2 Relative Deprivation in the Islamic World + FACE

TERRORISTI CON LE PEZZE AL CULO

Non propriamente dei frustrati...

Abbud Al-Zumur, coinvolto nell'assassinio del presidente egiziano Sadat, nacque in una delle famiglie più ricche e importanti del Governatorato di Giza e fu colonnello dell'intelligence militare, posizione alquanto prestigiosa.

Osama bin Laden, plurilaureato in occidente, era il rampollo di una delle famiglie più ricche dell'Arabia Saudita.

Ayman Al-Zawahiri, successore di bin Laden, proviene da una famiglia di accademici dell'alta borghesia.

Sami Al-Arian, che si dichiarò colpevole in un tribunale americano nel 2006 per aver fornito sostegno alla Jihad islamica palestinese, era professore ordinario di ingegneria informatica presso la University of South Florida.

Azhari Husin, ingegnere e responsabile della cantieristica di Jemaah Islamiyah nel sud-est asiatico, ha conseguito un dottorato presso l'Università di Reading e ha lavorato come docente presso l'Università tecnologica della Malesia.

Assem Ham-moud, un libanese coinvolto nel complotto del 2006 per far saltare in aria i tunnel della metro di New York, ha insegnato economia all'università internazionale libanese.

Anwar al-Awlaki, cittadino americano di origini yemenite che divenne predicatore di jihad e fu ucciso in Yemen nell'ottobre 2011 da un drone statunitense, ricevette una laurea in ingegneria civile presso la Colorado State University nel 1994; era figlio di Nasser al-Awlaki, ministro dell'agricoltura, presidente dell'Università di Sana’a e parente dell'ex primo ministro dello Yemen, Ali Mohammed Mujur. Invece di diventare un magnate degli affari o un funzionario di regime in Yemen, ha scelto di diventato un mentore jihadista.

Abdulmutallab, figlio di un ricco e ben connesso banchiere nigeriano che ricopriva anche posizioni politiche, venne nel Regno Unito per conseguire una laurea in ingegneria meccanica presso l'University College di Londra. Mentre frequentava l'università viveva in un appartamento del valore di 4 milioni di dollari.

Faisal Shahzad, che ha conseguito una laurea in informatica e ingegneria, è il figlio di un alto ufficiale dell'aeronautica pakistana; sebbene non fosse ricchissimo, era comunque un figlio del privilegio.

Samar Alami e Jawad Botmeh, due ingegneri responsabili dell'attentato del 1994 all'ambasciata israeliana a Londra, sono figli di un banchiere e di un facoltoso uomo d'affari, rispettivamente; nessuno di loro ha mai subito privazioni materiali, questo è poco ma sicuro.

Altri numerosi esempi si trovano nel libro.
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A groundbreaking investigation into why so many Islamic radicals are engineersThe violent actions of a few extremists can alter the course of history, yet there persists a yawning gap between the potential impact of these individuals and what we understand about them. In Engineers of Jihad, Diego...

AMAZON.COM

Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education

A groundbreaking investigation into why so many Islamic radicals are engineersThe violent actions of a few extremists can alter the course of history, yet there persists a yawning gap between the potential impact of these individuals and what we understand about them. In Engineers of Jihad, Diego...

2 Relative Deprivation in the Islamic World
Note:2@@@@@@@@@@@@@ saggiata l ipotesi della frustrazione. Spiega poco. Non basta. Occorres altro. Troppi privilegiati. Troppe xsone con buone prospettive altrove.

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many Muslim countries have suffered development crises and have failed to create decent jobs for university graduates.
Note:ISTRUITI: FUTURO PRECARIO

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We might speculate that political rebellions grow out of the frustrated expectations of the educated.
Note:IPOTESI FRUSTRAZ

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If acquiring a degree in higher education is a reflection of high hopes and ambition, does thwarted ambition produce militants among university graduates?
Note:ALTE ASPETTATIVE ALTE FRISYRAZ

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FRUSTRATED AMBITIONS AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
Note:Ttttttttt

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venerable tradition—a
Note:L ipotesi

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back to Aristotle and Tocqueville.

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The theory is not about absolute deprivation or poverty as such, factors that are not necessarily linked to militancy (Krueger 2007).
Note:Tipo l invidia

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(Berman et al. 2011; Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; Salert 1976; Finkel and Rule 1986; Piazza 2006).
Note:Ma L EVIDENZA È PRECARIA

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The process might not be limited to individual economic failure but could also involve “group relative deprivation,” a concept originally proposed by sociologist W. G. Runciman as “fraternal deprivation” (1966). This occurs when an individual feels that the group he belongs to is collectively deprived
Note:RETTIFICA DEL CONCETTO: FRUSTRAZIONE DI GRUPPO. NON INDIVIDUALE. Sono contagiato dalla rabbia del fratello

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Unfulfilled Promises: Egypt
Note:t

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In our reading of relative deprivation, individuals with above-average skills, who have been selected for their university studies on merit, are particularly susceptible to frustration and a sense of injustice when they find their professional future hampered by a lack of opportunities.
Note:PIÙ DOTATI PIÙ ESPOSTI

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Egypt, where our puzzle first emerged, perfectly epitomizes the story of militancy rooted in frustrated ambitions. During Nasser’s “socialist years,” from 1960 to 1966, the Egyptian university system was opened to lower-class students and enrollment greatly increased. Nasser offered state employment to all new graduates (Longuenesse 2007: 41).
Note:NASSER E L UNIVERSITÀ APERTA A TUTTI

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CON LAVORO STATALE X TUTTI

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When development sputtered and Egypt lost the 1967 war against Israel, students, who had been socialized and mobilized into Nasser’s ideology like no other group, were the most disillusioned. Protests occurred regularly, first dominated by leftist slogans but turning to Islamic rhetoric in the 1970s.
Note:CRISI E SCONFOTTA CON OSRAELE. LE VITTIME E LE RETORICHE: ISLAM E SINISTRA

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Ibrahim, in his early study of 1970s radicals, noted that most activists in his sample ranked “decidedly high in both motivation and achievement.”
Note:I RADICALI LAUREATI

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Many graduates preferred joblessness even to relatively well-paying menial jobs, and for numerous young Egyptians marriage became unaffordable. Making a virtue out of necessity, many graduates tried to restore their dignity by adopting an austere Islamic morality to compensate for their material deprivation (Hoffman 1995: 208).
Note:ORGOGLIO LAUREA: SI RIFIUTA IL LAVORO MODESTO

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The gradual marginalization of the middle classes, previously the bedrock of regime support, became increasingly obvious. The dearth of opportunities was made all the more grating by the corrupt allocation of jobs by the state, whereby elites channeled the country’s few well-paying jobs to their own offspring.
Note:CLASSE MEDIA ALL ANGOLO

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The Islamist opposition was able to provide an organized focus to this discontent, as documented by Wickham in her seminal study of grassroots Islamist mobilization.
Note:GLI ISLAMISTI CAPITALIZZARONO IL MALCONTENTO

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Muslim Brothers found strong support among lower-middle and middle-class students.
Note:FLLI MUS

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in the late 1990s Mohamed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers, wanted to return from his technical studies in Germany to work in Cairo but faced dire job prospects as his family lacked the “right connections.”3 When he left Germany for good in summer 2000, it was not to return to his home country but to enroll in a flight school in Florida on orders of Osama bin Laden.
Note:IL CASO ATTA È ESEMPLARE

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BEYOND EGYPT
Note:t

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Willis reports that the economic crisis in Algeria pushed young men, particularly students, toward Islamist movements in the 1980s and 1990s (1996: 85, 109).
Note:ALGERIA

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According to Sageman—who briefly mentions relative deprivation as a necessary condition of radicalization—many Al-Qaida members, although academically gifted, did not have full-time jobs (2004: 92, 95).
Note:I MOLTI TALENTI IN AL QUAEDA

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Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010) show that high levels of unemployment enable militant Palestinian organizations to recruit more educated and experienced suicide terrorists, who in turn attack more important Israeli targets.
Note:AI LAUREATI PALESTINESI

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Meyersson Milgrom and Jasso (2004) demonstrate that higher levels of education are associated with lower support for the Roadmap to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while higher levels of income among Palestinians are associated with greater support.
Note:PIÙ ISTRUITI PIÚ OPPOSTI ALLA ROAD MAP

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Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen
Note:ACASI SIMILI ALL EGITTO

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While Middle Eastern growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s had been impressive, the whole region fell behind in terms of per capita income compared to other developing economies from the mid-1970s on (see figure 2.2), exactly the time when Islamist opposition and, in most cases, militancy emerged as a major phenomenon across the region (Yazbeck Haddad, Esposito, and Voll 1991; Hunter 1988; Kepel 2002; Roy 1994).
Note:CONTA LA CRESCITA. NN LA XRICCHEZZA

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Elisabeth Longuenesse—who has written the foremost study of the social and educational history of the professional middle class in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria—provides a rich description of the emerging “discrepancy between expectations and possibilities” for graduates in the 1970s and 1980s
Note:UNA FONTE DI MERITO QUANDO SI PARLA DI FFRISTR

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there are some hard data that illustrate the limited mobility chances of average graduates in 1980s and 1990s Arab countries: private returns to higher education—the amount of extra earnings per year of education—in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen were considerably lower than they were in Latin American and Asian countries (see figure 2.3).
Note:MOBILITÀ SOCIALE BASSA

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In Palestine, the size of the educated labor force increased dramatically from 1981 to 1987 while income differences between secondary school and university graduates fell by half, meaning that a university degree paid off progressively less (Angrist 1995).
Note:COLLEGE PREMIUM IN PALESTINA

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If mobility closure for the highly educated explains their overrepresentation among militants, then Islamic countries with more successful economies should have fewer radicalized graduates than Arab countries.
Note:E LE NAZ CHE CRESCONO? HANNOENO UNIVERS TRA I TERORISTI

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Singapore, Indonesia, and India have not undergone economic crises as pronounced and protracted as those in the Arab world, and their output of university graduates is also more aligned with their level of development.6 These are the same countries that have the lowest presence of graduates in our sample (22.5 percent). The share is the lowest in Singapore (6 of 31 cases),7 which is the most successful economically, despite much higher levels of education in the population at large.
Note:I TRE PAESI SOTTO LA LENTE

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L IPOT CONFERMATA

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Comparative international research has shown that a larger share of adults who have attained some level of higher education makes democratic revolutions more likely (Kurzman and Leahey 2004).
Note:REGOLA GENERALE: SONO LE CLASSI MEDIE A FARE LA RIV

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ARE ENGINEERS ESPECIALLY DEPRIVED?
Note:t

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why should engineers stand out

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In the MENA region, a degree in engineering carries more than mere technical status (Cornand 1990; Wickham 2002), and many students choose it as much because of their interest in the subject as because of the prestige it confers (Hanafi 1990: 173).
Note:INGEGERI ANCHE X LO STATUS

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Mobility failure for these students at the top of the educational pyramid must be all the more galling.
Note:FRUSYRAZ PIÙ FORTE

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As early as the 1820s, Egypt’s modernizing regimes under the Muhammad Ali dynasty glorified science and industry as a means of catching up with the West (Longuenesse 2007: 174).
Note:L ING SIMBOLO DELL INSEGUOMENTO ALL OVEST

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Under the Nasserist regime in Egypt and Ba‘athist rule in Syria in the 1960s, the “hegemony of modernist scientism became total” (Longuenesse 2007: 68).
Note:c

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Among Egypt’s Nasserist technocrats, engineers had a heavier and more visible presence than any other category of graduates (Moore 1994: 9, 13,166ff.).
Note:c

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No Politics among the Engineering Aristocracy
Note:t

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Arab engineers were apolitical for most of their history, primarily focused on serving governments in the interest of technical modernity (Longuenesse 2007: 60, 101). Compared to their dominant role in post-1970s Islamist militancy, they are strikingly absent from previous political movements. Early nationalist and socialist leaders and even early Islamists overwhelmingly came from other professions; many of them were lawyers and teachers.
Note:ING. DA SEMPRE SIMBOLO DI APOLITICITÀ

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Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the two founders of the secularnationalist Ba‘athist movement in Syria, were teachers, as was Zaki al-Arsuzi, the leader of a parallel movement that joined forces with the Ba‘ath in 1947.
Note:c

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Engineers appeared later, as functionaries, not revolutionary leaders.
Note:c

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Springborg (1978) describes the political mobilization of the lawyers’, doctors’, and journalists’ syndicates from the 1950s to the 1970s but does not mention engineers.
Note:c

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Professionals were already present in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in the 1940s and 1950s,13 but most of the leading Islamist activists in the 1950s and 1960s in Egypt and North Africa came from second-tier faculties like education.
Note:c

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Among early Islamists, teachers had the leading positions that engineers occupy today: the prime mover of twentieth-century Islamist organization, Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, was a teacher at Dar Al-Uloum school in Cairo,
Note:c

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c

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Isam Attar, leader of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood after 1957, was a teacher of Arabic literature. The Shabiba Islamist movement in Morocco was set up by an educational inspector in 1972, a job also held by the leader of the Moroccan justice and charity movement, Abdessalam Yassine (b. 1928, d. 2012).
Note:c

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A Turn for the Worse, and toward Radicalization
Note:t

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But as cracks in the modernization projects widened from the 1970s onward, engineers began to show up in Islamist movements—notably in the early Egyptian militant groups studied by Ibrahim but also among the peaceful Islamist opposition in Egypt (Wickham 2002: 116, 184; Moore 1994: 208). The militant “Fighting Vanguard” group that led the mass insurrection in the Syrian city of Hama in 1982 was led by a civil engineer, Adnan Uqla (who had succeeded a dentist in leading the organization).
Note:L ING FA POLITICA E IMBRACCIA I FUCILI

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It seems hardly a coincidence that previously apolitical engineers appeared on the political scene precisely when development in the Islamic world started to wane and when the status of new cohorts of graduates, who were perceived to be their nations’ technical vanguard, was progressively undermined.
Note:L INGRESSO IN POLITICA NN È UNA CASO. COINCIDE CON LA CRISI

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“In less than half a century, the [Arab] engineer went from the status of a senior civil servant to that of a rank and file technical or bureaucratic employee, becoming a hindrance to administration and public enterprises” (2007: 81).17
Note:ING: DA SCIENZIATO A BUROCRATE. SPESSO DOSOCC MASCHERATO

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The employment situation for those in the engineering field in the 1970s worsened palpably, but it still compared favorably to that of other disciplines, not least due to heightened labor demand from the Gulf. A further dramatic deterioration came with the collapse of the price of oil after 1982.
Note:ANNI OTTANTA E COLLASSO DEL PEDTROLUO

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Individual and Collective Frustrations
Note:t

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Given their vaunted status as their nations’ pioneers, Muslim engineers were likely frustrated both individually and collectively, not only because of their personal labor market failures but also because of the technological and developmental failures of their societies.
Note:FRUSYRAZ COME PROFESSIONE. FRUSTRAZ COME ARABI

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Moreover, Muslim engineers who studied in the West, itself a sign of an even greater ambition and willingness to make sacrifices, should have felt more deprived, both individually and collectively.
Note:c IL CFR DI CHI HA STUDIATO ALL ESTERO

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Mohamed Atta often bemoaned Western influence in Arab cities (Holmes 2005): According to Dittmar Machule, his thesis supervisor at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg in Germany, Atta hated skyscrapers because in the Syrian city of Aleppo, on which he wrote his doctoral dissertation, tall buildings stole the privacy of the traditional Arab homes in whose courtyards women were once able to remove their veils unseen by strangers (Rose 2004).
Note:L ODIO DI AYTA X I GRATTACIELI

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Further Tests of Relative Deprivation
Note:t

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if being an engineer indicates that one is hard-working and ambitious, and if these traits lead to particularly deep frustration when development stalls in one’s home country, then we should expect the less well equipped and ambitious to be much less represented among militant movements. This is exactly what the data presented in chapter 1 seem to show: courses of study that are associated with less prestige in the Islamic world—the arts, humanities, education—which also typically have less stringent admission requirements, are strongly underrepresented in the sample.
Note:I MENO BIZIOSI SONO PIÙ PACIFICI

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Frustrated expectations also seem to explain why teachers played a much larger role in all forms of militancy in the early years of political Islam. Before the age of mass higher education, when many towns and villages were proud to send even one young student to university, a degree in education carried some prestige and was a vehicle for upward mobility.
Note:FASE 1 I PRIMI FRUSTR SONO GLI INSEGN. POI L ISTR DI MASSA LI HA DEGRADATI RIDUCENDO LE FRUSTR DELLA CRISI

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The story for lawyers—hardly present in our sample at just 1.8 percent—matches that of teachers: in early twentieth-century Egypt a law degree was considered very prestigious (Longuenesse 2007: 56), but later it became one of the least regarded degrees (Moore 1994: 46). Lawyers were among the leaders in the early nationalist struggle (Longuenesse 2007: 57). In the 1950s, the lawyers’ syndicate still led the opposition to Nasser, playing a more active political role than either the doctors’ or engineers’ syndicate up to the 1970s (Springborg 1978: 281; Reid 1974: 46).
Note:AVVOCATI . STESSO MODELLO

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Benmelech, Berrebi, and Klor (2010) and Lee (2011) explain the presence of highly educated militants in stagnant economies in terms of opportunity costs:26 As economic opportunities dwindle, highly skilled individuals incur smaller relative costs by becoming militant.
Note:COSTO OPPORTINITÀ DELLE CONVERS TERROROSYA

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THE SAUDI EXCEPTION AGAIN
Note:y

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Saudi Arabia, a country with only 1 engineer among 10 graduates in our main sample, no engineer among 14 graduates in the Sinjar sample, and only 1 engineer among 11 graduates in Thomas Hegghammer’s sample mentioned in chapter 1. This is true even though the proportion of engineers in the Saudi population is comparable to that of other Arab states.
Note:PO HI ING NEI TERRORISTI SAUDITI

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What is special about Saudi engineers? Most obviously, they have had much better labor market chances than their peers in any of the non-Gulf MENA states: the Saudi market has been able to absorb virtually all university graduates with prestigious technical degrees.
Note:OVVIO: IN AS L ECONOMIA TIRAVA

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Job market chances for the technically educated have further improved in recent years as the government has been exerting pressure on companies to hire nationals instead of foreigners.
Note:c

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There have been signs of scarcity of engineers during the recent oil boom (Saudi Gazette, 21 May 2006, 3 December 2006; Bahrain Tribune, 21 April 2006; Arab News, 12 April 2007; Khaleej Times, 21 June 2007).
Note:c

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Compared to the other Arab cases, the Saudi contingent in our Muslim world sample appears quite unaccomplished, with lower education levels and less prestigious courses of study among those who attended university.
Note:GLI UOMINI CHE FORNISCE AS AL TERRORISMO SONO I MENO PREP

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According to official sources, the main threat in Saudi domestic militancy comes from individuals who have dropped out of education, not elites (Saudi Gazette, 4 January 2011).
Note:c

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CONCLUSIONS, AND FACTS THAT DO NOT FIT
Note:Tttttttttt La frustrazione spiega aualcosa ma poco. Vedremo come a pesare é il profilo cognitovo

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the weaker presence of graduates among extremists from countries with better labor market opportunities

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RIASSUMIAMO I FATTI CHE CORROBORANO L IPOTESI DELLA FRUSTRAZIONE COME MOLLA DELLA SVOLTA RADICALE 1

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prominent role of engineers in Islamist radicalism from the 1970s on in countries undergoing economic crises,
Note:2

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absence from Islamist movements of engineers in Saudi Arabia, a country where they retain excellent labor market chances;
Note:3

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waxing and waning of the role played by other professions, such as teachers and lawyers, in opposition movements
Note:4

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consider the doctors who, compared to engineers, are significantly less overrepresented,
Note:DOVREMMO ASPETTARCELI E NN CI SONO...GODONO DI PARI STATUS E HANNO AVUTO PARI DIFFICOLTÀ

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a surplus of doctors and, consequently, unmet expectations
Note:EFFETTO DELLA GRANDE ESPANSIONE DELL UNIVERSITÀ

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engineers’ greater dependence on the state could have made them more vulnerable to budget cuts
Note:PRIMA SPIEGAZIONE della differenza...IL DOTTORE SI RICICLA NEL PRIVATO

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Second, if engineering students came from lower social backgrounds than those in medicine did, they would have incurred greater relative costs for their education and entertained expectations of higher social advancement.
Note:SECONDA IPOTESI: L ING PARTE PIÙ DAL BASSO. LA SUA FRUSTR È PIÙ BRUCIANTE

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we have found no evidence to support it.
Note:NESSUN SUPPORTO. VEDREMO CHE A PESARE SARÀ LA MENTALITÀ LINK

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engineering was the hardest subject that attracted the most ambitious individuals
Note:Altra spiega a supporto della frustrazione

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engineering students in the 1970s had relatively privileged backgrounds;
Note:L egitto nn conferma

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more urban and privileged background relative to agronomists
Note:Altro studio contro

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engineers are strongly overrepresented in three Asian countries that did not experience economic failure
Note:Contro fd

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individuals who abandoned a potential or actual promising career. For instance, Abbud Al-Zumur,
Note:Casi molto diffusi contro l ipotesi fd

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Osama bin Laden,
Note:Altro caso

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Ayman Al-Zawahiri,
Note:Altro caso

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Sami Al-Arian,

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Azhari Husin,
Note:Seguono molti esempi

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neither of whom likely experienced material deprivation.
Note:A chiusa della lunga lista

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The genealogy of global jihadism contains a core of wealth and privilege, as well as a surfeit of engineers—facts that do not sit comfortably with the theory of relative deprivation,
Conclusione. La frustraz nn spiega tutto

HL PREFA Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection + FACEBOOK

CERCASI INGEGNERI!

E' il grido d'allarme lanciato dai reclutatori di terroristi. Sembra infatti che il profilo cognitivo dei laureati in ingegneria sia particolarmente adatto a svolgere un ruolo nelle file del terrorismo islamista: amore per l'ordine, per la chiarezza, per la purezza; propensione al disgusto, al rigetto dell'ambiguità, della sfumatura; bisogno di una forte chiusura cognitiva per favorire la concentrazione e di una coerenza interiore che si traduca in una lealtà alle proprie idee e a quelle professate dal gruppo di appartenenza.

Non si tratta di mere congetture ma di fatti riscontrati: la presenza di ingegneri tra gli islamisti è sovrabbondante; avvocati, medici, umanisti non possono competere.

Se nella guerra tra le "due culture" uno volesse ancora difendere quella classica contro quella scientifica, questo libro, involontariamente, diventa fondamentale.
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Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection Between Violent Extremism and Education

AMAZON.IT

Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection Between Violent Extremism and Education

Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection Between Violent Extremism and Education

Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education by Diego Gambetta, Steffen Hertog

You have 122 highlighted passages

You have 99 notes

Last annotated on April 29, 2017

PREFACERead more at location 110

Note: PRE@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit

TO EVEN THE MOST CASUAL OBSERVER, KEY MOMENTS IN THE LAST TWO centuries demonstrate the disproportionate impact that the violent actions of a handful of extremists can have in shaping the course of events in the Western world.Read more at location 111

Note: STORIA: L IMPORTANZA DELLA VIOLENZA DI POCHI NEL MUTARE IL CORSO DELLA STORIA Edit

attacks of September 11, 2001,Read more at location 113

Add a note

assassination of Archduke FerdinandRead more at location 114

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The Spartacists whose revolutionary zeal contributed to the rise of the right in Germany in 1919Read more at location 115

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Baader-Meinhof GangRead more at location 116

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anarchists who rocked the European monarchies at the turn of the twentiethRead more at location 116

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Sendero Luminoso in PeruRead more at location 117

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FARC in ColombiaRead more at location 117

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IslamistRead more at location 118

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Violent extremists may have abruptly changed the course of history, both nationally and internationally, but often not in the way they intended. The outcome of their actions depends more on the response of the establishmentRead more at location 119

Note: SPESSO CONSEGUENZE NN INTEMZIONALI Edit

What kind of people embark on a violent, radical course when their chances of success are low and the fight they pick is so asymmetrical in terms of force?Read more at location 125

Note: CHI DIVENTA TERRORISTA? Edit

The powers under attack, too, strive to impose their narrative on events, and demonizing extremists is an inevitable part of that process.Read more at location 133

Note: ROSPONDERE È DIFFICILE. LA NARRATIVA È DISTORTA Edit

official rhetoric.Read more at location 136

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The truth could be the first victim of conflictRead more at location 139

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In this book we take a different and unusual approach. Our point of departure is a surprising fact: engineers are overrepresented among violent Islamist extremists.Read more at location 146

Note: L ORIGINALE PUNTO DI PARTENZA Edit

Relying on education as our key variable has several advantages. The level of education and, for those who attended university, the discipline of the degree pursued are types of biographic information that are not very difficult to obtain; because they are considered irrelevant for governments’ counterterrorism operations, they are unlikely to be classified or strategically manipulated.Read more at location 149

Note: I VANTAGGI DELL APPROCCIO: NOTIZIE DISPONIBILI Edit

education usually does not change or progress after an individual has gone through the education system, while occupation does.Read more at location 153

Note: MEGLIO L EDUCAZIONE CHE LA OCCUPAZ Edit

they are at least to some extent the result of the subjects’ choice.Read more at location 158

Note: ED LIBERA SCELTA Edit

put together data setsRead more at location 164

Add a note

four classic questionsRead more at location 189

Add a note

What are the socioeconomic conditions that explain why people join extremist groups?Read more at location 191

Note: PRIMA Q. CONDIZIONI SOCIOECONOMICHE CHE PRODUCONO IL TERRORISMO Edit

the failure of secular modernization projects, blocked social mobility, economic malaise, Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, the legacy of colonialism and cultural imperialism, and political alienation” (Wiktorowicz 2004b: 3).Read more at location 193

Note: LISTA FATTA DI SOLITO Edit

Poverty is often invoked,Read more at location 195

Note: NO POVERTÁ Edit

In fact, the opposite effect has also been detected: there is evidence of a positive correlation between level of education and militancy both among Islamist and left-wing radicals (Russell and Miller 1977; Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Krueger 2007; Berrebi 2007).Read more at location 197

Note: c VERO IL CONTRARIO. X IS E TERR DI SINISTRA Edit

Can we identify the socioeconomic conditions to which engineers are particularly exposed relative to other graduates that could explain their radicalization?Read more at location 208

Note: LIMITARE L INTERROGATIVO AGLI.ING PUÒ AIUTARE Edit

Do some people more than others have a mind-set susceptible to the lure of extremism?Read more at location 210

Note: SECONDA QUESTIONE: LA MENTALITÀ DEL TERRORISTA Edit

The idea that, given the “right” socioeconomic conditions, anyone can end up an extremist is widespread among social scientists. We are wary of believing that there could be types of individuals whose hardwired traits make them more likely to become extremists.Read more at location 211

Note: PEE MOLTI LA MENTALITÀ NN ESISTE. MA QS È ASSURDO Edit

While we know that violent extremists are more likely to be male and young, no other feature has consistently emerged. No one has been able to construct a profile of the archetypal extremist.Read more at location 217

Note: LA PSICOLOGIA CI DICE POCO Edit

an increasing amount of empirically grounded research in political psychology, which we review in chapter 6, shows that political preferences in general are grounded in personality types and even in genetic dispositions.Read more at location 225

Note: CONSIDERA CHE PREF POLITICHE E PERS SONO LEGAYE Edit

There are theoretical grounds to suggest that certain political and ideological orientations can be either promoted by the discipline one chooses to study or be the reason why certain individuals are attracted to a discipline in the first place.Read more at location 231

Note: SCELTE SCOLASTICHE E ODEOLOGOA POSSONO ESSERE LEGATE Edit

To what extent is the question of who ends up becoming an extremist a matter of “supply”—different types of people choosing particular types of extremism—or a matter of “demand”—groups searching for and selecting suitable recruits?Read more at location 235

Note: TERZA QUESTIONE: QUANTO PESA LA DOMANDA E QUANTO L OFFERTA Edit

This explanation of violent extremists as demand driven seems particularly suited to the case of engineers, who possess technical skills that make them prized recruits among all kinds of extremist groups.Read more at location 243

Note: BOMBE E INGEGNERI Edit

Does ideology matter in determining which types of people join certain groups? The strategic recruitment hypothesis may not work if different types of people are attracted to different types of groups, in which case regardless of how groups select, groups would receive different types of people: “It is plausible but yet to be proven that different types of terrorism disproportionately attract individuals with specific temperaments.Read more at location 247

Note: LA SOVRARAPPRESENTAZIONE IDEOLOGICA INVALIDA L IPOTESI DELLA DOMANDA Edit

2 Relative Deprivation in the Islamic WorldRead more at location 931

Note: 2@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit

6 Mind-sets for ExtremistsRead more at location 2961

Note: 6@@@@@@@@@@@@§ Edit

RESEARCHERS WHO HAVE LOOKED FOR PATHOLOGICAL TRAITS IN THE minds of violent extremists have found none, and generally uncovered little that distinguishes extremists from anyone else—“they are just like you and me!”Read more at location 2963

Note: NESSUNA PATO NEI TERRORISTI Edit

Kruglanski and Fishman 2006; Ruby 2002; Silke 1998).Read more at location 2966

Note: c Edit

The systematic differences in the educational composition of different extremist groups we described in chapter 5 is a strong indication that different types of people are attracted to different types of extremism: engineers appear mostly on one side, and social scientists and humanities graduates appear mostly on the other side.Read more at location 2968

Note: ING A DES UMANISTI A SINISTRI Edit

Right-wing and Islamist extremism share many ideological features, while left-wing extremism differs from both.Read more at location 2974

Note: AFFINITÀ COMPOSITIVA: DS E ISLAMISTI Edit

left-wing extremist groups.Read more at location 2976

Note: c Edit

are joined by humanities and social sciences graduates who are conversely absent from Islamist and right-wing extremist groups.Read more at location 2977

Note: c Edit

The political psychology literature, which we examine shortly, offers extensive evidence of the traits associated with conservatism and right-wing authoritarianism. We also have solid evidence on the prevalence of certain personality traits among graduates of different disciplines.Read more at location 2987

Note: COSA ABBIAMO IN MANO: PROFESSIONI /PERS. IDEOLOGIA/PERS Edit

TRAITS FOR TYPES OF EXTREMISTSRead more at location 2995

Note: t Edit

A thorough review of the literature, which focuses mostly on the personality traits underlying right-wing and conservative attitudes, reveals that three traits stand out as the most relevant: one trait, an emotional one, is the proneness to experience disgust; another trait, the most multifaceted of the three, involves a strong “need for cognitive closure”; the third, at once cognitive and emotional, is an urge to impose strict distinctions between in-group and out-group members.Read more at location 3001

Note: DESTRA: DISGUSTO CHIUSURA LEALTÀ Edit

DisgustRead more at location 3006

Note: t Edit

Right-wingers’ desire to keep their social environment pureRead more at location 3007

Add a note

This characteristic appears to underlie conservatism in particular on social issues like abortion or gay rights, both of which relate to notions of morality or purity (Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 2008; Inbar et al. 2009; Inbar et al. 2012; Jost and Amodio 2011).3 Nazis were particularly well-known for their rabid homophobia and obsession with cultural purity.Read more at location 3009

Note: ESEMPIO Edit

Conversely, disgust is weak among those with leftist inclinations—perhaps explaining why post-World War II left-wing student activists in Europe and the United States tried to shock the conservative establishment with their use of feces in various protest events (including so-called “shit-ins”).Read more at location 3014

Note: PROMISQUITÀ DELLA SIN Edit

Faisal Shahzad, who planted a bomb in an SUV parked in Times Square in 2010, was very clean and diligent, and left his apartment in immaculate condition:Read more at location 3021

Note: IL CASO DI FS Edit

Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a young Jordanian national whom the FBI “lured [in 2009] into a plot to blow up the Fountain Place tower in downtown Dallas,” was described by his friends as “obsessively clean; three times a week, he removed the furniture from his bungalow and cleaned the floors.”Read more at location 3025

Note: IL CASO DI HMS Edit

Most striking of all is Mohamed Atta, the 9/11 attack mastermind, who wrote in a sort of will, “an almost hallucinatory document,” instructions on how to treat his body after death: “‘I do not want any women to go to my grave at all during my funeral.’” He also asked “the men [who] would be washing his dead body to avoid unshielded contact with his genitals” (Holmes 2005: 138).Read more at location 3027

Note: MA Edit

Need for ClosureRead more at location 3032

Note: t Edit

“need for cognitive closure”Read more at location 3033

Add a note

It encompasses “intolerance of ambiguity,” a notion introduced in connection with authoritarianism by Else Frenkel-Brunswik, a psychologist who worked with Theodor Adorno on The Authoritarian Personality (1950).Read more at location 3034

Note: INTOLLERANZA X LE AMBIG Edit

the profile of liberals and left-wingers is the very opposite: they are “more open-minded, creative, curious, and novelty seeking” and more likely to tolerate disorder, complexity, and rebellion (Carney et al. 2008: 807–8).Read more at location 3041

Note: A SINISTRA PIÙ CURIOSI Edit

ideological conservatism, right-wing voting, attempts to maintain group norms and traditions, racism, right-wing authoritarianism,9 and “social dominance orientation,” a measure of individuals’ preference for social hierarchy and domination over lower-status groups (Kemmelmeier 1997; Kruglanski and Orehek 2011; Roets and Van Hiel 2006; Van Hiel, Pandelaere and Duriez 2004).Read more at location 3044

Note: CON COSA SI CORRELA LA CHIUAURA COGNITIVA? Edit

Kruglanski and Orehek (2011) show a correlation of high NFC and tough anti-terror positions, while Federico and colleagues (2005) link NFC to support for military action against Iraq.Read more at location 3047

Note: NFC E ANTITERRORISMO RADICALE Edit

Poland and FlandersRead more at location 3048

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(Kossowska and Van Hiel 2003).Read more at location 3049

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(Chirumbolo, Areni, and Sensales 2004).Read more at location 3050

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In-group and Out-group DistinctionRead more at location 3062

Add a note

THE THREE TRAITS AMONG GRADUATESRead more at location 3093

Note: t Edit

how these three traits are distributed among graduatesRead more at location 3095

Add a note

European Social Survey (ESS):Read more at location 3096

Note: FONTE Edit

data from four waves (2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008),Read more at location 3096

Add a note

Engineers stand out as those most opposed to gay freedom (figure 6.1); just under a quarter of them are opposed, while graduates in medicine, law, and economics hover around 20 percent (which is also the overall graduate average), and all other subjects, including humanities and social and psychological sciences, seem more tolerant, showing opposition at around 15 percent.Read more at location 3110

Note: AVVERSIONE AI GAY FORTE NELLE FACOLTÀ SCIENTIFICHE Edit

five components of NFC: traditionalism (figure 6.2), tolerance of inequality (figure 6.3), preference for order and hierarchy (figure 6.4), threat perception (figure 6.5), and openness to new experiences (figure 6.6).Read more at location 3119

Note: 5 COMPONENTI DELLA CHIUSURA MENTALE Edit

We find that engineers are not particularly traditional (figure 6.2). They are also somewhat in favor of creativity (figure 6.6), but this indicator is generally the least discriminating among academic disciplines. All other results are in the expected direction, showing graduates in engineering scoring at or near the top. While engineers are often “beaten” to the top position by graduates in economics, they are the most consistent, showing higher scores across all indicators.Read more at location 3129

Note: INGEGNERI I PIÙ CHIUSI Edit

engineers find it particularly likely that a terror attack will happen in the next twelve months, indicating a strong threat perception; display a strong preference for authoritarian schooling; and are economically to the right on questions about redistribution and welfare, albeit less so than economics graduates.Read more at location 3147

Note: ALTRI ELEMENTI CHE INDICANO L AUTORDITARISMO DEGLI INGEGNERI Edit

Economics students and even more so law graduates are less rigid on immigration, while engineers seem eager to preserve the integrity of their national community (even if not in the name of “tradition”).Read more at location 3152

Note: INGEGNERI E IMMIGRAZ Edit

One could suspect that our measures of psychological traits drawn from a European population may be relevant for understanding Western-born radicals but not graduates in Muslim countries. Muslims in the developing world might have different reasons for choosing their discipline of study; given strong family bonds and the high prestige of engineering programs, parental pressure, for example, might play a more important role than preferences.Read more at location 3165

Note: OB: GLI ISLAMIXI SCELGONO IN BASE ALLE PREF O ON BASE ALLA FAMIFLIA Edit

however, in Muslim countries medical studies are generally as prestigious (and time-consuming and costly) as engineering. High-achieving students hence should have a reasonably free choice between these two degrees.Read more at location 3171

Note: c Edit

We already know that doctors are more frequent among peaceful Islamists and less overrepresented among the violent variety.Read more at location 3172

Note: ING VS MEDICINA Edit

ENTER WOMENRead more at location 3182

Note: t Edit

In addition to male graduates in the social sciences and humanities, there is another group that manifests an inverse distribution to that of the engineers: women.Read more at location 3184

Note: UN TEST ALTERNATIVO: LE DONNE. SONO IL CONTRAR DEGLI ING Edit

we have been able to assemble for a number of groups show that the left-wing group with the lowest share of women still boasts a higher share than the highest shares of any right-wing or Islamist group (table 6.1Read more at location 3185

Note: ESITO: DONNE A SINISTRA Edit

everywhere in the world engineering is the most male-dominated discipline.19 Conversely, female representation among humanities and social sciences students is much stronger, in line with their stronger representation among leftist groups.Read more at location 3195

Note: DONNE NELL UNIVERSITÀ Edit

Weinberg and Eubank (2011).Read more at location 3200

Note: DONNE TERRORISTE Edit

women have largely been missing from the ranks of neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, and violent racial supremacist groups. And, so far as we are aware, women have rarely participated in the “death squads” that were prevalent in Central and South America during the 1970s. These rightist groups typically stressed the traditional child-bearing role of women and emphasized the manliness and therapeutic benefits of violence.Read more at location 3208

Note: DONNE E FASCISMI Edit

Cunningham 2003; Eager 2008; Henshaw 2013).Read more at location 3216

Add a note

“being male increases the probability of an individual being an extreme right voter by more than 50 percent This finding supports results from existing national studies that found that right-wing extremist parties have consistently attracted a considerably higher number of male voters than female voters” (Arzheimer and Carter 2006: 428).Read more at location 3221

Note: SESSO E IDEOLOGIA Edit

“Women and girls appear to make up about 10% of those leaving Europe, North America and Australia to link up with jihadi groups, including Islamic State.” Their motives, however, differ and seem less bellicose than those of men: “In most cases, women and girls appear to have left home to marry jihadis,Read more at location 3239

Note: DONNE FOREIGN FIGHTER Edit

Note: SPESSO CONTA L AMORE. OGNI DONNA CERCA UN FASCISTA Edit

their presence remains negligibleRead more at location 3247

Add a note

On all other measures that we presented for male graduates, women do indeed score lower than men do and, a fortiori, much lower than engineers: they are less tolerant of inequality, have a weaker preference for order and hierarchy, are less opposed to gay freedom, and more tolerant of immigrants in all other respects.Read more at location 3256

Note: L ABISSO TRA DONNE E ING Edit

ONE MORE TRAIT: “SIMPLISMRead more at location 3265

Note: t Edit

Political scientists Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab first attributed to right-wing extremists what they called simplism: the “unambiguous ascription of single causes and remedies for multifactored phenomena” (1971: 7).Read more at location 3267

Note: UN QUARTO TRATTO: TENDENZA A SEMPLIFIC Edit

It stands to reason that extremists of all stripes, not just right-wingers, in order to do what they do, need a considerable degree of cognitive naïveté concerning how the world works, especially about the causes of the state of affairsRead more at location 3270

Note: INGENUITÀ Edit

New evidence suggests that a feature arguably related to simplism, overconfidence in one’s beliefs, is indeed stronger on the right than on the left, and that Lipset and Raab’s conjecture might be correct.Read more at location 3283

Note: DESTRA OVERCONF Edit

Is simplism present also among Islamist extremists? Psychologist Bernhard Fink and evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers argue that “cognitive simplicity” is particularly powerful among religiously motivated suicide bombers (Fink and Trivers 2014; see also Triandis 2008).Read more at location 3288

Note: L INGENUITÀ DEI KAMIKAZE Edit

The assassins of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat believed that his regime would quickly crumble after his killing, allowing them to establish an Islamic state (Beattie 2000: 276).Read more at location 3290

Note: ES CLASSICO Edit

Is simplism also a feature of engineers? For all their technical superiority engineers can be surprisingly naïve when it comes to political issues. U.S. research has shown that students in the pure sciences have more sophisticated and less closed views of knowledge than do students in engineering (understood as an “applied science”); those in soft, social scientific fields have the most open-ended view of knowledge as uncertain and dependent on their own reasoning ability (Paulsen and Wells 1998; Jehng, Johnson, and Anderson 1993).Read more at location 3299

Note: ING E IGNORANZA POLITICA. PER LORO TUTTO È MECCANISMO Edit

Scientists learn to ask questions, while engineering students, like followers of text-based religions, rely more strongly on answers that have already been given.Read more at location 3306

Note: ISTRUITI A CHIEDERE E ISTRUITI A DOMANDARE Edit

The ordered, hierarchical, and corporatist view of society—akin to a well-maintained machine—that we mentioned in chapter 4 could gel with the engineering mentality, seeking clear answers to closed-end problems.Read more at location 3314

Note: ORDINATI GERARCHICI E CORPORATIVI. LA MENTAL DELL ING Edit

An extreme case illustrating the “arrogance of scientific certitude” is Bekkay Harrach, whom we met in chapter 1, a German Moroccan student of engineering who went to Afghanistan in 2007 to train for jihad, joined Al-Qaida, and died in a bombardment of the Bagram air base in 2010. He had released some videos that can still be viewed on YouTube:31 in one of them he presents, neatly written out on a blackboard, two simple mathematical formulas that produce curves that represent the fight between the West and Al-Qaida, aiming to “prove” that the latter will inevitably prevail.Read more at location 3321

Note: L ARROGANZA DELLA CERTEZZA SCIENTIFICA Edit

TRAITS AND DISCIPLINESRead more at location 3328

Note: t Edit

To test these assumptions, we used ESS data on self-declared political preferences, measured on a 0 to 10 left to right scale recorded by the ESS, broken down by discipline. The distribution is reported in figure 6.8: in line with our expectations, economics, law, and engineering are more to the right than the average of the whole sample while social sciences and humanities graduates are more to the left.Read more at location 3334

Note: STUDI E ODEOLOGIA. ING A DS. CONFERMA Edit

engineers are the least liberal, followed by faculty in business studies, while humanities and social science professors had the most leftistRead more at location 3340

Note: CONC Edit

Women in the ESS data, too, match the expectation and are more to the left by a small but significant margin (their score is 4.9 versus 5.1 for men).Read more at location 3343

Note: DONNE A SIN Edit

are the traits innate, that is, do they make individuals both choose a particular discipline and gravitate toward a particular political behavior?Read more at location 3376

Note: I TRATTI CARATTERIALI SONO INNATI? Edit

There is, however, a growing body of literature, to which we referred at the onset of this chapter (see footnote 1), arguing for and offering some evidence that political attitudes could be inherited (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi 2012). There is also indirect evidence that individuals who already possess a given mind-set are attracted to specific disciplines. Ladd and Lipset, drawing on the large 1969 Carnegie survey, not only document the above-mentioned political biases among U.S. faculty and students; they also show that “un-socialized” students in the first four semesters of study already exhibit these biases (1975: 74–75). In their study, no other variable predicts ideological leanings as powerfully as discipline.Read more at location 3381

Note: EVIDENZA X LE PREFERENZE EREDITATE. Edit

CONCLUSIONSRead more at location 3400

Note: t Edit

ConclusionsRead more at location 3619

Note: CONC@@@@@@@@@@§@ Edit

The evidence we found is ample enough to revive the theory of relative deprivation and frustrated expectations as a fundamental explanation of why people form and join extremist movements.Read more at location 3621

Note: TERRORISMO E FRUSYRAZIONE Edit

Engineers, and to a smaller extent doctors, stand out among them because when economic development ground to a halt in the late 1970s and early 1980s, they fell from the highest perch in terms of expectations and formed or joined Islamist movements that in previous decades had been led by lower-status graduates.Read more at location 3632

Note: ATTESE DELUSE Edit

The sources of frustrated expectations are not rooted in sheer materialism, however.Read more at location 3635

Note: NON FRUSTR MATERIALI Edit

The fuel flows rather from the feeling of being unjustly deprived of a status for which they and their families worked hard and sacrificed, and to which they felt entitled to aspire, and, grander still, from the lack of opportunity to prove one’s worth in shaping the future one’s country—Read more at location 3636

Note: C FRUSTR DI STATUS Edit

Middle East regimes would discover that promoting higher education does not promote social acquiescence.Read more at location 3642

Note: ISTRUZIONE NN SIGNIFICA PACE Edit

The first generation of violent Islamist radicals in the 1970s was replete with highly educated individuals.Read more at location 3644

Note: c Edit

Signs of “proletarization” have been apparent in radical Islamist groups now for a while, as we noted in chapter 1. Still, these motives seem to take effect in a second stage, after groups have been formed and their goals and ideology have taken shape.Read more at location 3648

Note: c Edit

Relative deprivation is not, however, an exhaustive explanation of engineers’ overrepresentation. Engineers continue to be vastly overrepresented among radical Islamists in both the West and South Asia despite not being exposed to the same relative deprivation as their peers in the Middle East.Read more at location 3650

Note: MA C È UNA CAUSA IN PIÙ: LA MENTALITÀ Edit

we found evidence that engineers are more likely to join violent opposition groups than nonviolent ones, to prefer religious groups to secular groups, and to be less likely to defect once they join an Islamist group.Read more at location 3666

Note: EVIDENZA: ING PIÙ VIOLENTI E PIÙ RELIGIOSI Edit

overrepresentation of engineers occurs in vastly different social and economic contexts,Read more at location 3669

Note: VERO OVUNQUE Edit

network connections by themselves do not explain the overrepresentation of engineers: this cannot be due to a hypothetical jihadi engineer-mutant who started the whole process, which then spread through his engineer-dominated network of friends and trusted contacts. Network connections also fail to explain why engineers are less likely, and social scientists and humanities students much more likely, to drop out of radical organizations.Read more at location 3671

Note: IPOTESI RIGETTATA: MOLTA TECH MOLTI ING Edit

Next, the patterns of overrepresentation show the limits of social movement theories that, in order to explain the emergence of rebel movements, invoke “political opportunity structures” and “political entrepreneurs”Read more at location 3674

Note: ALTRA IPOTESI SCARTATA: QUELLA MOVIMENTISTA Edit

But the concepts of social movement theory cannot account for the uneven success of Islamist activism across different categories of people and, by implication, the influence that the membership of groups has on their militant strategies and persistence. As we argued in the preface, they cannot explain why among larger dissatisfied populations certain agents were the first to become radicalizedRead more at location 3679

Note: c Edit

Another theory of extremists’ profile purports that it would be determined by recruiters’ choices, that it would be in other words demand driven.Read more at location 3685

Note: CONFUTATA LA TEORIA DELLA DOMANDA: ING IN TANTO XCHÈ MOLTO RICHIESTI Edit

our evidence suggests that recruiters’ preferences do not account for engineers’ overrep-resentation: in groups in which members are selected by recruiters, engineers are less frequent than they are in groups in which members are self-recruited—aRead more at location 3690

Note: c Edit

Engineers possess not so much a proclivity to extremism as such but to extremism of a certain type. In the case of MENA countries, relative deprivation and ideological propensity worked together: the former selected elite graduates and the latter boosted the share of engineers among them.Read more at location 3711

Note: FRUSTRAZIONE + MENTALITÀ. INGR ESSENiali Edit

interaction between social conditions and personal characteristics,Read more at location 3714

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ideology matters—Read more at location 3717

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different ideologies meet the cognitive and emotional needs of different people.Read more at location 3718

Note: IDEOLOGIA E BISOGNI EMOTIVI Edit