratico mira all’eguaglianza. Ma ci sono tante eguaglianze: eguaglianza nei diritti, nel reddito… Per il democratico conta solo l’eguaglianza politica.
Per Christiano l’eguaglianza deve avere una dimensione pubblica
… Christiano argues that only the last interpretation – democratic equality, as I shall call it – satisfies the crucial publicity principle, the principle that ‘it is not enough that justice is done; it must be seen to be done.’…
Ma il requisito della pubblicità puo’ convivere anche con altre concezioni di eguaglianza…
.. If we adopt the weak interpretation of publicity, then democratic decision making satisfies the publicity constraint, as do many other conceptions of equality. For instance, suppose one holds that the proper way to treat others equally is by according everyone the same liberty rights (roughly, rights to do as they wish, free of government interference). Individuals would be able to see that they were accorded the same liberty rights…
Se adottiamo una concezione di pubblicità più stringente, allora viene da chiedersi se la democrazia lo realizzi. D’altronde esistono cento forme di democrazia…
… Does equality of decision-making power require direct democracy, or is representative democracy sufficient? Does it require that all citizens have the same chance to stand for public office? If so, is it sufficient that all citizens are legally permitted to stand for public office, or must individuals also have financially and socially realistic opportunities to run for public office? If representative democracy is permitted, must representation be strictly proportional to population, or may some parts of a nation have representation in the legislature out of proportion to their population (as in the case of the representation of states in the U.S. Senate)? Is democratic equality violated if public officials draw districts in unusual shapes for voting purposes (as in the American practice of gerrymandering), with the specific intent of maximizing the representation of a particular party in the legislature? Is democratic equality violated if some persistent minorities rarely or never get their way? If so, what sort of minorities count? Do members of all third parties in the United States (parties other than the Democrats and the Republicans) count as persistent minorities who are not treated equally? These are all controversial questions…
Secondo Christiano chi disubbidisce ad una legge democratica non rispetta la volontà altrui e tratta il prossimo come inferiore anziché come un pari.
Ma puo’ darsi che questo giudizio (il fatto di considerare l’altro inferiore) non sia campato in aria ma molto ragionevole. Noi differiamo per intelligenza, motivazioni, conoscenza, cosicché nel prendere una certa decisione non ha senso parificare le persone…
… intelligence, knowledge, time, and effort – affect one’s reliability in arriving at correct beliefs. No one seriously maintains that persons are anywhere near to being equal in any of these dimensions, let alone all of them. It is therefore very difficult to see how one could argue that all persons are equally reliable at identifying correct political beliefs. In violating a democratic law, one may well be treating others as though they were epistemic ‘inferiors’, in the sense of persons with less reliable normative beliefs in a particular area. But there is nothing unjust in this if, as is very often the case, one knows this to be true…
Quand’anche i democratici abbiano ragione, ci si chiede: è giusto che chi ha torto sia sottoposto a violenze fisiche? Di solito noi non trattiamo così chi pensiamo che sbagli…
… You have gone out for drinks with some colleagues and students, and one of the students has proposed that you pay for everybody’s drinks. Over your protests, the other parties at the table vote to have you pay for the drinks. You tell them that you will not agree to do so. They then inform you that, if you do not pay, they intend to punish you by locking you in a room for some time and that they are prepared to take you by force…
Nell’esempio fatto chi fa un’ingiustizia a chi? Chi tratta l’altro da essere inferiore? Bè, il giudizio dei democratici sembrerebbe esattamente capovolto.
D’altro canto è vero che possiamo fare casi in cui la violenza fisica del disobbediente è sentita come meritata. Quello che manca è una demarcazione e i democratici non ci aiutano di sicuro a porla. Giustizia e Democrazia sembrano cose molto diverse…
… One might still worry that the Bar Tab example trades on the apparent unfairness of the student’s proposal and that our intuitions would change if the group had voted for an essentially fair and equitable way of paying the bar tab. But advocates of democratic authority explicitly claim that one must comply with a democratic decision regardless of whether the decision is in itself just…
Per Christiano risalire dall’obbligo alla legittimità è semplice, cosicché gli viene facile fissare il seguente principio 
… If justice requires (forbids) a person to do A, then it is permissible to coerce that person to do (not to do) A…
Eppure l’infondatezza del principio emerge da molti esempi, eccone uno…
… Consider an example in which I appear to violate one of these duties. I am out for drinks with some friends. Several of them are discussing what an excellent President Barack Obama is. I chime in, ‘You people are fools and your opinions are worthless. I do not respect your judgment. You are all inferior to me.’ I then plug my ears so I don’t have to hear what they say and turn my back on them. In this case, I have both failed to respect my friends’ judgments and treated them as inferiors. This strikes me as much more evident than the claim that I fail to respect other citizens’ judgments or treat other citizens as inferiors whenever I disobey a democratic law. But would my friends (or anyone else) now be justified in using physical force to impose punishment on me?…
Eccone un altro…
… Suppose I have recently learned that Amnesty International is working to promote democracy in the little-known country of New Florida. AI is appealing for monetary donations and contributors to letter-writing campaigns. I think AI has a reasonable chance of being reasonably effective in this endeavor, and I recognize that I could support democratic institutions by helping AI at this time.32 Because democracy is crucial to the equal advancement of persons’ interests, I would thereby be promoting the equal advancement of persons’ interests. Nevertheless, I fail to support Amnesty International. In this case, it is very plausible to say that I have (a) failed to promote the equal advancement of persons’ interests and (b) failed to help bring democratic institutions into being. And perhaps I have done wrong. But am I now an appropriate target for threats of violence?…

lunedì 5 dicembre 2016

Perché riconosciamo autorità ai nostri governi?

Perché riconosciamo autorità ai nostri governi?
Risposta in coro: perché altrimenti sarebbe l’anarchia, il tutti contro tutto, il “vita mea morte tua”, eccetera. Insomma, un gran casino che è meglio evitare.
Questa la risposta più scontata, senonché Mike Huemer nel saggio “Consequentialism and Fairness” s’incarica di smontarla pezzo a pezzo. Unica guida: il buon senso.
Cominciamo a dire che chi risponde in questo modo è un “conseguenzialista”: riconosce la bontà di una decisione dalla bontà delle sue conseguenze.
L’argomento del conseguenzialista è questo: 1) poiché obbedire ha conseguenze buone, allora è nostro dovere obbedire, 2) quando esiste un dovere, allora è legittimo usare la forza per farlo rispettare.
La sicurezza è il primo bene che ci garantisce il governo…
… Those who are most pessimistic about human nature fear that society would be reduced to a barbaric state of constant war of everyone against everyone…
Poi ci garantisce anche l’ordine, ovvero la legge. Dici poco.
Si tratta di ipotesi problematiche ma assumiamole come vere per continuare il discorso e poterci concentrare su altri aspetti.
La prima falla nell’argomento del conseguenzialista salta subito all’occhio: se disubbidisco ad una legge non distruggo il governo e quindi non precipito nessuno nell’anarchia.
Forse qui è meglio precisare una cosa: ok, ci sono leggi a cui è bene obbedire. Per esempio, non bisogna rubare: ma questo indipendentemente dall’esistenza formale o meno di quella legge! Non sono leggi come “non bisogna rubare” che difende il conseguenzialista. La sua difesa è una difesa della legge indipendente dal suo contenuto etico. L’obbedienza per lui è SEMPRE dovuta.
Facciamo un caso concreto
… Take the case in which you see a child drowning in a shallow pond: you could easily wade in and save the child, though this would entail getting your clothes muddy and missing a class…
Sicuramente in un caso del genere è doveroso tuffarsi e salvare il bambino. Ma questo non è un caso analogo a quello che affronta un cittadino davanti alla legge. Il suo caso è piuttosto quest’altro:
…Return to the case of the child drowning in the shallow pond (Section 5.1.3). But this time, suppose that there are three other people nearby ready to save the child. They do not need help; there is no danger that the child will drown or suffer…
E in questo caso non sembra esistere un dovere di tuffarsi, ci sono già molti altri che stanno intervenendo per salvare il bambino. Per conseguenza, non dovrebbe esistere nemmeno un dovere analogo di obbedire alle leggi, ci sono già altri che lo fanno.
L’obbedienza richiesta dal conseguenzialista è quindi ridondante.
A questo punto la domanda che ci attendiamo è questa: “e se tutti facessero come te?”.
Qui però abbandoniamo il conseguenzialismo puro in favore di un conseguenzialismo delle regole
… Take the case of a newly planted lawn on a university campus. Students and professors are tempted to take short cuts across the lawn while walking from building to building. One person cutting across the lawn will have no noticeable effect. But if everybody does it, the pristine lawn will be marred…
Ma questa dottrina si rivela assurda in molti casi
… Suppose I decide to become a professional philosopher. This seems permissible. But what if everybody did this?…
Non potrei nemmeno salire sul treno: “se tutti salissero”, infatti, moriremmo soffocati.
A questo punto il conseguenzialista e il conseguenzialista delle regole potrebbero puntare sull’equità legata all’obbedienza: disobbedire è ingiusto nei confronti di chi obbedisce.
Ma qui usciamo una volta per tutte dal conseguenzialismo, sia ben chiaro.
Per valutare al meglio l’argomento dell’equità ricorriamo all’analogia della barca…
… Contrast the following scenario. You are in a lifeboat with several other people. You are caught in a storm, and the boat is taking on water, which needs to be bailed out. Other passengers take up containers and start bailing. The other passengers’ efforts are clearly sufficient to keep the boat afloat; thus, no large negative consequences will result if you refuse to bail. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that you should help bail water. Intuitively… it would be unfair to let the others do all the work…
In effetti rifiutarmi di prendere il secchio sembrerebbe ingiusto, anche se quando il mio contributo fosse minimo.
E se gli altri rematori mi chiedessero, oltre che lavorare di secchio, di fare loro un panino? Fin dove deve spingersi l’obbedienza?
Ammettiamo che l’equipaggio elegga come capo Robert “il pazzo”, il quale escogita il seguente piano: usare i secchi per prendere l’acqua da fuori e svuotarli nella barca. Oppure: abbandonare i remi e pregare Poseidone. Oppure: ognuno prenda la frusta e si flagelli. Oppure: dare 100 euro a Sally...
Sono tenuto ad obbedire? Se non lo faccio manco di rispetto agli altri?
Ricordo solo che chi ritiene dovuta l’obbedienza la ritiene anche questo dovere svincolato da ogni contenuto.
Il disobbediente rischia l’anarchia ma il comandante che fa leggi assurde a cui è ben difficile obbedire, non è da meno.
C’è poi il problema dell’eremita
… individuals who feel they do not need the state; for example, hermits living in the wilderness or indigenous peoples who would prefer that European colonists had never arrived on their continent…
E’ un po’ difficile agitare lo spauracchio dell’anarchia ad un anarchico. Così come i pericoli che derivano dal non fare una guerra impressionano poco il pacifista….
… suppose that the other passengers on the lifeboat believe that praying to Jehovah will assist them… in many cases, their view, whether correct or incorrect, is perfectly reasonable. I should think this is the case in regard to those who oppose the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, drug prohibition, immigration restrictions, and several other controversial laws or governmental projects…
Il cattolico non è atterrito dalle conseguenze che potrebbero derivare dal non pregare per il Buddah. La sua apparente calma e il suo rifiuto non deriva da comportamenti opportunistici ma da convinzioni reali.
Il costo di ubbidire alla legge comprende il costo di cio’ a cui rinunciamo…
… obeying the law often interferes with doing more important things. For instance, suppose you have the opportunity to safely evade $1,000 worth of legally prescribed taxes. It would perhaps be wrong to evade the taxes to spend the money on a new television. It would, however, be permissible to evade the taxes to use the money in a more socially valuable way than giving it to the government… the marginal social benefit of a dollar given to any of a variety of extremely effective private charities.17 In this case, it is not wrong to evade one’s taxes to send the money to charity… duress excuses the payment of taxes, but it does not render it praiseworthy…
Il costo di pagare le tasse non è pari alle tasse ma comprende la maggiore efficienza dell’impiego alternativo che avrebbero potuto avere quelle risorse.
Per legittimare l’autorità politica non basta dimostrare che è doveroso ubbidire ai suoi ordini ma anche che non è condannabile chi violenta il disubbidiente. Un’analogia appropriata è la seguente:
… suppose you are at a board meeting at which you and the other members are discussing how to improve your company’s sales. You know that the best way to do this is to hire the Sneaku Ad Agency. Your plan will be morally unobjectionable and highly beneficial to the company. Nevertheless, the other members are not convinced. So you pull out your handgun and order them to vote for your proposal…
Un comportamento simile potrebbe essere giustificato nei casi di emergenza estrema….
… Christopher Wellman offers an example with a similar lesson.18 Amy has a medical emergency and needs to be taken to the hospital immediately. Beth is aware of this but has no vehicle with which to transport Amy. So she temporarily steals Cathy’s car… it is permissible to coerce a person or violate a person’s property rights, provided that doing so is necessary to prevent something much worse… Thus, perhaps the state is justified in coercing people and seizing people’s property through taxation, because doing so is necessary to prevent a virtual collapse of society…
… ma non è mai giustificabile come regola.
Grazie all’analogia della barca abbiamo visto come il dovere di ubbidire non puo’ essere indipendente dal contenuto dell’ordine. Non posso violentare il mio prossimo per indurlo ad una condotta inutile se non dannosa. Quanta legislazione puo’ ritenersi legittima a questa stregua? Giusto quella che condanna il furto, l’omicidio, la rapina, la frode.
Qualcuno aggiungerebbe volentieri alla lista la legislazione che consente di produrre beni pubblici. Testiamola allora con l’analogia della barca….
… You have forced the other passengers to bail water out of the boat, thus saving it from sinking. While you have your gun out, you decide you might as well accomplish a few other desirable goals. You see a passenger eating potato chips, which will elevate his risk of heart disease
Non sembra proprio che i beni pubblici passino il test! Anche in questo caso bisognerebbe introdurre dei distinguo.
Ma possiamo spingerci oltre: la natura dello stato richiede obbedienza completa indipendentemente dai contenuti degli ordini, non si è mai visti fare dei distinguo, lo stato deve detenere una sovranità assoluta. In questo senso è sempre illegittimo dal punto di vista etico…
… This is a problem because the state’s authority is generally held to be comprehensive and content-independent. On a very strict reading of the comprehensiveness and content-independence conditions, the existence of just a few laws that the state is not entitled to make would preclude the state’s having genuine authority…
Come se non bastasse, le pretese dello stato vanno oltre: chiede il monopolio. Torniamo sulla barca…
… Modifying the lifeboat scenario once again, suppose that on the boat there are two armed passengers, Gumby and Pokey… Gumby is quicker to act… does Gumby acquire some sort of supremacy?… No, he does not… It seems, then, that the state does not, on consequentialist grounds, have supreme authority….
Perché mai dovrei obbedienza allo stato X piuttosto che al potenziale stato Y? Forse perché X esiste ora e Y esisterebbe solo se X collassasse? Non è certo questa una buona ragione morale.
Ziggy Queenie SMALL

martedì 25 ottobre 2016

4 The Authority of Democracy - michael huemer the problem with political authority

4 The Authority of DemocracyRead more at location 1973
Note: 4@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit
4.1   Naive majoritarianismRead more at location 1975
Note: T Edit
Can the agreement only of a majority of society’s members – whether broad agreement to have a government or agreement to have specific policies or personnel – confer authority on government? At first glance, it is unclear how this might be thought to work.Read more at location 1976
Note: PRRCHÈ MAI LA MAGG DOVREBBE DETTARE LEGG? Edit
Bar Tab example. You have gone out for drinks with a few of your colleagues and graduate students. You are all busy talking about philosophy, when someone raises the question of who is going to pay the bill.Read more at location 1981
Note: CHI PAGA IL CONTO AL BAR Edit
A graduate student then suggests that you pay for everybody’s drinks. Reluctant to spend so much money, you decline. But the student persists: ‘Let’s take a vote.’ To your consternation, they proceed to take the vote, which reveals that everyone at the table except you wants you to payRead more at location 1983
Note: c Edit
Are you now ethically obligatedRead more at location 1986
May the others collect the money from you by force?Read more at location 1987
Majority will alone does not generate an entitlement to coerceRead more at location 1987
This sort of example places a dialectical burden on defenders of democratic authority, a burden of identifying some special circumstancesRead more at location 1990
Note: ONERE DELA PROVA Edit
4.2   Deliberative democracy and legitimacyRead more at location 1993
Note: T Edit
4.2.1   The idea of deliberative democracyRead more at location 1994
Note: T Edit
according to Joshua Cohen,Read more at location 1997
1.  Participants take their deliberation to be capable of determining action and to be unconstrained by any prior norms. 2.  Participants offer reasons for their proposals, with the (correct) expectation that those reasons alone will determine the fate of their proposals. 3.  Each participant has an equal voice. 4.  The deliberation aims at consensus. However, if consensus cannot be achieved, the deliberation ends with voting.Read more at location 1999
Note: DEF Edit
he is stipulating that citizens in an ideal deliberative democracy – a purely hypothetical scenario – take deliberation as the basis for legitimacy.Read more at location 2008
Note: LEGITTIMITÀ ASSUNTA NN DIMOSYTRATA Edit
How might democratic deliberation provide a basis for legitimacy? Cohen does not clearly explain this.Read more at location 2010
why should we assume that any procedure, however good, confers a content-independent, exclusive entitlement for the state to coerce peopleRead more at location 2012
4.2.2   Deliberative democracy as fantasyRead more at location 2015
Note: T Edit
If there is one thing that stands out when one reads philosophical descriptions of deliberative democracy, it is how far these descriptions fall from reality. Of the four features of deliberative democracy that Cohen identifies, how many are satisfied by any actual society?Read more at location 2015
Note: NESSUN PUNTO È RISPETTTO NELLA REALTÁ Edit
Actual people frequently regard themselves as bound by things other than the results of public deliberation. For instance, some believe in natural law, many believe in divinely mandated moral requirements, some believe themselves bound by a constitution that was established long ago, and so on.Read more at location 2020
Note: PRIMO ASSUNYO: CONTA SOLO LA POLITICA. NN VRRO Edit
Deliberation is reasonedRead more at location 2023
Note: SEVONDO ASSUNTO Edit
are required to state their reasons forRead more at location 2024
as Habermas puts it, ‘no force except that of the better argumentRead more at location 2025
In actual democracies, no one is required (by the state or anyone else) to state their reasons for advancing policy proposals. Moreover, the quality of the reasons offered for a policy proposal is only one part of what determines the fate of that proposal, and nearly everyone knows this.Read more at location 2027
Note: NEGAZIONE Edit
Political outcomes are also influenced by self-interest.Read more at location 2030
‘parties are both formally and substantively equal.’Read more at location 2035
Note: TERZO REQUISITO Edit
[E]ach has an equal voiceRead more at location 2036
There is of course no actual society in which these things are true. In any modern society, a small number of individuals – journalists, authors, professors, politicians, celebrities – play a large role in public discourse, while the vast majority of individuals play essentially no role in the discourse.Read more at location 2038
Note: MEDIA BIAS Edit
Wealthy citizensRead more at location 2042
the President of the United States, for example, can call a press conference at any time;Read more at location 2043
fourth condition, ideal deliberation ‘aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus’.Read more at location 2046
Note: 4 Edit
influence citizens who remain undecidedRead more at location 2049
Hardly any are aiming at a consensus.Read more at location 2050
no realistic hope of reaching agreementRead more at location 2051
Cohen writes that ‘the ideal deliberative procedure is meant to provide a model for institutions to mirror.’10 Perhaps Cohen’s conception of deliberative democracy provides guidance for how society ought to change. While this may provide a useful role for Cohen’s construction, it brings us no closer to deriving political authority. A description of an ideal that our society ought to aim at but of which we in fact fall very far short hardly constitutes an argument that our state has political authority.Read more at location 2058
Note: MODELLO E LEGITTIMITÀ Edit
‘outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreementRead more at location 2062
Note: CONDIZIONE CENTRALE Edit
On one reading, Cohen’s principle is absurdly permissive. Imagine that you are walking down the street, when a boxer suddenly punches you in the face. ‘What did you do that for?!’ you demand. ‘Well’, the boxer explains, ‘you could have agreed to be punched in the face.’Read more at location 2065
Note: BOXEUR Edit
Habermas writes of what ‘would meet with the unforced agreement of all those involved, if they could participate, as free and equal, in discursive will-formation’.Read more at location 2070
Note: HABERMAS Edit
Habermas are appealing to a hypothetical social contract theory.Read more at location 2073
there were two main problems. First, there is no reason to think that the structure and principles of any actual state would in fact be agreed to after ideal deliberation. Second, even if the structure and principles of some actual state would be agreed to, there is no reason to think that this fact would confer authority on that state.Read more at location 2074
Note: I DUE PROB DEL CONTRATTUALISMO Edit
4.2.3   The irrelevance of deliberationRead more at location 2078
Note: T Edit
Recall the Bar Tab example (Section 4.1). Your colleagues and students have voted, over your objections, to have you pay for everyone’s drinks. Now add the following stipulations to the example: before taking the vote, the group deliberated. Everyone, including you, had an equal opportunity to offer reasons for or against forcing you to pay for everyone’s drinks. The others advanced arguments that it would be in the best interests of the group as a whole to force you to pay. They attempted to reach a consensus. In the end, they were unable to convince you that you should pay, but everyone else agreed that you should pay. Are you now obligated to pay for everyone? Are the other members of the group entitled to compel you to pay through threats of violence? Clearly not. You have rightsRead more at location 2080
Note: NEL MONDO DEMOCRATICO IDEALE IL POTERE È LEGITTMATO Edit
4.3   Equality and authorityRead more at location 2093
Note: T Edit
4.3.1   The argument from equalityRead more at location 2094
Note: T Edit
The central idea is that we have a general obligation to treat other members of our society as equals and that this requires respecting democratically made decisions.Read more at location 2095
Note: TRATTARE GLI ALTRI DA EGUALI OMPLICA DECISIONI DEMOCRATICHE....ALTRE ARG Edit
laws that most voters do not support but that were passed by a democratically elected legislature?Read more at location 2099
supported by a majority of voters but not by a majority of all citizens?Read more at location 2100
regulations written by unelected bureaucrats?Read more at location 2100
orders issued by unelected judges?Read more at location 2100
Thomas Christiano has developed the Argument from Equality as an argument for political obligation, roughly as follows:14 1.  Individuals are obligated to treat other members of their society as equals and not to treat them as inferiors. 2.  To treat others as equals and not as inferiors, one must obey democratic laws. 3.  Therefore, individuals are obligated to obey democratic laws.Read more at location 2103
Note: L ARGOMENTO DI CHRISTIANO Edit
content-independent,Read more at location 2109
absolute:Read more at location 2109
constitutionRead more at location 2111
oppress minorities,Read more at location 2111
2e.  Democracy is crucial to the equal advancement of persons’ interests.Read more at location 2126
Note: ASSUNTO Edit
Christiano spends the most time justifying (2e). He argues that to truly advance individuals’ interests equally, a social system must satisfy a publicity requirement, meaning that it must be possible for citizens to see for themselves that they are being treated equally. He then argues that only democratic decision making, as a procedural form of equality, satisfies this requirement. There are other, substantive interpretations of equality – for example, that one treats others equally by equalizing their resources or that one treats others equally by granting them the same liberty rights. But these interpretations of equality do not satisfy the publicity requirement, because they are too controversial; only those who accept certain controversial ethical views could see themselves to be treated as equals in virtue of the implementation of one of these substantive forms of equality.Read more at location 2129
Note: ALTRE EGUAGLIANZE Edit
Note: SCARTI DI CHRISTIANO Edit
4.3.2   An absurdly demanding theory of justice?Read more at location 2136
Note: T Edit
Taken without qualification, this putative requirement of justice is absurdly demanding.Read more at location 2139
Suppose I have $50. If I spend the money on myself, I would be advancing my interests more than the interests of others. To advance persons’ interests equally, I must spend the money on something that benefits everyone, or divide the money among all the members of my society, or perhaps donate the money to help people whose interests are presently less well advanced than the average.Read more at location 2139
Note: ESEMPIO Edit
The government,Read more at location 2155
as an institutionRead more at location 2157
Consider two examples: Charity Case: I have $50, which I am considering either donating to a very effective antipoverty charity or spending on my own personal consumption. If I give the money to charity, it will reduce the inequality in society and bring society closer to the equal advancement of all its members’ interests. However, I have already given a large amount of money to charity this year and do not wish to give more. I decide to keep the money. Tax Case: Tax laws require me to pay a large amount of money to the government. I am considering either paying all of the required taxes or cheating on my taxes in such a way as to pay $50 less than the legally required amount, in which case I will spend the $50 on personal consumption. Assume that I am certain that, if I cheat, I will not be caught or suffer any other negative personal consequences. I decide to cheat. Advocates of democratic authority would surely wish to deny that my action is permissible in the Tax Case, yet to avoid an absurdly demanding ethical theory, they would wish to allow that my action is permissible in the Charity Case.Read more at location 2158
Note: ANALOGIA TRA GOVERNO E FILANTROPIA. SE I MIEI INTERESSI PREVALGONO NEL PRIMO CASO PREVARRANNO ANCHE NEL SECONDO Edit
either the obligation to promote equal advancement of interests is implausibly demanding, or it is too weak to support basic political obligations.Read more at location 2182
4.3.3   Supporting democracy through obedienceRead more at location 2184
Note: T Edit
one must obey democratic laws.Read more at location 2186
The obvious problem with this inference is that a particular individual’s obedience or disobedience to a particular law has no actual impact on the functioning of the state. For instance, the government persists despite a large number of people who evade a large amount of taxes every year.Read more at location 2187
Note: SBAGLIATO Edit
most modern societies are nowhere near the threshold level of disobedience that would be required for government to collapse; thus, the individual’s marginal impact on the state’s survival is zero.Read more at location 2195
Note: SOGLIA Edit
4.3.4   Is democratic equality uniquely public?Read more at location 2198
Note: T Edit
equalizing individuals’ material resources.Read more at location 2200
equal libertyRead more at location 2201
equal sayRead more at location 2202
Christiano argues that only the last interpretation – democratic equality, as I shall call it – satisfies the crucial publicity principle, the principle that ‘it is not enough that justice is done; it must be seen to be done.’Read more at location 2202
Note: PRINCIPIO DI PUBBLICITÀ Edit
If we adopt the weak interpretation of publicity, then democratic decision making satisfies the publicity constraint, as do many other conceptions of equality. For instance, suppose one holds that the proper way to treat others equally is by according everyone the same liberty rights (roughly, rights to do as they wish, free of government interference). Individuals would be able to see that they were accorded the same liberty rights,Read more at location 2209
Note: SODDISFATTO ANCHE DALLE ALTRE CONCEZIONI Edit
On the other hand, if we adopt the strong interpretation of publicity, then no interpretation of equality or justice satisfies publicity, because there is no conception of justice that all can agree on. Not all rational thinkers have agreed even that democracy is just.Read more at location 2213
Note: IMPOSSIBILITÀ Edit
Does equality of decision-making power require direct democracy, or is representative democracy sufficient? Does it require that all citizens have the same chance to stand for public office? If so, is it sufficient that all citizens are legally permitted to stand for public office, or must individuals also have financially and socially realistic opportunities to run for public office? If representative democracy is permitted, must representation be strictly proportional to population, or may some parts of a nation have representation in the legislature out of proportion to their population (as in the case of the representation of states in the U.S. Senate)? Is democratic equality violated if public officials draw districts in unusual shapes for voting purposes (as in the American practice of gerrymandering), with the specific intent of maximizing the representation of a particular party in the legislature? Is democratic equality violated if some persistent minorities rarely or never get their way? If so, what sort of minorities count? Do members of all third parties in the United States (parties other than the Democrats and the Republicans) count as persistent minorities who are not treated equally? These are all controversial questions.Read more at location 2222
Note: CENTO DEMOCRAZIE POSSDIBILI Edit
4.3.5   Respecting others’ judgmentsRead more at location 2235
Note: T Edit
when one disobeys a democratic law, one thereby treats others as inferiors by placing one’s own judgment above the judgments of other citizens.Read more at location 2236
Note: DISOBBEDIENZA Edit
the principle that individuals ought to treat each other as equals.Read more at location 2237
All of these factors – intelligence, knowledge, time, and effort – affect one’s reliability in arriving at correct beliefs. No one seriously maintains that persons are anywhere near to being equal in any of these dimensions, let alone all of them. It is therefore very difficult to see how one could argue that all persons are equally reliable at identifying correct political beliefs. In violating a democratic law, one may well be treating others as though they were epistemic ‘inferiors’, in the sense of persons with less reliable normative beliefs in a particular area. But there is nothing unjust in this if, as is very often the case, one knows this to be true.Read more at location 2258
Note: MA NOI NN SIAMO TUTTI UGUALI NE CERCARE IL GIUSFO Edit
4.3.6   Coercion and treating others as inferiorsRead more at location 2263
Note: T Edit
You have gone out for drinks with some colleagues and students, and one of the students has proposed that you pay for everybody’s drinks. Over your protests, the other parties at the table vote to have you pay for the drinks. You tell them that you will not agree to do so. They then inform you that, if you do not pay, they intend to punish you by locking you in a room for some time and that they are prepared to take you by force.Read more at location 2267
Note: ANCHE VIOLENTARE CHI NN È D ACCVORDO CON LA MAGGIORANZA È TRATTARLO DA INFERIORE. ESEMPIO Edit
Who in this scenario is doing an injustice to whom? Who is treating whom as an inferior?Read more at location 2271
Note: c Edit
who are you to disagree?Read more at location 2274
I have no comprehensive theory to offer of the conditions under which coercion is objectionable. But on the surface of it, the state’s collection of taxes is analogous to the collection of money from you in the Bar Tab example. In both cases a majority votes to take someone’s property for the benefit of the group,Read more at location 2292
Note: TASSE COME COLLETTA Edit
Note: UNA TEORIA GENERALE NN ESISTE Edit
One might still worry that the Bar Tab example trades on the apparent unfairness of the student’s proposal and that our intuitions would change if the group had voted for an essentially fair and equitable way of paying the bar tab. But advocates of democratic authority explicitly claim that one must comply with a democratic decision regardless of whether the decision is in itself just.Read more at location 2299
Note: GIUSTIZIA ¥ DEMOCRATICITÀ Edit
4.3.7   From obligation to legitimacy?Read more at location 2303
Note: T Edit
serious difficulties in accounting for political obligation.Read more at location 2304
even if we could account for political obligation, there would remain the challenge of accounting for political legitimacyRead more at location 2305
Christiano explainsRead more at location 2306
[T]he democratic assembly has a right to rule [ ... ] since one treats its members unjustly if one ignores or skirts its decisions. Each citizen has a right to one’s obedience and therefore the assembly as a whole has a right to one’s obedience.30Read more at location 2307
Note: DALL OBBLIGAZIONE ALLA LEGITTIMITÀ Edit
4.  If justice requires (forbids) a person to do A, then it is permissible to coerce that person to do (not to do) A.Read more at location 2312
Note: PRINCIPIO DI COERCIZIONE Edit
why should we accept (4)? In many cases it is plausible that one may enforce the requirements of justice by coercion. As we have seen above, it is plausible that one may use coercion to prevent a person from unjustly harming another person. It is also plausible that one may sometimes use coercion to prevent a person from unjustly damaging or stealing another person’s property or to recover stolen property or extract compensation.Read more at location 2316
Note: VALIDO MA NN SEMPRE VEDI ES CHE SEGUE Edit
Consider an example in which I appear to violate one of these duties. I am out for drinks with some friends. Several of them are discussing what an excellent President Barack Obama is. I chime in, ‘You people are fools and your opinions are worthless. I do not respect your judgment. You are all inferior to me.’ I then plug my ears so I don’t have to hear what they say and turn my back on them. In this case, I have both failed to respect my friends’ judgments and treated them as inferiors. This strikes me as much more evident than the claim that I fail to respect other citizens’ judgments or treat other citizens as inferiors whenever I disobey a democratic law. But would my friends (or anyone else) now be justified in using physical force to impose punishment on me?Read more at location 2324
Note: ESEMPIO CHE FA ECCEZIONE Edit
Suppose I have recently learned that Amnesty International is working to promote democracy in the little-known country of New Florida. AI is appealing for monetary donations and contributors to letter-writing campaigns. I think AI has a reasonable chance of being reasonably effective in this endeavor, and I recognize that I could support democratic institutions by helping AI at this time.32 Because democracy is crucial to the equal advancement of persons’ interests, I would thereby be promoting the equal advancement of persons’ interests. Nevertheless, I fail to support Amnesty International. In this case, it is very plausible to say that I have (a) failed to promote the equal advancement of persons’ interests and (b) failed to help bring democratic institutions into being. And perhaps I have done wrong. But am I now an appropriate target for threats of violence?Read more at location 2331
Note: ALTRO CHIARO ESEMPIO Edit