6 WHY GOD ALLOWS EVIL - Is There a God? by Richard Swinburne

6 WHY GOD ALLOWS EVIL -   Is There a God? by Richard Swinburne - malenaturalemalemorale libertàemale conoscenzaemale bancodiprovaemale limitareonnipotenzaeonniscienza sofferenzachenobilitanoieglialtri ossessionatidalmalefisico teodiceaanimale mondosenzamalemondopiatto

6 WHY GOD ALLOWS EVILRead more at location 1322

Note: 6@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Edit

And yet animals and humans suffer (through natural processes of disease and accident), and they cause each other to suffer (we hurt and maim each other and cause each other to starve).Read more at location 1325

Note: SOFERENZA Edit

An omnipotent God could have prevented this evil, and surely a perfectly good and omnipotent God would have done so. So why is there this evil?Read more at location 1326

Note: PERCHÈ L ONNIPOTENZA NN SALVA? Edit

what good things would a generous and everlasting God give to human beings in the course of a short earthly life.Read more at location 1341

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He will seek to give us great responsibility for ourselves, each other, and the world, and thus a share in his own creative activity of determining what sort of world it is to be.Read more at location 1343

Note: DIO CI DONA LA LIBERTÀ Edit

The problem is that God cannot give us these goods in full measure without allowing much evil on the way.Read more at location 1345

Note: IL PROBLEMA Edit

there are plenty of evils, positive bad states, which God could if he chose remove. I divide these into moral evils and natural evils.Read more at location 1350

Note: MALE ETICO E MALE NATURALE Edit

I understand by ‘natural evil’ all evil which is not deliberately produced by human beings and which is not allowed by human beings to occur as a result of their negligence.Read more at location 1351

Note: DISGRAZIA Edit

Moral EvilRead more at location 1359

Note: MALE MORALE Edit

The free-will defence claims that it is a great good that humans have a certain sort of free will which I shall call free and responsible choice, but that, if they do, then necessarily there will be the natural possibility of moral evil.Read more at location 1361

Note: TRADE OFF LIBERTÀ E MALE Edit

A God who gives humans such free will necessarily brings about the possibility, and puts outside his own control whether or not that evil occurs. It is not logically possible—that is, it would be self-contradictory to suppose—that God could give us such free will and yet ensure that we always use it in the right way.Read more at location 1364

Note: DIO CESSA DI CONTROLLARE. DIMINUISCE LA SUA ONNIPOTENZA Edit

Free and responsible choice is rather free will (of the kind discussed) to make significant choices between good and evil, which make a big difference to the agent, to others, and to the world.Read more at location 1369

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A world in which agents can benefit each other but not do each other harm is one where they have only very limited responsibility for each other.Read more at location 1384

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God would have reserved for himself the all-important choice of the kind of world it was to be, while simply allowing humans the minor choice of filling in the details. He would be like a father asking his elder son to look after the younger son, and adding that he would be watching the elder son’s every move and would intervene the moment the elder son did a thing wrong. The elder son might justly retort that, while he would be happy to share his father’s work, he could really do so only if he were left to make his own judgementsRead more at location 1388

Note: DIO NN È UN GENITORE CHE DÀ FINTE RESPONSABILITÀ. DIO TAGLIA I PONTI X FARE SUL SERIO Edit

A good God, like a good father, will delegate responsibility. In order to allow creatures a share in creation,Read more at location 1392

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I can not only benefit my children, but harm them.Read more at location 1394

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Note further and crucially that, if I suffer in consequence of your freely chosen bad action, that is not by any means pure loss for me. In a certain respect it is a good for me. My suffering would be pure loss for me if the only good thing in life was sensory pleasure, and the only bad thing sensory pain; and it is because the modern world tends to think in those terms that the problem of evil seems so acute.Read more at location 1409

Note: IL MALE NN È UNA XDITA PURA Edit

Recall the words of Christ, ‘it is more blessed to give than to receive’ (asRead more at location 1415

Note: DARE E RICEVERE Edit

Being allowed to suffer to make possible a great good is a privilege, even if the privilege is forced upon you. Those who are allowed to die for their country and thereby save their country from foreign oppression are privileged. Cultures less obsessed than our own by the evil of purely physical pain have always recognized that.Read more at location 1420

Note: IL SACRIFICIO (PER LA PATRIA x LA FAMIGLIA...) È UN OPPRTUNITÀ... SIAMO OSSESSIONATI DAL MALE FISICO. Edit

I am fortunate if the natural possibility of my suffering if you choose to hurt me is the vehicle which makes your choice really matter. My vulnerability, my openness to suffering (which necessarily involves my actually suffering if you make the wrong choice), means that you are not just like a pilot in a simulator, where it does not matter if mistakes are made.Read more at location 1434

Note: LA NS SOFFERENZA NOBILITA LE SCELTE ALTRUI Edit

So then God, without asking humans, has to choose for them between the kinds of world in which they can live—basically either a world in which there is very little opportunity for humans to benefit or harm each other, or a world in which there is considerable opportunity.Read more at location 1486

Note: DUE MONDI: CON O SENZA RESPONSABILITÀ. QUALE SCEGLIERE? Edit

There are clearly reasons for both choices. But it seems to me (just, on balance) that his choosing to create the world in which we have considerable opportunity to benefit or harm each other is to bring about a good at least as great as the evil which he thereby allows to occur.Read more at location 1488

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Natural EvilRead more at location 1494

Note: MALE NATURALE Edit

Its main role rather, I suggest, is to make it possible for humans to have the kind of choice which the freewill defence extols, and to make available to humans specially worthwhile kinds of choice.Read more at location 1495

Note: GIUSTIFICAZIONE: CONSENTE DI MOSTRARE IL BUON USO DELLA LIBERTÀ Edit

First, the operation of natural laws producing evils gives humans knowledge (if they choose to seek it) of how to bring about such evils themselves.Read more at location 1498

Note: CONOSCERE X CONTRASTARE: DIO NN IMPEDISCE IL MALE SOSPENDENDO LE LEGGI NATURALI AL FINE DI NN OSTACOLARNE LA CONOSCENZA Edit

But could not God give us the requisite knowledge (of how to bring about good or evil) which we need in order to have free and responsible choice by a less costly means?Read more at location 1502

Note: PERCHÈ NN RENDRCI EDOTTI A MINOR PREZZO? Edit

That knowledge would greatly inhibit his freedom of choice, would make it very difficult for him to choose to do evil.Read more at location 1506

Note: LIBERTÀ MINATA Edit

Natural processes alone give humans knowledge of the effects of their actions without inhibiting their freedom,Read more at location 1510

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The other way in which natural evil operates to give humans their freedom is that it makes possible certain kinds of action towards it between which agents can choose. It increases the range of significant choice.Read more at location 1511

Note: SECONDO MODO. PORCI DI FRONTE A SCELTE SIGNIFICATIVE Edit

A particular natural evil, such as physical pain, gives to the sufferer a choice—whether to endure it with patience, or to bemoan his lot.Read more at location 1513

Note: AVERE PAZIENZA O LAMENTARSI? Edit

I have then the opportunity to show gratitude for the sympathy;Read more at location 1519

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If you are callous, I can choose whether to ignore this or to resent it for life.Read more at location 1519

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It may, however, be suggested that adequate opportunity for these great good actions would be provided by the occurrence of moral evil without any need for suffering to be caused by natural processes. You can show courage when threatened by a gunman,Read more at location 1522

Note: MA NN BASTA IL MALE MORALE COME BANCO DI PROVA? Edit

But just imagine all the suffering of mind and body caused by disease, earthquake, and accident unpreventable by humans removed at a stroke from our society.Read more at location 1525

Note: UN MONDO SENZA MALE Edit

Many of us would then have such an easy life that we simply would not have much opportunity to show courageRead more at location 1527

Note: POCHI EROI Edit

God has the right to allow natural evils to occur (for the same reason as he has the right to allow moral evils to occur)—up to a limit.Read more at location 1529

Note: MA C È CMQ UN LIMITE A TUTTO Edit

Natural evils give to us the knowledge to make a range of choices between good and evil, and the opportunity to perform actions of especially valuable kinds.Read more at location 1532

Note: RIASSUNTO Edit

There is, however, no reason to suppose that animals have free will. So what about their suffering?Read more at location 1534

Note: E GLI ANIMALI? LORO NN HANNO FREE WILL Edit

Animals had been suffering for a long time before humans appearedRead more at location 1535

Note: SOFFRONO ANCHE LADDOVE NN C È L UOMO Edit

while the higher animals, at any rate the vertebrates, suffer, it is most unlikely that they suffer nearly as much as humans do. Given that suffering depends directly on brain events (in turn caused by events in other parts of the body), then, since the lower animals do not suffer at all and humans suffer a lot, animals of intermediate complexity (it is reasonable to suppose) suffer only a moderate amount.Read more at location 1536

Note: L ANIMALE SOFFRE POCO Edit

one does not need as powerful a theodicy as one does in respect of humans.Read more at location 1539

Note: NN SERVE UNA TEODICEA POTENTE Edit

That said, there is, I believe, available for animals parts of the theodicy which I have outlined above for humans. The good of animals, like that of humans, does not consist solely in thrills of pleasure. For animals, too, there are more worthwhile things, and in particular intentional actions, and among them serious significant intentional actions.Read more at location 1541

Note: UNA TEODICEA SIMILE A QUELLA UMANA MA DEPOTENZIATA Edit

Animals do not choose freely to do such actions, but the actions are nevertheless worthwhile. It is great that animals feed their young, not just themselves;Read more at location 1548

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Suppose that you exist in another world before your birth in this one, and are given a choice as to the sort of life you are to have in this one.Read more at location 1556

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You can have either a few minutes of very considerable pleasure, of the kind produced by some drug such as heroin, which you will experience by yourself and which will have no effects at all in the world (for example, no one else will know about it); or you can have a few minutes of considerable pain, such as the pain of childbirth, which will have (unknown to you at the time of pain) considerable good effects on others over a few years. You are told that, if you do not make the second choice, those others will never exist—and so you are under no moral obligation to make the second choice. But you seek to make the choice which will make your own life the best lifeRead more at location 1559

Note: DROGATO IN SOLITUDINE. IL PIACERE DI SOFFRIRE X GLI ALTRI Edit

You should choose the second alternative.Read more at location 1564

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While believing that God does provide at any rate for many humans such life after death, I have expounded a theodicy without relying on this assumption.Read more at location 1571

Note: NN DIMENTICHIAMOCI MAI DEL PARADISO

Una teoria del male partendo dall'analisi di Peter van Inwagen

Un dialogo simulato.

• 1. Credente. Propongo la mia tesi: il male è il prezzo della libertà.
• 2. Ateo. Ma un uomo libero significa un Dio non più onnipotente
• 3. Credente. Infatti ti concedo dei limiti all'onnipotenza divina: l'uomo, hai ragione, l'uomo non puo' essere libero per sua natura e contemporaneamente assoggettato ai voleri di un altro essere, sarebbe contraddittorio.
• 4. Ateo. Eppure un Dio buono limiterebbe i danni donando una libertà compatibilista del tipo "ti concedo di fare cio' che desideri ma decido io cio' che desideri". In questo modo Dio potrebbe instillare desideri buoni senza conculcare la libertà.
• 5. Credente. Ma la libertà compatibilista non è vera libertà, ciascuno vede quanto è limitata: l'uomo, in ultima analisi, sarebbe comunque determinato da forze esterne.
• 7. Ateo. Ma il male nel mondo è comunque sovrabbondante!
• 8. Credente. Come puoi dirlo? Puo' benissimo essere invece che viviamo nel migliore dei mondi possibili. Crederlo non è irrazionale.
• 9. Ateo. Perché Dio non interviene a limitare il male, almeno le conseguenze malvagie non volute dall'agente, una volta che la libertà umana è stata esercitata.
• 10. Credente. Potrebbe farlo solo interferendo con le leggi naturali. Dio ha fatto un altro dono all'uomo: la ragione. Se ad ogni istante mutasse il corso delle leggi per fermare le conseguenze non intenzionali danneggerebbe la nostra capacità di conoscere il mondo isolando delle leggi naturali. Senza dire che a volte lo fa, e allora ecco il miracolo. (IMHO)
• 11. Ateo. Esistono i terremoti, ovvero il male che non dipende dall'azione umana. Che mi dici?
• 12. Credente. Sono per l'uomo un banco di prova. Ogni uomo è unico, oltreché libero, e Dio per giudicarlo deve metterlo alla prova in modo unico. La nostra salvezza si realizza attraverso una prova unica: se Dio potesse prevedere la nostra reazione in anticipo la nostra vita sarebbe pleonastica. (IMHO)
• 13. Ateo. Ma da cio' discende che Dio non è onnisciente.
• 14. Credente. Te lo concedo, anche l'onniscienza divina è limitata: Dio non puo' conoscere cio' che non si puo' conoscere.
• 15. Ateo. E di fronte alla domanda/invocazione della mamma che ha perso un bimbo e dice perché a me?
• 16. Credente. Non abbiamo nulla da dirle, noi non sappiamo spiegare il suo dramma: possediamo una teoria generale del male, non una teoria specifica.

continua

3.1. Gli attentatori di Piazza Fontana uccisero di proposito? - I nemici della Repubblica: Storia degli anni di piombo (Italian Edition) by Vladimiro Satta

 Piazza Fontana uccisero di proposito? - I nemici della Repubblica: Storia degli anni di piombo (Italian Edition) by Vladimiro Satta - #sì

1. Gli attentatori di Piazza Fontana uccisero di proposito?Read more at location 3258

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Le bombe del 12 dicembre 1969 furono cinque. Tre vennero piazzate a Roma, due a Milano. Delle cinque in totale, quattro deflagrarono e una noRead more at location 3258

Note: ATTENTATO MULTIPLO Edit

Il succinto riepilogo della catena delle esplosioni è sufficiente a rilevare una sostanziale differenza tra la bomba di Piazza Fontana e le altre: l’ordigno depositato presso la Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura fu l’unico a uccidere,Read more at location 3267

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Chi collocò la bomba, cioè, sapeva che stava per compiere un massacro? O pensava che la banca, vista l’ora, fosse già chiusa al pubblico?Read more at location 3272

Note: VISTA L ORA Edit

perché ci sono stati morti soltanto in seguito a un’esplosione, mentre le altre quattro non hanno provocato vittime?Read more at location 3274

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L’opinione prevalente è che la strage sia stata voluta, ma i pareri contrari non sono mai mancati. Il dibattito è aperto,Read more at location 3278

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è stata ripresa anche da notori antifascisti per nulla inclini a minimizzare, come il più volte ministro dell’Interno Paolo Emilio Taviani: La bomba di Milano non avrebbe dovuto provocare morti.Read more at location 3284

Note: TAVIANI SULLA NN INTENZIONALITÀ Edit

Perché ho scritto che le bombe del ’69 a Milano non avrebbero dovuto provocare morti? Per due ragioni. Perché le bombe contemporanee di Roma furono volutamente collocate in modo da evitare stragi. E perché – una volta verificato che nel crimine erano implicati anche uomini delle istituzioni – non è supponibile che essi cinicamente pensassero di uccidere tanti innocenti.Read more at location 3289

Note: DUE ARGOMENTI X LA NON INT. Edit

il coinvolgimento di uomini delle istituzioni nella progettazione ed esecuzione del crimine è stato ipotizzato da talune inchieste giudiziarie, ma non suffragato dalle relative sentenze e riceve scarso credito anche in sede storiografica, dove piuttosto si va consolidando l’idea che gli stragisti abbiano ricevuto appoggi sotto forma di coperture e depistaggi soltanto dopo il massacro.Read more at location 3294

Note: UOMINI DELLE ISTITUZIONI Edit

Considerato che l’esplosione nel sottopassaggio causò alcuni feriti e altri se ne registrarono presso l’Altare della Patria, le bombe senza vittime sono due su cinque, cioè meno della metà.Read more at location 3306

Note: DUE SU 5 Edit

è presumibile che nei cinque episodi in questione i rispettivi attentatori, sebbene con ogni probabilità abbiano agito d’intesa fra loro, sapessero che i singoli risultati sarebbero stati diseguali. Questo però non esclude che i criminali fossero determinati a uccidere in almeno un caso,Read more at location 3311

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limitando le conseguenze negli altri quattro casi, intendessero riservarsi margini di escalationRead more at location 3313

Note: ESCALATION Edit

Alle 15.30, quindi, chi lasciò la borsa contenente la bomba si trovava in mezzo alla folla e assai difficilmente poteva ignorare che la clientela, come tutti i venerdì, si sarebbe trattenuta ancora a lungo.Read more at location 3325

Note: FOLLA

Dibattendo EMH

• Definizione
• 2 categorie di scettici: 1. i contrari ideologicamente e 2. i consulenti che non avrebbero niente da consigliare
• Shiller: hindsight bias
• Perchè esiste una regolamentazione e una banca centrale se vale EMH?
• Nel momento in cui reputi buone alcune regole cessi di credere a EMH!
• MIT Chicago Mason. Sapendo che il mercato è imprrfetto (pur considerandolo il meglio a disosizione) le regole ci saranno sempre come segno di speranza e di cammino verso la xfezione
• Krugman e LTCM
• Le bolle possono coesistere con EMH?
• The peso problem
• Xxx
• The Price Isn't Always Right justin fox
• Eugene Fama at Chicago in the late 1960s envisioned a market in which "security prices at any time 'fully reflect' all available information."
• the world experienced financial crises long before anybody at the University of Chicago thought to string the words "efficient" and "market" together.
• Finally, if all one means by "efficient market" is a market that's hard to beat, that's not such a wrongheaded idea at all
• Robert Shiller -- a long-time critic of the efficient market hypothesis -- cobbled together an inflation-adjusted index of U.S. real estate prices going back to 1890 and found that (a) in the past, prices had declined for decades on end and (b) the rise in real home prices since 1997 was by far the sharpest on record. From these two pieces of data he drew the common-sense conclusion that the rise in housing prices wouldn't go on forever
• Xxx
• In Defense of Efficient Markets eric falkenstein
• you make many gracious acknowledgements to the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), such as the basic implication that it is very, very difficult to outperform the market....This is not a minor acknowledgment, but basically is the EMH theory.
• I think this distaste for efficient markets comes from two sources. First, many people distrust the "invisible hand." They do not think markets are fair games that reward virtue and promote social welfare. Secondly, there are critics (stockbrokers, talking heads on CNBC, financial journalists) whose livelihood depends on markets being wrong;
• Shiller. Shiller did not predict an aggregate housing decline; instead, he merely stated the recent increase in home prices was unlikely to continue.
• Bolla: The market diagnosed the bubble......prices, not legislators, instigated the end of the insanity.
• No one thinks markets are perfect, and EMH never says this. The proof that markets are efficient is that it is so improbable one can generate alpha -- something you, like most EMH critics, concede. But the implications do not seem obvious. That you were able to find one person in 2004 and turn his measured warning into something that would have drastically reversed the regulatory emphasis on weakening underwriting standards is classic hindsight
• Markets Can Do Many Things Well, But Not Everything justin fox
• why over the past two centuries we've developed central banks and financial regulations. Yet it is a reality almost completely ignored by the efficient-market approach to finance.
• I'll be honest: I don't know what exactly the new rules should be.
• Why Most Market Regulation is Useless And/Or Harmful eric falkenstein
• As George Will writes, most regulation is championed by a confluence of Baptists and bootleggers,
• Regole: irrilevanti o contrproducenti.
• The first. Exemplified by things like short-sale downtick prohibitions, Glass-Steagall, and mortgage disclosure requirements, all of which are really irrelevant to protecting the retail investor.
• A second type of financial regulation is downright counterproductive... Consider the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, a law which sat around not causing problems, until 1992 when Fed President Richard Syron realized he could use it as a club to get banks to lower home loan underwriting standards in the 1990s....Another example is the Clinton administration law putting a surtax on millionaires, which created an incentive to focus on option-based compensation for corporate executives.
• Without regulation, markets correct themselves
• In the bad old days prior to much financial regulation, or even a central bank, we had crisesevery twenty years: in 1819, 1838, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907. After a couple of years, though, things always got better, and growth was strong over this period. It is historical experience, not religious faith,
• Much regulation is really about preventing competition,
• Bold regulation is the triumph of hope over experience,
• Back to the Myth of the Rational Market justin fox
• So Eric, you're saying that some financial regulations are pointless, some are counterproductive, and some actually do good. Sounds about right to me. But it's not what the die-hard rational marketeers of the 1970s and 1980s were saying.
• Xxx
• We Need Less Regulation, Not More eric falkenstein
• when you say something is imperfect, it should always be asked, "compared to what?" Some theoretical nirvana
• Krugman Reviews Book He Didn't Read eric falkenstein
• Justin Fox noted that I didn't read his book, because if I did he would have noted Fox's rather balanced treatment.
• The LTCM strategy had nothing to do with a tweak to the Black-Scholes option formula.
• Do Crashes Support or Disprove 'Rational' Markets? eric falkenstein
• Noneconomists tend to think 'rational markets' is patently absurd, pointing to various asset bubbles such as the internet bubble,
• To assert markets are irrational or inefficient, however, one needs to propose a measure of 'true value'... It is essential to have a specific alternative, because how do you know they are wrong unless you know the right answer?
• Prices fluctuate more than we would like. But is it too much? The future is very uncertain, and in the US where so many prominent financial researchers work, we tend to forget we had a very fortunate 20th century
• Xxxxx
• Arnold Kling
• MIT economists think markets are imperfect, therefore we need regulation.
• Chicago economists think markets are perfect, therefore we don't need regulation.
• George Mason economists think markets are imperfect, therefore we don't need regulation.
• Bad stuff's going to happen from time to time. Get used it. But political and regulatory reality is such that this mindset is never going to prevail.
• How to make money from a Nobel cause tim harford
• Fama and Shiller disagree with each other.
• EMH, is much maligned, so let me state it in the form that has spared me anxiety and saved me money over the years: it’s hard to beat the market,

.

Uberto Motta su Machiavelli al Tirinnanzi di Legnano

• Leggere nn rende più spensierati ma più felici e consapevoli
• ******
• L onestà conviene? Meglio perdere con integrità o vincere con astuzia
• Aristotele: la violazione della virtù ci fa disprezzare noi stessi
• M: il volgo bada al risultato. Il fine giustifica i mezzi. L opinione pubblica domina ed è superficiale, bisogna agire di conseguenza
• Non emerge se m condivida eticamente qs giudizio.
• La coscienza del vincitore si lava presto.
• La cattiveria fa vincere. La coscienza va messa da parte.
• Come reagire? Imho: costruire una soc. Realistica. Avere meno ambizioni.
• Il cinismo è un regresso o un progresso?
• Verga: il perdente è un minchione.
• Muntari segna alla juve. Buffon para oltre la linea. Non ammette niente. Non è un minchione.
• Utilitarismo sdoganato. Nn adottarlo è segno di immaturitá
• L emergenza legittima l illecito?
• Bun bun in cujun.
• In leopardi machiavelli disprezza la virtù
• K.: dico chiatamente quel che si fa e si deve fare...
• M: imita i grandi se nn ti senti all altezza. Almeno sarai come loro e potrai mischiarti a loro. Primcipio pedagogico: scegli un benchmark e seguilo.
• Il successo è solo fortuna? Per m siamo un po' prigionieri del ns carattere. L azione è cmq meglio dell inazione. La fortuna conta al 50/. L uomo deve essere camaleonte. Deve adattarsi.
• La fortuna aouta gli audaci. La fortuna è donna.
• Tedi: il successo tocca a chi se lo merita.
• 1971 john rawls

Dibattito sull'utilitarismo. Caplan vs Summer

Dibattito sull' utilitarismo. Caplan vs Summer

• Una serie di controesempi confutano l'u.
• risposta standard: l evol. ha inoculato dei bias nelle ns. intuizioni morali.
• controreplica: xchè allora postulare la sofferenza come male e la felicità come bene nn è un bias?
• la caricatura dell utilitarismo si rifiuta di guardare all utilitarismo delle regole concentrandosi sui buchi dell utilitarismo degli atti
• ma l ut. degli atti si può sempre trasformare in utilitarismo delle regole. es.: regola: punire il colpevole a meno che...
• critica: calcolare le conseguenze richiede tempo... risposta: nulla impedisce di calcolare a spanne
• critica: calcolare è impossibile... risposta: quello che conta è la propensione utilitarista... controreplica: se onesta conduce a conclusioni assurde
• critica: l u. ci chide troppo. singer accetta la critica e macchia d ipocrisia la sua proposta... altri cercano di modificare u. con il concetto di supererogatorio oppure il precetto di uguaglianza... altri trasformano u. da etica individuale a precetto x le politiche pubbliche
• critica: le preferenze degli individui nn sono confrontabili... risposta: a volte è necessario farlo e noi stessi lo facciamo... controrisp: ma l utilitarismo fa di un inconveniente un cardine
• most hard-line utilitarians concede that the standard counter-examples seem extremely persuasive.... think that pushing one fat man in front of a trolley to save five skinny kids... is morally obligatory. But the opposite moral intuition in their heads refuses to shut up.
• The smart utilitarian answer blames evolution. Scott Sumner: …………Other "counterexamples" take advantage of illogical moral intuitions that have evolved for Darwinian reasons,
• But what's the epistemically sound response to the specter of evolved bias? "Be agnostic about every belief that, regardless of its truth, helps your genes," is tempting. But it's also absurd.... every moral philosophy - including utilitarianism - agrees that a happy life is better than (a) death, or (b) suffering. But evolutionary heavily favors these value judgments!... Should we therefore dismiss our anti-death, anti-suffering views as "illogical moral intuitions that have evolved for Darwinian reasons"?..nihilist, who bites even more bullets than the utilitarian, can enthusiastically agree.
• None of this means that moral intuition is infallible. Serious intuitionists question their moral intuitions all the time.
• ………Suppose that a sheriff were faced with the choice either of framing a Negro for a rape... whom the sheriff knows not to be guilty)—and thus preventing serious anti-Negro riots... In such a case the sheriff, if he were an extreme utilitarian, would appear to be committed to framing the Negro………….
• this story might be quoted as part of a justification for moving from act to rule utilitarianism... the rule "do not punish an innocent person";.... However, McCloskey asks, what about the rule "punish an innocent person when and only when to do so is not to weaken the existing institution of punishment and when the consequences of doing so are valuable"?
• Predicting consequences... consequences are inherently unknowable...the Three Mile Island effect.[91]... ma... From the beginning, utilitarianism has recognized that certainty in such matters is unobtainable and both Bentham and Mill said that it was necessary to rely on the tendencies
• Utilitarismo troppo esigente... Too demanding[edit] Act utilitarianism not only requires everyone to do what they can to maximise utility, but to do so without any favouritism.... The well-being of strangers counts just as much as that of friends, family or self. "What makes this requirement so demanding is the gargantuan number of strangers in great need
• One response to the problem is to accept its demands. This is the view taken by Peter Singer... Others argue that a moral theory that is so contrary to our deeply held moral convictions must either be rejected or modified.[98]
• One approach is to drop the demand that utility be maximized. In Satisficing Consequentialism, Michael Slote argues for a form of utilitarianism where "an act might qualify as morally right through having good enough consequences,
• Robert Goodin takes yet another approach and argues that the demandingness objection can be "blunted" by treating utilitarianism as a guide to public policy rather than one of individual morality.
• AGGREGAZIONE UTILITÀ. The objection that "utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons"[105]
• A response to this criticism is to point out that whilst seeming to resolve some problems it introduces others.

continua