mercoledì 12 ottobre 2016

CHAPTER ONE Arguments for a Duty to Vote - jason brennan ethic ov voting

CHAPTER ONE Arguments for a Duty to VoteRead more at location 348
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It turns out that the expected disutility of driving to the polling station (in terms of the harm a driver might cause to others) is higher than the expected utility of a good vote. This is not hyperbole.Read more at location 458
CHAPTER TWO Civic Virtue without PoliticsRead more at location 898
Note: riconciliando beni pubblici e privati otteniamo una sorprendente teoria della virtù civica 3 teorie del voto la teoria tradizionale(repubblicana)della virtù civica cos è il bene comune e come si xsegue. il privato conta quanto il pubblico anti hobbes: come sarebbe la vita comune senza sfera privata phillies il genio della medicina che si butta in politica sia le attività private che quelle politiche creano potenziale bene pubblico. il virtuoso compie una CBA soppesando i costi opportunità nb: esiste anche il male pubblico e si realizza nel privato (obbedendo a leggi sbagliate) e nel pubblico (facendo scelte sbagliate) contributo indiretto: chi ha sfamato martin luther king la virtù civica esiste solo se si soffre x la comunità? e gli entusiasti della politica? non equivochiamo: chi pensa solo al profitto nn è un buon cittadino essere un buon cittadino può essere oneroso: bisogna cercare e sfruttare i propri talenti (arricchirsi a volte è faticoso) Edit
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THREE ARGUMENTS FOR VOTINGRead more at location 903
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The Agency Argument held that citizens should bear some causal responsibility in helping to produce and maintain a just social order with adequate levels of welfare. The Agency Argument asserts that voting is necessary to do this.Read more at location 905
Note: AGENCY. OGNUNO DEVE CONTRIBUIRE A MANTENERE L ORDINE Edit
The Public Goods Argument holds that nonvoters unfairly free-ride on the provision of good governance. Failing to vote is like failing to pay taxes—Read more at location 907
Note: ARG 2 PUBLIC GOOD: FREE RIDING Edit
The Civic Virtue Argument holds that voting is an essential way to exercise civic virtue, and civic virtue is an important moral virtue.Read more at location 909
Note: ARG 3. ESISTONO DELLE VIRTÙ CIVICHE Edit
In this chapter, I outline a theory of civic virtue and of paying debts to society.Read more at location 910
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The most popular views of civic virtue hold that active political participation and community-based volunteering are essential to civic virtue. In this chapter, I argue instead that a person of exceptional civic virtue can exercise civic virtue through stereotypically private activitiesRead more at location 915
Note: TESI: LE VIRTÙ CIVICHE SI ESERCITANO ANCHE IN PRIVATO. IL BRAVO CITTADINO NN PARTECIPA ALLA VITA PUBBLICA Edit
TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF CIVIC VIRTUERead more at location 917
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I defend the extrapolitical conception of civic virtue.Read more at location 919
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We should distinguish between the political virtues and the civic virtues more generally.5Read more at location 931
Note: DISTINZIONE CRUCIALE Edit
many activities stereotypically considered private, such as being a conscientious employee, making art, running a for-profit business, or pursuing scientific discoveries, can also be exercises of civic virtue. For many people, in fact, these are better ways to exercise civic virtue.Read more at location 935
Note: ATTIVITÀ PRIVATE CHE CI RENDONO BUONI CITTADINI Edit
insofar as we think of citizens as having debts to pay to society, there are many ways to pay these debts;Read more at location 938
WHAT “CIVIC VIRTUE” LEAVES OPENRead more at location 939
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I argue that political participation is not built into the concept of civic virtue.Read more at location 941
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Concept versus ConceptionRead more at location 944
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Defining “Civic Virtue”Read more at location 955
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civic virtue makes one a good member of a community.Read more at location 956
Note: DEF Edit
Shelley Burtt defines “civic virtue” as the “disposition to further public over private good in action and deliberation.”9 Richard Dagger uses this same definition in his defense of republican liberalism.Read more at location 959
Note: UNA CONCEZIONE Edit
William Galston defines a civic virtue as “a trait that disposes its possessors to contribute to the well-being of the community and enhances their ability to do so.”Read more at location 961
Note: GALSTON Edit
Jack Crittenden says that to be “civic-minded” is to “care about the welfare of the community (the commonweal or civitas) and not simply about [one’s] own individual well-being.”Read more at location 962
Note: ALTRA Edit
Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin analyze civic virtue as being able to determine the common good and having the motivation to act appropriately toward it.Read more at location 964
Note: ALTRA Edit
many seem just to assume that civic virtue requires political participation. For instance, almost immediately after Dagger says that civic virtue is the disposition to further public over private good, he concludes that a person of civic virtue will want to participate in government in order to help maintain the liberties needed for a good society.Read more at location 977
Note: IMPLICAZIONE POLITICA Edit
Similarly, Crittenden says, “Civic education, whenever and however undertaken, prepares people of a country, especially the young, to carry out their roles as citizens. Civic education is, therefore, political education or, as Amy Gutmann describes it, ‘the cultivation of the virtues, knowledge, and skills necessary for political participation.”Read more at location 983
Note: EDUCAZIONE CIVICA E POLITICA Edit
Many agree that to exercise civic virtue requires that one engage in activities that contribute to the common good of the community. This prompts a question: what activities contribute to the common good?Read more at location 992
Note: QUALI ATTIVITÀ Edit
I argue instead that the common good is often best promoted through extrapolitical means, through activities that do not fit the stereotype of civic virtue. Exercising civic virtue need not involve politics.Read more at location 1001
Note: TESI RIPETUTA Edit
The Common GoodRead more at location 1003
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In my view, something is presumed to be in the common good if it promotes the interests of most people either without harming others’ interests or, if it does harm them, without exploiting them.21 I do not assume there is some common good over and apart from the interests of individuals in society.Read more at location 1006
Note: DEF DI BENE PUBBLICO Edit
“Schlivic” Virtue versus Civic VirtueRead more at location 1019
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Suppose one pounds that table and insists that to exercise civic virtue, by definition, requires significant political engagement.Read more at location 1020
Note: GUERRA SUI TERMINI Edit
A public-spirited person who promotes the common good through nonpolitical means might lack civic virtue but instead have “schlivic” virtue. Schlivic virtue is the disposition and ability to promote the common good by nonpolitical activity. So, not much is gained by insisting that civic virtue requires political engagement as a matter of logic.Read more at location 1023
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THE EXTRAPOLITICAL CONCEPTION OF CIVIC VIRTUERead more at location 1028
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In this section, I outline the extrapolitical theory of civic virtue and argue that it is superior to the republican view.Read more at location 1030
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An Expansive ConceptionRead more at location 1049
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Schmidtz says that “any decent car mechanic does more for society by fixing cars than by paying taxes.”27 By extension, we can add that a decent mechanic typically does more for society by fixing cars than by voting or writing senators. By fixing cars, she is helping to create and sustain the cooperative networks that promote the common good.Read more at location 1072
Note: LAVORARE E PAGARE LE TASSE. CHI CONRIBUISCE DI PIÙ Edit
My point is not to deny that governments help promote and sustain the common good or to assert that extended cooperative networks do not need governmental support. Rather, just as it would be mistake to discount the role of politics in promoting the common good, it would be a mistake to discount the role of nonpolitical activities in promoting the common good.Read more at location 1075
Note: L ARGOM: IL PRIVATO È UN ALTERMNATIVA Edit
However, we can also imagine an “inverse state of nature”—a political society that lacks private, nonpolitical activity. In the inverse state of nature, people try to gather together for public deliberation, voting, and law creation, but no one engages in private actions. In the inverse state of nature, life would also be nasty, poor, brutish, and short, because there would be no food, music, science, shelter, or art.Read more at location 1080
Note: ESPERIMENTO MENT MONDO SOLO DI POLITICA. BENE COMUNE Edit
How Liberal Citizens Do Their PartRead more at location 1084
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Consider the famous essay “I, Pencil,” by Leonard Read.28Read more at location 1088
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When you write with a pencil, you benefit from the input of millions of people around the world. Most of them have no idea that they have helped produced a pencil and that, in virtue of doing so, they are helping you write or draw.Read more at location 1094
Note: c Edit
Note: LA RETE Edit
A citizen of a liberal society receives a bundle of goods: economic, cultural, social, political, and the like. Most liberal citizens contribute to the bundle others receive, but they do it in different ways. Liberalism encourages a division of labor in how citizens contribute to creating this bundle.Read more at location 1097
Note: c Edit
Some citizens provide political goods by voting, rallying, supporting causes, fighting in just wars, writing to senators, writing letters to editors, running for office, and so on. Others attempt to provide for the public welfare by volunteering or community organizing. These sorts of activities more or less exhaust the republican conception of civic virtue. However, one can also contribute to the social surplus by working at a productive job that provides goods and services others want. One makes society more interesting, more worthwhile, by creating culture or counterculture. One promotes the common good by raising one’s children well (and not just by instilling in them the democratic or political virtues). And so on. Consider artists, entrepreneurs, small-business owners, venture capitalists, teachers, physicians, intellectuals, stock traders, stay-at-home parents, working parents, chefs, janitors, grocery clerks, and others. Each of these kinds of people in one way or another contributes to fostering a worthwhile society.Read more at location 1099
Note: DIVISIONE DEL LAVORO ANCHE NEL BENE COMUNE Edit
Suppose for the sake of argument that citizens have debts to pay to society for the goods they receive. Even if so, there are many ways of paying those debts. Some citizens pay by providing good governance, others by providing good culture, and others by providing economic opportunity. Citizens who provide these other kinds of goods are not free-ridingRead more at location 1113
Note: PAGARE IL PROPRIO DEBITO Edit
Suppose Michelangelo, Louis Pasteur, or Thomas Edison never voted, never participated in politics, never volunteered, and, by clerical error, never paid any taxes. This alone would not imply he failed to contribute to the common good. On the contrary, each contributed far more to the common good than the average political officeholder or active, participatory democrat.Read more at location 1116
Note: la virtù civica non coincide con l' impegno pubblico Edit
In his famous funeral oration, Pericles says that private actions can be harmful to the polity, but one can compensate by performing useful public service. If so, there seems to be little reason not to accept something like the inverse.Read more at location 1121
Note: ANCORA NELLA SOC. INVERSA Edit
Citizens’ investing time and effort into political activities can potentially come at the expense of the common good.29 Consider, as a hypothetical case, Phyllis the Physician. Phyllis is a genius. She produces new medical breakthroughs hourly. Society may want Phyllis to contribute to the common good but not by taking time away from medicine—not even by volunteering at the local free clinic.Read more at location 1125
Note: IL POLITICO COMBINA GUAI Edit
Engaging in politics always has some opportunity cost, and sometimes this opportunity cost will mean that engagement produces a net loss for the common good.Read more at location 1130
Note: OPPORTUNITY COST Edit
Indirect Contributions to Good GovernanceRead more at location 1146
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Someone stubbornly clinging to the republican conception of civic virtue could, perhaps, insist that civic virtue is about promoting not merely the common good but the political part of the common good. Suppose we grant this claim. It still would not follow that citizens should promote the political part of the common good directly through political means.Read more at location 1146
Note: CONTRIBUIRE INDIRETTAMENTE Edit
Peter’s specializing in apple growing enables Quentin to specialize in fish catching, and vice versa. Peter produces apples directly, but he indirectly contributes to the production of fish. Quentin produces fish directly, but he indirectly contributes to the production of apples.Read more at location 1154
Note: SPECIALIZZAZIONE Edit
Those who focus on directly producing good governance receive assistance from those who provide the goods that make this focus possible (and vice versa). Martin Luther King Jr. had exceptional civic virtue. But he could not have rallied for political reform if others had not provided food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and even much of the basic philosophy underlying his movement.Read more at location 1157
Note: MLK Edit
A citizen does not have to repay cultural goods with cultural goods or political goods with political goods;Read more at location 1175
Note: MONETA X RIPAGARE Edit
That said, I am not arguing that you can make up for murder by raising the GDP,Read more at location 1176
Note: NN CONCEZIONE RETTIFICATIVA Edit
I am discussing what it takes, in general, to avoid free-ridingRead more at location 1177
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This is not a theory about rectificatory justice,Read more at location 1178
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Nonindividualistic Conceptions of the Common GoodRead more at location 1180
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At first glance, one might think that if some more strongly collectivist notion of the common good were correct, this would vindicate the republican conception of civic virtue over the extrapolitical conception. Not so.Read more at location 1183
Note: ACCETTIAMO L OLISMO Edit
For instance, both liberals and republicans can accept that certain public goods—that is, non-rivalrous, non-excludable goods like military defense—can promote the common good.Read more at location 1186
Note: BENE PUBBLICO BEL DEFONITO Edit
is said to be a strongly irreducible common good for some society S just in case X is good for S, and X’s being good for S is not conditional upon S’s being good for any member of S. For instance, perhaps ancient Sparta’s exceptional military prowess was a strongly irreducible common good. Maintaining its military prowess impoverished the city and stunted the moral development of its citizens, but perhaps it was good for Sparta, if not for any of the Spartans. Liberals tend to think that no such strongly irreducible common goods exist.Read more at location 1191
Note: BP IRRIDUCIBILI Edit
However, suppose one believes (I think mistakenly) that there are strongly irreducible common goods, that these goods ought to be pursued, and that these goods can be achieved only through politics. Even this would not imply that an extrapolitical conception of civic virtue is incorrect or that the republican conception is correct. As I have already argued, citizens who engage in nonpolitical activities can thereby indirectly promote political goods.Read more at location 1198
Note: LA PROMOZIONE INDIRETTA VALE ANCHE X QS SYRANO BENE PUBBLICO Edit
Personal Costs versus Public BenefitsRead more at location 1208
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One reason it is easy to overlook private contributions to the common good is that such contributions are often very obviously profitable, or at least of low cost, to the contributors. Yet, there is a difference between the benefit conferred by an activity and the cost the agent bears for that activity.Read more at location 1208
Note: IL PROFITTO INVALIDA IL BENE O LO NASCONDE? Edit
One cannot measure the value of a contribution by the cost of making it. Jane might spend $100 to buy a gift for Kelly that Kelly values at only $40. Or Jane might spend $10 for a gift that Kelly values at $40. Jane might spend $10 making a gift that Kelly values at $40, but Jane might have so enjoyed making the gift that she would gladly have paid $80 for the experience of making it. In each case, the value of the gift to the receiver is $40, though the cost to the giver varies. If Luke decides to contribute to society by becoming a policeman rather than an investment banker, he will probably bear higher personal costs, given the differences in pay and risk. However, it does not follow that society gains more from Luke’s choosing to become a policeman, or even that the average policeman does more good for society than the average investment banker.Read more at location 1211
Note: VALORE E COSTO. QUANTIFICARE IL CONTRIBUTO Edit
At the extreme, consider the soldier who “dies in vain.” This soldier has sacrificed everything for his country, but that does not mean his country benefited from the sacrifice.Read more at location 1218
Note: IL CASO ESTREMO DEL SOLDATO Edit
The amount one suffers is not a reliable measure of how much civic virtue one has.Read more at location 1224
Note: x Edit
There is a possible view that holds that whether citizens have paid their debts is determined not by the value of their contributions but by the costs they incur in making contributions. This view leads to some perverse results. It implies that an altruistic, ambitious, motivated person who enjoys politics, volunteering, working a productive job, and being a good neighbor would have to do a lot to repay her debts.Read more at location 1235
Note: VALORE = COSTO. EFFETTI XVERSI Edit
The Motivational Component of Civic VirtueRead more at location 1245
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Civic virtue has a motivational component. One can greatly contribute to the common good but still lack civic virtue.Read more at location 1246
Note: LA VRTÙ CIVICA È VOLONTARIA Edit
For instance, a person who helps others merely out a desire for personal profit is not benevolent.Read more at location 1247
Note: x LA DOMANDA Edit
So, if Michelangelo turns out to have been indifferent to making the world better for others and cared about art only for art’s sake or only about getting paid, then his artistic endeavors, however valuable, would not be exercises of civic virtue.Read more at location 1252
Note: ES MICHELANGELO Edit
Thus, the extrapolitical conception of civic virtue implies that a wide array of publicly beneficial private activities could be exercises of civic virtue provided that people have the right motivations. The extrapolitical conception does not have the silly implication that anyone who promotes the common good has civic virtue.Read more at location 1256
Note: EXPOL: SI PUÒ AVERE BENE COMUNE SENZA VIRTÙ CIVICA Edit
HOW DEMANDING IS THE EXTRAPOLITICAL CONCEPTION OF CIVIC VIRTUE?Read more at location 1259
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Readers might be tempted to conclude that the extrapolitical conception of civic virtue is not sufficiently demanding.Read more at location 1266
Note: OB: SI PRETENDE TROPPO POCO Edit
suppose instead we discover that civic virtue does not require a citizen continually to subvert her interests for society. (I think this conclusion is correct, though I have not argued for it here.) If so, the extrapolitical conception of civic virtue would have some attractive features, which I now discuss.Read more at location 1285
Note: L ONERE È UNO SVANTAGGIO O NO? Edit
Pocock, favorably citing Polybius, says that modern liberal societies tend to undermine civic virtue by pulling people toward private ends.40Read more at location 1327
Note: LA CRITICA REPUBBLICANA Edit
Modern liberalism’s success is that it finds many ways of reconciling the private and common good (at least, more so than competing regimes) and so lowers the personal cost of benevolence.Read more at location 1330
Note: MAX BENE COMUNE AL MINIMO COSTO Edit
Michael Walzer asks, “What was citizenship?”42 He says citizenship was possible only in classical republican societies. He contends that contemporary hand-wringing over citizenship comes from the feeling that something has been lost, because citizens seem to care so little about politics. He says this feeling of loss inspires many to try to resurrect the republican conception.43 However, he adds that citizenship so described was not really lost, because it never really could find a home in liberal societies.Read more at location 1340
Note: NOSTALGIE IMMORTIVATE Edit
Rather, it may be that liberalism encourages a different, more diverse, and better kind of citizenship than republican societies ever could.Read more at location 1345
Note: c Edit
WHY THERE’S NO DUTY TO VOTERead more at location 1346
Note: T Edit
Recall the Agency Argument: 1. You should be a good citizen. 2. In order for you to be a good citizen, it is not enough that other citizens obtain adequate levels of welfare and live under a reasonably just social order. Rather, in addition, you need to be an agent who helps to cause other citizens to have these adequate levels of welfare, etc. 3. In order to do this, you must vote. 4. Therefore, you must vote.Read more at location 1350
Note: AGENCY ARG Edit
we can conclude that premise 3 is false.Read more at location 1355
Note: x Edit
Recall the Public Goods Argument: 1. Good governance is a public good. 2. No one should free-ride on the provision of such goods. Those who benefit from such goods should reciprocate. 3. Citizens who abstain from voting free-ride on the provision of good governance. 4. Therefore, each citizen should vote.Read more at location 1358
Note: PUBLIC GOOD ARG Edit
Premise 3 is false. Citizens can contribute in other ways and thus not be guilty of free-riding.Read more at location 1363
Note: x Edit
Consider again the Civic Virtue Argument: 1. Civic virtue is a moral virtue. 2. Civic virtue requires voting. 3. Therefore, citizens who do not vote thereby exhibit a lack of civic virtue and are, to that extent, morally vicious.Read more at location 1375
Note: CIVIC ARG Edit
Premise 2 is incorrect.Read more at location 1380
Note: x Edit
REVISITING THE STRAW MAN ARGUMENTRead more at location 1389
Note: T Edit
It is consistent with my view to hold that, under special circumstances, a duty to vote might arise. I have not argued that there can never be a duty to vote. Instead, I have argued that a citizen in a modern democratic polity generally has no civic duty to vote, or even to participate in politics.Read more at location 1402
Note: CIRCOSTANZE PARTICOLARI Edit
Even if a person in fact lacks a duty to X, if she believes she has a duty to do X but does not do it, this can be evidence of bad character. Even though I think there is no duty to vote, I suspect that most people who abstain do so either because it is too costly for them, given their circumstances, or because they have somewhat deficient character.Read more at location 1407
Note: CARATTERI RIPROVEVOLI Edit
It is also consistent with my view to hold that for some citizens, voting, even if it is not obligatory, is at least a good idea, morally speaking.Read more at location 1410
Note: CARATTERI VIRTUOSI Edit

martedì 11 ottobre 2016

Il ruolo della religione nella sfera pubblica

E’ cio’ di cui si occupa Kevin Vallier nel suo Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation”.
Per trovare una risposta si cerca di attingere a tutte le tradizioni ideologiche.
Cosa suggeriscono i libertari duri e puri in merito? Praticamente nulla. Nulla di razionale: per loro la “sfera pubblica” nemmeno dovrebbe esistere: 
… I begin by assessing the libertarian approach, or more accurately, what I see as libertarians’ lack of an approach to religion in politics … The view I most often encounter is that religious belief is dangerous and should be excluded from politics… the more general attitude is that religion in politics is uninteresting because democratic politics should be dramatically weakened or abolished; private property alone will then answer these questions… The father of this approach was Murray Rothbard… he never penned a single piece developing a systematic libertarian approach to religion in public life. He may not have thought it necessary…
Ma poiché la “sfera pubblica” è destinata a stare tra noi per molto tempo, meglio darsi da fare cercando altrove.
Comunque questo disinteresse ha i suoi lati positivi
… Libertarians do not use politics to either establish religion or denigrate it…
Anche se non mancano i difetti
… The weakness of the libertarian approach is that it confuses politics and the state… Politics and religion are not going away even if the state is abolished…
E l’approccio conservatore?
Essenzialmente un conservatore rivendica privilegi per la sua religione:
… Religious conservatives across many societies, including democratic ones, seek some favored social or political status for their preferred religious view. In the United States, this often takes the form of civic theism… The attempt to display the Ten Commandments in public spaces is a paradigmatic example of civic theistic legal policy, though coercive laws play a role as well, such as those that ban same-sex marriage… some establishmentarian policies violate the rights of non-believers, as with attempts to interfere with science education in mandatory public schooling. Both believers and non-believers have a right to educate their children as they think is best…
Una specie di teocrazia depotenziata.
E l’approccio progressista?
Essenzialmente il laico si inventa una religione ad hoc – di solito la chiama Laicità o  Ragione – e conferisce ad essa tutti i privilegi, praticamente resta l’unica sulla scena, le altre religioni sono relegate alla sfera privata:
… The secular progressive approach claims to embrace equality and state neutrality. On these grounds, secular progressives oppose religious influences in politics… Treating others with equal respect in politics requires appealing to reasons whose force all can appreciate. Since not everyone is religious, no religious reasons are shared reasons… In this way, secular progressives assign religious reasoning an auxiliary role in public life, at best… Whether they realize it or not, secular progressives seek to establish secularism as the de facto if not official ruling ideology of democratic states by insisting on a conception of political life that excludes many people of faith…
Il pericolo di un simile approccio è quello di marginalizzare l’uomo religioso e vilipendere la sua dignità. La fede, infatti, è al cuore dell’identità personale. La Francia è l’esempio di una deriva laica.
L’opzione favorita dall’autore viene denominata “liberale classica”, si fonda sulla libertà religiosa e sulla convivenza tra fedi diverse senza bisogno di fondare nuovi culti civili di tipo laico da imporre al prossimo.
Per spiegarmi faccio il caso del liberale classico di fronte al matrimonio gay:
… Let’s assume for the sake of argument that conservatives have both successful (but not indubitable) natural law arguments that explain why heterosexual marriage is the only morally permissible… these arguments cannot justify restricting marriage to a man and a woman given that such laws force many organizations to deny benefits to gay couples that would otherwise offer them… On the other hand, legalizing gay marriage without religious exemptions disrespects sincere citizens of faith by forcing them to provide benefits to gay…
La soluzione:
… Thus, my approach either requires the abolition of government marriage, or as a second best policy, the legalization of gay marriage with extensive religious exemptions
Faccio anche l’esempio dell’  assicurazione obbligatoria dei contraccettivi. Qui però occorre spiegare cosa sia poiché è un problema sorto in ambito americano: 
… The contraception mandate, created by the Department of Health and Human Services in order to fully implement the Affordable Care Act, originally required all employers, save religious organizations, to pay for contraception for their employees…
Come giustificare questa coercizione di stampo laico?
… This mandate has been incredibly and needlessly divisive. There is no reason that the Obama Administration couldn’t have paid for contraception for women who need it in some other way. Instead, they have threatened non-profit religious institutions like Little Sisters of the Poor… This is the authoritarianism of the secular progressive approach made manifest… Religious organizations have publicly offered highly sophisticated, well-reasoned and sincere arguments against the mandate drawing on hundreds of years of intellectual tradition…
Conclusione:
… for true liberalism, religion is not the problem; coercion is the problem… legalizing same-sex marriage in combination with religious exemptions reduces legal coercion by permitting organizations to extend benefits to same-sex couples…
Cerchiamo di ricapitolare come la religione possa accostarsi alla sfera pubblica. Direi che i precetti sono quattro.
Innanzitutto nessun privilegio e nessuna penalizzazione di una religione sulle altre (compresa la religione laica):
… religious conscience and religious institutions should have no special protections… this equal treatment should be understood as leveling up the protection given to secular conscience and secular institutions, not leveling down the protection given to religious conscience and religious institutions…
Nessun limite alla libertà di espressione (su questo punto la religione laica è molto aggressiva con le sue censure per sessismo, razzismo, specismo…):
… there are no ethical (and certain no legal) restraints on when a citizen can appeal to religious reasoning… Officials also have an absolute moral and religious right to freedom of speech, save when their speech constitutes a speech act that affects whether someone is coerced (like a judicial decision)…
Obiezione di coscienza a tutto campo per chi professa una fede:
… since religious exemptions are reductions in coercion, classic liberal should favor religious exemptions basically all of the time… it is better to have less coercion rather than more, so the inequality is no reason to support the continued coercion of the religious…
Contro l’ 8 per mille et similia ma a favore della concorrenza: scuole e ospedali religiosi – per esempio - devono avere trattamento pari a quelli statali.
… classic liberal should oppose government attempts to fund expressly religious activities like proselytizing rather than a religious group’s charitable activity… lclassic liberal should not oppose government funds going to religious organizations in addition to secular organizations… Libertarians should not oppose school vouchers on the grounds that they’re forms of establishment…
Poi c’è la questione simbolica (crocifisso in classe), la più difficile. Non c’è ricetta. Una linea guida potrebbe essere questa: se il simbolo offende o discrimina, rimuovere. Altrimenti no. Solo il buon senso puo’ districare la matassa.
… on symbolic establishment we face hard issues… The only way I know how to address the issue is to argue that taxpayers own public buildings and objects (like courthouses and currency) and that the government should only use public buildings and objects in ways that represent everyone and does not reject the values of anyone. That sort of unanimity rule seems too demanding… But if we go with a supermajority or simple majority rule, then dominant social groups, religious or secular, can legitimately press public buildings and objects to represent their views… my conclusion is that lclassic liberal need have no position… I think that unless symbolic establishment is meant to directly threaten or marginalize religious or secular minorities, then libertarians just shouldn’t care about it… If Italy puts crucifixes in its public schools, or if the US leaves “In God We Trust” on coins, do libertarians really have any more reason to be upset qua libertarians than they have to be upset about government schools and government money?…After all, libertarians don’t give a damn about the ethics of the American flag, since it is a dumb symbol of an evil thing… Of course, if people started posting “Death to the Jews!” all over public buildings and currency, that would be morally objectionable, and would probably constitute some sort of injustice, but how is a libertarian to characterize that injustice?…
 Casa-Benati-Reggio-Emilia-1985

Chapter 3 Democracy and Liberalism - leftism erik ritter kuehnelt

Chapter 3 Democracy and LiberalismRead more at location 337
Note: 3@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit
It is wrong to say, “Mr. Green is very democratic; on his trips he sits down for lunch with his chauffeur.” He is, rather, a friend of simple people, and so is appropriately called demophile, not democratic.Read more at location 339
demophile,Read more at location 341
of simple people, and so is appropriately called demophile, not democratic.Read more at location 341
Note: DEMOFILO E DEMOCRATICO Edit
“Democracy” is a Greek word composed of demos (the people) and krátos (power in a strong, almost brutal sense).Read more at location 341
Note: DEF Edit
Hence “monarchy” is the fatherlike rule of a man in the interest of the common good, whereas “monocracy” is a one-man tyranny.Read more at location 343
Note: c Edit
Here it must be remembered that, later on, aristocracy also came to mean not a form of government but the highest social layer. The term republic came to mean every (external) form of government that is non-monarchical and “public.”Read more at location 345
Note: c Edit
GOOD FORMS: BAD FORMS: Monarchy, the rule of one man in the interest of the common good. Tyranny, the rule of one man to his own advantage. Aristocracy, the rule of a group in the interest of the common good. Oligarchy, the rule of a group for their own benefit. Republic or Polity, the rule of the better part of the people in the interest of the common good. Democracy, the rule of the worse part of the people for their own benefit.Read more at location 352
Note: ARISTOTELE Edit
One school insists that only direct democracy is real democracy, whereas elected delegates form an oligarchy with a time limit. There exists a so-called “oligarchic school” of this interpretation of democracy and its foremost opponents were Vilfredo Pareto, Gaëtano Mosca and Roberto Michels (an Italianized former German Socialist). All three might conceivably be called fascist sympathizers, but it is probably the intellectual and realistic climate of Italy, so hostile to all forms of illusions, which influenced their critical thinking.Read more at location 361
Note: DEMOCRAZIA DIRETTA E OLIGARCHIA Edit
was partly conditioned by modern administrative methods and technological inventions.15 ChapterRead more at location 501
Note: nazionalismo vs patroottismo... xchè i nazisti sedevano a destra la formula idiota: gli estremi si toccano... solo chi identifica scorrettamente gli estremi può giungere a simili incoerenze collettivismo e progressivismo... certe tribù africane che mettono tutto in comune sono progressisste? destra: libertà xsonale... così come cresce organicamente (tradizione)... nani sulle spalle dei giganti... natura umana: nè bestia né angelo... verità etrrne... diversità sinistra: collettivisti che fanmo leva sull invidia di massa... che vogliono fare piazza pulita del passato (ascolta l internazoonale) in nome del progresso... utopia.. uniformità... odoo x la chiesa vhe crea varietà deturpando il conformismo