PROLEGOMENON - The Evolution of the Soul by Richard Swinburne

PROLEGOMENON - The Evolution of the Soul by Richard Swinburne - neuroscienzeinutili ilpipistrellodinagel continuitàeidentità miracolistrutturanascostaoillusionismo? emergenzialismoautonomista

PROLEGOMENONRead more at location 36

Note: PREGOLOMENI@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Cos' è il dualismo sostanziale?: corpo e anima sono due sostanze separate. Sostanza: ciò che esiste in modo indipendente... Oggi l'ipotesi monista attinge dagli studi della neurofisiogia ma possono davvero dirci qualcosa? Difficile visto che la questine dell'origine del pensiero resta inevasa. La scienza nn risponde se nn prende una posizione filosofica... @@@ quanti e anima quanti e libera scelta interazione mind/body: nn abbiamo l intelligenza sufficiente x comprenderla è improbabile che ci sia una struttura nascosta (indaghiamo da millenni) + probabile che dio sostenga qs relazione attraverso cui si esplicita la ns libertà mind/body problem è indizio dell esistenza divina obiezione al dualismo: nn spiega tutto. risposta: ma spiega + e meglio delle alternative obiezione: il dualismo parla di anima ma nn ci dice cosa sia risposta: nn è del tutto vero ne viene dato un resoconto differenziale godel/lucs: un argomento x l anima Edit

The central theme of the book was the theme of substance dualism=that humans consist of two separate substances, body and soul. Plato thought this, and so did Descartes, and so did so many other thinkers of the last three millennia. But in 1997, as in 1986, few philosophical positions are as unfashionable as is substance dualism.Read more at location 41

Add a note

recent philosophical debate has generated more heat than lightRead more at location 48

Note: DUALISMO: CONFLITTO STERILE Edit

There has also been a lot of interesting work in neurophysiology and psychology, but I do not think that any results in this field affect in any way the main arguments of this book.Read more at location 49

Note: NEUROSCIENZE? INUTILI Edit

To my mind by far the most interesting scientific work relevant to our topic has been the work, not of neurophysicists, but of physicists considering how Quantum Theory might be held to provide an explanation of mind-brain interaction-and give rise to free choice. I discuss Roger Penrose's two fascinating books in Appendix E.Read more at location 51

Note: TEORIA DEI QUANTI E LIBERO ARBITRIO Edit

Quantum Theory allows room for human free choice. Read more at location 54

Add a note

we have no idea and no possible way of discovering to any significant degree of probability exactly which mental events are caused by certain brain events. However much we know about a bat's brain, we can get from it very little understanding of how (if at all) the bat perceivesRead more at location 58

Note: IL PIPISTRELLO Edit

continuing to have a conscious life after a brain operationRead more at location 60

Note: LA CONTINUITÀ. IDENTITÀ Edit

A full description of the world should tell us not merely what happened to my body and its constituent atr ,s but also what happened to my soul.Read more at location 62

Add a note

One writer of recent years who has emphasized this point very clearly is Colin McGinn. In a number of works, but especially in The Problem of Consciousness,' he has argued that humans very probably do not have the kind of intelligence which would enable them to understand the mechanism of mind-body interaction. He is however convinced not merely that there is such interaction,Read more at location 79

Note: COLIN MCGUINN Edit

His conviction seems to arise from the fact that `it is either eliminativism [i.e. there are no conscious events] or miracles [i.e. the action of God to connect body and soul] or hidden structure.Read more at location 83

Note: 3 ALTERNATIVE Edit

I gave arguments in Chapter 10 as to why there is most unlikely to be a `hidden structure' of McGinn's kind, and I share his wish not to deny the undeniable. If that leaves us with GodRead more at location 85

Note: STRUTTURE OCCULTE E ILLUSIONISMO? IPOT. IMPRO Edit

mind-body interaction forms part of a strong cumulative case for the existence of God.Read more at location 87

Note: DIO E IL DUALISMO Edit

There is however one firm defence of the substantial and immaterial nature of the human person in John Foster's, The Immaterial Self.5Read more at location 92

Note: APOLOGETI DEL DUALISMO Edit

In The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel has claimed that `the main objection to dualism is that it postulates an additional nonphysical substance without explaining how it can support subjective mental states whereas the brain can't'.' But again it is no objection to a theory that it cannot answer all questions.Read more at location 93

Note: NAGEL Edit

I argue in Part II, the mere continued existence of the person's body is neither necessary nor sufficient for the continued existence of the person.Read more at location 95

Note: CONTINUITÀ DEL FISICO E DELLA XSONA Edit

So mental states must pertain to an immaterial substance.Read more at location 97

Add a note

Most of the enormous amount of writing by philosophers, psychologists, and physicists over the past twelve years on the mind-body problem, has been very materialist in its general stance. Some of it has been of an 'eliminativist' nature, arguing that really there are no such things as beliefs or pains; there are simply brain states.? I reject this highly implausible viewRead more at location 99

Note: MATERIALISMO Edit

The majority of philosophers perhaps accept that there are mental eventsRead more at location 102

Note: EMERGENZIALISTI Edit

mental events 'supervene' on brain events,Read more at location 103

Add a note

I argue in New Appendix A that such views have to come clean-either they claim that for each mental event, there is some brain event the occurrence of which entails the occurrence of the former-of logical necessity; or they allow that the connection between brain events and mental events is merely contingent. I claim that the former view is open to all the old objections against identity theory; the latter view is that which I espouse in Part I. Read more at location 104

Note: CONNESSIONE UNIVOCA O BIUNIVOCA? Edit

One criticism of substance dualism is that the dualist cannot say what souls are;Read more at location 107

Note: COS È L ANIMA Edit

but claim that it is no good objection that I cannot say what makes the difference between one soul and another.Read more at location 109

Add a note

In the first edition of The Evolution of the Soul I had no treatment of one argument in favour of human free will-the argument from Godel's Theorem, given currency by J. R. Lucas.Read more at location 110

Note: LUCAS GODEL E IL LIBERO ARBITRIO

Indagine sui preti cattolici: più altruisti, onesti e affidabili rispetto alla popolazione

Indagine sui preti cattolici: più altruisti, onesti e affidabili rispetto alla popolazione | UCCR:



'via Blog this'

Fair Play: What Your Child Can Teach You About Economics, Values and the Meaning of Life by Steven E. Landsburg

Ieri sera, nel corso dell'incontro con il dott. Ballerini è stato citato un noto proverbio africano: "per educare un bambino occorre un intero villaggio". Queste "sagge" parole contengono però un lato oscuro e spesso vengono pronunciate per insinuare una contrapposizione tra "famiglia" e "villaggio":

Hillary Clinton believes that it takes a village—and by extension, a great federal bureaucracy—to raise a child. Republicans scoff, emphasizing that it takes not a village but a traditional family—while at the same time criticizing the Clinton administration for doing too little to keep kids off drugs; apparently those Republicans believe that it takes not a village but a police state. In the traditional family as I remember it, drug education was supplied by the parents, not the government. At any rate, I wish they’d all lay off my daughter. Education about risks is one thing; telling kids that there’s a single “right” response to those risks is something different and more sinister.

Qual è l’idea più stramba a cui credete?

Personalmente credo che tra qualche secolo l’ Intelligenza Artificiale sarà tra noi, quella vera intendo. Ma l’idea stramba non è questa, sono in tanti a pensarlo, anzi, molti la pronosticano entro un secolo se non prima.

Credo anche che IA non si realizzerà attraverso programmi codificati a tavolino da softwaristi quanto piuttosto attraverso tecnologie in grado di mappare ed emulare il cervello umano, magari un cervello specifico preso come riferimento. Ma anche qui nulla di particolarmente strambo: sono in molti a privilegiare l’ipotesi degli “emulatori” rispetto all’ipotesi del programma software prodotto in modo tradizionale.

Ma come saranno questi emulatori (o robot)? E qui arriva la mia idea stramba: penso che molti di loro saranno religiosi. E penso anche che prima o poi arriveremo a riconoscere che  Gesù è morto in croce anche per loro.

Non mi sembra che a livello teologico ci siano problemi insormontabili. L’uomo per millenni ha generato il suo simile in un modo, ora si aggiunge una modalità alternativa, a livello teologico cosa cambia? Forse c’è qualche problemino sulla resurrezione dei corpi visto che non ho idea di come saranno i corpi di questi soggetti, forse saranno ancorati ad una macchina che somiglia al nostro pc, forse avremo una varietà disparata, forse vivranno solo “nella nuvola” per “discendere” a richiesta ora in questo device ora in quello. Boh.

Coniugare transumanesimo e religiosità, ecco l'idea stramba. I transumanisti, in genere, sono anche atei convinti ma francamente non vedo un nesso forte tra le due posizioni.