PROPORZIONALE

Le misure di spesa che di recente hanno più di altre alterato i nostri conti sono "quota 100" e "reddito di cittadinanza". Sono due perché gli alleati erano due. Se fossero stati in tre, sarebbero tre. Se quattro, quattro. Quanti più alleati, tante più misure di spesa; ognuno vuole il suo osso da rosicchiare. Ma chi moltiplica le alleanze? Il sistema elettorale, ovvero il regime proporzionale. L'Italia, regina del proporzionale e della spartizione che ne consegue regolarmente, non poteva che, alla lunga, scavare una voragine nei conti. E c'è chi, in nome di una rappresentanza che non rappresenta nessuno, lo rimpiange evocando un ritorno pernicioso alle pratiche consociative. http://campus.unibo.it/8472/1/Persson_%26_Tabellini.pdf

Constitutions and Economic Policy Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini

Notebook per

Constitutions and Economic Policy

Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini

Citation (APA): Tabellini, T. P. G. (2016). Constitutions and Economic Policy [Kindle Android version]. Retrieved from Amazon.com

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Parte introduttiva

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 14

Constitutions and Economic Policy Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 37

Our overall message is loud and clear: constitutional rules systematically shape economic policy.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 38

extent of political corruption,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 39

fiscal policy,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 40

Constitutional Objectives

Nota - Posizione 40

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 46

constitution design entails a tradeoff between accountability and representation

Nota - Posizione 46

IL TRADE OFF

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 46

Bing- ham Powell, 2000; Prezworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999).

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 47

Constitutional features that clarify policy responsibilities and make it easy to replace an incumbent gov- ernment strengthen accountability, but at the same time increase the political influence of the groups to whom policymakers are accountable.

Nota - Posizione 48

x TRSSPARENZA

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 49

Elections using plurality rule, in which legislators are often elected in many individual districts each using majority rule, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini 77 translate swings in voter sentiment into larger changes in legislative majorities than elections using proportional representation, where legislators are often elected by the share of a national vote received.

Nota - Posizione 51

X MAGGIORITARIO E PROP

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 52

strengthens the incentives of politicians to please the voters and could result in smaller political rents and less corruption.

Nota - Posizione 52

MAGGIORITARIO

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 53

this greater accountability also raises the propensity to target benefits to narrow constituencies, at the expense of broad spending programs.

Nota - Posizione 54

MAGGIORITAROO R VOSTO ESTRNI

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 54

similar tradeoff between accountability and representation also arises in the choice between pres- idential and parliamentary

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 56

Constitutional Inertia and Systematic Selection

Nota - Posizione 56

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 57

constitutions have changed very seldom in the post-World War II

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 57

sample of 60 democracies

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 58

no democratic country changed its form of government between 1960 and 1998,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 64

experiments with constitutional reforms are very seldom observed,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 64

cross-country estimates risk confounding constitutional effects with other country characteristics.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 65

Self-selection of countries into constitutions is clearly nonrandom and most likely correlated with other unobserved variables that also influence a country's policy outcomes.

Nota - Posizione 66

x IL PROBLEMA

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 70

we have exploited the econometric methodology

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 72

we rely on instrumental variables to try to isolate exogenous variation

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 74

We have used the broad period in which the constitution was adopted as an instrument for the constitutional feature of interest.

Nota - Posizione 74

X PERIODO DI ADOZIONE COME VARIABILE STRU. VARIABILE CORRELATA ALLA COST MA NN ALLE XFORMANCE. NON SI ABBINA LA COST A UN PAESE MA A UN GRUPPO DI PAESI ETEROGENEI CON SOLO IL XIODO DI ADOZIONE IN COMUNE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 75

there are "fashions" in constitution

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 75

period of birth of the current constitution is related to its broad features;

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 75

identifying assumption is

Nota - Posizione 76

........

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 76

birth period of the constitution is not directly related to current policy outcomes.

Nota - Posizione 77

ASSUNTO FONDAMENTALE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 78

"matching methods"

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 79

Comparisons of countries with similar propensity scores, but with different constitutions, receive more weight.

Nota - Posizione 80

ALTRO ESPEDIENTE MM

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 84

Categorizing Political Institutions

Nota - Posizione 85

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 86

its electoral rules and its form of government.

Nota - Posizione 86

2 ASPETTI PRINCIPALI

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 86

two dimensions.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 89

Electoral Rules

Nota - Posizione 90

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 90

three dimensions

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 91

District magnitudes

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 92

One polar case is when all legislators are elected in districts with a single seat,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 92

U.S. House of Representatives,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 93

elected in a single, all-encompassing district, such as the Israeli Knesset.

Nota - Posizione 93

ALTRO POLO

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 93

formulas translate votes into seats.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 94

Under plurality rule, only the winner( s) of the highest vote share( s) get represented

Nota - Posizione 94

UNINOMINALE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 95

proportional representation awards seats in proportion to votes in each district.

Nota - Posizione 95

PROPORZIONALE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 96

plurality rule is often amended by a system of "adjustment seats" at the national level.

Nota - Posizione 96

EMENDAMENTO

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 96

Ballot structures, finally, determine how citizens cast their ballot.

Nota - Posizione 97

BALLOT

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 97

choose among individual

Nota - Posizione 97

PRIMO CASO

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 98

chooses among lists of candidates

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 100

Anglo-Saxon countries often implement plurality rule with voting for individual candidates in single-member districts.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 101

proportional representation is often implemented through a system of party lists

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 102

"majoritarian" and "proportional"

Nota - Posizione 102

CLASSIFICAZIONE DOVUTA AD ABBINAMENTI DI FATTO

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 103

"mixed" electoral systems

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 103

In Germany, for example, voters cast two ballots, electing half the Bundestag by plurality in single-member districts, and the other half by proportional representation at a national level, to achieve pro- portionality between national vote and seat shares.

Nota - Posizione 105

X ES GERMANIA

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 105

propor- tional representation systems, such as the Irish, do not rely on party lists. 2

Nota - Posizione 106

ANOMALIA

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 106

Forms of Government

Nota - Posizione 106

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 107

two main forms of government: presidential and parliamentary regimes.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 108

presiden- tial regime, the citizens directly elect the (top) executive;

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 110

gov- ernment has executive powers and acts as the agenda setter, initiating all major legislation and drafting the budget.

Nota - Posizione 111

REGIME PARLAMENTARE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 112

president has full executive powers, but smaller agenda-setting powers.

Nota - Posizione 112

PRESIDENZIALE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 112

For domestic policy, the president has a veto,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 112

power to propose and amend typically rests with the legislature.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 114

government remains in office only as long as it enjoys the support of a majority

Nota - Posizione 114

PARLAMENTO

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 121

president, the executive can hold onto its powers without the support of a legislative majority.

Nota - Posizione 122

PRESIDENZIALISMO

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 124

several mixed systems are observed,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 130

Political Accountability

Nota - Posizione 130

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 139

how the constitution affects corruption, rent seeking and electoral budget cycles.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 140

Political Accountability and Electoral Rules

Nota - Posizione 140

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 143

Politicians may have stronger direct incentives to please the voters if they are held accountable individually, rather than collectively.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 144

party lists discourage effort by officeholders,

Nota - Posizione 144

PROP

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 144

they disconnect individual efforts and re-election

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 145

political rents will be higher under electoral systems that rely on list voting,

Nota - Posizione 146

COSA CI SI ASPETTA

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 147

open lists (where voters can modify the order of candidates) should be more conducive to good behavior

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 150

corruption is only an imperfect proxy for political rents.

Nota - Posizione 150

PROXY

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 152

study about 80 democracies in the 1990s, mea- suring perceived corruption

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 154

per capita income, openness to international trade, the citizens' education and religious beliefs, a country's history as captured by colonial heritage, and geographic location

Nota - Posizione 155

X CONFOUNDER

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 155

voting over individuals does indeed correlate with lower corruption:

Nota - Posizione 156

ESITO

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 168

Summarizing, both theory and evidence suggest that individual accountability under plurality rule strengthens the incentives of politicians to please the voters and is conducive to good behavior.

Nota - Posizione 169

X VONCLUSIONI

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 169

effects of individual accountability under proportional representation, implemented with open rather than closed lists, are more controversial.

Nota - Posizione 170

x PREFERENZE CONTROVERSE. FAVORI. COMPET INTRAPARTY

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 174

if seats are next to certain, little effort goes into pleasing the voters of those districts. 4

Nota - Posizione 175

SE LA VITTORIA È CHIARA L UNINOMINALWE NN GIOVA

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 181

Myerson (1993) presents a model

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 185

two dimensions: honesty and ideology.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 187

in single-member districts, only one candidate can win the election. Voters may then cast their ballot, strategically, for dishonest but ideologically preferred

Nota - Posizione 188

MAYERSON

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 191

If many factions are represented in parliament, the government is more likely to be supported by a coalition of parties, rather than by a single party.

Nota - Posizione 192

X RENT SEEKING DEL PROP

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 192

Under single-party government, voters know precisely whom to blame or reward for observed performance. Under coalition government, voters may not know whom to blame,

Nota - Posizione 194

x RESP NEL BIPARTITISMO

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 195

Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003) show that proportional representation and multimember districts lead to a higher incidence of coalition governments and thereby higher political rents, compared to plurality rule and small district mag- nitude.

Nota - Posizione 195

X RISULTATI EMPIRICI

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 197

The hypothesis that coalition governments are associated with more corruption remains untested, as far as we know, though some of the blatant corruption scandals in Europe-Belgium and Italy-have been intimately associated with such governments.

Nota - Posizione 199

DATI INFORMALI SU CORRUZIONE NEL PROP.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 199

evidence does support the idea that barriers to entry raise corruption,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 201

Alt and Lassen (2002) show that restrictions on primaries

Nota - Posizione 201

.....

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 202

are positively associated with perceptions of corrup- tion in U.S. states.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 204

electoral cycles in taxation, government spending, or macroeconomic policies stimulating aggregate demand.

Nota - Posizione 205

ALTRI INDICATORI

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 205

consider panel data from 1960 covering about 500 elections in over 50 democracies.

Nota - Posizione 205

DATABASE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 205

classify countries in two groups according to the electoral formula

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 207

democracies that use plurality rule cut

Nota - Posizione 207

.....

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 208

taxes, as well as government spending,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 209

This finding may be consistent with better accountability

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 210

allowing voters to punish governments for high taxes and spending

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 211

Political Accountability and Forms of Government

Nota - Posizione 211

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 213

comparison between presidential and parliamen- tary regimes,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 214

accountability is likely to be stronger in pres- idential

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 215

the chain of delegation is simpler and more direct under presidential

Nota - Posizione 215

XCHÈ PIÙ TRASPARENTE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 217

Second, many presidential regimes have a strong separation of powers-between

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 219

In parliamentary regimes, instead, the government concentrates all the executive prerogatives

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 220

Checks and balances are thus stronger under presidential government.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 221

voters can exploit conflict between different offices to prevent abuse

Nota - Posizione 221

ELEZIONI PIÙ FREQUWENTI NE CHECK AND BALANCE. MAGGIORE PISSIBILITÀ DI PUNIRE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 224

Among "good" democracies, Persson and Tabellini (2003) do find that presidential regimes have less widespread corruption than do parliamentary regimes, but the result does not hold among regimes classified as bad democracies. "Good" and "bad" are defined in terms of democracy scores in the Freedom House and Polity IV datasets, which measure aspects such as constraints on the executive's use of powers and freedom of political participation across societies and time. Since many presidential regimes fall in the latter group, the negative correlation between corruption and presiden- tialism in the sample of good democracies is due to relatively few observations and, hence, not very robust.

Nota - Posizione 226

x EMPIRIA. CONFERMATA SOLO NELLKE BUONE DEM

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 231

Overall Lessons

Nota - Posizione 231

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 232

When it comes to the form of government, our knowledge is not yet precise

Nota - Posizione 233

INSEGNAMENTO X RIFORME ANTICORRUZIONE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 235

A switch from propor- tional representation to plurality rule, accompanied by a change in the ballot structure from party lists to voting over individuals, would strengthen political incentives for good behavior, both directly and indirectly through the type of government.

Nota - Posizione 236

x RIFORMA

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 237

erecting barriers to entry

Nota - Posizione 237

DA EVITARE

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 241

Political Representation

Nota - Posizione 241

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 246

Electoral Rules and Incentives for Politicians and Voters

Nota - Posizione 246

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 246

Single member districts

Nota - Posizione 246

....

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 247

programs benefiting small geographic constituencies.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 247

multimember districts and proportional representation both pull in the direction of programs targeting broad groups.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 253

universalistic redistributive programs such as public pensions or other welfare state programs.

Nota - Posizione 253

TIPICI DEL PROP

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 255

strong incentives to target voters in these swing districts.

Nota - Posizione 255

IL MAGGIORITARIO SI CONCENTRA SUL SWING

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 267

Is the evidence consistent with the prediction

Nota - Posizione 267

DOMANDA

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 268

Table 1 (panel A) suggests that it is.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 269

proportional electoral systems spend more in social security and welfare by as much as 8 percent of GDP,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 283

a reform from plurality rule to proportional representation would boost welfare

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 287

Electoral Rules, Party Formation and Types of Government

Nota - Posizione 288

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 289

electoral rules also shape party structure and types of government.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 289

Plurality rule and small district magni- tude produce fewer parties

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 291

few parties mean more frequent single-party majority governments, and less frequent coalition

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 293

proportional electoral rule is associated with a more fragmented party system,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 295

surprising if such large political effects did not also show up in the economic policies

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 296

more fractionalized party systems induced by proportional elections lead to a greater overall size of government spending.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 297

Austen-Smith (2000)

Nota - Posizione 297

c

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 299

Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2003) and Bawn and Rosenbluth (2003)

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 300

proportional representation leads to more government spending

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 303

If instead the government is supported by a coalition of parties, voters can discriminate between the parties in government and this dynamic creates electoral conflict inside the governing coalition.

Nota - Posizione 304

x CONFLITTO INTERNO E POCA TRASPA

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 305

inefficiencies in bargaining induce excessive government spending.

Nota - Posizione 305

CONFLITTO INTDRNO

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 306

theoretical predictions are supported by the data:

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 338

Ticchi and Vindigni (2003) and Iversen and Soskice (2003)

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 339

proportional electoral rule is frequently associated with center-left gov- ernments, while right-wing governments are more frequent under majoritarian elections.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 340

could explain why proportional representation systems spend more.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 341

But why should the electoral rule be correlated with the ideological government type?

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 342

majoritarian elections concentrate power, which tends to favor the wealthy.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 359

in winner-takes-all systems, conservative parties have an electoral advantage.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 360

If electoral rules are chosen on the basis of the policies they will deliver, this might explain explain the observed correlation:

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 362

where the center-left voters dominate, propor- tional systems have been selected,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 378

Alesina and Perotti (1995)

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 378

coalition governments are more prone to run deficits.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 380

These arguments find some support in the experiences of European and Latin American countries.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 381

coalition governments have more players who could potentially veto a change,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 383

When governments must often face a vote on their own survival, it could lead to greater policy myopia

Nota - Posizione 384

FIDUCIA

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 385

a larger number of veto players tends to "lock in"' economic policy

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 392

electoral rule is correlated with the reaction of government to economic shocks:

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 392

in proportional democracies, spend- ing as a share of GDP rises in recessions but does not decline in booms,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 394

Forms of Government and Political Representation

Nota - Posizione 394

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 394

parliamentary democracies

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 395

executive can be removed

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 396

parties represented in government thus hold valuable bargaining powers

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 398

strong incentives to maintain discipline inside the governing party

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 399

the confidence requirement creates "legislative cohe- sion"-a

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 401

in a presidential system, the result is unstable coalitions and less discipline within the majority.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 402

In parliamentary democracies, a stable majority of legislators pursues the joint interest of its voters.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 403

Spending thus opti- mally becomes directed toward a broad majority of voters, as in the case of broad social transfer programs

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 404

In presidential democracies, the (relative) lack of such a majority instead pits the interests of different minorities

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 405

As a result, programs with broad benefits suffer,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 405

allocation of spending favors minor- ities

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 411

presidential regimes are predicted to have lower overall spending and taxation

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 411

because presidential regimes never face the risk of a no-confidence vote

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 413

associated with more targeted programs at the expenses of broad spending programs.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 413

The evidence is strongly supportive

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 435

Baqir (2002) contrasts public spending in U.S. municipalities differing in their form of govern- ment. Some are parliamentary,

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 436

Baqir finds that presidential governments indeed spend less

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 439

Types of Government and Political Representation

Nota - Posizione 439

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 442

greater durability of the executive in presidential regimes could reduce policy myopia,

Nota - Posizione 442

DEFICIT

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 443

more rapid reactions to adverse events.

Nota - Posizione 443

IN CASO DI CRISI

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 448

Persson and Tabellini (2003) find no robust evidence for government deficits being systematically influenced by the form of government.

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 454

Concluding Remarks

Nota - Posizione 454

T

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 467

negative effect of presidentialism is only present among the democracies with lowest scores

Evidenzia (giallo) - Posizione 468

perhaps it is not presidential government per se that is detrimental to economic performance, but rather the combination of a strong and directly elected executive in a weak institutional environment

Nota - Posizione 469

x NN OL PRES DI X SÈ