Visualizzazione post con etichetta terrorismo. Mostra tutti i post
Visualizzazione post con etichetta terrorismo. Mostra tutti i post

mercoledì 26 aprile 2017

Violenza politica

Bombe, attentati, scontri di piazza... Vladimiro Satta è l'autore da consultare per farsi un'idea sulla violenza politica in Italia...
Il periodo considerato nel suo libro...
... La violenza politica, nelle sue varie espressioni, è un fenomeno ricorrente nella storia dell’Italia unita. Il periodo che va dalla fine degli anni Sessanta agli anni Ottanta fu il più violento dalla nascita della Repubblica...
Come segnare l'inizio degli anni di piombo?...
... Una vena di aggressività affiorò il 1° marzo 1968 a Roma (scontri di Valle Giulia) dall’interno del movimento studentesco...
All'inizio fu lo stragismo di una certa destra...
... Nel corso del 1969 si susseguirono una serie di attentati dinamitardi incruenti – alcuni a opera di fascisti, altri di anarchici – ai danni di sedi di istituzioni fino ad arrivare al tragico salto di qualità con l’apparizione dello stragismo, una forma di terrorismo di estrema destra...
Seguito da manie di golpismo strisciante...
... sempre a destra, furono intessute trame golpiste che, pur non essendo mai arrivate oltre la soglia del tentativo di colpo di Stato inscenato da Junio Valerio Borghese ma conclusosi con un dietrofront nella notte fra 7 e 8 dicembre 1970, potenzialmente avrebbero comportato un massiccio uso della forza...
Poi il terrorismo rosso delle Brigate Rosse...
... Nella seconda metà del 1970 prese le mosse la lotta armata condotta dalle Brigate rosse e da altri gruppi di estrema sinistra...
... con la risposta nera...
... Tra la fine degli anni Settanta e l’inizio del decennio successivo si scatenò un terrorismo nero di nuova generazione – si pensi ai Nuclei armati rivoluzionari – per certi aspetti speculare a quello rosso...
Ciliegina sulla torta il terrorismo internazionale...
... il Paese fu teatro di azioni di terrorismo internazionale, specie mediorientale, e nel 1981 dell’attentato contro papa Giovanni Paolo II (un discorso a parte andrebbe fatto per il disastro aereo del 27 giugno 1980 nel cielo di Ustica)...
Ma a quel tempo il fenomeno del terrorismo era ubiquo, non certo un'esclusiva italiana...
... L’origine straniera della definizione «anni di piombo», comunque, ci ricorda che il caso italiano non fu isolato. Uno studioso del terrorismo su scala mondiale, Walter Laqueur, titolando un suo famoso libro, chiamò il periodo 1958-1975 L’età del terrorismo. Le ricerche in chiave comparatistica di Leonard Weinberg e altri mostrano che l’avvento di sistemi democratici nel mondo contemporaneo ha coinciso con l’ascesa del fenomeno terroristico in svariati Paesi... la novità della democrazia genera spesso grandi aspettative seguite da delusioni...
***
Tra gli studiosi internazionali viene accreditata una tesi: l'avvento della democrazia porta terrorismo.
Perchè?
Molte aspettative, molte delusioni. Da qui la reazione armata.
Si diffonde facilmente una sensazione di "rivoluzione sociale tradita"...
... per una fascia consistente delle masse popolari, la fine della dittatura doveva essere il preludio di una rivoluzione sociale...
La cosa è tanto più vera quanto più il quadro politico è frantumato. Il sistema elettorale  proporzionale in questo non ha aiutato…
… Inoltre, sempre secondo Weinberg, tra i sistemi democratici risultano maggiormente esposti al terrorismo quelli che presentano un elevato grado di frammentazione politica,6 ovvero una morfologia caratteristica dell’Italia di quegli anni, nei quali vigeva un sistema elettorale proporzionale con soglia di accesso in Parlamento bassissima…
Aggiungiamoci elezioni con un unico competitore, nel senso che all’altro )PCI) l’accesso alla stanza dei bottoni era di fatto interdetto…
… Ancora, nota Weinberg, le elezioni possono essere libere e corrette, ma quando i risultati sono sempre favorevoli a una parte e sfavorevoli al principale partito di opposizione ciò può indurre taluni a smettere di accettare le regole del gioco…
Un certo populismo latino non ha certo giovato…
… Come la storiografia (soprattutto anglosassone) ha rilevato da tempo, nel nostro Paese i modelli totalitari e i radicalismi di destra e di sinistra continuavano a godere di un livello di popolarità ormai desueto presso altre democrazie occidentali…
Tra le cause, da escludere la povertà
… Non si può dire, viceversa, che l’insorgenza della violenza politica e dei terrorismi fosse conseguenza delle condizioni materiali di vita della popolazione…
Al contrario, ad essere nel mirino di molti terroristi era il nuovo stile di vita dovuto all’arricchimento dei ceti popolari…
… Al contrario, eversori di destra e rivoluzionari di sinistra riconoscevano apertamente che l’aumento dei consumi nel secondo dopoguerra era tanto sensibile da influire profondamente sulla società italiana e sui suoi valori ma, poiché demonizzavano la trasformazione dello stile di vita degli italiani in tale direzione, intendevano combattere tutto ciò…
***
Sono stati molto studiati – e continuano a esserlo – i terroristi e i gruppi da essi formati, mentre lo sono stati molto meno gli apparati statali preposti a contrastarli. Come giudicare la loro azione?
Bene.
Le tesi sulla strategia della tensione si sono sgretolate progressivamente. Non si possono escludere depistaggi, anzi, comunque operati da singoli più che dalle istituzioni…
… Emergerà così un quadro assai più realistico di quelli proposti dalle consuete raffigurazioni in chiave di complotto, le quali non a caso risultano a volte caricaturali e altre volte nebulose, mai convincenti. In realtà, gli errori e le manchevolezze di vario tipo – operativo, amministrativo, giudiziario, normativo e politico – furono compensate da decisioni opportune e da successi che, messi insieme, portarono alla vittoria finale… gli attacchi contro la democrazia furono di provenienza varia, e non già un’unica trama recitata da attori che un Grande Vecchio travestiva con costumi dai colori diversi di volta in volta…

sabato 7 gennaio 2017

Fearing Fear john mueller

Notebook per
Fearing Fear
john mueller
Citation (APA): mueller, j. (2016). Fearing Fear [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com

Parte introduttiva
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 1
Fearing Fear By John Mueller
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 6
Franklin Roosevelt’s famous pronouncement early in the Depression that “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”
Nota - Posizione 7
x ROOSVELT
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 14
by scaring people about fear, Roosevelt may have made things worse.
Nota - Posizione 15
x MECHANISM WORSE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 18
accusing them of being insensitive
Nota - Posizione 18
ACVUSA CHE NN RENDE POLITICAMENTE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 18
if another terrorist event takes place,
Nota - Posizione 18
SOMMA DI DUE MALI
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 19
in the case of terrorism, politicians and bureaucrats in particular have special reasons to fear fear itself. And the safest route for them is to empathize with the public’s emotions (I feel your pain), to suggest the public is right to think the danger is just terrible, and to warn of future attacks (if they don’t happen, nobody will remember the prediction, and if they do, everybody will).
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 22
the wisest course is to play along, to exacerbate,
Nota - Posizione 23
c
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 24
this is the lesson of the post‑9/ 11 rhetoric.
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 25
America faces an existential threat
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 36
Extensive studies of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear reactor meltdown find that the largest health consequences came not from the accident itself (fewer than 50 people died directly from radiation exposure), but from the impact on the mental health of people traumatized by completely imaginary, if officially stoked, fears that they would soon die of cancer. And Americans fearful of terrorism after 9/ 11 have been three to five times more likely than others to be diagnosed with new cardiovascular ailments.
Nota - Posizione 39
x ECCESSO DI PAURA PROBLEMI DI SALUTE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 41
If one has really come to deem the threat to be “existential,” all sorts of policies become attractive, even obligatory, such as reducing civil liberties and plunging the country into costly wars in the Middle East.
Nota - Posizione 42
x ALTRO RISCHIO SDOGANARE POLITICHE ASSURDE
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 51
the probability of being harmed by a terrorist is “extraordinarily small,” and one possibility for the risk communicator would be to put some numbers on that observation. At present rates, in fact, the chance anyone living outside a war zone will be killed by an international terrorist comes in at about 1 in 75,000‑‑ that’s not per year, but over an 80‑year period. The chance of dying in an automobile accident over the same interval, in distinct contrast, is about 1 in 80. That assumes another 9/ 11 every several years; if there are no terrorist attacks of that magnitude, the chance of death by terror slumps to about 1 in 130,000.
Nota - Posizione 52
x RISCHIO EFFETTIVO
Nota - Posizione 54
x 80 ANNI 1/75000 VS 1/80
Nota - Posizione 56
x NUMERI X RIDURRE LA PAURA
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 61
One might also instructively tally up the number of people killed by al‑Qaeda and its clones, lookalikes, and wannabes outside of war zones since 9/ 11. That comes to maybe 200 to 300 per year. That’s 200 to 300 per year too many of course, but it hardly suggests the country is under an existential threat‑‑ or perhaps even under something that deserves to be called a “threat” at all.
Nota - Posizione 65
x ESCLUSO IL 9/11
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 69
the constructs and institutions that the terrorism fear has inspired or even made necessary will probably live on after the instigating fear itself fades
Nota - Posizione 70
x RATCHET EFFECT
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 71
The FBI continued to squander resources chasing members of the pathetic domestic Communist Party
Nota - Posizione 72
x ESEMPIO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 78
Getting to the Specifics By John Mueller
Nota - Posizione 81
T
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 85
The question is, what messages does the research on risk communication suggest would be effective at reducing exaggerated perceptions of risk, what messages would foster resilience without exacerbating fear?
Nota - Posizione 86
x IL PROB COMUNICATIVO
Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 104
Unnecessarily concerned that this might hurt morale, Roosevelt went on the radio two months after the attack trying to reduce the alarm‑‑ the way, suggests Burns, we should now seek to reduce excessive alarm over terrorism. In his effort, Roosevelt assured his listeners that only three combatant ships had been put permanently out of commission and that all the rest were under repair or had already rejoined the fleet. Roosevelt’s facts were utterly correct
Nota - Posizione 107
x PEARL HARBOR

lunedì 12 settembre 2016

Identikit del terrorista kamikaze

Chi è il terrorista kamikaze?
Potremmo definirlo un altruista radicale.
Un altruista che attinge a quelle stesse forze attraverso le quali abbiamo posto le fondamenta delle più nobili e più potenti civiltà umane.
E la religione c’entra?
Certo che c’entra, la religione è il mattone fondamentale per costruire la civiltà umana.
Ecco, in estrema sintesi queste sono le risposte che fornisce Scott Atran dopo aver a lungo parlato con loro in Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists. In realtà dietro c’è uno studio antropologico e psicologico decennale.
Ecco una riga tratta dal testamento spirituale di un martire, mi sempra esemplare di un comune sentire:
I and thousands like me have forsaken everything for what we believe. MOHAMMAD SI DI QUE KHAN, ELDEST OF THE JULY 7, 2005, LONDON UNDERGROUND SUICIDE BOMBERS
Tra i terroristi la voglia di martirio è sincera, la fede è integerrima e la dedizione assoluta:
I noticed tears welling up in the eyes of my traveling companion and bodyguard, Farhin. He had just heard of a young man who had recently been killed in a skirmish with Christian fighters, and the experiment seemed to bring the youth’s death even closer to home. “Farhin,” I asked, “did you know the boy?” “No,” he said, “but he was only in the jihad a few weeks. I’ve been fighting since Afghanistan [the late 1980s] and I’m still not a martyr.” I tried consoling him: “But you love your wife and children.” “Yes.” He nodded sadly. “God has given this, and I must have faith in the way He sets out for me.” “What way, Farhin?” “The way of the mujahid, the holy warrior.”
Il terrorista non è un nichilista ma un credente a tutto tondo:
The terrorists aren’t nihilists, starkly or ambiguously, but often deeply moral souls with a horribly misplaced sense of justice.
L’obiettivo dello studioso è quello di comprendere questo altruismo estremo che conduce a sacrificare la propria vita per cause solo all’apparenza astratte:
… understand and convey what makes humans willing to kill and die for others…
L’istituzione privilegiata per vedere all’opera l’altruismo radicale dell’uomo è la tribù, ma intesa in senso lato:
It is the larger family, or “tribe,” and not the mostly ordinary individuals in it, that increasingly has seemed to me the key to understanding the extraordinary violence of mass killing and the murder of innocents… There is an extended sense of tribe similar to philosopher Jonathan Glover’s outlook in Humanity, his very disturbing chronicle of twentieth-century atrocities. This broader idea of tribe refers to a group of interlinked communities that largely share a common cultural sense of themselves, and which imagine and believe themselves to be part of one big family and home…

La tribù “allargata” puo’ diventare una comunità immaginaria i cui membri mancano spesso di una relazione  personale tra loro:
the “imagined community,” as political scientist Benedict Anderson once referred to the notion of the nation,6 extends from city neighborhoods to cyberspace…

La cosa non è nuova, già le ideologie novecentesche (vere religioni) avevano realizzato un legame tribale tra estranei:
Nazi Germany imagined itself in terms of a tribe, the fatherland, and pushed the Soviet Union away from pretensions of universal brotherhood and back to a Mother Russia, which, with the Stalin priesthood, in fact mobilized tribal passions for sacrifice in the Great Patriotic War…
Ormai sappiamo che esiste un legame solido tra altruismo e guerra. Niente altruisti, niente guerre. Non a caso rinveniamo spesso un’esaltazione della guerra tra gli altruisti radicali: 
War is noble in a true cause that is worth more than life. Fighting for that is a strong feeling, strong.”…
La metafora più sfruttata in questi casi è quella familare:
… It’s no accident that nearly all religious and political movements express allegiance through the idiom of the family—brothers and sisters, children of God, fatherland, motherland, homeland…
I terroristi non sono razzisti: per loro l’uomo è una creta sempre modellabile e la cultura è tutto, un bambino sionista puo’ sempre diventare un eccellente mujahedin:
whether the children of Zionist Jews raised by mujahedin families since birth would become good Muslims and mujahedin or remain Zionist Jews. Nearly all mujahedin, leaders and foot soldiers alike, answered that the children would grow up to be good Muslims and mujahedin. They usually said that everyone’s fitrah (nature) is the same and that social surroundings and teaching make a person good or bad…
Il bene più ambito dai terroristi è la gloria:
Glory is the promise to take life and surrender it in the hope of giving greater life to some group of genetically bound strangers who believe they share an imagined community under God (or under His modern secular manifestations, such as the nation and humanity)…
Difficile non sentire l’afflato religioso spirare da questi sentimenti sinceri.
Nelle parole dei martiri la causa (religiosa) è sempre accostata alla fratellanza, ovvero alla comunità di appartenenza. 
“My son didn’t die just for the sake of a cause, he died also for his cousins and friends. He died for the people he loved.” And my puzzling over that sentiment then became an overarching theme of study for this book…
Ma, almeno nell’uomo moderno, la scienza puo’ rimpiazzare fede e altruismo radicale? No. E non deve quindi meravigliare che molti terroristi non siano affatto estranei al mondo della scienza, o per lo meno della tecnologia (è nota tra loro la preponderanza di ingegneri). La scienza fallisce invariabilmente nel momento in cui vuole proporsi come base morale per una vita appagata:
Some of my fellow nonreligious scientists believe that science is better able than religion to constitute or justify a moral system that regulates selfishness and makes social life possible. In fact, there doesn’t seem to be the slightest bit of historical or experimental evidence to support such faith in science… Neither do I think scientists are particularly well suited to provide moral guidance to society… As Noam Chomsky put it in response to my criticism of “new atheists” who claim to replace faith-based morality with science-based morality: “On the ordinary problems of human life, science tells us very little, and scientists as people are surely no guide. In fact they are often the worst guide, because they often tend to focus, laser-like, on their professional interests and know very little about the world.”…
Dai tempi di Dukheim sappiamo che la religione e solo la religione fonda la convivenza umana (la laicità nasconde quasi sempre una religione moderna che si oppone a quelle passate, ricordiamoci che lo statista laico per eccellenza fu Hitler):
“God and society are one and the same…” French sociologist Émile Durkheim famously conjectured…
In nome della religione e dell’altruismo noi compiamo sia i gesti più nobili che quelli più infimi. L’empatia è alla base dell’ecatombe come della umanità. I genocidi più efferati sono stati compiuti spesso da chi ha sacrificato la propria vita e la propria famiglia alla causa e non certo da avidi egoisti in cerca di un sordido tornaconto personale:
…religions sanctify and incite fear (which is the father of cruelty) but also hope (which is the friend of happiness). Between the Hecatomb and Humanity, religion’s polar products, the destinies of civilizations continue to evolve…
L’idea religiosa regala all’uomo “senso” e “socializzazione”, due beni primari:
Humans and other primates have two preoccupations in life: health and social relations. Actually, they’re often the same: socialize to survive… This belief that our world was intended for the committed community is what I call the Cause. It is a mystical thing, a product of our biological evolution and history that gives spiritual purpose to our lives…
Con la socializzazione e il “senso” del proprio agire arrivano le motivazioni e  arriva presto anche  la civiltà:
… this illusion [Atran è un ateo convinto] came to drive humanity and make itself real in the creation of cultures and the religious rise of civilizations..
Il libro risulta disturbante proprio per il sottile legame che istituisce tra terrorismo e civiltà. Ecco lo scopo dell’autore dietro questa mossa ardita:
It’s about attempting to demystify terrorism, lessen our fears, and reduce the dangers of violent overreaction…
Jihadisti e umanitari hanno molto in comune, quasi ci si confonde:
jihad fights with the most primitive and elementary forms of human cooperation, tribal kinship and friendship, in the cause of the most advanced and sophisticated form of cultural cooperation ever created: the moral salvation of humanity…
Dal punto di vista psicologico e antropologico il terrorista è un tipo normale:
Anthropologically and psychologically, terrorists usually are not remarkably different from the rest of the population. There are a few cruel kooks and some very bright individuals who go in for violent jihad, but most terrorists fall in between. Small-group dynamics can trump individual personality to produce horrific behavior in ordinary people…
Ecco un profilo:
demographic and social tendencies exist: in age (usually early twenties), where they grew up and where they hang out (neighborhood is often key), in schooling (mostly nonreligious and often science oriented), in socioeconomic status (middle-class and married, though increasingly marginalized), in family relationships (friends tend to marry one another’s sisters and cousins)…
Il concetto centrale che il libro vuol far passare: non ci si sacrifica solo per una causa ma per una comunità. Gruppo e sopravvivenza vanno a braccetto cosicché la psicologia evoluzionista viene chiamata direttamente in causa:
These are tales and studies in the wild about how and why people come naturally to die and kill for the Cause—people almost never kill and die just for the Cause, but also for each other: for their group, whose cause makes their imagined family of genetic strangers—their brotherhood, fatherland, motherland, homeland, totem, or tribe… Now I see that friendship and other aspects of small-group dynamics, such as raising families or playing on a team together, trump most everything else in moving people through life. But I also see religion, and quasi-religious nationalist or internationalist devotion such as patriotism and love of humanity, as framing and mobilizing that movement with purpose and direction….But I think I’ve come to understand that without groups, and without sincere love of them by some, our species probably wouldn’t have survived… A person alone can analyze history but can’t make it without others…
Ricordiamoci sempre qual è la chiave del nostro successo evoluzionistico:
The key to this astounding and bewildering development, it appears, is mushrooming cultural cooperation and creativity within groups, in order to better compete against other groups…
E naturalmente la religione è l’ingrediente fondamentale di questa ricetta:
The story of humanity has been the religious rise of civilizations, however secular in appearance the recent chapters of the story appear…
In particolare i monoteismi, che hanno dato vita alle civiltà più estese (grandi dei, grandi civiltà):
The formation of large-scale cooperative societies is an evolutionary problem, because evolutionary theories of reciprocity based on kin relations or quid pro quo (scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours) cannot account for the fact that people frequently cooperate with strangers of unknown reputation whom they will never meet again and whose loyalties they cannot control. But religious beliefs and obligations can reinforce cooperative norms by conferring on them sacredness, and with supernatural punishment or divine retribution for breaking with those cooperative norms. Supernaturals are the unimpeachable authors of what is sacred in society… Sociologists and anthropologists argue that sacred beliefs and values authenticate society as having existence beyond the mere aggregation of its individuals and institutions… A reason for these divine beings: to make large-scale cooperation possible between anonymous strangers. Historical and cross-cultural analyses indicate that the larger a society’s population, the more likely it is to have deities who are concerned with managing morality and mitigating selfishness.
Forse la religiosità non è un istinto innato ma di sicuro emerge direttamente da istinti innati:
Religion, for example, is neither a naturally selected adaptation of our species nor innate in us. But we are biologically primed by evolution to be on the lookout for potential predators, and especially guard against intelligent and cunning agents like ourselves. So hair-trigger is this survival sensibility that we see enemies in clouds or hear them in the wind. It’s only a short step from imagining invisible agents to believing in their supernatural existence—a step motivated by fears of death and deception, and hopes of success and salvation. I’ll show evidence that this tricking and tweaking of our species’ innate and universal sensibilities is what creates religion from cognition…
Un parallelo (provocatorio, esagerato ma eloquente) potrebbe essere fatto tra pornografia e altruismo radicale:
From an evolutionary standpoint, imagined kinship isn’t all that different from pornography: It too involves manipulation of naturally selected proclivities for passionate ends that may be very far removed from evolutionary needs but create a cultural reality of their own….
Atran ha studiato a lungo l’origine della religione. Per lui, questo istinto naturale di far gruppo tra parenti ha isolato alcuni strumenti particolarmente efficaci a fungere da collante, tra questi il più affidabile è appunto il pensiero religioso (la religione emergerebbe così come effetto collaterale di questa esigenza):
When imagined kinship combines with team spirit, amazing things are possible: like winning battles against all odds, achieving civil rights, or you and your buddies blowing yourselves—and your perceived enemies—to bits…
Il concetto di Nazione è essenzialmente un concetto religioso:
In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson describes the birth of the concept of the nation as basically a reformulation of religion and the imagined kinship of ethnicity…
Ci sono una miriade di religioni moderne che noi non siamo abituati a considerare tali:
Secularized by the European Enlightenment, the great quasi-religious isms of modern history, as political philosopher John Gray calls them—colonialism, socialism, anarchism, fascism, communism, democratic liberalism—harnessed industry and science to continue on a global scale the human imperative of cooperate to compete… Even the idea of human rights is an outgrowth of monotheism, brought down from heaven to everyone on earth (in principle) by Europe’s Enlightenment.
Oggi le comunità sono virtuali e spesso staccate dai territori. Difficile allora pensare ai conflitti come a “scontri di civiltà” perché questa deterritorializzazione segna una crisi delle civiltà tradizionali – essenzialmente territoriali - e l’emersione di nuove civiltà:
As French political scientist Olivier Roy astutely notes, religion and politics are becoming increasingly detached from their cultures of origin, not so much because of the movement of peoples (only about 3 percent of the world’s population migrates),18 but through the worldwide traffic of media-friendly information and ideas…contrary to those who see global conflicts along long-standing “fault lines” and a “clash of civilizations,” these conflicts represent a crisis, even collapse, of traditional territorial cultures, not their resurgence… Many made giddy by globalization—the ever faster and deeper integration of individuals, corporations, markets, nations, technologies, and knowledge—believe that a connected world inexorably shrinks differences and divisions, making everyone safer and more secure in one great big happy family…
Molti giovani sono in cerca di “senso” e lo rinvengono in queste comunità virtuali che pur veicolando valori tradizionali sono spesso staccate dalla tradizione vera e propria e nel contesto contemporaneo offrono qualcosa di originale e in grado di marcare l’identità:
Many, especially the young, are increasingly independent yet interactive, in the search for respect and meaning in life, in their visions of economic advancement and environmental awareness. These youth form their identities in terms of global political cultures through exposure to the media…
Ora ci appare più chiaro l’errore preoccupante che si annida nelle analisi più superficiali:
Politicians and pundits assure us that jihadism is nihilistic and amoral, with no real program or humanity. Yet charges of nihilism against an adversary usually reflect willful ignorance regarding the adversary’s moral framework
COMMENTO PERSONALE
Al netto dell’ateismo dell’autore – fatto emergere anche laddove del tutto irrilevante – le tesi del libro sembrano convincenti. D’altronde, una certa sovraesposizione ideologica è giustificata: l’autore vorrebbe forse rassicurare della sua fede di fondo i “quattro cavalieri” dell’ateismo militante (Harris, Dawkins, Hitchens e Dennett) visti i duri scontri precedenti. Ricordo solo che i “quattro” sostenevano come al fanatismo islamico andasse contrapposto un non meglio precisato “pensiero scientifico”. Il commento di Atran: “barzellette”. E da lì sono state legnate pesanti come solo tra atei puo’ succedere.

venerdì 26 agosto 2016

CHAPTER 2 TO BE HUMAN: WHAT IS IT?

CHAPTER 2 TO BE HUMAN: WHAT IS IT?Read more at location 345
Note: 2@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit
“My son didn’t die just for the sake of a cause, he died also for his cousins and friends. He died for the people he loved.” And my puzzling over that sentiment then became an overarching theme of study for this book.Read more at location 393
Note: CAUSA E FRATELLANZA Edit
BALTIMORE, OCTOBER 1962-NOVEMBER 1963Read more at location 395
Note: T Edit
Some of my fellow nonreligious scientists believe that science is better able than religion to constitute or justify a moral system that regulates selfishness and makes social life possible. In fact, there doesn’t seem to be the slightest bit of historical or experimental evidence to support such faith in scienceRead more at location 457
Note: FEDE NELLA SCIENZA Edit
Neither do I think scientists are particularly well suited to provide moral guidance to society.Read more at location 460
As Noam Chomsky put it in response to my criticism of “new atheists” who claim to replace faith-based morality with science-based morality: “On the ordinary problems of human life, science tells us very little, and scientists as people are surely no guide. In fact they are often the worst guide, because they often tend to focus, laser-like, on their professional interests and know very little about the world.”Read more at location 460
Note: FALLIMENTO DELLA SCIENZA COME MORALE §§§§§ Edit
“Is it not that God and society are one and the same?” French sociologist Émile Durkheim famously conjectured.Read more at location 468
Note: SOCIETÀ E RELIGIONE Edit
religions sanctify and incite fear (which is the father of cruelty) but also hope (which is the friend of happiness). Between the Hecatomb and Humanity, religion’s polar products, the destinies of civilizations continue to evolve.Read more at location 471
Note: GENOCIDIO E UMANITÀ Edit
THE CAUSERead more at location 473
Note: T Edit
Humans and other primates have two preoccupations in life: health and social relations. Actually, they’re often the same: socialize to survive.Read more at location 473
Note: SOCIALIZZARE Edit
This belief that our world was intended for the committed community is what I call the Cause. It is a mystical thing, a product of our biological evolution and history that gives spiritual purpose to our lives.Read more at location 476
Note: SENSO Edit
this illusion came to drive humanity and make itself real in the creation of cultures and the religious rise of civilizationsRead more at location 477
Note: CIVILTÀ Edit
It’s about attempting to demystify terrorism, lessen our fears, and reduce the dangers of violent overreactionRead more at location 479
Note: LO SCOPO DEL LIBRO Edit
These are tales and studies in the wild about how and why people come naturally to die and kill for the Cause—people almost never kill and die just for the Cause, but also for each other: for their group, whose cause makes their imagined family of genetic strangers—their brotherhood, fatherland, motherland, homeland, totem, or tribe.Read more at location 481
Note: MORIRE X LA CCAUSAS Edit
A SOCIAL CREATURE, EVEN “I”Read more at location 484
Note: T Edit
Now I see that friendship and other aspects of small-group dynamics, such as raising families or playing on a team together, trump most everything else in moving people through life. But I also see religion, and quasi-religious nationalist or internationalist devotion such as patriotism and love of humanity, as framing and mobilizing that movement with purpose and direction.Read more at location 487
Note: FARE GRUPPO Edit
But I think I’ve come to understand that without groups, and without sincere love of them by some, our species probably wouldn’t have survived.Read more at location 504
Note: GRUPPO E SOPRAVVIVENZA Edit
A person alone can analyze history but can’t make it without others.Read more at location 505
Note: SOLI Edit
jihad fights with the most primitive and elementary forms of human cooperation, tribal kinship and friendship, in the cause of the most advanced and sophisticated form of cultural cooperation ever created: the moral salvation of humanity.Read more at location 510
Note: JIHADISTI E UMANITARI Edit
Anthropologically and psychologically, terrorists usually are not remarkably different from the rest of the population. There are a few cruel kooks and some very bright individuals who go in for violent jihad, but most terrorists fall in between. Small-group dynamics can trump individual personality to produce horrific behavior in ordinary people,Read more at location 524
Note: TERRORISTACUN TIPO NORMALE Edit
demographic and social tendencies exist: in age (usually early twenties), where they grew up and where they hang out (neighborhood is often key), in schooling (mostly nonreligious and often science oriented), in socioeconomic status (middle-class and married, though increasingly marginalized), in family relationships (friends tend to marry one another’s sisters and cousins).Read more at location 528
Note: PROFILO Edit
THE DIVINE ANIMALRead more at location 535
Note: T Edit
The key to this astounding and bewildering development, it appears, is mushrooming cultural cooperation and creativity within groups, in order to better compete against other groups.Read more at location 543
Note: EVOLUZIONISMO. LA CHIAVE DEL NS SUCCESSO Edit
The story of humanity has been the religious rise of civilizations, however secular in appearance the recent chapters of the story appear.Read more at location 545
Note: LA RELIGIONE COME MOTORE Edit
The formation of large-scale cooperative societies is an evolutionary problem, because evolutionary theories of reciprocity based on kin relations or quid pro quo (scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours) cannot account for the fact that people frequently cooperate with strangers of unknown reputation whom they will never meet again and whose loyalties they cannot control.12 But religious beliefs and obligations can reinforce cooperative norms by conferring on them sacredness, and with supernatural punishment or divine retribution for breaking with those cooperative norms. Supernaturals are the unimpeachable authors of what is sacred in society.Read more at location 546
Note: RELIGIONE E AMPI GRUPPI Edit
Note: IL SACRO COORDINA Edit
Sociologists and anthropologists argue that sacred beliefs and values authenticate society as having existence beyond the mere aggregation of its individuals and institutions.Read more at location 554
Note: IL GRANDE DIO Edit
A reason for these divine beings: to make large-scale cooperation possible between anonymous strangers.Read more at location 557
Note: LO STRANIERO Edit
Historical and cross-cultural analyses indicate that the larger a society’s population, the more likely it is to have deities who are concerned with managing morality and mitigating selfishness.Read more at location 558
Note: EGO E MORALE Edit
Religion, for example, is neither a naturally selected adaptation of our species nor innate in us. But we are biologically primed by evolution to be on the lookout for potential predators, and especially guard against intelligent and cunning agents like ourselves. So hair-trigger is this survival sensibility that we see enemies in clouds or hear them in the wind. It’s only a short step from imagining invisible agents to believing in their supernatural existence—a step motivated by fears of death and deception, and hopes of success and salvation. I’ll show evidence that this tricking and tweaking of our species’ innate and universal sensibilities is what creates religion from cognition.Read more at location 564
Note: RELIGIONE: NEMICO E SPERANZA. EMERSIONE DALL INNATO Edit
Imagined kinship—the rhetoric and ritual of brotherhood, motherland, family, or friends, and the like—is also a critical ingredient of nearly all religious and political success,Read more at location 569
Note: LACGRANDE FAMIGLIA Edit
From an evolutionary standpoint, imagined kinship isn’t all that different from pornography: It too involves manipulation of naturally selected proclivities for passionate ends that may be very far removed from evolutionary needs but create a cultural reality of their own.Read more at location 571
Note: PORNOGRAFIA E TRIBALISMO Edit
When imagined kinship combines with team spirit, amazing things are possible: like winning battles against all odds, achieving civil rights, or you and your buddies blowing yourselves—and your perceived enemies—to bits.Read more at location 572
Note: EFFETTO COLLATRRALE: PER FAR GRUPPO CON LA PARENTELA SI RICORRE ALLA DIVINITÀ CHE CONSENTRE GRUPPI PIÙ ALLARGATI E POTENTI Edit
In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson describes the birth of the concept of the nation as basically a reformulation of religion and the imagined kinship of ethnicity.Read more at location 576
Note: ANDERSON Edit
Secularized by the European Enlightenment, the great quasi-religious isms of modern history, as political philosopher John Gray calls them16—colonialism, socialism, anarchism, fascism, communism, democratic liberalism—harnessed industry and science to continue on a global scale the human imperative of cooperate to compete—Read more at location 577
Note: RELIGIONI SECOLARIZZATE Edit
Even the idea of human rights is an outgrowth of monotheism, brought down from heaven to everyone on earth (in principle) by Europe’s Enlightenment.Read more at location 582
Note: DIRITTI UMANI Edit
THE CRASH OF CULTURESRead more at location 588
Note: T Edit
As French political scientist Olivier Roy astutely notes, religion and politics are becoming increasingly detached from their cultures of origin, not so much because of the movement of peoples (only about 3 percent of the world’s population migrates),18 but through the worldwide traffic of media-friendly information and ideas.Read more at location 590
Note: DISTACVCVO DAL TERRITORIO Edit
contrary to those who see global conflicts along long-standing “fault lines” and a “clash of civilizations,”19 these conflicts represent a crisis, even collapse, of traditional territorial cultures, not their resurgence.Read more at location 593
Note: CONTRO LA CLASH OF CIVILIZATION Edit
Many made giddy by globalization—the ever faster and deeper integration of individuals, corporations, markets, nations, technologies, and knowledge—believe that a connected world inexorably shrinks differences and divisions, making everyone safer and more secure in one great big happy family.Read more at location 595
Note: GLOBALIZZAZIONE Edit
But my field experience and experiments in a variety of cultural settings lead me to believe that an awful lot of people on this planet respond to global connectivity very differently than does the power elite.Read more at location 601
For there is, together with a flat and fluid world, a more tribal, fragmented, and divisive world, as people unmoored from millennial traditions and cultures flail about in search of a social identity that is at once individual and intimate but with a greater sense of purpose and possibility of survival than the sorrow of here today, gone tomorrow.Read more at location 605
Note: FRAMMENTAZIONE Edit
Many, especially the young, are increasingly independent yet interactive, in the search for respect and meaning in life, in their visions of economic advancement and environmental awareness. These youth form their identities in terms of global political cultures through exposure to the media.Read more at location 608
Note: IN CERCA DI SENSO Edit
Note: MEDIA Edit
Human rights constitute one global political culture,Read more at location 613
The decidedly nonsecular jihad is another political culture in this massive, media-driven transnational awakening: thoroughly modern and innovative despite its atavistic roots in the harsh purity of the Prophet’s original community in the Arabian Desert.Read more at location 615
Note: DIRITTU UMANI EVJIHSD Edit
Politicians and pundits assure us that jihadism is nihilistic and immoral, with no real program or humanity. Yet charges of nihilism against an adversary usually reflect willful ignorance regarding the adversary’s moral framework.Read more at location 628
Note: GLI ERRORI Edit