venerdì 17 marzo 2017

HL Traffic by Tom Vanderbilt GENERICO SU TUTTO IL LIBRO

Traffic by Tom Vanderbilt
You have 208 highlighted passages
You have 167 notes
Last annotated on March 17, 2017
Chapter One Why Does the Other Lane Always Seem Faster? How Traffic Messes with Our HeadsRead more at location 351
Note: 1@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit
Shut Up, I Can’t Hear You: Anonymity, Aggression, and the Problems of Communicating While DrivingRead more at location 353
Note: t Edit
HORN BROKEN. WATCH FOR FINGER. —bumper stickerRead more at location 354
Are You Lookin’ at Me? Eye Contact, Stereotypes, and Social Interaction on the RoadRead more at location 521
Note: T Edit
Jay Phelan, an evolutionary biologist who works a few buildings over from Jack Katz at UCLA, often thinks about traffic as he pilots his motorcycle through Los Angeles. “We evolved in a world in which there were about a hundred people in the group you were in,” he says. “Every person you saw you had an ongoing relationship with.” Was that person good to you? Did they return the spear they borrowed last week? This way of getting along is called “reciprocal altruism.” You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours; we each do it because we think it will benefit us “down the road.” What happens in traffic, Phelan explains, is that even though we may be driving around Los Angeles with hundreds of thousands of anonymous others, in our ancient brains we are Fred Flintstones (albeit not driving with our feet), still inhabiting our little prehistoric village. “So when someone does something nice for you on the road, you’re processing it like, ‘Wow, I’ve got an ally now.’ The brain encodes it as the beginning of a long-term reciprocal relationship.”Read more at location 531
Note: FRED FLINSTON NELLA TESTA Edit
This sense of fairness might cause us to do things in traffic like aggressively tailgate someone who has done the same to us. We do this despite the costs to our own safety (we might crash, they might be homicidal) and the fact that we will never see the person we are punishing again.Read more at location 552
Note: ALTRUISMO AGGRESSIVO Edit
The Swiss economist Ernst Fehr and his colleagues have proposed a theory of “strong reciprocity,”36 which they define as “a willingness to sacrifice resources for rewarding fair and punishing unfair behavior even if this is costly and provides neither present nor future material rewards for the reciprocator.”Read more at location 560
Note: RECIPROCITA AGGRESSIVA Edit
So perhaps, as the economist Herbert Gintis suggests, certain forms of supposed “road rage” are good things.Read more at location 568
Note: RABBIA SULLA STRADA RABBIA COMUNITARIA Edit
Because eye contact is so absent in traffic, it can feel uncomfortable when it does happen. Have you ever been stopped at a light and “felt” someone in a neighboring car looking at you? It probably made you uneasy. The first reason for this is that it may violate the sense of privacy we feel in traffic.Read more at location 581
Note: SENSO DELLA PRIVACY Edit
When you need to do something like change lanes, however, eye contact is a key traffic signal.Read more at location 590
Note: INTESA E COOPERAZIONE GUARDANDOSI NEGLI OCCHI Edit
Many studies have confirmed this: Eye contact greatly increases the chances of gaining cooperation in various experimental games (it worked for Seinfeld’s George, by the way). Curiously, the eyes do not even need to be real. One study showed that the presence of cartoon eyes on a computer screen made people give more money to another unseen player than when the eyes were not present.40 In another study, researchers put photographs of eyes above an “honor system” coffee machine in a university break room.41Read more at location 593
Note: FORZA DELLO SGUARDO Edit
Waiting in Line, Waiting in Traffic: Why the Other Lane Always Moves FasterRead more at location 761
waits.” Think of ramp meters, those signals that delay drivers’ entrance onto the freeway. Drivers fume: Why should I have to wait on the ramp while the freeway is moving? One study found that people thought of waiting on the ramp as 1.6 to 1.7 times “more onerous” than waiting on the highway itself.68 The more people understand the purpose of ramp meters (which I will discuss in Chapter 4), the less bothersome the wait becomes. This relates to proposition no. 5: “Unexplained waits are longer than explained waits.” Hence our frustration when we find no “cause” for a traffic jam. If we know there is an accident or construction, the delay is easier to process. Proposition no. 8 is appropriate, too: “Solo waiting feels longer than group waiting.”Read more at location 790
Note: RAMP METER: EVITARE L'ATTRITO SENZA CONTATTO (VEDI RISO) Edit
Chapter Two Why You’re Not as Good a Driver as You Think You AreRead more at location 972
Note: 2@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit
If Driving Is So Easy, Why Is It So Hard for a Robot? What Teaching Machines to Drive Teaches Us About DrivingRead more at location 973
Note: t Edit
For those of us who aren’t brain surgeons, driving is probably the most complex everyday thing we do.Read more at location 977
Note: INCASINATISSIMO Edit
Engineers call the moment when we’re too close to the amber light to stop and yet too far to make it through without catching some of the red phase the “dilemma zone.” And a dilemma it is.Read more at location 1036
Note: DILEMMA DEL SEMAFORO Edit
In traffic, these sorts of dilemma zones occur all the time.Read more at location 1049
Note: C Edit
How’s My Driving? How the Hell Should I Know? Why Lack of Feedback Fails Us on the RoadRead more at location 1091
Note: t Edit
What if there was an eBay-like system of “reputation management” for traffic? This idea was raised in a provocative paper by Lior J. Strahilevitz,Read more at location 1107
Note: REPUTAZIONE COME SU E BAY Edit
Less ambitious and official versions of this have been tried.16 The Web site Platewire.com, which was begun, in the words of its founder, “to make people more accountable for their actions on the roadways in one forum or another,” gives drivers a place to lodge complaints about bad drivers, along with the offenders’ license plate numbers; posts chastise “Too Busy Brushing Her Hair” in California and “Audi A-hole” in New Jersey. Much less frequently, users give kudos to good drivers.Read more at location 1126
Note: ESEMPI CONCRETI Edit
Monty Python: “We Are All Above Average!” Psychologists have called this phenomenon “optimistic bias” (or the “above-average effect”), and it is still something of a mystery why we do it. It might be that we want to make ourselves out to be better than others in a kind of downward comparison, the way the people in line in the first chapter assessed their own well-being by turning around to look at those lesser beings at the back of the queue. Or it might be the psychic crutch we need to more confidently face driving, the most dangerous thing19 most of us will ever do.Read more at location 1143
Note: OPTIMISTIC BIAS Edit
Chapter Three How Our Eyes and Minds Betray Us on the RoadRead more at location 1401
Note: 3@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit
Keep Your Mind on the Road: Why It’s So Hard to Pay Attention in TrafficRead more at location 1403
Note: t Edit
You realize, with a mixture of wonder and horror, that you cannot remember what you have been doing for the past few moments—nor do you know how long you have been “out.”Read more at location 1407
Note: BLIND SPOT Edit
“How did I get here?”Read more at location 1409
“highway hypnosis”Read more at location 1410
“time-gap experience,Read more at location 1410
What is also unclear is how much attention we were actually paying to the road while under the spell of highway hypnosisRead more at location 1413
Note: QUANTA ATTWNZIONE Edit
Why is it so hard to pay attention while we are driving?Read more at location 1420
Driving, for most of us, is what psychologists call an “overlearned” activity. It is something we’re so well practiced at that we’re able to do it without much conscious thought.Read more at location 1421
Note: OVERLEARNED Edit
the better we become at it, the less we think of each individual step.Read more at location 1424
Note: MANY STEP Edit
The more overlearned an activity becomes, the less cognitive workload it imposes—Read more at location 1430
Note: WORKLOAD Edit
Too little workload has its own problems. We get bored. We get tired. We lapse into highway hypnosis. We may make errors.Read more at location 1438
Note: NOIA Edit
Most driving rarely requires our full workload. So we listen to the radio, look out the window, or, increasingly, talk on the cell phone or read text messages—in the case of one fatal crash in California, the driver may have been operating a laptop computer as he drove.Read more at location 1443
Note: IMPEGNARSI ALTROVE Edit
This raises another point: Researchers look at how driving is affected when people do other things, but research also shows that secondary tasks suffer as well. We become worse drivers and worse talkers.Read more at location 1454
Note: CATTIVI PARLATORI Edit
It’s like speed-reading. You think you can read really fast but your comprehension disappears.Read more at location 1459
Note: SPEED READING Edit
we buy into the myth of multitasking with little actual knowledge of how much we can really add in or, as with the television news, how much we are missing.Read more at location 1464
Note: MITO MULTITASKING Edit
The sources of distraction inside a car have been painstakingly logged by researchers. We know that the average driver adjusts their radio 7.4 times per hour of driving, that their attention is diverted 8.1 times per hour by infants, and that they search for something—sunglasses, breath mints, change for the toll—10.8 times per hour.8 Research has further revealed just how many times we glance off the road to do these things and how long each glance takes: In general, the average driver looks away from the road for .06 seconds9 every 3.4 seconds.Read more at location 1481
Note: DISTRAZIONI Edit
The drivers were redistributing workload. With more of their attention devoted to a cell phone conversation, they may have had to work just a bit harder to stay in their lane;Read more at location 1518
Note: REDISTRIBUIRE Edit
Something similar happens with very new drivers on highways: So much of their mental concentration is devoted to simply staying in the lane, they have trouble paying attention to their speed.Read more at location 1524
Note: REDISTRIBUIRE L ATTENZIONE Edit
“If drivers are in an area that they already know, they almost don’t even see the sign, because they already know it’s there,” Andersen said.Read more at location 1556
Note: ZONE FAMILIARI Edit
Inattentional blindness, it has been suggested, is behind an entire category of crashes in traffic,Read more at location 1583
Note: INAT BLIND. CONCENTR SU ALTRO. GORILLA Edit
Objects in Traffic Are More Complicated Than They Appear: How Our Driving Eyes Deceive UsRead more at location 1706
Note: t Edit
Try to picture, for a moment, the white stripes that divide the lanes on a major highway. How long would you guess they are? How much space would you say lies between each stripe? When first asked this question,Read more at location 1707
Note: EFFETTI OTTICI CHE INGANNANO Edit
I use this as a simple example of how what we see is not always what we get as we move in the unnaturally high speeds of traffic.Read more at location 1713
Note: VISIONE IN MOV Edit
As the naturalist Robert Winkler points out, creatures like hawks, whose eyes possess a much faster “flicker fusion rate” than humans’, can track small prey from high above as they dive at well over 100 miles per hour.50 The short answer is that we cheat.Read more at location 1715
Note: FALCHI Edit
What we see while driving is a visually impoverished view of the world.Read more at location 1720
you notice their bumper sticker: IF YOU CAN READ THIS, YOU’RE TOO CLOSE).Read more at location 1725
Traffic illusionsRead more at location 1729
the spokes on a car’s wheels sometimes seem to be moving “backward.” This so-called wagon-wheelRead more at location 1730
we perceive the world not as a continuous flow but in a series of discrete and sequential “frames.”Read more at location 1739
Note: Wagon WHEEL Edit
in some places, engineers have tried to exploit this by employing “illusory pavement markings”54 to make drivers think they are going faster than they are.Read more at location 1760
Note: ILLUSIONE VELOCITÁ Edit
These experiments have been focused on exit ramps because they are a statistically dangerous part of the highway.Read more at location 1766
Note: c Edit
“speed adaptation.”Read more at location 1767
Have you ever noticed, when driving from a rural highway onto a village road with a lower speed limit, how absolutely slow it feels?Read more at location 1767
Note: SPEED ADAPT Edit
The longer we drive at high speeds, the harder it is for us to slow down.Read more at location 1769
Note: c Edit
the “treadmill effect.”Read more at location 1773
Chapter Four Why Ants Don’t Get into Traffic Jams (and Humans Do): On Cooperation as a Cure for CongestionRead more at location 1940
Note: t Edit
Meet the World’s Best Commuter: What We Can Learn from Ants, Locusts, and CricketsRead more at location 1941
Note: t Edit
In both insect and human vehicular traffic, large patterns contain all kinds of hidden interactions. A subtle change in these interactions can dramatically affect the whole system.Read more at location 2001
Note: PICCOLI CAMBIAMENTI Edit
the New World army ant, or Eciton burchellii, and these insects may just be the world’s best commuters. Army ant colonies are like mobile cities, boasting populations that can number over a million. Each dawn, the ants set out to earn their trade. The morning rush hour begins a bit groggily, but it quickly takes shape.Read more at location 2015
Note: IL MIGLIOR TRAFFICO DEL MONDO Edit
The secret to the ridiculous efficiency of army ant traffic is that, unlike traveling locusts—and humans—the ants are truly cooperative.Read more at location 2038
Note: SEGRETO. COOP Edit
What about merging?Read more at location 2045
How are the ants at this difficult task?Read more at location 2046
That Oscar afternoon was a small but perfect illustration of how complicated human traffic is when compared to ant traffic.Read more at location 2107
Note: TANTI SCOPI PIÙ COMPLICAZ Edit
Ants have evolved over countless centuries to move with a seamless synchronicity that will benefit the entire colony.Read more at location 2108
Note: MILLENNI Edit
Los Angeles, like all cities, is essentially a noncooperative network.Read more at location 2113
Take traffic signals. It’s common to hear drivers in Los Angeles, as elsewhere, lament, “Why can’t they time the signals so they’re all green?” The obvious problem with so-called synchronized signals is that there is a driver moving in a different direction asking the same thing.Read more at location 2116
Note: PROBLEMI DI SINCRO Edit
Engineers can use sophisticated models to squeeze as much “signal progression” as possible out of a network, to give the driver the “green wave.”Read more at location 2122
Note: MODELLI SIMCR Edit
To further complicate matters, there are, even in Los Angeles, pedestrians.Read more at location 2135
Note: PEDONI Edit
As a profession, traffic engineering has historically tended to treat pedestrians like little bits of irritating sand gumming up the works of their smoothly humming traffic machines.Read more at location 2137
Note: c Edit
Engineers at Caltrans say that as a rule of thumb, for every one minute a highway lane is blocked, an additional four to five minutes of delay are generated.Read more at location 2183
Note: BLOCCO AMPLIF Edit
the story is that there is no story,Read more at location 2191
Note: PERCHÈ CI SIAMO FERMATI! Edit
He can tell which way a rainstorm is moving by looking at the real-time traffic-flow highway maps. He knows Fridays heading east out of the city can be particularly bad. “Everyone’s going to Las Vegas—all the way to ten p.m. that’ll be backed up.” He knows that people drive slower on highway stretches that have sound barriers to either side. He knows that mornings with heavy rains often lead to lighter afternoon traffic.Read more at location 2205
Note: IL MAGO Edit
When Slower Is Faster, or How the Few Defeat the Many: Traffic Flow and Human NatureRead more at location 2267
Note: t Edit
ramp meters,Read more at location 2272
This is one of the most basic, and often overlooked, facts about traffic: That which is best for an individual’s interest may not be best for the common good.Read more at location 2275
Note: LEGGE Edit
The first efforts merely tried to model the process known as “car following.” This is based on the simple fact that the way you drive is affected by whether or not someone is in front of you, and how far away or close they are.Read more at location 2282
Note: CAR FOLLOWING Edit
you’re influenced by the driver ahead,Read more at location 2284
Do you feel uncomfortable driving next to someone else, and therefore speed up or slow down? Are you sometimes willing, for no apparent reason, to ride quite close to the car in front, before gradually drifting back?Read more at location 2290
Note: CAR FOLLOWING - della serie non siamo formiche, ci spaventiamo troppo o troppo poco - l'attrito di chi non si tocca Edit
A study that looked into how closely passenger-car drivers followed SUVs found that car drivers, contrary to what they said they did—and despite the fact that the SUV was blocking their view of the traffic ahead—actually drove closer to SUVs than when they followed passenger cars.Read more at location 2293
Note: PIÙ ATTACCATI SE È UN SUV Edit
Los Gatos effect,Read more at location 2295
You may have experienced this: Drivers seem reluctant to abandon the passing lane and join the lane of trucks chugging uphill, even when they are being pressured by other drivers, and even when the other lane is not crowded. What’s going on? Drivers may not want to give up the fast lane for fear of having trouble returning to it. They may also be unsure whether the person behind truly wants to go faster or is just keeping a tight space to prevent someone else from passing.Read more at location 2296
Note: CODE A SINISTRA - della serie non siamo formiche ma ingannati dall'istinto Edit
One of the idiosyncrasies I have noticed in traffic flow is something I call “passive-aggressive passing.” You’re in the passing lane when suddenly the driver behind you pressures you to move into the slower right-hand lane. After you have done so, they then move into your lane, in front of you, and slow down, thus forcing you to pass them.Read more at location 2300
Note: IL SORPASSO PASSIVO - non siamo formiche Edit
Ramp metering aims to keep the highway’s “main-line flow”Read more at location 2321
This means not only more cars but more cars jockeying to merge.Read more at location 2323
“That [merging] eventually breaks down the right lane,”Read more at location 2324
A line of cars waiting to exit an off-ramp can trigger this same chain reaction, one study showed, even when all the other lanes were flowing nowhere near critical density.Read more at location 2326
Note: SPOSTAMENTI PER INSERIMENTO Edit
A simple way to see this in action involves rice. Take a liter of rice and pour it, all at once, through a funnel and into an empty beaker. Note how long it takes. Next, take the same rice and pour it not all at once but in a smooth, controlled flow, and time that process. Which liter of rice gets through more quickly?Read more at location 2330
Note: L ANALOGIA DEL RISO Edit
Rice has more to do with traffic than you might think. Many people use water analogies when talking about traffic, because it’s a great way to describe concepts like volume and capacity.Read more at location 2335
Note: c Edit
bottlenecks,Read more at location 2343
The inflow of rice exceeds the capacity of the funnel opening. The system gets denser and denser. Particles spend more time touching one another. More rice touches more rice.Read more at location 2350
Note: CONTATTO Edit
Pouring less rice at a time—or moving fewer cars—keeps more space, and fewer interactions, between the grains.Read more at location 2354
Note: c Edit
The “slower is faster” idea shows up often in traffic. The classic example concerns roundabouts.Read more at location 2362
Note: ROTONDE Edit
a properly designed roundabout can reduce delays by up to 65 percent over an intersection with traffic signals or stop signs. Sure, an individual driver who has a green light may fly through a signalized intersection much more quickly than through a roundabout. Roughly half the time, however, the light will not be green; and even if it is green there is often a rolling queue of vehicles just starting up from the previous red. Add to this such complications as left-turn arrows, which prevent the majority of drivers from moving, not to mention the “clearance phase,” that capacity-deadening moment when all lights must be red, to make sure everyone has cleared the intersection.Read more at location 2363
Note: c Edit
Note: c Edit
The first cars in a queue squander an average of two seconds each, two seconds that would not have been lost had the car sailed through at the “saturation-flow” rate.Read more at location 2378
Note: TEMPI DI REAZIONE Edit
Chapter Five Why Women Cause More Congestion Than Men (and Other Secrets of Traffic)Read more at location 2482
Note: 5 Edit
Who Are All These People? The Psychology of CommutingRead more at location 2483
Note: tg Edit
You’re not stuck in a traffic jam. You are the traffic jam. —advertisement in GermanyRead more at location 2484
Note: cit Edit
most people, the world over, spend roughly the same amount of time each day getting to where they need to go. Whether the setting is an African village or an American city, the daily round-trip commute clocks in at about 1.1 hours.Read more at location 2486
Note: 1 ORA Edit
One striking thing the numbers seem to reveal is that women now make the largest contribution to congestion.Read more at location 2542
Note: DONNE CHE INTASANO Edit
Many of us can remember or envision a time when the typical commute involved Dad driving to the office while Mom took careRead more at location 2546
Note: PRIMA UN AFFARE TRA MASCHI Edit
American families had only one car,Read more at location 2547
in 1950 women made up 28 percent of the workforce. Today, that figure is 48 percent.Read more at location 2551
Note: OCCUPAZ Edit
you wouldn’t see these astonishing increases in traffic congestion in all indices of travel if women weren’t in the labor force, driving.”Read more at location 2554
Note: NIENTE TRAFFICO SENZA DONNE Edit
In the 1950s, studies revealed that about 40 percent of daily trips per capita were “work trips.” Now the nationwide figure is roughly 16 percent.10 It’s not that people are making fewer trips to work but that they’re making so many other kinds of trips. What kinds of trips?Read more at location 2557
Note: VIAGGI DI LAVORO Edit
Taking the kids to school or day care or soccer practice, eating out, picking up dry cleaning. In 1960, the average American drove 20.64 miles a day. By 2001, that figure was over 32 miles.Read more at location 2559
Note: ALTRI VIAGGI. PER LO PIÙ DONNE CON BIMBI Edit
The Parking Problem: Why We Are Inefficient Parkers and How This Causes CongestionRead more at location 2710
Note: t Edit
The next time you find yourself at a shopping mall or a store with a large parking lot where the store entrance more or less divides the lot in half by width, take a moment to observe how the cars are arrayed. Unless the lot is completely filled, you may be able to observe a common pattern. Chances are, the row that is dead opposite the store entrance will be the most filled, with cars stretching far out along the row. In each adjacent row, there are likely to be slightly fewer cars. This pattern will continue sequentially in each row so that if one were able to gaze down at the lot from above (as anyone can with Google Earth), the cluster of cars might look, depending on the lot’s occupancy, like a giant Christmas tree or, perhaps, like a bell.Read more at location 2714
Note: COME SI PARCHEGGIA: DAVANTI ALLA PORTA. MAGARI LONTANO MA DAVANTI ALLA PORTA. PERCHé? PERCHE EDECIDIAMO DI PARCHEGGIARE NEL POSTO MIGLIORE MA POI, QUANDO SIAMO NELLA CORSIA, PARCHEGGIAMO NEL POSTO MIGLIORE DELLA CORSIA. Edit
Whatever the case, something curious happens in parking lots. It seems that the people who actively look for the “best” parking place inevitably spend more total time getting to the store than those people who simply grab the first spot they see. This was the conclusion that Andrew Velkey, a psychology professor at Virginia’s Christopher Newport University, came to after he studied the behavior of parkers at a Wal-Mart in Mississippi.Read more at location 2725
Note: L'OSSESSIONE DEL PARCHEGGIARE AL POSTO GIUSTO Edit
Velkey wondered if a “gender effect” existed in the way women and men perceived distance and travel time (previous studies have arrived at mixed conclusions on this),51 So he gathered a group of subjects and had them estimate the distance to an object at varying locations, and then asked them to estimate the time it would take them to walk there. Men seemed to underestimate how long it would take to walk, while women seemed to overestimate it—which might explain the differences in parking strategies.Read more at location 2745
Note: GENDER GAP NELLE STRATEGIE DI PARCHEGGIO Edit
lot, Velkey saw two kinds of behavior emerge: an active and a passive search strategy. Some people would drive around the lot looking for a space, while others would sit at the head of a row and wait for someone to leave. In terms of the avian foraging models Velkey usually studied, the active searchers were like condors, soaring and looking for prey; the passive searchers, meanwhile, were like barn owls, perched and lying in wait.Read more at location 2756
Note: PARCHEGGIATORI ATTIVI E PASSIVI Edit
In our daily lives as parkers, we face these foraging questions. We must decide whether to act like condors or barn owls.Read more at location 2779
Note: CONDOR O GUFO? Edit
But neither animals nor humans always follow optimal strategies. One reason is that not enough information might be available—Read more at location 2788
Note: STRATEGIA OTTIMA Edit
The Nobel Prize–winning economist Herbert Simon has suggested, in a seminal theory he called “satisficing” (a mix of satisfying and suffice), that because it is so hard for humans to always behave in the optimal way, we tend to make choices that leave us not with the “best” result but a result that is “good enough.”58 To take the bell-curve parking patterns described earlier as an example, drivers may have entered the lot with a general goal of getting the “best” spot, that is, in the row closest to the entrance. Once they were in the row, however, the goal changed to getting the best spot in that row.Read more at location 2796
Note: NON OTTIMO MA SODDISFACENTE Edit
What you may not realize, when you find yourself driving on a crowded city street, is that many of your fellow drivers on that crowded street are simply cruising for parking.Read more at location 2824
Note: TRAFFICO DA PARCHEGGIO Edit
titled The High Cost of Free Parking.Read more at location 2827
Note: DONALD SHOUP Edit
Why More Roads Lead to More Traffic (and What to Do About It)Read more at location 2891
Note: 6@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit
The Selfish CommuterRead more at location 2892
Note: t Edit
When a road is once built, it is a strange thing how it collects traffic. —Robert Louis StevensonRead more at location 2893
Note: STEVE Edit
“latent demand.Read more at location 2910
Engineers have a phrase: “It’ll be all right by Friday.”2 This rough rule of thumb means that even if on Monday something major happens that throws off the usual traffic patterns—a road is closed, a temporary detour set up—by the next Friday (or so) enough people should have reacted to the change in some way to bring the system back to something resembling normal.Read more at location 2915
Note: CI SI ADATTA A TUTTO. VENERDÌ TUTTO COME PRIMA Edit
Things are going to keep balancing.Read more at location 2919
The instant that this line is finished there will arise a demand for other lines.”Read more at location 2928
Note: DOMANDA LATENTE Edit
Do we build more roads because there are more people and more traffic, or does building those roads create a “special traffic all its own”?Read more at location 2930
Note: DILEMMA Edit
studies suggest that induced travel is real:Read more at location 2933
If you do not believe that new roads bring new drivers, consider what happens when roads are taken away.Read more at location 2940
Note: BLOCCHI Edit
“disappearing traffic,”Read more at location 2942
There is another way, a bit more subtle and complicated, that new roads can cause more traffic: the Braess paradox.Read more at location 2987
Note: BRAESS Edit
German mathematician, Dietrich Braess.Read more at location 2989
the paradox he discovered says that adding a new road to a transportation network, rather than making things better, may actually slow things down for all its users (even if, unlike in the “latent demand” example, no new drivers have been induced onto the roads).Read more at location 2989
Note: AIL PARADOSSO Edit
First, imagine there are two roads running from one city to another. There is Sure Thing Street, a two-lane local street that always takes an hour. Then there is Take a Chance Highway, where the trip can be half an hour if it’s not crowded, but otherwise also takes an hour. Since most people feel lucky, they get on Take a Chance Highway—and end up spending an hour. From the point of view of the individual driver, this behavior makes sense.Read more at location 2995
Note: INTUITO Edit
If you cannot improve your situation, why move to a different road?Read more at location 3001
Note: c Edit
when everyone does what is best for him- or herself, they’re not doing what is best for everyone.Read more at location 3002
Note: c Edit
On the other hand, if a traffic cop stood at the junction of the two roads and directed half the drivers to Sure Thing Street and half to Take a Chance Highway, the drivers on Sure Thing Street would get home no sooner, but the highway drivers would get home twice as fast. Overall, the total travel time would drop.Read more at location 3003
Note: c Edit
imagine again the two hypothetical roads I mentioned, but this time imagine that halfway between the two cities, Take a Chance Highway (where the trip takes less than an hour by however many fewer drivers choose it) becomes like Sure Thing Street (always an hour), and vice versa.Read more at location 3006
Note: c Edit
But now imagine that a bridge is built connecting the two roads, right at the halfway point where Take a Chance becomes Sure Thing, and vice versa. Now drivers who began on Take a Chance Highway and found that it was not so good take the bridge to the other Take a Chance Highway segment. Meanwhile, drivers who began on Sure Thing Street are not about to cross the bridge and move to the other Sure Thing Street when, instead, they could stick around as their road becomes Take a Chance Highway (who knows, they might get lucky). The problem is that if everyone tries to do what they think is the best thing for themselves, the actual travel time for all drivers goes up! The new link, designed to reduce congestion, has made things worse. The reason lies in what computer scientist Tim Roughgarden has called “selfish routing.”Read more at location 3009
Note: c Edit
Note: c Edit
This really brings us to the heart of traffic congestion. We are “selfish commuters”Read more at location 3017
Note: EGO Edit
A Few Mickey Mouse Solutions to the Traffic ProblemRead more at location 3053
Note: t Edit
98% OF U.S. COMMUTERS FAVOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FOR OTHERS —headline in the OnionRead more at location 3054
So how can traffic congestion, this age-old dilemma, be solved? “Build more roads!” is a typical answer.Read more at location 3056
Note: RISPOSTA TIPICA Edit
But even if we could afford to build more roads, that might not be the best way to spend the money.Read more at location 3064
Note: COMMENTO ALLA RISPOSTA TIPICA Edit
The economist Thomas Schelling points out that when each driver slows to look at an accident scene for ten seconds, it does not seem egregious because they have already waited ten minutes. But that ten minutes arose from everyone else’s ten seconds.Read more at location 3091
Note: CURIOSI E AMPLIFICAZIONE Edit
In traffic, the basic model has been a state-subsidized, all-you-can-eat salad bar.Read more at location 3120
Note: LOGICA DEL BUFFET LOGICA DEL TRAFFICO Edit
Later, the Nobel Prize–winning economist William Vickrey led a long, lonely crusade to get people to accept the idea that urban roads are a scarce resource and should be priced accordingly. After all, as Vickrey pointed out in 1963, hotels charge more for in-season rooms, railways and airlines charge more for peak travel periods, and telephone companies charge more during the times when more people are likely to call—why should roads not cost more when more people want to use them?42 (Vickrey was a bit ahead of his time: Told in the early 1960s that there was no way to track where people drove, or how much they drove, Vickrey, the story goes, built a cheap radio transmitter and installed it in his car, displaying the results to friends.)43 Congestion charging, in cities like London and Stockholm, has been shown to work because it forces people to make a decisionRead more at location 3126
Note: PEDAGGIO Edit
Once the tolls kicked in, things really began to change: People left sooner, took different routes, took buses, “collapsed” trips into shorter bundles. “The reality which is emerging is that I think people are very intelligent agents, working on their own behalf,” he said. “They understand the unique trade-off they face between time and money. The range of response is extremely broad. For instance, my willingness to pay to save ten minutes today might be very different than tomorrow.”Read more at location 3152
Note: IL PEDAGGIO CONTRO LA PIGRIZIA Edit
Cities like London are, in effect, learning from Disneyland.Read more at location 3182
Note: CITTA MAESTRA Edit
Early on, Disney realized that as the park grew in popularity, managing the queues of people would prove difficult, particularly on the marquee attractions like Space Mountain. What could you do? Disney could take the approach of our traffic networks, which is simply to let an inefficient kind of equilibrium take hold. Let people wait, and if the line is too long, they may decide on their own not to get in line (or get on the highway), and thus be diverted to other rides (roads). The queue will regulate itself.Read more at location 3193
Note: SOLUZIONE DISNEY Edit
Disney tried a form of congestion pricing. It issued ticket books in which the tickets’ values reflected the capacity of the rides. Popular rides like Space Mountain required E tickets, which were more expensive than A tickets, good for tamer attractions like the Horseless Carriage on Main Street. The idea was not only to prevent people from simply lining up for the top attractions but to spread people out across the park, avoiding traffic jams at places like Space Mountain.Read more at location 3202
Note: C Edit
Disney finally hit upon the ultimate solution in 1999, when it introduced the FastPass, the system that gives the customer a ticket telling them when to show up at the ride. What FastPass essentially does is exploit the idea that networks function both in space and in time. Rather than waiting in line, the user waits in a “virtual queue,” in time rather than space, and can in the meantime move on to other, less crowded rides (or buy stuff). People can take a chance on the stand-by line, or they can have an assured short wait if they can simply hold off until their assigned time. Obviously, FastPass could not literally work on the highway. Drivers do not want to pull up to a tollbooth and be told, “Come back at two-thirty p.m.” But in principle, congestion pricing works the same way, by redirecting demand on the network in time.Read more at location 3214
Note: FAST PASS Edit
Shreckenberg calls this the “self-destroying prognosis.” In his office at the University of Duisburg-Essen, he points to a highway map with its roads variously lit up in free-flowing green or clogged red. “The prognosis says that this road becomes worse in one hour,” he says. “Many people look at that and say, ‘Oh, don’t use the A3.’ Then they go somewhere else. The jam will not occur since everyone turned to another way. This is a problem.” These sorts of oscillations could happen with even short lags in information, in what Shreckenberg calls the “ping-pong effect.” Imagine there are two routes. Drivers are told that one is five minutes faster. Everyone shifts to that route. By the time the information is updated, the route that everyone got on is now five minutes slower. The other road now becomes faster, but it quickly succumbs to the same problem.Read more at location 3281
Note: ALTERNATIVA: INFORMARE? NO. IL PROBLEMA ONDA VERDE Edit
Chapter Seven When Dangerous Roads Are SaferRead more at location 3332
Note: 7@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit
The Highway Conundrum: How Drivers Adapt to the Road They SeeRead more at location 3333
Note: t Edit
The Trouble with Traffic Signs–and How Getting Rid of Them Can Make Things Better for EveryoneRead more at location 3521
Note: t Edit
Forgiving Roads or Permissive Roads? The Fatal Flaws of Traffic EngineeringRead more at location 3873
Chapter Eight How Traffic Explains the World: On Driving with a Local AccentRead more at location 3996
Note: 8@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit
“Good Brakes, Good Horn, Good Luck”: Plunging into the Maelstrom of Delhi TrafficRead more at location 3997
Note: t Edit
“Delhi has forty-eight modes of transport, each struggling to occupy the same space on the carriageway. What other city is like this?”Read more at location 4004
Note: DEHLY 48 Edit
a motorized maelstrom.Read more at location 4006
They lurch, belch smoke, and ceaselessly toot their pressure horns.Read more at location 4008
“Horn Please,”Read more at location 4009
“Horn Please” originally invited following drivers to honk if they wanted to pass the slower-moving, lane-hogging trucks on the narrower roads of the past, and I was told that it endures merely as a decorative tradition.Read more at location 4010
Note: HORN PLEASE Edit
a cacophony of claxonsRead more at location 4011
The most striking feature of Delhi traffic is the occasional presence of a cow or two, often lying idly in the median strip, feet away from traffic.Read more at location 4022
Note: VACCHE Edit
Delhi drivers have a chronic tendency to stray between lanes, most alarmingly those flowing in the opposite direction.Read more at location 4032
Note: DIFETTUCCI Edit
Delhi, where the unexpected perversely becomes the expected.Read more at location 4053
There are nearly 110 million traffic violations per day in Delhi,Read more at location 4054
Why New Yorkers Jaywalk (and Why They Don’t in Copenhagen): Traffic as CultureRead more at location 4085
Note: t Edit
One of the first things that strikes a visitor to a new country is the traffic.Read more at location 4086
Note: TURISTI Edit
It’s the reason a horn in Rome does not mean the same thing as a horn in Stockholm, why flashing your headlights at another driver is understood one way on the German autobahn and quite another way on the 405 in Los Angeles, why people jaywalk constantly in New York and hardly at all in Copenhagen.Read more at location 4096
Note: IL TRAFFICO È CULTURA Edit
Danger: Corruption Ahead–the Secret Indicator of Crazy TrafficRead more at location 4376
Note: t Edit
In 1951, some 852 people were killed on the roads in China. In the United States in that year, 35,309 people were killed in traffic. In 1999, traffic fatalities in China had risen to nearly 84,000.31 The U.S. figure, meanwhile, was 41,508. The population of both countries had almost doubled in that time. Why did fatalities rise so much higher in China than in the United States? The answer lies in the number of vehicles in each country. In 1951, there were about 60,000 motor vehicles in China, while in the United States, there were roughly 49 million.32 By 1999, when China had 50 million vehicles, the United States had over 200 million—four times as many.Read more at location 4376
Note: CINA E USA Edit
What Smeed’s law showed was that, across a number of countries, ranging from the United States to New Zealand, the number of people killed on the roads tended to rise as the number of cars on the road began to rise—up to a point—and then, gradually if not totally uniformly, the fatality rates began to drop, as, generally, did the absolute numbers of fatalities.Read more at location 4385
Note: LEGGE DI SMEED Edit
The nations that rank as the least corrupt—such countries as Finland, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, and Singapore—are also the safest places in the world to drive.Read more at location 4480
Note: CORRUZIONE E SICUREZZA Edit
Nine Why You Shouldn’t Drive with a Beer-Drinking Divorced Doctor Named Fred on Super Bowl Sunday in a Pickup Truck in Rural Montana: What’s Risky on the Road and WhyRead more at location 4616
Note: 9@@@@@@@@@@@ RISCHIO Edit
Semiconscious Fear: How We Misunderstand the Risks of the RoadRead more at location 4619
Note: t COSA CI SUCCEDE NEL CERVELLO Edit
When we are in traffic, we all become on-the-fly risk analysts. We are endlessly having to make snap decisions in fragments of moments, about whether it is safe to turn in front of an oncoming car, about the right speed to travel on a curve, about how soon we should apply the brakes when we see a cluster of brake lights in the distance. We make these decisions not with some kind of mathematical probability in the back of our heads—I have a 97.5 percent chance of passing this car successfully—but with a complicated set of human tools.Read more at location 4644
Note: FLASH RISK ANALYST Edit
In most cases, when cars and trucks collide, the car bears the greater share of what are called “contributory factors.” This was the surprising conclusion that Daniel Blower, a researcher at the University of Michigan Transport Research Institute, came to after sifting through two years’ worth of federal crash data.Read more at location 4660
Note: CAMIONISTI E AUTOMOB Edit
the reason trucks are dangerous seems to have more to do with the actions of car driversRead more at location 4672
Note: c Edit
Should I Stay or Should I Go? Why Risk on the Road Is So ComplicatedRead more at location 4692
Note: t Edit
“risk as analysis,”Read more at location 4693
“risk as feelings.”Read more at location 4696
It was smart of the Detroit driver to feel risk from the truck next to him, but the instinctual fear response doesn’t always help us.Read more at location 4699
Note: L ISTINTO DEL PERICOLO TRADISCE Edit
In collisions between cars and deer, for example, the greatest risk to the driver comes in trying to avoid hitting the animal.Read more at location 4700
Note: CERVI Edit
DON’T VEER WHEN YOU SEE A DEER.Read more at location 4702
This is why, it has been argued, it has long been difficult to convince people to drive in a safer manner. Each safe trip we take reinforces the image of a safe trip.Read more at location 4715
Note: SEMPRE RASSICURATI Edit
“traffic fatalities are by far the most important contributor to the danger of leaving home.”Read more at location 4720
Note: MAX RISK Edit
Saturday and SundayRead more at location 4732
In other words, just two nights accounted for a majority of the week’s deaths in that time period.Read more at location 4733
Note: Sabato DOMENICA Edit
fatal crashes occur much less often during rush hours;Read more at location 4737
Note: FATAL CRAH Edit
8 of every 1,000 crashes that happened outside the peak hours were fatal, while during the rush hour the number dropped to 3 out of every 1,000.Read more at location 4738
Note: c Edit
What’s so striking about the massive numbers of fatalities on weekend mornings is the fact that so few people are on the roads, and so many—estimates are as high as 25 percent—have been drinking.Read more at location 4744
Note: WEEK END Edit
The economists Steven D. Levitt and Jack Porter have argued that legally drunk drivers between the hours of eight p.m. and five a.m. are thirteen times more likely than sober drivers to cause a fatal crash, and those with legally acceptable amounts of alcohol are seven times more likely. Of the 11,000 drunk-driving fatalities in the period they studied, the majority—8,000—were the drivers and the passengers, while 3,000 were other drivers (the vast majority of whom were sober). Levitt and Porter argue that the appropriate fine for drunk driving in the United States, tallying up the externalities that it causes, should be about $8,000.Read more at location 4751
Note: MULTA UBRIACHI Edit
The most important risk factor, one that is subtly implicated in all the others, is speed. In a crash, the risk of dying rises with speed.Read more at location 4762
Note: VELOCITÁ Edit
Solomon curve,Read more at location 4774
Solomon found after examining crash records on various sections of rural highway, seemed to follow a U-shaped curve: They were lowest for drivers traveling at the median speed and sloped upward for those going more or less than the median speed.Read more at location 4775
Note: SOLOMON Edit
“low speed drivers are more likely to be involved in accidents than relatively high speed drivers.”Read more at location 4777
Note: c Edit
It’s not the actual speed itself that’s the safety problem, they insist, it’s speed variance.Read more at location 4780
Note: SPEED VARIANCE Edit
The Risks of SafetyRead more at location 4970
Note: t Edit
Be wary then; best safety lies in fear.Read more at location 4971
the insides of cars have been made radically safer. In the United States (and most other places), fewer people in cars die or are injured now than in the 1960s, even though more people drive more miles. But in an oft-repeated pattern with safety devices from seat belts75 to air bags, the actual drop in fatalities did not live up to the early hopes.Read more at location 4978
Note: PELTZMAN Edit
Were drivers trading a feeling of greater safety for more risk?Read more at location 4996
Note: COMPENSARE Edit
Describing what has since become known as the “Peltzman effect,” he argued that despite the fact that a host of new safety technologies—most notably, the seat belt—had become legally required in new cars, the roads were no safer. “Auto safety regulation,” he concluded, “has not affected the highway death rate.”Read more at location 5012
Note: EFFETTO PELTZ Edit
the increase in car safety had been “offset” by an increase in the fatality rate of people who did not benefit from the safetyRead more at location 5016
Note: c Edit
This gap between expected and achieved safety results might be explained by another theory, one that turns the risk hypothesis rather on its head. This theory, known as “selective recruitment,” says that when a seat-belt law is passed, the pattern of drivers who switch from not wearing seat belts to wearing seat belts is decidedly not random. The people who will be first in line are likely to be those who are already the safest drivers.Read more at location 5023
Note: SELECTIVE SELETTIVO AS Edit
The number of crashes went up, they found, while injuries went down.Read more at location 5040
I have always considered the act of wearing my seat belt not so much an incentive to drive more riskily as a grim reminder of my own mortality (some in the car industry fought seat belts early on for this reason). This doesn’t mean I’m immune from behavioral adaptation. Even if I cannot imagine how the seat belt makes me act more riskily, I can easily imagine how my behavior would change if, for some reason, I was driving a car without seat belts.Read more at location 5048
Note: CINTURE E COMPENSAZIONI Edit

Anatomia di una crisi

Come si esce da una crisi economica?
Cominciamo col dire che ci sono due tipi di crisi economiche.
C'è la crisi da domanda: la gente non spende più perché impaurita, per esempio da uno shock finanziario.
C'è poi la crisi da offerta: le imprese non vendono perché, per esempio, fanno a mano ciò che i concorrenti fanno con i robot.
Fortunatamente, l’economia canonica prescrive la stessa rivetta per uscire da entrambe le crisi: abbassare i salari.
Salari più bassi consentono di abbassare i prezzi e invogliare i clienti in modo da superare le crisi di domanda.
Salari più bassi sollecitano la migrazione dei lavoratori verso settori più produttivi in modo da superare le crisi dell'offerta.
Che ci vuole ad abbassare un salario? Semplice, no?
No. Abbassare i salari non è affatto semplice cosicché le crisi perdurano per decenni interi, come la Grande Depressione che colpì l' America negli anni trenta.
Il salario di solito si esprime come W (wage). Ma il salario deve tener conto dei prezzi (P) affinché possa indicare il potere d'acquisto. Il salario reale è quindi W/P.
Il salario può essere abbassato in due modi: abbassando W o alzando P.
Per abbassare W dobbiamo contare sull'imprenditore. Ma gli imprenditori deludono: non abbassano!
Non si sa perché ma non abbassano. Forse vogliono evitare il conflitto oppure non intendono demoralizzare i dipendenti, sta di fatto che preferiscono chiudere piuttosto che abbassare W. Questo è un dato di fatto, ognuno ci costruisca su la sua teoria.
Per alzare P dobbiamo invece contare sulla banca centrale. È lei che di solito che ha in mano le armi per creare non dico inflazione ma almeno aspettative inflazioniste (bastano quelle in fondo). Eppure, l'inflazione non è un fenomeno facile da controllare, se scappa di mano sono guai, per cui a volte la banca centrale – specie in quei paesi scottati in passato dall’inflazione -ci va con i piedi di piombo.
Keynes conclude: rassegniamoci, i salari sono incomprimibili. L’imprenditore non abbassa (minimo vitale) e la banca centrale è impotente (trappola della liquidità). Bisogna precedere altrimenti abbandonando il paradigma classico.
La sua proposta si fonda su un assunto forte: esistono solo crisi di domanda, le crisi di offerta sono illusorie (e comunque trascurabili).
Non può che partire da lì poiché la sua ricetta prevede di superare le crisi di domanda trasformandole in una crisi di offerta. In questo modo, se le crisi di offerta non esistono, il problema puo’ ben dirsi risolto.
Facciamo un esempio per capire. Supponiamo che il sistema sia in piena crisi: disoccupazione, povertà, sfiducia. Keynes propone: lo stato crei una domanda artificiosa (a debito), per esempio impegnandosi nella costruzione di autostrade. La proposta ha successo, tutti cominciano a costruire autostrade, tutti diventano asfaltatori ed esperti in bitumi: piena occupazione, ricchezza, fiducia... alé!
Poi il debito sale alle stelle e di autostrade c’è sovrabbondanza. Non c’è più bisogno di asfaltatori ma noi ormai siamo tutti asfaltatori specializzati in asfalti drenanti. Che si fa? Nulla, una crisi del genere è una crisi dell'offerta (sistema produttivo inadeguato alle reali esigenze della popolazione) ma le crisi dell'offerta non esistono per definizione. Keynes è un pragmatico: sposta in avanti il problema nella speranza che in qualche modo la rinnovata fiducia di sistema lo risolva da sé, il lungo periodo non lo interessa (“sul lungo periodo saremo tutti morti”).
Pesa di più il pragmatismo o la miopia keynesiana? Nel corso degli anni trenta Mussolini e il suo allievo Hitler hanno speso forte secondo la ricetta keynesiana. Non in autostrade ma in armamenti. La crisi che ha atterrato mezzo mondo è stata da loro brillantemente schivata. E poi? E poi è partita la guerra: l'apparato produttivo che si ritrovava la Germania, per esempio, era l'ideale per sostenere una simile impresa, la riconversione sarebbe costata lacrime e sangue sfociando nell'inevitabile crisi dell'offerta tipica della ricetta keynesiana. Guardando alla storia europea degli anni successivi possiamo ben dire che in questo caso ha pesato di più la miopia.
Molti studiosi ritengono che Keynes ci faccia cadere dalla padella nella brace e che sia necessario un passo indietro. In altri termini, forse non è poi così vero che i salari siano incomprimibili. Uno di questi studiosi è Scott Sumner.
Per Scott Summer, in particolare, la banca centrale può agire  su P in modo efficace e la politica del lavoro può almeno limitare l'aumento di W tenendo a bada i sindacati, o perlomeno non fornendo loro canali privilegiati attraverso cui agire.
L’esperimento naturale dove da sempre si fronteggiano le varie scuole macroeconomiche è costituito dalla Grande Depressione Americana seguita alla crisi di borsa del 1929. E’ su questo decennio che si concentra l’attenzione di Sumner.
Sumner – sulla base della sua analisi di quel periodo storico – ritiene che i keynesiani abbiano preso un granchio colossale nel giudicare inefficaci le politiche monetarie espansive, questo perché le hanno valutate nel momento in cui erano più esposte all’effetto controbilanciante (offsetting) delle politiche del lavoro tese ad incoraggiare W attraverso una forte azione sindacale e governativa.
E’ chiaro che se aumentano sia W che P l’effetto globale su W/P è nullo. 
***
Una delle cause del tracollo nell'analisi di Sumner...
... Many economists now see the initial contraction as being caused, or at least exacerbated, by monetary policy errors and/or defects in the international gold standard...
Si noti che il gold standard limita l'azione della banca centrale: per alzare P occorre emettere moneta, ma in regime di gold standard la cosa è possibile solo possedendo una adeguata riserva aurea. L'oro esiste in quantità limitata e, specie in periodi dove anche i privati intendono detenerlo come bene rifugio, avere riserve adeguate è difficile.
Quel che manca nei precedenti studi...
... But we still lack a convincing narrative of the many twists and turns in the economy between 1929 and 1940...
Il periodo americano dal 1929 al 1940 è una miniera di informazioni con i suoi 17 schock nella produzione industriale.
Tesi...
... I will show that if we take the gold market seriously we can explain much more about the Great Depression than anyone had thought possible...
I cambiamenti cruciali...
... changes in central bank demand for gold, private sector gold hoarding, and changes in the price of gold...
Poi c' è la politica (New Deal)...
... remaining output shocks are linked to five wage shocks that resulted from the New Deal...
La borsa registra fedelmente i cambiamenti di politica monetaria...
... financial market responses to the policy shocks of the 1930s were consistent with a gold market approach...
In questo senso è un termometro attendibile.
L'illustre precedente...
... In 1963, Friedman and Schwartz’s Monetary History of the United States seemed to provide the definitive account of the role of monetary policy in the Great Depression...
Ma il capolavoro ha un difettino...
... Friedman and Schwartz paid too little attention to the worldwide nature of the Depression, especially the role of the international gold standard...
Non sembra valorizzato il vero nodo...
... the complex interrelationship between gold, wages, and financial markets during the 1930s....
Ciò a consentito che ancora oggi circolino bufale sulla grande depressione. Almeno tre.
Prima...
... Assuming causality runs from financial panic to falling aggregate demand (rather than vice versa)...
Seconda...
... Assuming that sharply falling short-term interest rates and a sharply rising monetary base meant “easy money.”...
Terza...
... Assuming that monetary policy became ineffective once rates hit zero...
La spiacevole conseguenza di miti del genere...
... the view that Fed policy was “easy” during late 2008 was almost universal... we congratulate the Fed for avoiding the mistakes of the 1930s, even as it repeats many of those mistakes....
***
Il problema dei nessi è il problema eterno dello statistico. Qui, fortunatamente, abbiamo una risorsa che aiuta...
... financial markets respond immediately... there was an especially close correlation between news stories related to gold and/or wage legislation and financial market prices...
La sentenza individua due chiari colpevoli del disastro...
... The demand shocks were triggered by gold hoarding (or changes in the price of gold), and the supply shocks were caused by policy-driven changes in hourly wage rates....
livello internazionale la "stretta monetaria" dell'ottobre 1929 appare chiara...
... World monetary policy (as measured by changes in the gold reserve ratio) was stable between June 1928 and October 1929, and then tightened sharply over the following twelve months. It was this policy switch, perhaps combined with bearish sentiment from the reduced prospects for international monetary coordination, which triggered a sharp decline in aggregate demand...
La crisi tedesca del 1931 non va trascurata...
... The German economic crisis of 1931 was a key turning point in the Depression. It led to substantial private gold hoarding, and between mid-1931 and late 1932 strongly impacted U.S. equity markets...
L'errore di Keynes...
... Keynes suggested that the Fed’s spring 1932 open market purchases might have been ineffective due to the existence of a “liquidity trap.”... The open market purchases were associated with extensive gold hoarding, and this prevented any significant increase in the money supply...
Un errore del genere ha impedito ai keynesiani di capire gli anni settanta facendo così sparire un’illustre scuola macroeconomica (ormai Keynes piace solo ai politici spendaccioni e a qualche editorialista d’assalto)...
... A misinterpretation of two key policy initiatives, the open market purchases of 1932 and the NIRA, had a profound impact on macroeconomic theory during the twentieth century. Because early Keynesian theory was based on a misreading of these policies, it could not survive the radically altered policy environment of the postwar period...
Altro insegnamento: le aspettative contano più dei fatti...
... President Roosevelt instituted a dollar depreciation program in April 1933 with the avowed goal of raising the price level back to its 1926 level. This program was unique in U.S. history and was the primary factor behind both the 57 percent surge in industrial production between March and July 1933 and the 22 percent rise in the wholesale price level in the twelve months after March 1933. The initial recovery was triggered not by a preceding monetary expansion, but rather by expectations of future monetary expansion....
La sciagura delle politiche dei salari alti...
... The National Recovery Administration (NRA) adopted a high wage policy in July 1933, which sharply increased hourly wage rates. This policy aborted the recovery, led to a major stock market crash, and helped lengthen the Depression by six to seven years.... a second “Great Depression” began in late July 1933...
Le politiche espansive minate dall'incertezza dei comportamenti ondivaghi...
... The gold-buying program of late 1933... was essentially a monetary feedback rule aimed at returning prices to pre-Depression levels... Although the program helped promote economic recovery, it eventually became a major political issue and led key economic advisors to resign from the Roosevelt Administration...
L'uscita dal gold standard: una finta per almeno due anni...
... Although the conventional view is that Franklin D. Roosevelt took America off the gold standard, U.S. monetary policy became even more strongly linked to gold after 1934 than it had been before 1933. A recovery in the United States finally got underway when the Supreme Court declared the NIRA to be unconstitutional in mid-1935....
Per ogni politica buona c'è una politica cattiva: offsetting everywhere
... During 1937, the expansionary impact of gold dishoarding began to be offset by wage increases, which reflected the resurgence of unions after the Wagner Act and Roosevelt’s landslide reelection...
Casi esemplari di offsetting...
... Because the expansionary impact of dollar depreciation was largely offset by the contractionary impact of the NIRA wage codes, economic historians have greatly underestimated the importance of each shock considered in isolation...
Si tratta di compensazioni che fanno saltare l'edificio keynesiano...
... it is a model based on two assumptions, the ineffectiveness of monetary policy and the lack of a self-correcting mechanism in the economy. The first assumption confuses the two (unrelated) concepts of gold standard policy constraints and absolute liquidity preference. And Keynes’s stagnation hypothesis falsely attributes problems caused by government labor market regulations to inherent defects in free-market capitalism...
Averli trascurati troppo ha ripercussioni ancora oggi nella mentalità di molti analisti che ripetono gli errori di allora nel diagnosticare la crisi attuale...
... If the monetary model in this book is correct, then we have fundamentally misdiagnosed the stock and commodities market crashes of late 2008,... Unfortunately, just as contemporaneous observers misdiagnosed those earlier crashes, our modern policymakers attributed the current recession to financial market instability, rather than to the deeper problem of falling nominal expenditures caused by excessively tight monetary policy....
Come giudicare il New Deal di Roosevelt? Male. Timido in politica monetaria e disastroso in politica del lavoro. Schizoide tra passività e interventismo, senza un piano comprensibile ai mercati. Di fatto ha trascinato la crisi per un decennio, poi le guerre mondiali hanno spazzato via tutto...
... At the deepest level, the causes of the Great Depression and World War II are very similar—both events were generated by policymakers moving unpredictably between passivity and interventionism...
La variabile chiave dei salari...
... high frequency fluctuations in real wages during the 1930s were tightly correlated with movements in industrial production. Understanding real wage cyclicality is the key to understanding the Great Depression...
I gravi errori di Roosevelt...
... New Deal legislation led to five separate nominal wage shocks, which repeatedly aborted promising economic recoveries...
Ma perché un'analisi incentrata sul gold standard è tanto utile?...
... is even more useful during the first five years after the United States departed from the gold standard. Under an international gold standard, the domestic money supply, the interest rate, and gold flows are not reliable indicators of domestic monetary policy...
Solo guardando all'oro capiamo la cosa più difficile da capire in macroeconomia: se siamo in presenza di politiche monetarie espansive.
***
Torniamo al problema metodologico della causalità. Di solito il prima e il dopo è l'unica bussola che possediamo...
... Economists often look for leads and lags...
Per noi il problema è quello di identificare gli schock monetari.
Assumendo emh (efficient market hypothesis) i mercati finanziari - che reagiscono istantaneamente - forniscono il segnale più affidabile circa la politica monetaria.
Ma per molti emh è problematica, lo abbiamo visto quando - nel 2008 - si è interpretato il crollo sui mercati come l'esplosione di una bolla immobiliare anziché come un segnale di politiche monetarie restrittive.
Ad ogni modo anche molti simpatizzanti di emh invocano un approccio più eclettico, per esempio Deirdre McCloskey. Il riferimento è sempre al capolavoro...
... the most relevant example would be Friedman and Schwartz’s Monetary History. Their work combined an extremely detailed narrative, insightful theoretical analysis, and a wealth of descriptive statistics...
Le ragioni dell'ecclettismo sono fondate: nel momento in cui le aspettative contano più delle azioni il mondo dei media e delle notizie diventa cruciale...
... I develop a narrative of the Great Depression that relies heavily on the relationship between policy news and the financial markets...
Difficile capire i mercati senza conoscere le voci di corridoio che circolano in un Ministero.
Certo, per la statistica sarebbe meglio studiare 100 crisi piuttosto che una sola, ma la crisi americana degli anni trenta presenta una volatilità che ci mette a disposizione una varietà di situazioni che per lo studioso sono una manna, inoltre, occupando un intervallo ben definito consente di isolare le notizie e il “sentiment”...
... It is easy to imagine finding a spurious correlation for a single observation; it is less obvious that it would be easy to do so for many dozens of observations that all exhibit a common causal relationship... It has been my good fortune that stock prices during the Depression were unusually volatile, and unusually closely related to policy-oriented news events linked to the world gold market and also to federal labor market policies....
Inoltre, la bussola dei mercati finanziari, ci mette a disposizione un segnale rapidissimo e affidabile di quel che avviene nel mondo opaco della politica (monetaria e no). I mercati reagiscono in un tempo medio che va dai 4 agli 8 minuti. Non è un modo di dire…
... A recent study of the U.S. Treasury bond market showed that if one divides the trading day into five-minute intervals, virtually all of the largest price changes occur during those five-minute intervals that immediately follow government data announcements...
***
Sul piano dei salari abbiamo 5 schock autonomi...
... On the supply side, there were five autonomous wage shocks during the New Deal, each of which led to higher nominal wage rates...
Sul piano della moneta è possibile registrare altrettante variazioni...
... On the demand side, a series of gold market shocks produced a highly unstable price level, which then impacted real wage rates...
Il mix di questi eventi spiega praticamente tutto...
... The mixture of gold market and labor market shocks can explain the high frequency changes in industrial production, and indeed can explain the Great Depression itself...
Si noti come una causa cruciale del tracollo sia la mancata collaborazione internazionale tra banche centrali, risorsa particolarmente preziosa in regime di gold standard. Il perché è chiaro: visto che l'oro ė disponibile in quantità limitate è bene che sia messo nelle mani della banca centrale più bisognosa. Se invece si crea una corsa all'accaparramento - sia da parte dei privati che da parte delle altre timorose banche centrali - gli inconvenienti sono facilmente prevedibili...
... I concentrate most of the analysis on how a lack of policy cooperation led to central bank gold hoarding and how devaluation fears triggered private gold hoarding... If I were to choose a metaphor for the approach taken in Part II, it might be something like “the Midas curse”—that is, a world impoverished by an excessive demand for gold...
***
Come possiamo concludere? Forse così: il modello classico (domanda e offerta) è perfettamente in grado di spiegare un evento anomalo come la Grande Depressione - e a maggior ragione la crisi del 2008. Il ricorso al confuso pragmatismo informale dei keynesiani non è necessario, sperare che poi le cose vadano “a posto da sole” non è obbligatorio, il convento passa di meglio. Le alternative ci sono e gli economisti le conoscono: meno timidezze nella politica monetaria e briglie al sindacato. La conferma che le cose stiano in questi termini? La conversione dei keynesiani in neo-keynesiani, ovvero in economisti che fondamentalmente accolgono queste critiche.
uovo

giovedì 16 marzo 2017

Gioco d'azzardo

Notebook per
Are casinos good for the economy
tyler cowen
Citation (APA): cowen, t. (2017). Are casinos good for the economy [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com

Parte introduttiva
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 1
Are casinos good for the economy? by Tyler Cowen Ernest Goss Creighton University - Department of Economics - Edward A. Morse
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 9
People who live near casinos are going broke faster than people who don’t,
Nota - Posizione 10
BANCAROTTA PIÙ PROBABILE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 11
The growth rate of personal bankruptcies
Nota - Posizione 11
TASSO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 11
more than double
Nota - Posizione 11
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 11
counties
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 11
1990s,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 12
Creighton University.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 12
rate of business bankruptcies was significantly lower
Nota - Posizione 13
IMPRESE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 14
compared roughly 250 counties
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 15
similar demographics.
Nota - Posizione 15
CONTEE COMPARATE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 16
100 percent higher
Nota - Posizione 16
TASSO FALLIMENTI XSONALI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 17
35.4 percent lower
Nota - Posizione 17
TASSO FALLIMENTI IMPRESE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 22
business bankruptcy rates are lower when gambling is present, even after adjusting for the quality of the county’s economy.
Nota - Posizione 22
LA NOTIZIA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 25
I’m all for legalizing (zoned) gambling.
Nota - Posizione 25
PARERE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 25
The real question is whether we should tax gambling at higher
Nota - Posizione 26
PROBLEMA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 27
The Social and Economic Impact of Native American Casinos
Nota - Posizione 27
VEDI AUTORI SOTTO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 28
effects of casinos after at least four years
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 29
positive changes include: young adults moving back to reservations, fueling an 11.5 percent population increase; adult employment increasing by 26 percent; and a 14 percent decline in the number of working poor. In counties with or near a casino, the employment- to- population ratio has increased and mortality has declined."
Nota - Posizione 31
EFFETTI POSITIVI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 37
The Social and Economic Impact of Native American Casinos (NBER Working Paper No. 9198), authors William Evans and Julie Topoleski
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 55
The negative changes include about a 10 percent increase in auto thefts, larceny, violent crime, and bankruptcy in counties four years after a casino has opened, and an increase in bankruptcies within 50 miles of a new casino.
Nota - Posizione 57
EFFETTI NEGATIVI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 62
Studies: Casinos bring jobs, but also crime, bankruptcy, and even suicide By Dylan Matthews
Nota - Posizione 63
t
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 71
the opposition to it is mainly funded by owners of rival casinos.
Nota - Posizione 73
OPPOSIZIONE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 82
The Baylor's Earl Grinols, University of Georgia's David Mustard, and the University of Illinois' Cynthia Dilley found that 8 percent of crime in counties with casinos was attributable to their presence, a crime increase that cost residents, on average, $ 65 a year.
Nota - Posizione 85
CRIMINE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 86
The St. Louis Fed's Thomas Garrett and Mark Nichols found that Mississippi riverboat gambling increases bankruptcies not just in Mississippi, but in counties outside the state where many residents gamble in Mississippi.
Nota - Posizione 89
FALLIMENTI PERSONALI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 90
Interestingly, other casinos— such as Las Vegas, Atlantic City, and so forth— didn't have statistically significant effects on other areas' bankruptcy rates.
Nota - Posizione 91
LAS VEGAS FA BENE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 94
The National Gambling Impact Study Commission found that having a casino within 50 miles doubles one's likelihood to become a problem gambler.
Nota - Posizione 96
GAMBLER ADDICTION
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 97
The evidence on casino gambling's distributional impact is much weaker than that concerning state lotteries, but there is extensive evidence that the latter amounts to a regressive tax, given that lottery ticket purchasers are disproportionately poor.
Nota - Posizione 100
LOTTERIA AI POVERI CASINO AI RICCHI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 102
casino-goers are richer than the average American,
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 103
most of the gambling industry's revenue come from addicts.
Nota - Posizione 104
RICAVI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 104
Grinols estimates that 52 percent of revenue at the typical casino comes from problem gamblers,
Nota - Posizione 106
FONTE ENTRATE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 114
one could reasonably argue the benefits in terms of jobs created and education funded outweigh the costs in terms of crime, bankruptcy, and problem gambling.
Nota - Posizione 115
TRADE OFF