7 Philosophical Preliminaries

7 Philosophical Preliminaries
Note:7@@@@@@@@@L'INIMMAGINABILE ESISTE? PER IL BUON SENSO NO PER LA SCIEZA SÌ. CHI HA RAGIONE? IL BUON SENSO.

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7.1   Metapreliminaries 7.1.1   Why a chapter of preliminaries?
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This chapter explains some general features of my philosophical outlook,
Note:SCOPO

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Readers sympathetic to empiricism will tend to reject the rest of this book.
Note:PREVISIONE

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7.1.2   Modern empiricism
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it is impossible to attain any substantive knowledge of the world except on the basis of observation.
Note:DOGMA EMPIRICO

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rationalism holds that there is some substantive knowledge about the world that is not based on observation;
Note:CONTROPARTE

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pure reason.
Note:ESISTE SOLO X I RAZIONALISTI

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an extreme form of empiricism, logical positivism,
Note:XX SECOLO

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literally meaningless,
Note:TUTTE LE VERITÀ NN OSSERVABILI

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wide swathes of human intellectual endeavor meaningless, including such fields as metaphysics, theology, and ethics.
Note:CONCLUSIONE RADICALE

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if any scientific theory entails the existence of observationally undetectable facts, that theory must be either false or meaningless.
Note:COROLLARIO IMBARAZZANTE

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empiricists have generally treated their philosophy more like an a priori axiom than like an empirical hypothesis.
Note:IRONIA

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assumed as self-evident,
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Peter van Inwagen describes an ideology of ‘scientism’, consisting in ‘an exaggerated respect for science
Note:MA XCHÈ TANTO RADICALISMO?

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all knowledge must be like scientific knowledge,
Note:L OBBIETTIVO DA XSEGUIRE

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all books not containing mathematics or science should be burned,
Note:HUME

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7.1.3   The significance of empiricism
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Positivistic assumptions were crucial in motivating Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics, and the formalist approach to mathematics,
Note:UNA VISIONE MAGAEI NN ACCETTATA MA INFLUENTE

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Today, even those who would explicitly disavow positivism tend to accept positivist-inspired theories without knowing their provenance.
Note:TUTTI VITTIME

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some very broad philosophical viewpoints, such as ‘naturalism’.
Note:INFLUENZA INDIRETTA MA XSISTENTE

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Empiricism and positivism set the agenda
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the leading philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world.
Note:NEOPOSIT

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7.2   Phenomenal conservatism
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Phenomenal conservatism holds that undefeated appearances are a source of justification (perhaps the only source of justification) for belief.
Note:GNOSEOLOGIA DEL SENSO COMUNE...PRINCIPIO DI CREDULITÀ

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An appearance is a broad type of mental state, distinct from and normally prior
Note:NO PRIOR...SENSO COMUNE: PRIOR + APPARENZA + VERIFICA

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including sensory experiences, memory experiences, and rational intuitions.
Note:I VARI TIPI

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When I look out the window, it seems to me that there is a squirrel in the tree (visual appearance); I seem to recall falling off my motorcycle a few times in college (memory appearance); it seems to me that the shortest path between any two points must be a straight line (rational intuition); it seems to me that, given that cows have four stomachs, it follows that cows have more than one stomach (inferential appearance).
Note:ES DI APPARENZE RAZIONALI

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There is no rational basis for discriminating fundamentally among species of appearances. What makes sensory experiences a source of justification is the same thing that makes memories and intuitions a source of justification:
Note:IL PRIMATO DEI SENSI NN HA SENSO....MEMORIA E INTUIZIONE

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It is, for example, arbitrary to hold that sensory experiences may be presumed reliable but that intuitions should not be.
Note:ARBITRARIO

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phenomenal conservatism is not the thesis that all appearances are true.
Note:CAVEAT

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how things initially appear is the rational starting point:
Note:PIUTTOSTO

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unless contrary evidence
Note:ONERE DELLA PROVA

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7.3   Synthetic a priori knowledge
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7.3.1   The question of the synthetic, a priori

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•Empirical knowledge is knowledge whose justification depends essentially on observations
Note:DEFINZIONE

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•A priori knowledge is knowledge that is not empirical.
Note:DEF 2

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•An analytic statement is, roughly, one whose denial is a contradiction.
Note:DEF 3

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synthetic statement is one that is not analytic, that is, its denial is consistent.
Note:DEF 4

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is there any synthetic, a priori knowledge?
Note:LA DOMANDA DEGLI ULTIMI 3 SeCOLI

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can there be a sentence whose denial is not contradictory, but nevertheless we can see it to be true in a way that does not depend on observation for its justification?
Note:TRADOTTO

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7.3.2   The answer
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No object is completely purple and also completely orange.
Note:ES 1...DIFETTO D IMMAGINAZIONE

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For any two moments in time, one is earlier than the other.
Note:2

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it is better to be happy than to be miserable.
Note:3

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If x is inside y, and y is inside z, then x is inside z.
Note:4

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The appearance of white is more similar to the appearance of yellow than to that of any other chromatic color.
Note:6

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No action can cause an effect to occur before the action itself occurs.
Note:7

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The number three exists.
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There could have been only seven planets in the solar system.
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The probability that either it is raining or it isn’t is 1.
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numbers, spatial properties, colors, ethical value, decision theory, time, causation, probability, possibility,
Note:TUTTO È COINVOLTO NEI SINT A PRIORI

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Take a famous epistemological thought experiment: suppose that I am a disembodied brain being kept alive by scientists in a vat of nutrients; my brain is being artificially stimulated to create the illusion of a physical world, and so on. In this case, all of my observations are false. Nevertheless, even if this scenario is true, I still know that no object is completely purple and completely orange.
Note:PERCHÈ PARLIAMO DI APRIORI?

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produce the definitions of the relevant terms in the statement, substitute the definitions for the terms they define, then, from the denial of the resulting statement, derive a sentence of the form ‘A and not A’.
Note:COSA FARE X DIMOSTRARE L ANALITICITÁ

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Take the sentence, ‘No object is completely purple and also completely orange.’ The project of showing this to be analytic is stymied at the first stage by the fact that there is no verbal definition of either ‘purple’ or ‘orange’. (There is only an ‘ostensive definition’, that is, these terms have to be explained by pointing to examples of the relevant colors.)
Note:IMPOSSIBILE NEL NS CASO

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‘Something is completely purple and also completely orange’, has the same logical form as ‘Something is completely furry and also completely happy’, which is not a contradiction.
Note:ANALOGIA

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7.3.3   How much synthetic a priori knowledge is there?
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they are willing to accept analytic a priori knowledge, but not synthetic a priori knowledge.
Note:L EMPIRISMO CADE O VINCE QUI... LA CONOSC ANALITICA È MNIMIZZATA COME NN SOSTANZIALE (SOLO LINGUISTICA) PER SALVARE LA LGICA

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What is the source of our synthetic a priori knowledge? The best answer to this is rational intuition, and the best explanation for our justification for relying on rational intuition is phenomenal conservatism.
Note:LA SORGENTE

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Rational intuition is not relevantly different from observation, reasoning, or memory for present purposes; all of these are simply different species of appearances,
Note:TUTTO APPARE

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we have good reason for seeking multiple justifications for a given conclusion; if it is possible to support a conclusion through both observation and intuition, this is preferable to supporting it through only one of these means.
Note:VALE TUTTO

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7.4   Metaphysical possibility
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7.4.1   The meaning of ‘possible’ and related terms
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a proposition is possible if it could be true
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A proposition is necessary if it could not be (and could not have been) false;
Note:DEF

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A proposition is contingent if it is neither necessary nor impossible; that is, it could be true and could be false.
Note:DEF

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‘logical possibility’ and ‘metaphysical possibility’.
Note:LE DUE POSSIBILITÀ DI CUI CI CCUPIAMO

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A proposition is said to be logically possible provided only that it is not contradictory.
Note:DEF

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Metaphysical possibility is undefinable;
Note:CONCETTO VAGO MA INTUITIVO

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7.4.2   Metaphysical possibility is broader than physical possibility
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even things that conflict with the laws of nature may nonetheless be in some sense ‘possible’,
Note:MP E FISICA

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laws of nature could have been different.
Note:INFATTI

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‘It could have turned out that we lived in a perfectly Newtonian
Note:ESEMPIO

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7.4.3   Metaphysical possibility as conceivability?
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To say that something is metaphysically possible is something close to saying that it is coherently conceivable.
Note:CONCEPIBILE

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conceivable’ just means ‘possible to conceive’,
Note:PUNTO E A CAPO

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a proposition might be impossible for human beings to conceive solely because of some cognitive defect or limitation on our part.
Note:ALTRO PROBLEMA

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conceivability by an ideal observer,
Note:CIÒ CHE DOBBIAMO INTENDERE

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7.4.4   Metaphysical possibility and science fiction
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The notion of metaphysical possibility can also be illuminated by considering the limitations of fictional stories.
Note:UNA BUONA ANALOGIA: LA CRITICA DEI FILM DI FANTASCIENZA

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in Star Trek, people travel faster than the speed of light all the time.
Note:NESSUNO OBBOETTA...C È SOLO UNA FISICA DIFFERENTE

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aspects of stories are rejected by alert fans as ‘not making sense’. Time travel stories sometimes evoke this kind of criticism,
Note:REVERSIBILITA' DEL TEMPO...ESEMPIO CLASSICO DI IMPOSSIBILITÀ METAFISICA

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on the ‘branching timelines’ theory, when a person ‘goes back’ to some earlier time t, what actually happens is that a new branch of the universe is generated
Note:INVENZIONI X RENDERE CONCEPIBILE L NCONCEBIBILE

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there is a certain very broad sort of possibility that ought to constrain stories, such that if a story is impossible in this broad sense, it is thereby defective.
Note:IL PUNTO DI QS DISCUSSIONE....C È UN IMPOSSIBILITÀ CHE VA OLTRE LE LEGGI DELLA FISICA....IMPO METAFISICA

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critics are claiming that the time travel stories are metaphysically impossible.
Note:COSA FANNO I CRITICI DEI FILM DI FANTASCIENZA. ALTRI ESEMPIO: IL TELETRASPORTO A ZERO COINVILGIMENTO DELLA MATERIA

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7.4.5   Metaphysical possibility as a priori knowability?
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Metaphysical possibility is closely tied to the notion of a priori knowledge.
Note:SI NOTI CHE

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Thus, we know a priori that pentagons have five sides, and it is metaphysically necessary that pentagons have five sides; we know a priori that no object is completely purple and completely orange, and it is metaphysically necessary that no object is completely purple and completely orange.
Note:ESEMPI...VALE SIA X L ANALITICO CHE X IL SINTETICO

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7.4.6   Logical vs. metaphysical possibility
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The synthetic a priori truths are metaphysically necessary, yet their denial is not contradictory
Note:NON SONO LA STESSA COSA

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The synthetic, necessary, a priori truths that I have been defending are anathema to empiricists.
Note:RIPETIZIONE

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7.4.7   False signs of possibility: Analogies and mathematical systems
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No one should believe that a proposition is metaphysically possible merely because it is logically possible.
Note:PRIMA AVVERTENZA

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Mathematical systems in modern times are constrained by nothing other than mere consistency
Note:SECONDA AVVERTENZA...NEANCHE LA POSSIBILITÀ MATEMATICA GARANTISCE QUELLA METAFISICA

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the fact that one can develop a coherent mathematical system in which one talks about ‘infinite numbers’ such as ℵ0, does not show that any such numbers exist or could exist.
Note:ESEMPIO

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the argument by analogy: A is possible, and there is an analogy to be drawn between A and B; therefore, B is possible. This is usually fallacious, particularly when the analogy is based upon mere similarity of mathematical structure.
Note:ALTRO ARGOMENTO FALLACE...TERZO

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it is possible to travel in either direction along a spatial dimension, and there is an analogy to be drawn between the temporal dimension and a spatial dimension
Note:ESEMPIO

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7.5   Possibility and paradox
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I argue that most of the paradoxes of the infinite involve scenarios that are logically possible but metaphysically impossible.
Note:TESI

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I hold that there are many more necessary truths than are standardly recognized by philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians;
Note:LA VISIONE STANDARD È DOVUTA ALL EMPIRISMO

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I think there are many fewer possibilities than are commonly recognized.
Note:CONSEGUENZA...CHE RISOLVE I PARADOSSI

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For an empiricist, nothing can be ruled out a priori unless it is actually a contradiction
Note:GLI EMPIRISTI SI APPIATTIVANO SULLA MERA LOGICA SNOBBANDO L INCONCEPIBILE

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Even though empiricism is less popular than it once was, contemporary philosophy retains a significant resistance to synthetic necessary truths.
Note:PURTROPPO

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Suppose we want to know whether some proposition P is metaphysically necessary, impossible, or contingent. Many think that the presumption should be that P is contingent,
Note:BURDEN OF PROOF...UN PORTATO DELL EMPIRISMO

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If, however, metaphysical possibility is distinct from logical possibility, and if there are many things that are logically contingent yet metaphysically necessary or impossible, then it is unclear why there should be any such burden of proof.
Note:L'IMPOSSIBILITA' METAFISICA CI TOGLIE MOLTI IMBARAZZI... MOLTI PARADOSSI POSSONO ESSERE LIQUIDATI

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7.6   A realist view of mathematics
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the nature of mathematics.
Note:IL TEMA

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a body of a priori knowledge, some of it analytic and some synthetic.
Note:OPINIONE....COS È LA MATEMATICA....ANALITICA L INFERENZA...SINTETICA L ESISTENZA. ES: IL NUMERO 3 ESOSTE (GIUDIZIO SINTETICO A PRIORI)

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properties of and relations between certain kinds of universals.
Note:OGGETTO

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It is, however, necessary that there could be things exemplifying the property.
Note:IMMANENTISMO

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Arithmetic studies the properties and relationships of numbers, where numbers are properties that groups of things (whether physical or non-physical) can exemplify – for example, whenever there are two of anything, the property of twoness is exemplified.
Note:ESEMPIO...REALTA' CHE EMERGONO DA ESEMPI SEMPRE PRESENTI...IMMANENTISMO

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This view of mathematics (which is a form of mathematical Platonism) always seemed to me completely natural, so much so that I have never seriously entertained any other view. Nevertheless, the view is quite controversial in contemporary philosophy of mathematics.
Note:L'IMMANENTISMO MATEMATICO LA VIA PIU' NATURALE

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Some philosophers and mathematicians believe, instead, that mathematics is essentially a conventional symbol-manipulation game:
Note:CONCEZIONE ALTERNATIVA

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mathematicians invent a series of symbols,
Note:Cccc CONTRO IL BUON SENSO

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the whole system is pure invention,
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That view of mathematics, known as ‘formalism’, is motivated by empiricism. The empiricists of the twentieth century were loath to admit that there was any a priori knowledge of objective reality,
Note:FORMALISMO NOMINALISTA.... UN PORTATO DELL EMPIRISMO PER LIMITARE L APRIORISMO

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Some empiricists turned to the formalist philosophy of mathematics to rescue them from what would otherwise be a striking collection of counterexamples to their epistemological theory.
IMBARAZZO @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

paradox lost mike huemer

paradox lost mike huemer

riccardo-mariani@libero.it

Citation (APA): riccardo-mariani@libero.it. (2018). paradox lost mike huemer [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com

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Parte introduttiva

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 12

fictional objects.

Nota - Posizione 12

OGGETTI CHE POTREBBERO METTERE IN CRISI LA BIVALENZA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 16

Jar Jar Binks is secretly a Sith Lord. "It seems to me that this statement is neither true nor false. However, I think that if J.J. Abrams decided, in Episode IX, to take a definitive stance on this question, it would settle it one way or another. Then J would have a definite truth value.

Nota - Posizione 17

CREATURA FANTASIOSA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 21

in the process of creation, the truth values about their nature are indeterminate.

Nota - Posizione 22

OGGETTI FINZIONALE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 24

Future contingent claims are neither true nor false, but could become true or false.

Nota - Posizione 25

UNA TEMATICA CLASSICA SIMILE AI PERSONAGGI DELLE FINCTION

Segnalibro - Posizione 27

Nota - Posizione 28

RISPOSTA DI H. SE PENSI CHE IL MONDO SIA IN UN CERTO MODO ALLORA NN SARÀ IN UN ALTRO. QUESTO CI DICE IL PRINCIPIO DEL TERZO ESCLUSO E LA NS INTUIZIONE RAZIONALE. I PERSONAGGI FINZIONALI SONO IPOTESI SU MONDI POSSIBILI ( PRETESE) E QUINDI VALE ANCHE X LORO LA BIVALENZA. FUTURI CONTINGENTI: SONO AFFERMAZIONI VERE. E IL PROBLEMA DELLA VERITÀ SORGE SOLO SE INDICIZZI UNA PROPOSIZIONE, OPERAZIONE ILLECITA! NN POSSO DERE: LA PROP: "SCRIVERÒ QS MESSAGGIO" ERA GIÀ VERA UN SECOLO FA" IMPLICANDO DETERMINISMO.

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 28

cosa.

Segnalibro - Posizione 56

Segnalibro - Posizione 93

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 93

Part 3 in my 10-part series on paradoxes: THE PUZZLE OF THE SELF-TORTURER

Nota - Posizione 94

Ttttttttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 95

You’ve been fitted with a torture device that applies an electric current to the pain center in your brain. It has settings from “0” to “1000”.

Nota - Posizione 95

SCENARIO...SORITE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 96

so slightly higher that you would not notice the difference.

Nota - Posizione 97

DA N A N+1

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 97

You are offered a series of 1000 choices: each time, you are offered $ 10,000 if you turn the setting on the device up by 1.

Nota - Posizione 98

L OFFERTA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 99

But at the end, you wind up condemned to spend the rest of your life in anguish, in exchange for $ 10 million– which doesn’t seem worth it.

Nota - Posizione 100

DICENDO SEMPRE SÌ...COME È RAZIONALE CHE SIA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 103

My solution:

Nota - Posizione 103

Ttttttttr

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 104

possibility of increments in pain that are too small to detect.

Nota - Posizione 104

REALTÀ

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 107

The disvalue of an undetectable increment of pain can also be larger than the value of a detectable profit

Nota - Posizione 108

DI FATTO

Segnalibro - Posizione 117

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 117

Part 4 in my 10-part series on paradoxes: NEWCOMB’S PROBLEM

Nota - Posizione 117

Tttttttttt

Segnalibro - Posizione 154

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 156

Part 5 in my 10-part series on paradoxes: THE SURPRIZE QUIZ.

Nota - Posizione 156

Ttttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 157

A teacher announces that there will be a “surprise quiz” some day next week,

Nota - Posizione 157

SCENARIO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 158

class meets Monday through Friday.

Nota - Posizione 158

Ccccccc

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 159

Surely it cannot be on Friday, since then the students would know,

Nota - Posizione 160

Cccccccc

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 161

Nor can it be on Thursday, because if it hasn’t come by Wednesday evening, the students could reason: “Since we know it can’t be on Friday, and it hasn’t happened so far, it will have to be on Thursday.”

Nota - Posizione 163

Cccccccc

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 164

They conclude that the surprise quiz cannot be given.

Nota - Posizione 164

CONCLUSIONE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 165

The following week, the teacher gives a quiz on Wednesday, and everyone is surprised.

Nota - Posizione 166

CONC SECONDA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 172

“Surprise” is vague,

Nota - Posizione 173

INDIZIO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 185

I said that *if* the quiz is not given by Thurs., then the students should assign an intermediate credence to the quiz occurring at all

Nota - Posizione 186

IL QUIZ CANCELLATO SEMBRA STIPULATO MA È IMPOSSIBILE

Segnalibro - Posizione 188

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 191

Part 6 in my 10-part series on paradoxes: THE TWO-ENVELOPE PARADOX.

Nota - Posizione 191

Tttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 192

You are shown two indistinguishable envelopes. You are told that both contain money, and one contains twice as much as the other.

Nota - Posizione 193

SCENARIO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 194

After you choose but before you open it,

Nota - Posizione 194

TI CONVIENE CAMBIARE?

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 197

The other envelope contains either 2a or a/ 2,

Nota - Posizione 198

PRIMA RISPOSTA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 198

expected gain from switching is (1/ 2)( a) + (1/ 2)(-a/ 2) = + a/ 4.

Nota - Posizione 199

CONVIENE CAMBIARE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 200

Your envelope contains either b/ 2 or 2b, with equal probability.

Nota - Posizione 200

SECONDA RISPSTA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 201

expected gain from switching is (1/ 2)( b/ 2) + (1/ 2)(-b) = -b/ 4.

Nota - Posizione 201

CONVIENE TENERE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 202

It doesn’t matter.

Nota - Posizione 202

TERZA RISPOSTA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 204

Answer (III) appears to be the correct one. But what went wrong with (I) and (II)?

Nota - Posizione 205

DILEMMA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 207

All three above arguments are confused, since they treat variables (“ a”, “b”, “c”) as if they were numerical values.

Nota - Posizione 208

L ERRORE...SOSTITUISCI VALORI NUMERICI

Segnalibro - Posizione 215

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 216

My 7th paradox: PARADOXES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIFFERENCE.

Nota - Posizione 216

Tttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 219

if there is no reason for preferring either one over the other, then the two are equally probable.

Nota - Posizione 219

DATE DUE ALTEENATIVE....NELL IGNORANZA ASSOLUTA 50/59

Nota - Posizione 229

XCHÈ ALLORA LE RISPO SONO DIVERSE?

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 230

You take different ways of describing the possibilities, try to apply the PI, and get incompatible results.

Nota - Posizione 230

CI SONO MOLTI ESEMPI SIMILI...Qual è la probabilità di una guerra nucleare prima dell'anno 2000? Per il principio di indifferenza rispondiamo un mezzo. Qual è la probabilità che nessuna bomba atomica cade sugli stati uniti? Risposta: un mezzo. Che nessuna bomba a cada sulla russia? Risposta Un mezzo. Che nessuna bomba cadde sulla francia? Risposta: un mezzo. Se applichiamo Questo ragionamento a 10 Paesi diversi la probabilità che nessuna bomba cada su uno di essi è la decima potenza di un mezzo, ossia 1/1024. Sottraendo questo numero a uno otteniamo la probabilità che una bomba atomica casa su uno dei 10 paesi ovvero 1023/1024. Il fatto è che abbiamo tacitamente presupposto l'indipendenza di eventi che chiaramente non sono indipendenti. Un altro buon esempio è il paradosso del cubo sconosciuto. Supponete di sapere che un cubo nascosto in un armadio sia di lato compreso tra 2 e 4 cm. Non avendo ragione di ritenere che il lato sia minore o maggiore di 3, supponete che misuri 3. Ora consideriamo il volume del cubo deve essere compreso tra 2 alla terza cioè 8 cm3, e 4 alla terza, cioè 64 cm3. Non avendo ragione di ritenere che sia minore o maggiore di 36, supponete che il volume sia pari a 36 cm3. In altri termini, la vostra migliore stima di avere un cubo con lato 3 e volume 36 Cm3. Ma questo è un cubo Ben strano! Detto in altri termini, se si applica il principio di indifferenza al lato del cubo si ottiene un cubo di lato 3 e volume 27, se lo si applica il volume si ottiene un cubo con volume 36 e lato uguale alla radice cubica di 36, ovvero 3,30 cm.

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 231

Some say this means the PI is inconsistent and thus false.

Nota - Posizione 231

SECONDO ALCUNI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 234

randomization procedures).

Nota - Posizione 234

UTILIZZIAMO PI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 235

how the problem of induction is really another paradox of the Principle of Indifference;

Segnalibro - Posizione 235

Nota - Posizione 235

ALTRO PROBLEMA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 238

Paradox #8: THE RAVENS PARADOX.

Nota - Posizione 238

ttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 238

confirmation theory.

Nota - Posizione 238

AMBITI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 239

E makes H more likely.

Nota - Posizione 239

E CONFERMA H

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 245

O is an observation of a white shoe.

Nota - Posizione 245

DESCRIZIONE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 245

O is irrelevant to “All ravens are black,”

Nota - Posizione 245

Cccccccc

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 245

however, O confirms “All non-black things are non-ravens,”

Nota - Posizione 246

Cccccccc

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 246

“All nonblack things are nonravens” is logically equivalent to “All ravens are black”;

Nota - Posizione 247

Cccccccc

Segnalibro - Posizione 249

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 249

Doesn’t it depend on the universe being finite?.

Nota - Posizione 249

HAMPEL SOLUTION

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 249

don’t think we Can look at confirmation in a vacuum like the paradox suggests

Nota - Posizione 250

Ccccccc

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 252

THE SHOOTING ROOM.

Nota - Posizione 252

IL GIO O DEL MATTATOIO...VEDI SUL BLOG E SU FACEBOOK

Segnalibro - Posizione 323

Segnalibro - Posizione 355

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 355

Given facts about population growth, *if* the human species lasts for a long time into the future, then the great majority of humans who ever live will turn out to have lived at a later time than now,

Nota - Posizione 357

METTO IN FILA TUTTI

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 360

Therefore, the fact that you find yourself living now is *evidence that* the human species will not last long into the future.

Nota - Posizione 360

ccccccc

Segnalibro - Posizione 375

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 377

THE FINE-TUNING ARGUMENT

Nota - Posizione 377

Ttttttttttt

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 378

There are several parameters of the universe (e.g., the gravitational constant, the mass of the proton, etc.) such that, if they had been very slightly different from their actual values, life would have been impossible

Nota - Posizione 379

LA VITA È UN CASO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 382

There are very many (perhaps infinitely many) parallel universes, with different physical parameters. In some tiny portion of them, the parameter values are life-permitting.

Nota - Posizione 383

LA SPIEGAZIONE DEL MULTIVERSO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 385

Leonard Susskind has a fascinating book

Nota - Posizione 386

FONTE MULTIVERSO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 388

The Firing Squad:

Nota - Posizione 388

L ANALOGIA IMBARAZZANTE X M: PLOTONE

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 388

You’re about to be executed by a firing squad of 50 expert marksmen. They take aim, fire, and . . . somehow miraculously all miss you.

Nota - Posizione 389

INCOLUME!!!!!!

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 390

Then you realize: there’s no need to posit any intentional intervention, because it could just be that there are a trillion trillion trillion other firing squads, somewhere where you can’t see them, so many that it would be expected that some of them would all miss. You don’t need any other explanation of why your squad missed, because if they hadn’t, you wouldn’t be here to wonder about it.

Nota - Posizione 393

LA SPIEGAZIONE CHE NN SPIEGA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 394

MIA REAZIONE:

Nota - Posizione 394

PERCHÈ IL PLOTONE NN SPIEGA? CONTINUO A CHIEDERMI: TRA I TANTI CONDANNATI XCHÈ PROPRIO IO? PENSO P IN TERMINI DI PAURA E SOLLIEVO...INVEVE NN RIESCO A PENSARE M IN QS TERMINI. L UOMO CHE CONSENTE M SONO NECESSARIAMENTE IO. IN M NN C È QS STUPORE. XCHÈ? IN M IO È NECESSARIO IN P RESTA CONTINGENTE ANCHE SE PUÓ ESSERE SPIEGATO. MA IN M AFFINCHÈ IO SIA REALMENTE NECESSARIO DEVE ESSERE CONCEPIBILE ANCHE NEGLI ALTRI UNIVERSI, COSA IMPOSSIBILE SPECIE X UN FISICALISTA

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 394

Ho qualche dubbio che l’ipotesi multiverso sia parente di quella del plotone: nella prima mi colloco necessariamente dopo l’evento, nella seconda prima, durante e dopo.

Nota - Posizione 395

LA DIFFERENZA ESPRESSA IN ALTRO MODO

Evidenzia ( giallo) - Posizione 395

Il problema del multiverso è che l’ipotesi concorrente sembrerebbe più semplice

Nota - Posizione 396

ALTRO PROBLEMA